Organizing the  *South: Railroads, Plantations, and War. by Collins, Steven Gedson
Louisiana State University
LSU Digital Commons
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses Graduate School
1999
Organizing the *South: Railroads, Plantations, and
War.
Steven Gedson Collins
Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
gradetd@lsu.edu.
Recommended Citation




This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the 
text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and 
dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of 
computer printer.
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy 
submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and 
photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment 
can adversely affect reproduction.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a  complete manuscript and 
there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright 
material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.
Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning 
the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and continuing from left to 
right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in 
one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book.
Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced 
xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic 
prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for 
an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.
Bell & Howell Information and Learning 
300 North Zeeb Road. Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 USA 
800-521-0600
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
ORGANIZING THE SOUTH: RAILROADS, PLANTATIONS, AND WAR
A  D issertation
Subm itted to the G raduate Faculty of the 
L ouisiana State University' and 
A gricultural and M echanical College 
in  p artia l fulfillm ent o f the 
requirem ents for the degree of 
D octor of Philosophy
in
The D epartm ent of H istory
by
Steven G. Collins
B. S., O klahom a State U niversity, 1987 
M. A., Southw est Texas State U niversity, 1992 
December 1999
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
UMI Number 9960046





Copyright 2000 by Bell & Howell Information and Learning Company. 
All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
Bell & Howell Information and Learning Company 
300 North Zeeb Road 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Copyright 1999 
Steven G edson Collins 
All R ights R eserved
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This dissertation  could n o t have been w ritten w ithout the help  of a 
num ber of people supporting m y efforts. First, I  would like to thank  Paul 
Paskoff. Through long conversations, he helped give focus and direction to 
m y cluttered ideas. His advice an d  constant encouragem ent kep t m e 
plugging along. One could not ask for a  better dissertation advisor. Gaines 
Foster also gave m y work careful reading and always provided penetrating 
comments and questions. It was a  pleasure and a privilege to w ork so 
closely w ith these two fine scholars. I w ould also like to thank o ther 
m em bers of m y dissertation com m ittee, W illiam J. Cooper, Jr., C arville 
Earle, Thomas O w en, and C hristopher Kenny for their careful reading  and 
thoughtful com m ents. James G aughan also took time from  his busy  
schedule to im prove this m anuscript w ith  his editing skills. O n a  personal 
level, I w ould like to thank m y parents, Ged and Joyce Collins, w ho have 
always given support to my endeavors. Their level-headed advice has 
served me w ell. My m other-in-law , M artha Luan Brunson has prov ided  
w isdom  and encouragem ent. A nd finally, I w ould like to thank  my wife 
A nn who has read , edited, and com m ented on  every draft of this w ork. She 
has always been a  source of strength  and laughter.
iii






1 "THE VISIBLE HAND" IN  THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH:
SOUTHERN RAILROAD MANAGEMENT, 1840-1860 ........... 7
2 SYSTEM AND ORGANIZATION IN THE ANTEBELLUM 
SOUTH................................................................................................ 50
3 ORGANIZING FOR WAR: SOUTHERN RAILROAD 
MANAGEMENT DURING THE CIVIL W A R........................... 94
4 SYSTEM AND WAR: THE CONFEDERATE ORDNANCE
DEPARTMENT AND UNIFORM PRODUCTION OF 
AMMUNITION................................................................................143
5 SYSTEM, TECHNOLOGY, AND CONFEDERATE 
GUNPOWDER PRODUCTION.................................................... 191
6 ORGANIZING A NEW SO U TH ...................................................229
EPILOGUE............................................................................................................... 277
BIBLIOGRAPHY...................................................................................................... 282
APPENDIX: LETTER OF PERMISSION............................................................. 305
VITA.......................................................................................................................... 307
iv
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
ABSTRACT
This w ork exam ines the em ergence of organizational and  
bureaucratic ideas in  the nineteenth-century South. It show s th a t 
organizational th inking took ro o t in  th e  antebellum  South an d  grew  during  
the Civil War. M any Southerners accepted  the m odem  precepts of tim e, 
system , and bureaucratic control. They created of m odem  view  of the w orld 
w hile incorporating slavery w ithin th is outlook. These sam e organizational 
ideals helped create a  New South.
The first section  of this w ork exam ines how sou thern  railroad  
m anagers in troduced m odem  bureaucratic structures in to  the ir operations. 
A t the same tim e, they incorporated slavery w ithin this m odem  corporate 
structure. The second section exam ines the acceptance of m odem  ideas of 
organization, system , control, and  technology by southern planters.
Southern reform ers transform ed organizational ideals in to  a unique vision 
of m odernization based on agriculture an d  slave labor. A gricultural reform , 
educational reform , and  com m ercial conventions became the clearest 
m anifestations of these new  organizational ideals.
The th ird  section of this d issertation  studies the g row th  of 
organizational and  bureaucratic ideas du ring  the Civil W ar. S outhern
v
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railroads and the C onfederate O rdnance D epartm ent reveal the failure and  
success respectively of organizational ideas during the w ar. Under the stra in  
of w ar, southern railroads' bureaucratic structures collapsed. However, the 
Confederate O rdnance D epartm ent represented the greatest success the 
Confederacy had in  organizing for w ar. The O rdnance D epartm ent 
incorporated the la test ideas of system , uniform ity, and control associated 
w ith  the American System  of M anufacturing.
The final section of this study exam ines how  the organizational ideas 
th a t em erged during the antebellum  period  and  during the w ar provided 
the fram ew ork for creating  a New South. Railroad m anagers, agricultural 
reform ers, and form er Confederate O rdnance officers, all played a role in  
th is transform ation. Railroad m anagers continued to im prove bureaucratic 
operations and acted upon  the lessons they learned from  the war. M any 
Confederate O rdnance officers became academ ics after the w ar and played a 
significant role in h igher education reform . A gricultural reform ers 
continued to preach the need for system , control and organization in  
sou thern  agriculture. O rganizational and  bureaucratic ideas associated w ith  
railroads, plantations, and  w ar provided the foundations for a New South.
v i
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INTRODUCTION
A historical debate has occurred in  the last th irty  years over 
m odernization in the nineteenth-century South. D id the South accept the 
m odem  tenets associated w ith  the industrializing N o rth  o r d id  it reject new  
technologies and m anagerial ideas? In other w ords, w as the South capitalist 
or pre-capitalist? Eugene Genovese asserted in the 1960s that the antebellum  
South, w ith its slave-based society, rem ained noncapitalist in  an increasingly 
free-labor, wage-labor, capitalist w orld. H e has since m oderated his views 
and backed away from significant parts of his argum ent. Nevertheless, the 
questions he raised originally have continued to in te re st historians, some of 
w hom  have show n that p lanters w ere capitalistic. S lavery, they argue, d id  
no t preclude a m odernist in terest in  economic rationalization .1 This study 's 
findings support this revisionist conception of the O ld  South.
aEugene D. Genovese, The Political Economy o f  Slavery; Studies in  
the Economy and Society of the Slave South (New Y ork: Pantheon Books, 
1965); Eugene D. Genovese, The Slaveholders' D ilem m a: Freedom  and 
Progress in Southern Conservative Thought. 1820-1860 (Columbia: 
University of South Carolina Press, 1992); James O akes, The Ruling Race: A 
H istory of American Slaveholders (New York: A lfred A. Knopf, 1982); M ark 
M. Sm ith, M astered by the Clock: Time. Slavery, and Freedom  in  the 
A m erican South (Chapel Hill: U niversity of N orth C arolina Press, 1997); 
Laurence Shore, Southern Capitalists: The Ideological Leadership of an 
Elite. 1832-1885 (Chapel Hill: U niversity of N orth C arolina Press, 1986);
1
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
O ne m anifestation o f capitalism  in  th e  nineteenth century  w as the 
em ergence of new organizational ideas an d  bureaucratic structures in  
concert w ith  industrialization. Railroads an d  factories required bureaucratic 
structu res in  order to control time, labor, an d  technology. H istorians have 
argued  th a t in  the n ineteen th  century innovations in industria l production, 
transportation , and com m unication b ro u g h t about a "control revolution." 
This revolution created  the need for system , uniform ity, and  bureaucratic 
structures. A t the sam e tim e, an organizational m entality or Zeitgeist arose 
as individuals created new  organizations to  pro tect their in terests. Indeed, 
organizational thinking became part and parcel of the sp irit of the  tim es and 
a  cen tral com ponent o f the pursuit of p rogress and m odernity.2
This developm ent of organizational thinking raises im portan t 
questions w ith respect to  the South. D id the  South embrace the new  
organizational and bureaucratic ideas associated w ith industrialization?
A nd if so, w here and w hen d id  these organizational ideas em erge? These
J. M ills Thornton m , Politics and Power in a Slave Society: Alabama. 1800- 
1860 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State U niversity Press, 1978); Lacy K. Ford, Jr., 
O rigins of Southern Radicalism: The South Carolina U pcountrv. 1800-1860 
(N ew  York: Oxford U niversity Press, 1988).
2A lfred D. C handler, The Visible H and: The M anagerial Revolution 
in  A m erican Business (Cambridge: H arvard  University Press, 1977); James 
R. Beniger, The C ontrol Revolution: Technological and Econom ic O rigins 
of the Inform ation Society (Cambridge: H arvard  University Press, 1986); 
D avid A. H ounshell, From  the Am erican System  to Mass Production. 1800- 
1932: The D evelopm ent of M anufacturing Technology in the U nited  States 
(Baltim ore: The Johns H opkins U niversity P ress, 1984); Louis Galam bos, 
'T echnology, Political Economy and Professionalization: C entral Themes of 
the O rganizational Synthesis," Business H isto ry  Review 57 (4): 471-493.
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questions are the cen tral concern of th is dissertation, w hich exam ines the 
developm ent of an  organizational m entality  in  the South o n  its railroads, 
plantations, and d u rin g  the Civil W ar. Indeed, the em ergence of a  N ew  
South evolved from  the ideas first in troduced  into Southern society during 
the antebellum  decades and during the w ar.
The railroad industry  provides a  logical point of departu re  for an 
exam ination of th is organizational transform ation  w ith in  the South. As 
A lfred Chandler dem onstrated in his w ork, The Visible H and , the railroad 
industry  of the 1850s became the first b ig business to require a large-scale 
bureaucratic structu re to coordinate its m ovem ents. This w as as m uch the 
case in  the South as in  the N orth. The firs t section of this w ork  exam ines 
how  Southern railroad  m anagers adop ted  and  used m odem  bureaucratic 
structures. They p u t in  place m anagem ent hierarchies, as w ell as o ther 
bureaucratic structures, to m aintain system  and control, over their 
operations. At the sam e time, they incorporated  slavery in to  this m odem  
corporate structure. For those who ow ned and  m anaged sou thern  railroads, 
econom ic progress an d  slavery w ent hand-in-hand.
The second section of this w ork exam ines the acceptance of m odem  
ideas of organization, system , control, an d  technology by sou thern  planters.
A  study of southern agricultural journals dem onstrates th a t a significant 
num ber of southerners accepted and tried  to incorporate bureaucratic 
structures and organizational ideals in  their agricultural practices. Southern 
reform ers transform ed new  ideas of system , technology, organization, and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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control in to  a  unique vision of m odernization based on agriculture and 
slave labor. M oreover, they sought to apply organizational structures to 
southern society. A gricultural reform , educational reform , and com m ercial 
conventions, especially during the 1850s, w ere m anifestations of these new  
organizational ideals.
The South m oved tow ard a  m ore organized and bureaucratized 
society during  the 1850s. The C ivil W ar intensified these m odem , 
organizational changes. In o rder to  fight an industrialized N orth, th e  South 
had to transform  its agricultural society into a w ar-fighting m achine. The 
history of southern  railroads and the C onfederate O rdnance D epartm ent 
reveal the failure and success o f th e  application of organizational ideas 
during the w ar. U nder the strain  o f w ar, the bureaucratic structures of 
southern railroads collapsed. This section exam ines why the lines failed  and 
the lessons learned by southern railroad  m anagers—lessons that they w ould 
apply to railroad m anagem ent after the w ar. The Confederate O rdnance 
D epartm ent epitom ized the greatest success the Confederacy had in  
organizing for w ar. The O rdnance D epartm ent incorporated the la test ideas 
of system , uniform ity, and control associated w ith the American System  of 
M anufacturing. W hen it came to  equipping its arm ies w ith am m unition 
and gunpow der, m odem  bureaucratic principles allow ed the South to  wage 
a long and destructive war. Southerners, w ho, after the war, strove to  create 
a New South, d id  no t fail to grasp these lessons.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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The fin a l section of this study  exam ines how the organizational ideas 
that em erged during  the antebellum  period  and during the  w ar provided 
the fram ew ork for creating a  N ew  South. M any southerners argued that a 
New South could  be created w ith the adoption of bureaucratic and 
organizational structures. Railroad m anagers, agricultural reform ers, and 
Confederate O rdnance officers, all played a role in attem pting to bring about 
this econom ic transform ation. A fter the w ar, railroad m anagers continued 
to im prove bureaucratic operations and  acted upon the lessons they learned 
from  the w ar. They forged econom ic links betw een the N ew  South and the 
N orth th rough  consolidation and  new  form s of traffic agreem ents. Many 
Confederate O rdnance officers becam e academics after the w ar and played a 
significant ro le  in  transform ing h igher education. From their universities, 
they taught a  new  generation of southerners the virtues o f system , 
uniform ity, an d  bureaucratic control. They also changed the university 
curriculum  so  that it stressed expertise in  technology, science, and 
engineering. A t the same time, agricu ltu ral reform ers continued to preach 
the need for system  and control in  sou thern  agriculture. They pushed for 
the adoption o f new  technology, fertilizer, labor-saving m achinery, and a 
m odem  v iew  of tim e m anagem ent. A lso, farm ers began to  organize in  
order to assert control over the m arket. This organizational m entality 
w ould assum e concrete form first w ith  the Patrons of H usbandry and, later, 
w ith  the F arm ers' Alliance.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
This study  reevaluates the  South from  a  new  perspective. I t show s 
that organizational thinking an d  bureaucratic structures took  ro o t in  the 
antebellum  South and in tensified  d u ring  the Civil W ar. To a  surprisingly  
large degree, m en of property an d  pow er in  the Old South h ad  accepted the 
m odem  precepts of time, system , and  bureaucratic control. From  this 
acceptance, they created of m odem  view  of the world, w hile incorporating 
slavery w ith in  this outlook. W ith the destruction  of slavery, a  N ew  South 
grew  on the ideas associated w ith  railroads, plantations, and  w ar.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 1
"THE VISIBLE HAND" IN  THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH: SOUTHERN 
RAILROAD MANAGEMENT, 1840-1860
In  the  sum m er of 1852, Isham  H ow ze, a M ississippi farm er, w ro te in  
his d iary: "While sitting here, I can hear the puffing, and rum bling, and  
w histling of the railroad locom otive an d  cars, for the first time." The 
follow ing Novem ber, he ad d ed  enthusiastically, "I can hear the steam  
w histle—the railroad  cars are m oving. W hat im provem ents in  science and  
art!"1 H ow ze lived near one o f the South’s largest railroads, the M em phis 
and C harleston, and he understood th a t the w orld was changing around 
him . Indeed , w hen railroads began  to  nim ble through the South, they 
brought m ore than a new source of transportation; they carried w ith  them  
m en w ho h ad  new  conceptions o f tim e, technology, control, and 
organization.2 Southerners d id  n o t ignore these changes. Rather, they
1Isham  Howze Journal, A ugust 2,1852 and Novem ber 26,1852, Box 1, 
Folder 5, in  Isham  Howze Fam ily Papers, M ississippi D epartm ent of 
Archives an d  History, Jackson M ississippi.
2See especially, A lfred D. C handler, The Visible Hand: The 
M anagerial Revolution in A m erican Business (Cambridge: H arvard 
U niversity Press, 1977); James R. Beniger, The C ontrol Revolution: 
Technological and Economic O rigins o f the Inform ation Society (Cambridge:
7
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em braced m odernization, new  organizational ideas, and strove to 
incorporate them  in to  their slave society.3
M odem  bureaucratic structures that incorporated the ideas of system , 
uniform ity, and  control, developed during the ante-bellum  period from  the 
m anagem ent techniques adopted by the railroads and  by the m ilitary. The 
Am erican System  of M anufacturing and large-scale railroads em erged 
concom itantly an d  changed the structure of the econom y dram atically.
From both of these sources em erged the principles and  m ethods of w hat 
w ould later com prise the bureaucratic system of corporate m anagem ent.
H arvard U niversity Press, 1986); Thomas C. Cochran, Railroad Leaders. 
1845-1890: The Business M ind in A ction (New York: Russell & Russell, 
1965); M ark M. Sm ith, M astered by the Clock: Time. Slavery, and Freedom  
in  the A m erican South (Chapel H ill: The U niversity of N orth Carolina 
Press, 1997), 69-89.
3For im portan t w orks on  southern  railroads see John F. Stover, The 
Railroads of the South. 1865-1900: A Study in Finance and Control (Chapel 
H ill: The U niversity of N orth  C arolina Press, 1955); M aury Klein, The G reat 
Richm ond Term inal: A Study in Businessmen and  Business Strategy 
(Charlottesville: U niversity of V irginia Press, 1970); A llen W. Trelease, The 
N orth  Carolina Railroad. 1849-1871. and the M odernization of N orth 
Carolina (Chapel H ill: The U niversity of N orth C arolina Press, 1991); 
K enneth W. N oe, Southw est V irginia's Railroad: M odernization and the 
Sectional Crisis (Urbana: U niversity of Illinois Press, 1994); Scott Reynolds 
Nelson, "Public Fictions: The Southern Railway an d  the C onstruction o f the 
South, 1848-1885," (Ph.D. diss., U niversity of N orth Carolina, 1994); George 
R. Taylor and Irene D. N eu, The Am erican Railroad Netw ork. 1861-1890 
(Cambridge: H arvard  U niversity Press, 1956); U. B. Phillips. A History of 
T ransportation in  the Eastern C otton Belt to 1860 (New York, 1908); Robert
C. Black m , Thg Railroads of the Confederacy (Chapel Hill: University o f 
N orth  Carolina Press, 1952); F ranz A nton Ritter V on G erstner, Early 
Am erican R ailroads: Franz A nton R itter von G erstner's Die innem  
Com m unicationen (1842-1843) ed. Frederick C. Gainst, trans. David J. 
Diephouse and John C. Decker (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997);
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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The influence of the railroad and  the  A m erican System of M anufacturing 
on the N o rth  has been studied com prehensively.4
The antebellum  economy changed  slow ly from one based  on 
m erchant capitalism  w ith specialized enterprises of com m erce to one based 
on large-scale bureaucratic structures. The G v il War served as a catalyst for 
the com pletion of this transform ation.5 U ntil the 1840s, transportation  by 
way of turnpikes, canal boats, steam  boats, and trans-A tlantic packet ships 
provided a loose organization and  regular routes. These types of enterprises 
required som e specialized m anagem ent b u t not a large-scale bureaucratic 
system. A m erchant, through fam ily connections, could contro l m ost 
aspects of his trade. Transactions o f m erchants followed sim ple 
bookkeeping m ethods. Even investm ent in  turnpikes, canal boats, and 
steam boats required  only a few  p artn ers and d id  not change m erchant
Albro M artin, Railroads T rium phant: The G row th. Rejection, and  Rebirth 
of a Vital A m erican Force (New York: O xford University Press, 1992).
4See especially, Chandler, The V isible H and: D avid A. H ounshell, 
From the A m erican System to M ass Production. 1800-1932: The 
D evelopm ent of M anufacturing T echnology in  the U nited S tates (Baltimore: 
The Johns H opkins University Press, 1984); James R. Beniger, The C ontrol 
R evolution: To A nne Yates, C ontrol th rough  Com m unication: The Rise of 
System in  A m erican M anagem ent (Baltim ore: The Johns H opkins 
University Press, 1989).
5Jam es L. H uston, "The A m erican Revolutionaries, th e  Political 
Economy of Aristocracy, and the A m erican Concept of W ealth, 1765-1900," 
The A m erican H istorical Review 98 (October 1993): 1098-1105.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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capitalism  dram atically. In addition , the slow speed of steam boats and canal 
boats needed little scheduling o r control.6
Before the 1840s, m anufacturing also followed traditional patterns. 
Few enterprises required a com plex in ternal organization o r provided large- 
scale production. Only in  textiles, such as the Lowell factories that adopted 
m achinery, d id  this type of p roduction  emerge before to the 1840s. The 
organization of these mills, how ever, d id  not require com plex bureaucratic 
structures o r a g reat deal of skilled labor. For a long tim e, textile mill 
m anagers follow ed "traditional w ays," and "organizational innovation" 
came slow ly.7
In the 1830s, railroads tried  to conduct their operations through the 
traditional 19th-century m anagem ent style of the contract system . This non- 
bureaucratic form  of organization used  small com panies to ru n  specific 
operations. H ow ever, for a large railroad , this system  of m anagem ent d id  
not w ork effectively. The m anagers of the early railroads encountered 
significant problem s. Wrecks occurred quite frequently. The first large-scale 
railroad, the W estern, experienced several collisions in  1841 that killed both 
em ployees and  passengers and  horrified  the public. In  response, northern 
railroad journals called for m anagerial reform  in  o rder to  m ake railroad
6C handler, The Visible H and. 36-49.
7Ibid., 58-68; See also A nthony F. C  Wallace, Rockdale; The Growth of 
an A m erican Village in the Early Industrial Revolution (New  York: W. W. 
N orton, 1980).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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travel safer and m ore reliable.8 A ccidents proved the m ajor stim ulus for 
better m anagem ent techniques an d  a m ore efficient system  of railroad 
operations.9 Railroad m anagers in  bo th  the N orth  and the South read  these 
railroad journals, and they played a  significant role in  expanding the 
adoption o f new  bureaucratic structures as w ell as the professionalization of 
railroad m anagem ent.10 M any railroad  m anagers cam e to the conclusion 
that bureaucratic structures allow ed for m ore control, m anagerial authority, 
and discipline.11
In 1851, the Am erican Railw ay Times m ade the po in t that railroad 
workers needed experience and training to "insure safety and general 
efficiency of service regardless of co st This is no place for niggardly 
econom y.. . .  Five or ten dollars saved per m onth on  a sw itchm an's wages 
makes a poor show  for the thousands lost by the m an's inefficiency."
Railroad m anagers asserted th a t investm ent in  safety features such as state
8C handler, The Visible H and. 96-97.
9"Reform  our Railroad System ," A m erican Railw ay Times, v. 5, 7 July
1853.
10T. J. Sum ner, engineer fo r the C harlotte and South Carolina, 
reported th a t he studied the Railw ay Times, especially the operating 
expenses of o ther railroads. Proceedings of the Stockholders of the C harlotte 
and South C arolina Railroad C om pany, a t their Tw elfth Annual M eeting 
(Columbia, S.C., 1860), 15.
“ W alter Licht, W orking for the Railroad: The O rganization of W ork 
in the N ineteenth  C entury (Princeton: Princeton U niversity Press, 1983), 
19-24.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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of the a rt brakes, couplings, and sw itches not only saved m oney b u t also 
saved lives.12
In  add ition  to better construction and technology, railroad m anagers 
w anted adm inistrative reform, especially system atic rules and  regulations. 
"Basically," a  w riter for the A m prican  R a ilw a y  T im es argued in  1851, "rules 
to stay on  schedule and  not leave a  sta tion  late" w ent unheeded. This lack 
of rig id  tim e schedules resulted in  m any tra in  collisions. The w riter 
m aintained that "discipline" should be "enforced on every railw ay in  the 
country. There can  be no safety w ithou t it." The article outlined 47 rules, 
regulations, and procedures that railroads should follow. Furtherm ore, to 
help coordination  of movement, railroads required  an "organized system  of 
railroad com m unication." In another article, a  contributor contended that 
railroads needed a "system" that introduced "discipline, a n d  economy."13
By the mid-1850s, railroad m anagers h ad  addressed m any of these 
problem s w ith the  introduction of bureaucratic structures and the use of the 
telegraph. In 1847, the managers of Baltim ore and Ohio Railroad created a 
new  p lan  en titled  O rganization of th e  Services of the Baltim ore and Ohio R. 
Road u n d er the P roposed New System of M anagem ent. This p lan  tried  to 
"system atize its operations" by dividing the road into two
12"Railway Accidents " A m erican Railw ay Times 24 July 1851.
13"Railway Regulations," Ibid., 13 N ovem ber 1851; "Railway 
M anagem ent," Ibid., 9 December 1852.
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departm ents: "The W orking of the Road" and "The Collection and 
D isbursem ent of the R evenue."14
Introduction of bureaucratic structures b rought significant 
im provem ent to railroad operations. In an 1854 rep o rt on  the Erie R ailroad, 
a  repo rter found that the com pany had a "trium ph of principle and good 
m anagem ent over selfishness and  insubordination." R ather than chaos, the 
w riter observed a "rigid system  of accountability of agents" and workers. 
"Form erly," the reporter sta ted , "the utm ost confusion prevailed in this 
departm ent, so m uch so, th a t in  the greatest press of business, cars in perfect 
o rder have stood for m onths . . .  w ithout being p u t to  the least service, and  
w ithou t its being know n wTiere they w ere." But w ith  the introduction of 
m anagem ent reform s, bureaucratic structures, and  the telegraph, the general 
superin tendent "can tell a t any h o u r in  the day, the precise location of every 
car and  engine on the line of the road, and the du ty  it  is perform ing."15
In  an  1856 article, a repo rter outlined the line-and-staff system on the 
Erie R ailroad. The w riter com pared the many details in  the m anagem ent of 
a railroad  to "a thick veil, a cloud, a  fog," but daim ed that a  bureaucratic 
structu re lifted the fog. The reporter discussed a  new  "chart o r diagram , 
exhibiting the division of responsibility" for the m anagem ent of the N ew
14Licht, W orking for th e  R ailroad. 13; A lfred D. Chandler, Jr., 'T h e  
Railroads: Pioneers in  M odem  C orporate M anagem ent," Business H istory 
R eview  39 (Spring 19651: 23.
15"Erie Railroad," A m erican Railroad Toumal 27 (September 2,1854): 
549; C handler, The Visible H and . 104.
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York an d  Erie Railroad. "This chart, sketched by the superin tendent as
an  outline of the system —  [is] an  exact and  faithful representation of the 
actual condition of the m anagem ent." A  to tal of 4,715 workers, "each of 
w hom  is represented in  this chart by a  circle . . .  attached together by suitable 
stem s, an d  connected finally th rough  the superintendent." The w riter saw  
that in  this system  "every m an  is distinctly  entrusted  w ith a certain 
departm ent," and "by the a id  of daily reports from  the conductors and 
station  agents . . .  and of system atic division of the care and labor in  every 
d ep a rtm e n t. . . ,  the superin tenden t is enabled to re tu rn  to the m en carefully 
p repared  m onthly reports." In  this w ay, the railroad im proved "the 
econom y and efficiency of every d e p a rtm e n t. .  ,"16 These m anagem ent 
reform s fundam entally changed the natu re of w ork for people em ployed by 
the railroads. Railroad rulebooks provided  strict instructions that 
established standards of conduct, lines of authority, and guidelines for 
operations. M ost tasks had  "m inutely draw n directives." Strict regulations 
against drink ing  and o ther activ ities becam e the norm  on railroads. M en 
w orked on precise schedules an d  had little  say in  the m anagem ent of the 
line .17
In  order to run a large railroad, professional managers became 
essential. In  1850, the A m e r ic a n  R a ilro a d  T oum al argued  that the "railway"
16"The Responsibility o f Railw ay M anagem ent," American Railway 
Tim es. 1 2  June 1856.
17Licht, W orking fo r  th e  R a ilro a d . 4 3 ,5 ,8 1 .
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was "a distinct departm ent of industry" th a t existed "w ithout parallel in the 
history  of industria l pursu its." Therefore, the journal asserted, railroad 
m anagers needed "m ore skill and experience" as well as a scientific and 
technical education. In o ther w ords, railroad  managem ent required  salaried 
professionals who devoted all of their tim e, education, and energy to 
railroad  adm inistration. Scientific education, technical training, and  
professional status, the w riter argued, ensured  better m anagem ent, more 
reliable service, and  left "no room  for accidents."18
A nother railroad reform er contended tha t owners and the board of 
d irectors should n o t in terfere w ith  the daily  m anagem ent of a  railroad  
because they d id  no t understand the com plex operations. 'T h e  
Superintendents of the roads," the w riter protested, "instead of being 
encouraged in  carrying ou t their own plans, and  in adopting a rig id  system 
of supervision and accountability, are em barrassed and interfered w ith by 
the D irectors who . . .  assum e the pow er and  prerogatives w hich only 
properly  and  exclusively should belong to the Superintendents." Only w ith 
a separation  of m anagem ent from  ow nership could the superin tendent 
control efficiently "not only m onthly and weekly, but daily, all the details of 
the operating of the road " l9
^"Q ualifications for the M anagem ent of Railroads," A m erican 
R ailroad Toumal. 23 (December 14.18501: 790-791.
I9"Personal A ccountability in the M gm t. of Railroads," A m erican 
Railw ay Times. 1 May 1856.
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N orthern  railroad m anagem ent slowly evolved in to  a  system atic 
organization th a t allowed for bureaucratic control. Railroads developed 
functional departm ents and  m anagem ent along geographical lines. 
M anagem ent followed a h ierarchical chain of com m and based on line-and- 
staff organization. This system  allow ed for the division of responsibilities as 
well as control and com m unication feedback. Daily an d  m onthly reports 
from  each division produced statistics on miles run, operating expenses, an d  
repairs. D etailed reports allow ed for the introduction o f cost accounting and  
greater efficiency of operations. Rules and regulations controlled and 
d irected  the actions of hundreds, if no t thousands, of em ployees. D etailed 
instructions in  case of em ergencies, such as a train w reck, created standard  
operating procedures. Significantly, ow nership and m anagem ent becam e 
separate functions, and professional m anagers oversaw  the operations of the 
com pany.20
The ideas associated w ith  no rthern  railroad m anagem ent also took 
hold in  the South. Indeed, in  m any respects, railroad m odernization in  the 
South m irrored  northern operations. A lthough m ost sou thern  railroads 
were n o t as large as northern railroads, their m anagers struggled w ith the 
same problem s and tried to im plem ent the sim ilar bureaucratic solutions. 
Railroads in  the South—especially long lines—required the sam e system  of 
m anagem ent as northern railroads. Indeed, w ith the in troduction  of a  new
“ Chandler, The Visible H and. 96-106.
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technology and trained  professionals, the South w ent th rough  the same 
m odernization process as the N orth.
Isham H ow ze cap tured  the sp irit o f the age w ith his excitem ent at the 
introduction of the railroad . Southerners, especially Whigs, heeded  the new 
"Industrial Gospel" b rough t on by the transportation and industria l 
revolutions. They believed that technological progress, railroads, and 
econom ic grow th w ould create a m ore orderly  and efficient society.
Southern journals an d  editorials rem arked repeatedly on the pow er of 
steam  and the railroad  to  transform  the South. De Bow's Review, the 
lead ing  southern in d u stria l journal, proclaim ed that "the revolution" 
com m enced by the railroad  "has been equaled by no other w hich history 
reco rd s.. . .  It has dim inished labour, destroyed space, lenghtened time, and 
created a  new w orld." The Southern Q uarterly  Review, an  arts and  science 
journal, advocated the building of railroads to prom ote com m erce, industry, 
and "all sources of o u r genius and w ealth." This prom otion w ould  be 
"propelled onw ard by  the perfection of science . . .  [and] the m agnetic 
telegraph," and the "locom otive" w ould im prove "civilization and  
intellectual life." The A m erican C otton P lan ter foresaw that th e  railroad 
had  "the social, m oral, and  po litical. . .  energy" to create a "m odem  
civilization." M any southerners agreed w ith  these assessm ents and  viewed 
railroads as a key com ponent in the m odernization of the South.21
21 "Railway System s and Projects in  Europe and Am erica," P e  Bow's 
R eview  1 (January 1846): 21-22; "The H istory and  Economy of Railroads,"
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As the first large corporate entities, the railroads required  new 
financial arrangem ents. For the m ost p art, southerners b u ilt their own 
railroads. Local, county, and state conventions raised m oney from  
individual investors. These investors tended to be from  urban  areas and the 
economic leaders in  their regions—planters, m erchants, and  lawyers. The 
argum ents they  used to  entice investm ent centered on  expanding the 
m arket, low ering freight costs, and increasing industry. The Charlotte and 
South C arolina R ailroad's first convention, for example, stressed that 
investm ent in  the  line w ould open "up  new  sources of w ealth , of
Southern Q uarterly  Review 13 (April 1848): 373; "Railroads," Am erican 
Cotton P lanter 1 (1853): 25-26; O n the relationship betw een technology, 
industrial progress, and progressive ideology in the antebellum  South see 
especially, D anial W alker Howe, The Political Culture o f the American 
W higs (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1979); Lawrence F. Kohl, 
The Politics o f Individualism : Parties and the American C haracter in the 
Tacksonian Era (New York: Oxford U niversity Press, 1989); John F. Kasson, 
Civilizing the M achine: Technology and  Republican V alues in  America. 
1776-1900 (New  York: Penguin Books, 1976); J. Mills Thornton, Politics and 
Power in a Slave Society: Alabama. 1800-1860 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1978); Lacy K. Ford, Tr.. O rigins of Southern Radicalism?
The South Carolina U pcountrv. 1800-1860 (Oxford: O xford University Press, 
1988); James Oakes, Slavery and Freedom : An Interpretation of the Old 
South (New York: V intage Books, 1990); Laurence Shore, Southern  
Capitalists: The Ideological Leadership of an Elite. 1832-1885 (Chapel Hill: 
The U niversity of N orth  Carolina Press, 1986); Vicki V aughn Johnson, The 
Men and the V ision of the Southern Com m ercial C onventions. 1845-1871 
(Columbia: U niversity of M issouri Press, 1992); Mary A. DeCredico, 
Patriotism  for Profit: G eorgia's U rban Entrepreneurs and the Confederate 
W ar Effort (C hapel Hill: The U niversity of N orth C arolina Press, 1990); Tom 
Downey, "R iparian Rights and M anufacturing in A ntebellum  South 
Carolina: W illiam  Gregg and the O rigins of the 'Industria l M ind,"' Toumal 
of Southern H istory  65 (February 1999): 77-108; PaulF. Paskoff, Invention 
and C ulture in  the  O ld South, 1790-1860," Unpublished p ap er delivered at 
W orks-in-Progress Sem inar, Louisiana State University, N ovem ber 1991.
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em ploym ent —  [and] facilities o f trade an d  general intercom m unication."22 
These conventions also pointed o u t th a t as railroads expanded the m arket, it 
w ould benefit bo th  yeom an and planters alike. This argum ent for 
expansion helped build  a general consensus in  favor of railroad 
construction.23
Indiv idual investm ent, how ever, w as not enough to build  the 
railroads. D uring the antebellum  period, southern states invested over $81 
million, and local governm ents contribu ted  over $55 m illion tow ard 
railroad construction. In all, the public sector contributed 55 percent to 
antebellum  railroad  construction in  the South, m uch o f i t  funded w ith long­
term debt and bonds. Despite com plaints about the dangers of using public 
funds for in ternal im provem ents, local and  state governm ents saw  each 
other as rivals for railroad links. The M ontgom ery A dvertiser, for example, 
asserted in  1852 that the city was "surrounded by rivals and  w ould-be rivals 
on all sides. Colum bus in one direction, Selma in  ano ther, and  W etumpka 
is another." M ontgom ery needed to develop railroad connections soon or 
the city faced the "danger of serious loss and  injury to o u r grow th and 
prosperity." State governm ents also believed they needed to fund railroad
^Proceedings of a Convention Respecting the C harlotte and South 
Carolina Rail Road. Held at W innsboro'- Fairfield D istrict. S. C. (Columbia, 
S. C , 1847), 12-13.
^ re le a s e , The N orth C arolin a  R ailroad . 16-17; Bradley G. Bond, 
Political C ulture in  the N ineteenth-C entury South: M ississippi. 1830-1900 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State U niversity, 1995), 8-10.
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construction o r they w ould fall beh ind  o ther states economically. The 
Mobile an d  O hio Railroad, fo r instance, constructed its  line w ith city and 
state funds. The City of M obile initially invested $300,000 w ith a real estate 
tax, and the State of Alabama invested $400,000 w ith governm ent bonds. In  
addition, the railroad sold state-backed bonds on the European market. M ost 
southern  railroads financed th e ir construction in sim ilar ways, w ith 
governm ent and  private enterprise w orking together.24
The building of railroads required  no t just m oney b u t technical 
expertise. Southern railroad com panies quickly began to  appreciate the need  
for experts to build  their lines. In  their first m eeting, the  directors of the 
C harlotte an d  South Carolina R ailroad observed the need  of "com petent 
Engineers." They noted that "the w ant o f knowledge w hich the Engineer 
alone possesses, disqualifies any one, how ever respectable, to claim for his 
mere opinions, th a t authority w hich should be the basis of decision."25 A
24W illiam  J. Cooper, Jr., an d  Thom as E. Terrill, The Am erican South: 
A H istory v. 1 (New York: M cGraw-Hill, hie., 1991), 324; O n public 
financing, see especially M ilton S. H eath, "N orth A m erican Railroads:
Public R ailroad C onstruction and  the D evelopm ent of Private Enterprise in  
the South before 1861," Toumal of Economic H istory 10 (1950): 40-43,46-48; 
Trelease, The N orth  C arolina R ailroad. 16-20; Klein, The Cleat Richmond 
T erm inal. 8-11; Nelson, "Public Fictions," 9-25; "Internal Im provem ents," 
A dvertiser and  Gazette (M ontgomery), 9 M arch 1852; Proceedings of the 
Eight A nnual M eetings of the Stockholders o f the M obile and Ohio R ailroad 
Company (Mobile, 1856), 3-4,7,10; Proceedings pf the Ninth Annual. . .  ef 
Mobile and O hio Railroad C om pany (Mobile, 1857), 4, 9; Proceedings gf the 
Tenth A n n u a l . . .  of Mobile and  O hio Railroad Com pany (Mobile, 1858), 4-5.
^Proceedings of a C onvention Respecting the C harlotte and South 
Carolina Rail Road Held a t W innsboro/ Fairfield D istrict. S. C. (Columbia, S. 
C , 1847), 8.
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civil engineer on  the M obile and O hio Railroad noted in  his diary the 
expertise required . "I m ust change," h e  w rote, "for the last 6 weeks o r two 
m onths I have no t stud ied  as m uch as I o u g h t I am  getting  altogether too 
careless. If I  d o n 't look o u t I will lose w hat little R eputation I have been 
three o r fou r years in  building up."26
Indeed , railroad construction included a m yriad of engineering tasks. 
Physical geography played an im portant role in planning and building a 
line. The m ost im portant factors concerned a railroad 's g rade and curve. 
Engineers encountered steep grades, w hich necessitated a  knowledge of 
physics and  m athem atics. The art of cutting, filling,, and  excavating the road  
required education and experience. M. B. Prichard, the chief engineer of the 
East Tennessee and Georgia Railroad, observed that the selection and 
building of a railroad took the "utm ost care" and had to be based on an 
engineer's know ledge of the "prescribed lim its of grade an d  curvature."27
In add ition , building railroad lines depended on p roper organization 
of construction crew s. Southern projects often involved com plex divisional 
organizations. The M em phis and C harleston, for exam ple, laid  over 200
26H is studies included Civil Engineering by D ennis U. M ahan. Civil 
Engineer D iary, M arch 14 and  March 15,1854 in Civil Engineer, Mobile and  
Ohio Railroad, D iary December 14,1853-December 31,1854. Box 22,7N, 
Range B, Section 1, Shelf A. Alabama D epartm ent of A rchives and H istory, 
M ontgom ery, A labam a.
27M artin , R ailroads T rium phant. 253; Annual R eport of the P resident 
and D irectors of the East Tennessee fc G eorgia Railroad Com pany (Athens, 
Ga., 1852), 16.
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m iles of road. In  o rd er to work that am ount of milage efficiently, the 
com pany divided th e  line into six divisions, each w ith  its ow n supervisor. 
John Childe, the chief engineer of the M obile and Ohio Railroad, 
com m ented on  the im portance of organization. 'T h e  first step," in  
construction, he observed, "was to arrange a system of operations," that 
provided "sim ultaneous and united action." O rganizational control, he 
explained, required "a perm anent organization of officers" that enabled "the 
Com pany to progress w ith judgem ent, economy and efficiency."28
Besides grading and laying track, railroad com panies built bridges, 
m achine shops, an d  depots. M. B. Prichard proudly told stockholders that 
his railroad planned on  constructing a  "m odel bridge" over the Tennessee 
River. It would span  1,694 feet, supported by "10 piers and  two abutm ents of 
first class cut stone m asonry." He reported  the building of "substantial and 
capacious Freight houses of brick and stone" as well as tu rn  tables, hoisting 
platform s, and car shops. The architecture of these types of buildings often 
became quite elaborate. L. O. Reynolds ordered the Savannah depot made 
"on a scale suited to  the m agnitude of the enterprize." Engineers believed
28Fifth A nnual Report of the Board of D irectors to  the Stockholders in  
the M emphis and C harleston Railroad Com pany (M em phis. Tenn., 1855),
29: Proceedings of the  Fourth A n n u a l  M e e t i n g  o f  the Stockholders of the 
M obile and Ohio R ailroad Company (Mobile, Ala., 1852), 3-4,11.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
23
that their w orks symbolized the system , uniform ity, an d  progress of the 
age.29
Southern railroads grew  rapidly in  the late 1840s and especially in  the 
1850s. In the decade before the Civil War, nearly 7,000 miles of track crossed 
the South o u t of 22,000 in  the nation  as a w hole. N evertheless, m ost 
southern railroads rem ained local in  nature because they concentrated on 
the cotton m arket. By the late 1850s, though, the South had constructed 
several long hau l roads. For instance, the C entral of G eorgia covered over 
200 miles, distinguishing it as the longest railroad  in  the w orld in  1846. By 
the eve of the Civil War, the M obile and Ohio h ad  469 m iles of road. These 
long lines requ ired  a large num ber of locom otives and  freight cars. The 
South C arolina Railroad, for exam ple, controlled 849 cars of different types, 
the W estern & A tlantic em ployed 746, and the Southw estern of Georgia 235 
by 1860. As a  result, southern railroads, m uch like their northern 
counterparts, struggled w ith questions of technology, system, and 
organization.30
29A nnual Report of the P resident and D irectors of the East Tennessee 
& Georgia R ailroad  C om p an y  (A thens, Tenn., 1853), 13 and (Athens, Tenn.,
1855), 11; Second Report. Central R ailroad and Banking Com pany of G eorgia 
(Savannah, G a., 1838), 30; D avid F. Noble, The R eligion of Technology: The 
D ivinity of M an and the Spirit o f Invention (New  York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1998), 21-100; See also, Kasson, C ivilizing the M achine.
“ C handler, The Visible H and. 79-121; Black, Railroads of the 
Confederacy. 2-3,5,21.
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De Bow's Review  understood the challenge and explained to  its 
readers th a t railroads required  technical an d  m anagerial expertise. "There is 
deplorable ignorance in  the m inds of in te llig en t com m ercial m en," the 
journal reported , "as regards the value, d ie  du ties and the responsibilities of 
the engineer." S outhern railroad investors d id  no t give engineers the 
authority  they needed to ru n  a railroad efficiently. De Bow's com plained, a 
rem ark th a t echoed m any northern  ra ilroad  journals. The boards o f 
directors, the journal m aintained, "taken as they are, for the m ost p art, from  
the counting room , the plantation, o r even  the law  bench, are not, no r ever 
could be, p repared  to transact the business o f the operative bureau w ithout 
an  engineer's training." Engineers, n o t th e  investors, the journal 
concluded, should control the labor, the operation , and the "discipline" of 
the road, because a  w ell-run railroad requ ired  a  "professional engineer," not 
an  "ignorant and u n tried  quack!"31
A South  C arolina educational jo u rnal. The Self Instructor, also m ade 
the connection betw een engineering skill an d  railroad  m anagem ent. "The 
com plicated operations of a  railroad com pany are not unlike the strategic 
m ovem ents o f an a rm y .. . . "  Therefore, th e  article continued, it behooved 
the South to arouse "public interest to see th a t the highest talent of the 
country be developed, especially in  the engineer departm ent of the 
m echanical art, for up o n  the w isdom  of h e r railroad  operations does m uch
31 "Rail-Road A dm inistration a t th e  South. The Civil Engineer," De 
Bow's Review  14 (February 18531: 146-151.
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of the South 's chance for d irect trade and com m ercial independence rest."
In o rd er to  accom plish this training, the South had  to "support our m ilitary 
schools as near as possible o n  the m odel of W est Point, and there w ill be no 
w ant o f m echanical talent and  theoretical know ledge among our youth, to 
supply any dem and we m ake."32
De Bow's Review and  the Self Instructor touched on an im portant 
point th a t the railroads required large-scale bureaucratic structures to 
coordinate their m anpow er and  tra in  m ovem ents. This developm ent was 
as m uch the case in the South as in  the N orth, as large southern railroads 
adopted  new  organizational structures and business techniques. D espite 
com plaints th a t southern railroads lagged behind  northern railroads in  
organization and technology, the South did  a ttrac t experienced m en to build 
and organize its railroad enterprise. For exam ple, J. Edgar Thomson, a 
recognized leader in railroad m anagem ent, who established the bureaucratic 
structu re for the Pennsylvania Railroad in  1857, gained much of his 
experience on southern railroads. D uring the 1840s, Thomson served as the 
superin tendent of transportation for die G eorgia Railroad, where he
32"Railroads," The Self Instructor: A M onthly Toumal D evoted to 
Southern Education and to the D iffusion of a K now ledge of Resources and 
Pow er o f the South, as represented by The N egro. The Rail and the Press 1 
(Novem ber 1853): 39-40.
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developed the rudim entary organizational structure he im plem ented on  the 
Pennsylvania in  1857.33
Thom son divided the Georgia Railroad into departm ents. H e m ade 
the superin tendent of transportation responsible for the "regular an d  safe 
transm ission" o f everything "sent by  the road" and gave him  "entire 
control" over a ll the railroad's departm ents. U nder the  transporta tion  
superintendent, Thom son had a superin tendent of m otive pow er, who 
m anaged the railroad 's movements, a superintendent of the car factory, who 
oversaw the m achine shops and repair of cars, and tw o m aintenance officers 
who directed the upkeep of the road  and m anaged the construction and 
m aintenance crew s. Thus, it was in  the South, and n o t in  the N orth , that 
Thomson first developed the incipient m anagerial hierarchy that historian 
Alfred C handler considered the critical com ponent in  the developm ent of a 
corporate bureaucracy.34
Thom son d id  not act alone in  trying to im plem ent bureaucratic ideas 
on southern railroads. O ther experts, usually in  the new  fields of
33J. E dgar Thom son, "The Pennsylvania Rail Road Com pany. 
O rganization for Conduction the Business of the Road. A dopted Decem ber 
26,1857" in  The Railroads: Pioneers in  M odem  M anagem ent. A lfred D. 
Chandler, ed., (New York: Amo Press, 1979), 3; C handler, The V isible H and. 
105-106; Jam es A. W ard, 1. Edgar Thom son: M aster of the Pennsylvania 
(W estport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980), 60-63.
^R eport of the Engineer in C hief of the Cenrgia Rail Road ar>d 
Banking Co. to  the Convention of Stockholders. M ay 9.1842. T ogether w ith 
the Cashier's S tatem ent of the Condition of Finances, on  9th May 1842: and 
Statem ent of D ividends. Athens, Geo. Printed a t the Office of the 'Southern 
Banner.' June, 1842; Chandler, The Visible H and. 105-107.
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m echanical and  civil engineering, from  bo th  the N o rth  and  South, quickly 
grasped th a t railroad technology required new  m ethods of m anagem ent to  
control its  speed, m achinery, and m anpow er. T hrough m uch trial and 
error, sou thern  railroad  m anagers struggled to p u t new  m anagem ent 
principles in to  place. L. O . Reynolds, a northern transp lan t and 
superin tendent of the C entral R ailroad of Georgia, fo r exam ple, divided the  
adm inistration  of his line in to  a  departm ental stru ctu re  in  1842, the sam e 
year Thom son had  in stitu ted  his reform s.35 The C entral of Georgia's 1846 
salary scale reflected an  em erging m anagerial hierarchy. The 
Superintendent of T ransportation received $2,000, the  C hief Engineer $2,000, 
and the  Superintendent of M achinery $1,200. Also in  the upper echelon o f 
m anagem ent, the ticket m anager, the assistant engineer, and  the forw arding 
agents a t Savannah and M acon all m ade $1,000. O n the low er level of the 
organization, receiving clerks earned $700, book keepers $600, cotton clerks 
$600, passenger train conductors $600, and the po rter $500. In addition, there 
were m aintenance crews, usually  m ade up of slave labor. O ther southern 
railroads follow ed a sim ilar structure and  divided th e ir lines into separate 
traffic departm ents.36
^E ighth  Report. C en tra l R ailroad an d  Banking Com pany of Georgia 
(Savannah, Ga., 1842), 75-78.
^T w elfth  Report. C entral Railroad and Banking Com pany of G eorgia 
(Savannah, Ga., 1846), 151,156; Black, Railroads of the Confederacy. 28.
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By the 1850s, rudim entary bureaucratic structures had developed on  
m ost large sou thern  railroads. The C harlotte and S outh  Carolina R ailroad 's 
1854 annual report, for example, com plained of a "w ant of system and 
econom y." In  response, the line m oved to create a  m ore system atic 
operation. It developed an organizational chart th a t listed the officers, sub­
officers, and  em ployees to "classify the services" on  the  road. In this w ay, 
the ra ilro ad 's m anagem ent hoped  to im prove the p o o r "authority and  
control" th a t w ould  "not [be] to lerated  or perm itted on  well-m anaged 
N o rth ern  Roads."37 In addition to  draw ing up an organizational chart, the 
C harlotte and  South Carolina adopted  a bureaucratic structure that included 
four functional departm ents—transportation, cars, m otive pow er and 
m achinery, and w ay. General Superintendent Nims to ld  stockholders th is 
departm ental system  com pared favorably w ith those "adopted by well- 
organized  Com panies" and im proved the railroad's "regularity," w ith  tra in s 
"seldom  failing to arrive and d ep a rt in  their schedule tim e."38
By the Civil W ar, large sou thern  railroads h ad  m ade considerable 
strides tow ard  im plem enting m odem  bureaucratic structures. F. C. A rm s, 
the chief engineer and  superin tendent of the M emphis and  Charleston,
37Proceedings of the Stockholders of the C harlotte and South C arolina 
Rail Road C om pany, a t their Sixth Annual M eeting (Columbia, S. C., 1854), 
6-8,44-48.
38Proceedings of the Stockholders of the C harlotte and South C arolina 
R ailroad Com pany, a t their E ighth Annual M eeting (Columbia, S. C., 1856), 
37.
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outlined that railroad 's new ly installed  system of m anagem ent and control. 
A large railroad by southern standards, it had 445 cars of different types and  
functions for 287 m iles of track. Its organizational structure consisted of tw o 
separate divisions, each w ith  its ow n superintendent of transportation, 
m aster of engines, and  track m aster. Arms explained why a  large railroad 
required a bureaucratic structure. "In the w orking organization of your 
Road," he w rote, "two Divisions continue to be operated , to a great extent, 
independently of each other." This structure differed significantly from  a 
sm all railroad because on a short road , "the Superintendent may have a 
personal, and, in  som e cases, a daily  com m unication w ith  all the officers and  
employes fsicl of his Road. All irregularities and derelictions of duty come 
prom ptly to his know ledge for correction &c." But, he observed "upon a 
long line, com pensation for these advantages, can only be obtained, by the 
adoption of a system  w hich w ill involve a proper d ivision of 
responsibilities" that allow ed "great prom ptness in  the report of 
irregularities; and great care, in  the correction of errors, not to em barrass 
principle officers in their control and  influence over subordinates." Sam 
Tate, the president of the M em phis and  Charleston, shared Arm s' views. "It 
takes time and a vast am ount of labor to procure a  thorough and system atic 
organization of any large and heavy business," he w rote, "but more 
especially in this a difficult task o n  a  long Railroad, w here there are 
necessarily so m any departm ents to organize under separate and individual 
heads, the whole to be looked after by one general head, conferring. . .  [with]
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absolute pow er on each head  of departm ent." Such an  organization proved  
necessaryx he concluded, to enable the railroad  to operate w ith "simplicity, 
efficiency an d  economy."39
Besides these organizational changes, southern  railroad m anagers 
recognized the need for control m echanism s. In  response, they classified 
jobs and  im plem ented new  regulations. W hen a  w atchm an died 
accidentally while coupling a train, the superin tenden t of the South- 
W estern Railroad of Georgia blam ed the incident on  the fact that the 
w atchm an attem pted to  do a  job that w as "no p art of his business." In  a 
sim ilar case, w hen the South-W estern of G eorgia had  a series of accidents, 
its superin tendent w rote that he had "prescribed such rules and regulations 
as w ill p rev en t. . .  fu tu re accidents of like character." Railroads enacted 
strict ru les for em ployees. The East Tennessee and Georgia Railroad m ade 
the use of "intoxicating liquors" grounds fo r dism issal. The preservation of 
life and  property  and the com plicated requirem ents of railroad work 
dem anded regulations, no ted  L. J. Fleming, the general superintendent of 
the M obile and Ohio. H e argued that rules h ad  to be enforced strictly and 
any w orker breaking them  fired im m ediately. "All experience in  railroad  
m anagem ent," he w rote in  1857, "has show n th a t stric t discipline and 
personal responsibility are essential to safety and  security of person and
39Seventh A nnual R eport of the D irectors to the Stockholders in  the 
M em phis an d  Charleston R ailroad  Com pany (M emphis, Tenn., 1857), 41,25- 
26.
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property, an d  th e  organization shou ld  be form ed on these fundam ental 
p rincip les/' W ith this idea in  m ind, Flem ing prepared  "ru les and  
regulations accurately defining the d u ty  of each person," w hich he printed 
and d istributed to  all workers. He sta ted  that "strict adherence to  all their 
requirem ents w ill be considered the only condition of rem aining in  the 
Com pany's services."40
Flem ing required daily reports from  both agents and  conductors.
These reports contained the arrival an d  departure of all trains. Further, he 
w anted a list o f all "discrepancies o r failure in  the delivery of freight, the 
am ount on  h an d  and  the cars req u ired  for its transportation." Fleming 
dem anded vouchers that show ed "in  detail" the m ovem ent of all freight 
and passengers. These vouchers h ad  to be signed by the head of the 
appropriate departm ent and had to be approved by the superintendent. He 
hoped this system  of control w ould "contain the . . .  detentions and 
irregularities o f trains, in the delivery o f freight," and no ted  th a t "additional 
precautions m ay be adopted if necessary to prevent a recurrence. A  few years 
later, in  his rep o rt on a collision betw een a passenger tra in  and a freight 
train, he concluded that it was caused by "running ou t o f tim e [not on 
schedule], and  positively contrary to  the  p rin ted  regulations for the
40N in th  A nnual Report. South-W estern R ailroad C o. (Macon, Ga.,
1856), 246-247; R eport of the P resident and D irectors of the E ast Tennessee 
and Georgia R ailroad  Company (A thens, Tenn., 1857), 18-19; SeYCIlth 
A nnual R eport. South-W estern R ailroad Co. (Macon. G a., 1854), 197-198; 
N inth A nnual M eeting of the S tockholders of the M obile and  O hio Railroad 
Co. (Mobile, A la., 1857), 51.
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governm ent of the em ployees o f the Company." C learly, sou thern  railroad  
m anagers had  come to understand  th a t w orkers needed to follow  rules and 
to stay w ith in  their job classifications.41
In add ition  to rules an d  regulations, southern railroads im plem ented 
detailed accounting procedures. A nnual reports to stockholders and  state 
au thorities included tables th a t specified the condition of locom otives, 
num ber o f m iles run, w ood burned , oil used, and cost o f repairs. W hen he 
set up  the accounting procedures for the Memphis and  C harleston Railroad, 
Chief E ngineer Charles F. M. G arnett em ulated no rthern  railroads. "All the 
railroad  com panies in the U nion," he observed, "are in  the hab it of keeping 
an accurate account of annual expenses, from the salaries of their officers 
dow n to the oil used to grease a locomotive." The C harlotte and South 
Carolina R ailroad also developed ledgers that helped control cost. The line 
reported  m onthly earnings, m onthly expenditures, and  a cost breakdow n of 
transportation , m aintenance, m achine shop, loss and  dam ages, construction, 
and freight and passenger traffic. M oreover, it listed the am ount paid  to 
each em ployee from  the p residen t dow n to the train boys.42
“ Proceedings of the N in th  A nnual M eeting of the Stockholders of the 
M obile and O hio Railroad C o m p a n y  (Mobile, Ala., 1857), 51; Tw elfth 
A nnual M eeting of the Stockholders of the Mobile and  O hio Railroad Co. 
(Mobile, Ala., 1860), 14.
42The F irst Annual R eport o f Charles F. M. G arnett. Chief Engineer of 
the M em phis & Charleston Rail Road (Huntsville, A la., 1851), 6; Proceedings 
of the Stockholders of the C harlotte and  South C arolina Rail Road 
Com pany, a t their Sixth A nnual M eeting (Columbia, S. C., 1854), 33-42.
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Southern railroad m anagers also tried  to establish systematic 
m aintenance program s. H eavy rains and floods frequently caused m ud 
slides tha t dam aged track and bridges. Further, railroad ties rotted and 
needed replacem ent on a regular schedule. As early as 1842, L. O. Reynolds 
urged stockholders of the C entral of Georgia no t to cut expenditures after the 
com pletion of the road. "The subject of 'm aintenance of the w ay,"' he 
explained, "is one of the m ost im portan t of all m atters connected w ith the 
m anagem ent of the railw ay." H e w arned investors th a t it would be "a g reat 
error to suppose it is the best policy, to cut dow n the expenses of repairs of 
[the] Road to the lowest possible sum  that w ill keep the Road in  operation." 
Such a policy, he argued, w ould cause an  "over-strained economy" that 
w ould "resu lt in  constant derangem ent of m achinery, in the m echanical 
departm ent, m ore than equivalent to the apparent savings." If m aintenance 
investm ent w ent unm et, Reynolds predicted, the railroad would experience 
an abundance of accidents. W illiam  Johnson, the president of the C harlotte 
and South Carolina, agreed. "Experience has proved," he told stockholders, 
"that it is cheaper to keep the bed  and  track of a railroad in a safe and sound 
condition, than  otherw ise." H e observed that m aintenance im proved the 
condition of m achinery as w ell as safety. M oreover, it contributed to the 
public's confidence in the railroad  w hich he argued was an "essential"
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elem ent "in  the success of all corporations, and especially so, in  regard to 
railroad  com panies."43
Large southern railroads established regular schedules for track repair. 
The C entral of Georgia, for exam ple, used 400 slaves for bo th  construction 
and m aintenance in  1849. W. M . W adley, its superintendent, inform ed 
stockholders th a t the com pany h ad  invested  in tools, shanties, and tents to 
enable the m aintenance crews to  live on  the track. Sim ilarly, the South- 
W estern Railroad of Georgia b u ilt tent-cars that slept fifty. These tent-cars 
allow ed constant w ork on foundations, ditches, culverts, and slopes.
Beyond this, every large southern  railroad  built m aintenance shops to repair 
locom otives and cars. Some even  constructed their ow n freight and 
passenger cars. The South-W estern, fo r example, built its  ow n freight cars, 
box cars, platform  cars, wheel cars, and second-class passenger cars. The 
Southern Railroad had a  w orkshop in  Vicksburg, M ississippi, th a t em ployed 
over 100 m echanics, m any of them  slaves. The M em phis and  Charleston 
constructed shops to build freigh t cars in  H untsville, A labam a. R. R. Cuyler 
told C entral of Georgia stockholders in  1860 that the line constructed its ow n
43Eight Report. Central Railroad and Banking Com pany of Georgia 
(Savannah, Ga., 1842), 77-79; Proceedings of the Stockholders o f the Charlotte 
and South C arolina Railroad C om pany a t their N inth A nnual M eeting 
(Columbia, S. C., 1857), 13-14.
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m otive pow er and w anted "to  avoid  all purchases of these articles in  the 
fu tu re /'44
Besides im plem enting regularly  scheduled track repairs, southern  
railroad m anagers also em braced the new technology in  developm ent. M ost 
of the m ajor southern railroads adopted  the im proved T rail over the fla t 
bar by the 1850s. The C harlotte and  South Carolina Railroad, which adop ted  
the T rail in  1856, reported th a t it "will be the best econom y in  the end . . .  as 
well as security  of the Road against accident and contingent loss." The entire 
line of the M emphis and C harleston, com pleted in  1857, consisted of English 
T rail.45 M oreover, southern  railroads encouraged the developm ent of 
telegraph lines, the spread o f w hich allow ed for im proved com m unication 
and control. The Central of G eorgia began using the telegraph in 1847, only 
three years after Morse dem onstrated its practicability. The general
“ F ifteenth Report. C entral Railroad and Banking Company of 
Georgia  (Savannah, Ga., 1849), 200,208; Seventh A nnual Report. South- 
W estern  Railroad Co. (Macon, Ga., 1854), 199; E leventh A nnual Report. 
South-W estern Railroad Co. (Macon, Ga., 1858), 306; A nnual Report of the  
President and  Directors of the East Tennessee & Georgia Railroad Com pany 
(Athens, Tenn., 1851); 8; John H ebron Moore, The Em ergence of the C otton 
Kingdom in  the Old Southw est: M ississippi. 1770-1860 (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1988), 194; Black, Railroads of the 
Confederacy. 23-24.
45Fifth Report. C entral Railroad and Banking Com pany of G eorgia 
(Savannah, Ga., 1840), 53; Proceedings of the Stockholders of the C harlotte fc 
South C arolina Railroad C om pany a t their E igh th  A nnual M eetin g  
(Columbia, S. C., 1856), 7; Seventh A nnual R eport of the D irectors to the  
S tockholders in  the M em phis and  Charleston Railroad Com pany (M em phis, 
Tenn., 1857), 16: The Reports o f the  Com m ittees of the  H ouse of 
R epresentatives made d u ring  the  Second Session T hirty-N inth Congress. 
1866-'67. 4 vols. (W ashington: G overnm ent Printing Office, 1867), 692-703.
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superin tenden t of the South Carolina Railroad to ld  investors in 1856 th a t its 
new  te legraph  line w ould n o t only im prove "convenience o f . . .  travel" b u t 
also w ould  create "the m eans of preserving g reater regularity in the th rough 
connections." In  1861, the Richm ond & D anville created a telegraph 
departm ent w ith  a superintendent, six operators, and  three messengers.46
N one of this is to say, how ever, that sou thern  railroads were perfectly 
organized. D espite their bureaucratic structures and control mechanisms, 
coordination problem s p lagued them . D ifferent lines often did not connect 
even w hen  they served the sam e city, and in  som e cases they used different 
gauged track, which m ade the transport of th rough freight a  logistical 
nightm are. It w as not uncom m on for a train  to be unloaded, its contents 
carried by team sters across tow n, and then reloaded on another com pany's
46T hirteenth  Report. C entral Railroad and Banking Company of 
Georgia (Savannah, Ga., 1847), 167; Annual R eports of the President and 
D irectors and the General Superintendent of the South Carolina Railroad 
Com pany (Charleston, 1856), 9; The telegraph expanded rapidly in  the South 
after 1847. The two largest corporations in  the South were the Am erican 
T elegraph Com pany and the Southw estern Telegraph Company. The m ajor 
lines included  the W ashington and New O rleans Com pany (the second 
oldest in  the country), that covered 1,700 miles an d  connected Richmond, 
C harleston, Savannah, M ontgom ery, and M obile. The W ashington and 
M em phis Telegraph Com pany connected Lynchburg, Virginia, and 
W ashington. The A bingdon Telegraph Com pany tied Richmond and 
Bristol, Tennessee, together. The East Tennessee Telegraph Company 
connected Bristol to Chattanooga. There were som e 283 telegraph offices in  
the South  by 1860. J. Cutler A ndrew s, "The Southern Telegraph Com pany, 
1861-1865: A C hapter in the H istory of W artim e Com munication," Journal 
of Southern H istory 30 (A ugust 1964): 319-320; Robert Luther Thompson, 
W iring a Continent: The H istory of the Telegraph Industry in  the U nited 
States. 1832-1866 (Princeton: Princeton U niversity Press, 1947), 141-143;
Black, Railroads of the Confederacy. 35.
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train. T. J. Turner, a  superin tenden t of the C harlotte and South Carolina, 
acknowledged in  1859 that connections betw een different railroads made 
"freight service . . .  m ore varied a n d  d ifficu lt" F. C. Arms com plained that 
passengers a t several of their sta tions suffered delays of up to  14 hours due to 
"the failure of connecting R oads to m ake d o se r connections." W hen 
railroad com panies did  tie their services together, other logistical problems 
developed. The Central of G eorgia's W. M. W adley noted he often  had 
difficulty locating his railroad cars once they had been connected to another 
com pany's train, h i fact, he told stockholders in 1855 that he feared "we 
have lost qu ite a number." The M em phis and  Charleston d id  n o t w ant to 
connect w ith  the Nashville and C hattanooga Railroad because the m anagers 
thought the different time schedules and tariff rates, as well as the 
inconvenience to travelers and dam age to packages, would m ake operations 
too difficult. In like m anner, the East Tennessee and Georgia railroad 
reported th a t the "interchanging fof] cars w ith  o ther roads has been the 
source . . .  o f nearly if not quite a ll our dam ages and difficulties in  
forwarding freight."47
47Taylor and Neu, A m erican Railroad Netw ork. 41-48: Proceedings of 
the Stockholders of the C harlotte and South Carolina Railroad Com pany 
(Columbia, S. C., 1859), 25-26: Seventh  A nnual R eport of the D irectors to the 
Stockholders in  the M emphis a n d  C harleston Railroad Com pany (M emphis, 
Tenn., 1857), 40-41: Twenty-First R eport. C entral Railroad and Banking 
Company of Georgia (Savannah, G a., 1855), 39; Third A nnual M eeting of the 
Stockholders of the Memphis a n d  C harleston Railroad C n .  (H untsville, Ala.,
1853), 30; R eport of the President and  D irectors of the East Tennessee and 
Georgia Rail Road Company (A thens, Tenn., 1857), 13; Seventh A nnual 
Report. South-W estern Railroad Co. (Macon, Ga., 1854), 197-198.
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The lack o f a  system atic freight o r tariff policy com pounded these 
difficulties. D ue to inherent weaknesses in  a fragm ented an d  uncoordinated 
railroad system , through rates varied considerably from those posted. 
Beyond logistics, com petition for business betw een different lines caused 
significant problem s in  setting th rough rates.48 Southern ra ilro ad  m anagers 
adm itted as m uch. "It is contended," L. O. Reynolds' w rote as early as 1841, 
"that w e have y et arrived  a t the precise po in t in  the arrangem ent of our 
tariff of freights." Tariff problems grew  as railroad milage spread  and 
coordination problem s increased. To com plicate m atters, p lanters and 
farm ers com plained that through ra tes w ere cheaper for those hauling 
cotton longer distances. For their part, sou thern  railroad m anagers argued 
that th rough  rates increased efficiency. "The idea that injustice is done to 
the traders and  planters w hen we reduce through rates w ithout 
corresponding reduction of way rates," R. R. Cuyler of the C entral of Georgia 
argued in  1844, "is fallacious." In o ther w ords, southern railroad  managers 
grappled w ith  the  idea of economies o f scale w ithin a fragm ented railroad 
system. "The necessity [of lower th rough  rates]," Cuyler m aintained, was
"im posed on  us by nature [T]here should be a corresponding fall in rates
through the w hole line." This principle, he argued, had been "learned b y . . .  
observation an d  thorough experience." John Childe, the Superintendent of
48Black, Railroads of the Confederacy. 38; Klein, G reat Richm ond 
Terminal, 16-29.
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the M obile and  Ohio R ailroad, agreed. I t m ust be understood, he explained, 
" th a t the expenses of a fu ll tra in  are b u t a trifle m ore than  those of one a 
quarter o r half loaded." D espite this understanding, the system  of railroad 
rates rem ained unsophisticated in  the pre-w ar South.49
In  addition  to problem s w ith freights rates and  service, the lack of 
coordination also im paired safe operations. In 1854, the South-W estern of 
G eorgia reported  several "serious accidents" due to  increased traffic.
R ailroad w ork rem ained extrem ely dangerous. For exam ple, in  December 
1860, a C entral Railroad of G eorgia freight train and a  passenger train  
collided, killing a train h an d  and  several passengers. The South-W estern 
R ailroad reported  that a slave em ployed on a  "gravel tra in  fell betw een the 
cars" and  w as crushed u n d er the w heels. A M emphis and  C harleston train 
ran  over a  young slave em ployee w hen he tried to jum p betw een tw o cars. 
The M obile and  Ohio R ailroad reported  that a conductor and  another 
railroad  em ployee died w hen their tra in  struck a cow  on  the tracks and 
derailed.50
49N in th  Report. C entral Railroad and Banking C om pany of Georgia 
(Savannah, Ga., 1844), 85; Proceedings of the Eighth A nnual M eeting of the 
S tockholders of the Mobile and  Ohio Railroad Com pany (Mobile. 1856), 32; 
Black, Railroads of the Confederacy. 38-39.
^S eventh  A nnual R eport. South-W estern R ailroad Co. (Macon, Ga.,
1854), 197-198: Twenty-Sixth Report. C entral Railroad and  Banking 
Com pany of Georgia (Savannah. Ga., 1860), 175: South-W estern Railroad Co. 
(Macon, Ga., 18571.272: F ifth A nnual R eport of The B oard of D irectors to the 
S tockholders in  the M em phis and C harleston Railroad C om pany (M emphis, 
Tenn., 1855), 44: Proceedings of the N in th  Annual M eeting of the
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As these accidents and  coordination problem s suggest,, the operations 
of sou thern  railroads still had  considerable problem s in the antebellum  
period. Nevertheless, sou thern  railroads had  grow n rapidly in  the 1850s and 
h ad  im plem ented m any of the organizational ideas identified w ith  northern 
railroad  m anagem ent. The South, in  term s of railroads, took th e  sam e path 
to m odernization as the N orth, except for one critical difference—slave labor. 
B ureaucratic organization and  railroad  m odernization in the South 
incorporated  w ithin its  fram ew ork the "peculiar institution."
S outhern  railroad  m anagers had  no problem  with using slave labor. 
P rogress and  slavery w ent hand  in  hand  in  their m inds. Few w ould  have 
d isagreed w ith B. Ayers, superin tendent of the Memphis and C harleston, 
w hen he w rote in 1855, "The econom y of slave labor upon Southern roads 
has been frequently dem onstrated" and  " it w ill no doubt be greatly  to their 
advantage to own the labor required in  w orking the road."51
As slave prices increased w ith  cotton prices in  the late 1840s and 1850s, 
railroad  m anagers debated w hether to ren t or buy slaves. Several lines 
op ted  to continue contracting for slave labor. The Charlotte & South 
C arolina even allowed stockholders to pay for their stock w ith slaves. 
E dw ard G. Palmer, the ro ad 's president, observed that "allowing
Stockholders of the M obile & Ohio Rail Road Com pany (Mobile. Ala., 1859), 
18.
51Fifth Annual R eport of the Board of D irectors to the S tockholders in 
the M em phis & Charleston Railroad Co. (M emphis. Tenn., 1855), 44.
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Stockholders to pay up their subscriptions in labour . . .  is adm irably 
calculated to increase the am ount of stock subscribed . . .  and give slave 
S tates g reat advantages over the free in  the construction of Rail Roads." The 
C entral of Georgia, however, decided to end the contract system that year in  
favor of d irect ownership of slaves. President C uyler thought that slaves 
purchased by the railroad w orked m ore efficiently, created a safer w orking 
environm ent, and  received better m edical care. O ther railroads follow ed 
su it. The N ashville & C hattanooga invested m ore than  $128,000 in  slaves, 
the Raleigh & Gaston purchased $125,000 w orth of slaves, and the South 
C arolina bought 90 slaves valued  a t m ore than $80,000.52
The decision to purchase slaves centered prim arily  on tight m arket 
conditions. The chief engineer of the Richmond & York Railroad, rep o rted  
in  1856 that the supply of labor appeared so scarce th a t rented slaves w ere 
alm ost "im possible" to obtain. In  response, he argued, the railroad should  
consider buying slaves. In addition , railroad contracts w ith  slave ow ners 
requ ired  negotiations and stric t guidelines, w ith the railroad usually 
p rovid ing  the ren ted  slaves w ith  shelter, food, do th ing , and medical care. 
Beyond these costs, the railroad had  to pay rent to the slaveholder. 
Furtherm ore, if a slave suffered injuries o r death, the railroad had to 
reim burse the ow ner for the value of the slave. The Richm ond & D anville,
52Proceedings of the C harlotte & South Carolina Railroad at their 
Second A nnual M eeting a t W innsboro (Columbia, S. C., 1849), 4; F ifteen th  
R eport. Central Railroad and Banking Co. of Georgia (Savannah, Ga., 1849); 
200; Black Railroads of the Confederacy. 29-30.
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for instance, paid  $1,379.44 for a  slave laborer killed in  an  accident. To avoid 
such paym ents, some railroads stipu lated  contractually th a t the com pany 
bore no responsibility "for accidents from  any cause w hatever." Tension 
betw een the slave ow ner and  the railroad  com pany over p ro p er treatm ent as 
w ell as punishm ent o f slaves proved inevitable. Some ra ilroad  m anagers 
soon decided they needed  greater control over slave labor than  the contract 
system  allowed.53
Despite som e tension betw een railroad  com panies an d  slave holders, 
slave labor played an  im portant role in  sou thern  railroad operations. Slaves 
constructed and  m aintained m ost of the tracks in the South, b u t they also 
served  as brakem en, firem en, station helpers, and in som e cases, 
enginem en.54 The annual reports of the C harlotte and South Carolina 
R ailroad provide a look a t the varied use o f slaves. Blacks, m ostly slaves, 
perform ed a variety of tasks on the line. They worked as blacksm iths, 
firem en, strikers, depo t hands, and pum p tenders. A large num ber of slaves 
w orked a t laying and  repairing track. A lthough slaves perform ed m any of 
the same jobs as w hite wage earners, the railroad  reported th a t slaves cost 
less. For example, a  black carpenter cost the Charlotte line $20 per m onth
53Second A nnual M eeting of the Stockholders of th e  R ichm ond and 
York R. R. Co. (Richm ond, Va., 1856), 19; W alter Licht, W orking fo r the 
R ailroad: The O rganization of W ork in  th e  N ineteenth C entury  (Princton: 
Princeton University Press, 1983), 68-69,88-89.
^W alter Licht, W orking for the R ailroad: The O rganization of Work 
in  the  N ineteenth C entury  (Princeton: P rinceton U niversity Press, 1983), 67.




(apparently in  ren tal fees) and board, w hile a white carpenter received SI .50 
per day in  wages, o r about $40 a  m onth  on a six-day workweek. A  black 
forem an cost the com pany $15 p er m onth com pared to $35 p er m onth for a 
w hite forem an. Clearly, the m anagers of the Charlotte and South Carolina 
Railroad along w ith  o ther southern  roads had  no qualms incorporating 
slave labor w ithin their bureaucratic system .55
Because of their dependence on  slave laborers, railroad rulebooks 
carefully defined the proper treatm ent of slaves w ithin a bureaucratic 
organization. The M emphis and  O hio Railroad allowed its slaves to be 
w hipped, bu t it also enforced a  ru le  stating that punishm ent "m ust be 
adm inistered in  m oderation, and  w ith in  the bounds of the law , w hich is not 
to exceed thirty-nine lashes." The M&O rulebook also forbade hitting a 
slave w ith a club, stick, fist, o r o ther heavy object. With such ru les and 
regulations guiding discipline on southern  railroads, it could be argued that 
slaves who w orked for railroads suffered less gratuitous violence and 
labored in a m ore rational w orking environm ent. However, the 
proposition th a t an  im personal and  bureaucratic railroad organization
55Proceedings of the Stockholders of the Charlotte and South Carolina 
Rail Road Com pany a t their Sixth A nnual M eeting (Columbia. S. C., 1854), 
39-40; Proceedings of the Stockholders of the Charlotte and South Carolina 
Railroad C om pany a t the Seventh A nnual M eeting (Columbia. S. C., 1855), 
43-45: Proceedings of the Stockholders of the Charlotte and South Carolina 
Railroad Com pany a t their Eighth A nnual M eeting (Columbia, S. C., 1856); 
35-36: Proceedings of the Stockholders of the Charlotte and South Carolina 
Railroad Com pany a t their N inth A nnual M eeting (Columbia, S. C., 1857), 
28-29.
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treated slaves better than  plantation owners is debatable. A veteran slave 
trader w rote tellingly to a colleague in Richm ond, Virginia, that "if I dont 
Isic] come hom e I shall no t le t my negroes w ork on  the Rail Road any longer 
than this w eek for they dont take care of them  an d  it is better to feed them  
and let them  do  nothing than  to have them  cripp led  up  and no care taken of 
them ."56
The w ork done by slave labor was very dangerous. Most toiled at 
grading, ditching, track laying, and track repair. Injury and disease claimed 
many casualties. M ost railroads reported the loss of workers to epidem ics 
and cholera. The superin tendent of the M em phis and Charleston observed 
that contractors and their slaves have "several tim es dispersed by the 
appearance o f cholera and other m alignant diseases." The East Tennessee 
and Georgia noted the "prevalence of epidem ic disease." In 1841, the Central 
of Georgia to ld  "of m uch sickness on some parts of the line am ong the 
laborers." The next year it reported "almost universal prevalence of fever 
am ong our operatives."57 These com plaints w ere a common them e in  
annual reports.
56Licht, W orking for the R ailroad. 68-69, 88-89; A. Rux to E. H . Stokes, 
December 18,1861, Cornelius Chase Papers, L ibrary of Congress, M anuscripts 
Division, W ashington D . C.; See also Eugene D . Genovese, R oll. Tordan.
Roll: The W orld the Slaves M ade (New York: Random  House, 1976), 3-112; 
and Joseph P. Reidy, From  Slavery to Agrarian C apitalism  in the C otton 
Plantation South: C entral Georgia. 1800-1880 (C hapel Hill: The U niversity 
of N orth Carolina Press, 1992), 31-81.
^T hird A nnual M eeting of the Stockholders of the M em phis and 
Charleston R ailroad  Co. (Huntsville, Ala., 1853), 15; Annual R eport of the
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G rading the roadbed also m eant w orking w ith  gunpow der and 
blasting. The C entral of Georgia, w hich had construction crew s num bering 
over five hundred  slaves, determ ined that the crew s needed to "blast the 
rock in  every excavation." A G reensboro, N orth C arolina, new spaper 
reported th a t tw o slaves w ere h u rt "w hen an explosion took place, blow ing 
the drill o u t of the hole and taking w ith  it the little  finger of the boy w ho 
held it, the eye of the other w as in jured by a fsicl gravel, w hich seems to 
have sunk into the [eyejball." O ther jobs also proved hazardous for slaves. 
Special tim ber and  gravel trains hauling gangs constantly  m oved up and 
dow n the line doing repairs. The C entral of Georgia described it as a "gang 
of hands, w ith  a sm all engine and  train  of cars, engaged . . .  in  clearing out 
ditches in  the deep cuts . . .  and filling up  trestle bridges." The Mobile and 
O hio's accident reports show a large num ber of slave laborers h u rt during 
construction and  operation of the line. For exam ple, the line reported that a 
black w orker "em ployed on G ravel Train, was ru n  over and  killed by [a] 
regular T rain." W hen a train  derailed , two brakem an d ied  instantly and the 
firem an w as "so scalded that he d ied  the next day." A  brakem an standing on  
top of the cars d ied  when he h it the top  of the Q uitm an Bridge. A 
sw itchm an attem pting to get on the engine slipped and  had  his leg cut off
President and  D irectors of the East Tenn. and Ga. Railroad Co. (Athens, 
Tenn., 1855), 8: Seventh Report. C entral Railroad and  Banking Com pany of 
Georgia (Savannah, Ga., 1841), 63; Eighth Report. C entral Railroad and 
Banking C om pany of Georgia (Savannah, Ga., 1842), 73.
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w hen ru n  over by a train. O bviously, slaves as well as w hite workers faced a  
significant chance of injury o r even death .58
N ot surprisingly, slaves tried  to escape from  railroad  work. W hite 
w orkers could  sim ply quit a  job they d id  no t like; slaves rem ained in  
bondage. In  January and February 1858, the Charlotte and  South Carolina 
purchased seven slaves for the am ount of $6,250. T itus, the most expensive, 
cost $1,000. Three of the slaves w orked in  the shops an d  the others as train  
hands. The next year the com pany sold Titus because of "his habit of 
running aw ay from  service ren d ered  this expedient." They sold him  a t cost 
for $1,000. In his place they purchased "Sam, his w ife and  three children" 
for $2,550.59
In jobs w here whites an d  blacks w ere both em ployed, especially in  
construction, the groups w ere typically segregated and  placed on different 
sections of the line.60 Conflicts over slavery nevertheless occurred, h i 1839,
58Second Report C en tra l R ailroad  and Banking Company of Georgia 
(Savannah, Ga., 1838), 30; G reensboro new spaper quoted  in  Nelson, Iron  
Confederacies. 19: Seventeenth R eport. Central R ailroad and Banking 
Company o f Georgia (Savannah. Ga., 1851), 243: Proceedings of the N inth 
Annual M eeting of the S tockholders o f the M obile an d  O hio Rail Road 
Company (Mobile, Ala., 1857), Table 10.
59Proceedings of the S tockholders of the C harlotte and South Carolina 
Railroad C om pany a t their T en th  A nnual M eeting (Columbia, S. C., 1858), 
11: Proceedings of the Stockholders of the Charlotte and  South Carolina 
Railroad C om pany a t their E leventh  A nnual M eeting (Columbia, S. C., 
1859), 10.
60Proceedings of the Stockholders of the C harlotte and  South Carolina 
Railroad C om pany a t their E ighth  A nnual M eeting (Columbia, S. C., 1856),
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the C entral o f G eorgia confronted fighting and bitterness over this issue. 
"Some disturbances originating from sectional differences am ong the 
laborers," Superintendent Reynolds reported, "in terrup ted  for a short tim e 
the harm ony w hich had previously prevailed th roughout the line." h i 
response, the contractors resorted  "to the em ploym ent of blacks altogether." 
In his next report, Reynolds argued that his views "on the subject of the 
em ploym ent of slave labor have been much strengthened by  the experience 
of the la s t Sum m er."61 W hen conflict arose w ith  w hite laborers, 
m anagem ent could  sim ply dism iss them.
D espite difficulties w ith  slaves and slave ow ners, southern  railroad 
m anagers praised the use of slave labor. Unlike northern  free labor, slaves 
could n o t strike, and  m any southern railroad m anagers argued  that they cost 
less than  free labor. Reynolds told stockholders that slaves proved "perfectly 
adapted to the construction of internal im provem ent" and  guarded against 
the "fluctuations and vicissitudes" of northern free labor. Edw ard Palm er, 
president of the C harlotte and  South Carolina, declared slave labor m ore 
"economical" and "efficient" than  free labor. John Childe, chief engineer of 
the M obile and Ohio, agreed. H e proffered that "owning an d  controlling"
36: E leventh A nnual M eeting of the Stockholders of the M obile and Ohio 
Rail Road Co. (Mobile, Ala., 1859), Table 12.
61T hird Report. C entral Railroad and Banking Com pany of Georgia 
(Savannah, Ga., 1839), 34: Fourth Report. C entral Railroad and  Banking 
Com pany of Georgia (Savannah. Ga., 1839), 44.
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slave labor "freed" southern railroads "from the fluctuations incident to  the 
em ploym ent o f foreigners."62
Thus it w as on  the issue of slavery, and not on  ideas about econom ic 
m odernization, th a t the N orth an d  South differed. Southerners, like their 
northern counterparts, believed th a t railroads w ould transform  their 
economy. D espite m uch historiographical debate over m odernization in  the 
antebellum  South, a  study of sou thern  railroads discloses that the South 
embraced the sam e bureaucratic ideals that A lfred C handler discovered a t 
w ork on no rthern  railroads.63 By developing sim ilar organizational 
structures, job specialization, rules and regulations, accounting procedures,
62Third Report. Central Railroad and Banking Com pany of Georgia 
(Savannah, Ga., 1839), 32-35: Proceeding of the C harlotte and South Carolina 
Railroad a t th e ir Second Annual M eeting a t W innsboro (Columbia. S. C., 
1849), 4; Proceedings of the Fifth A nnual M eeting of the Stockholders of the 
Mobile & O hio Rail Road Com pany (Mobile. 1853), 16.
63O n the m odernization debate, see Eugene D. Genovese, The 
Slaveholders' Dilemma: Freedom  and Progress in Southern C onservative 
Thought. 1820-1860 (Columbia: U niversity of South C arolina Press, 1992); J. 
Mills T hornton m , Politics and Pow er in a Slave Society: Alabama. 1800- 
1860 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1978); Lacy K. Ford, Jr., 
Origins of Southern Radicalism: The South Carolina U pcountrv. 1800-1860 
(Oxford: O xford University Press, 1988); James Oakes, Slavery and Freedom : 
An In terpretation  of the Old South (New York: V intage Books, 1990); 
Laurence Shore, Southern C apitalists: The Ideological Leadership of an 
Elite. 1832-1885 (Chapel Hill: The U niversity of N orth  C arolina Press, 1986); 
John A shw orth, Slavery. Capitalism , and Politics in the Antebellum  
Republic. Vol. 1: Commerce and Com prom ise. 1820-1850 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge U niversity Press, 1995); G avin W right, The Political F rrm om y of 
the Cotton South: H ouseholds. M arkets, and W ealth in  the N ineteenth 
Century (N ew  York, 1986); Fred Batem an and Thom as W eiss, A Deplorable 
Scarcity: The Failure of Industrialization in the Slave Economy (Chapel
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and technology, the South m irrored  the N orth in  m any respects. W hat d id  
distinguish the tw o systems was th a t w hite southerners firm ly believed th a t 
economic progress included the "peculiar institu tion ."
R ailroad m odernization also influenced so u th ern  thought. Sam Tate, 
the president o f th e  M emphis and Charleston, saw  a  South transform ed by 
the railroad. A long the line he saw  a "division" of 'Tabor and capital" 
associated w ith  the beginning of m anufacturing. H e adm ired new m ills, 
grist m ills, flouring  mills, foundries, railroad car factories, wagon shops, and  
cotton factories. H e believed railroads w ould allow  the South to rival N ew  
England for econom ic grow th.64 O thers agreed. Some believed they saw  a  
new South em erging in the 1850s. N ew  ideas affected how  southerners 
viewed railroads, factories, and farm s. Indeed, sou thern  farm ers and 
planters, such as Isham  Howze, discussed and im plem ented new 
bureaucratic ideas of system, uniform ity, and control.
Hill: The U niversity  of N orth C arolina Press, 1981); Sm ith, M astered by the 
Clock. 70-92.
“ Seventh A nnual R eport o f the  D irectors o f the Stockholders in the  
Memphis C harleston  Railroad C om pany (M emphis, Tenn., 1857), 28; N inth  
Annual R eport o f the D irectors to the Stockholders in  the  M emphis and 
Charleston R ailroad Com pany (M em phis, Tenn., 1859), 18.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 2
SYSTEM AND ORGANIZATION IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH
The rap id  grow th of railroads played an im portan t role in  the 
diffusion of bureaucratic and system atic ideas during the 1840s and 1850s. 
Southern railroad  m anagers, like their northern counterparts, began to list 
officers and w orkers in  rough organizational charts and  govern their 
activities according to rules an d  regulations. In addition, southern railroads 
adopted com plex accounting m ethods to control goods and services. In 
many ways, these organizational ideas aligned w ith progressive 
southerners' conceptions of efficient m anagem ent of p lantations and of 
society. Like the railroads, the northern  factory system  influenced southern  
attitudes tow ard labor efficiency and  discipline.1
1See especially, Alfred D. Chandler, The Visible H and: The 
M anagerial R evolution in A m erican Business (Cambridge: H arvard 
University Press, 1977); James R. Beniger, The C ontrol R evolution: 
Technological and Economic O rigins of the Inform ation Society (Cambridge: 
H arvard U niversity Press, 1986); D avid A. Hounshell, From  the A m erican 
System to Mass Production. 1800-1932: The D evelopm ent of M anufacturing 
Technology in  the United States (Baltimore: The Johns H opkins U niversity 
Press, 1984); M erritt Roe Sm ith, H arpers Ferry A rm ory and the New 
Technology: The Challenge of C hange (Ithaca: C ornell U niversity Press, 
1977); H erbert G. Gutm an, "W ork, C ulture, and Society in  Industrializing 
America. 1815-1919." The A m erican H istorical Review  78 (Tune 1973): 531- 
588; Louis Galam bos, 'Technology, Political Economy and
50
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C o n tra ry  to conventional historical wisdom, reform  m inded 
southerners adm ired m uch of w hat they saw  in the N orth. Only in the late 
1850s, as sectional hostility peaked, d id  Southerners condem n northern 
society and  its factory system, h i fact, southern reform ers saw  this system in  
the N orth  no t as evil b u t as beneficial to the South's prosperity . Some 
Southerners exam ined northern business practices and reform s and 
em ulated them . O ne reform er, for instance, com pared th e  "system" he 
found in  N ew  England's textile m ills w ith  that on southern  plantations. 
Each had  "particular departm ents" th a t arranged the production process 
system atically. A nother w riter for a  southern agricultural journal adm ired 
the technology in  northern  factories and  expressed his belief that the South, 
like the N orth , needed to combine "the plow , the loom, an d  the anvil."
Professionalization: C entral Themes o f the O rganizational Synthesis," 
Business H istory Review 57 (4): 471-493; Joyce Chaplin, A n A nxious Pursuit: 
A gricultural Innovation and M odernity in  the Lower South. 1730-1815 
(Chapel H ill: U niversity of N orth C arolina Press, 1993); Jam es Oakes, 
Slavery and  Freedom : A n Interpretation of the Old South (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1990) and  "From Republicanism  to Liberalism : Ideological 
Change and  the Crisis of the Old South," American Q uarterly  47 (Autum n 
1985): 551-571; M ark M. Smith, M astered bv the Clock: Time. Slavery, and 
Freedom  in  the A m erican South (Chapel HUl: U niversity of N orth Carolina 
Press, 1997); Laurence Shore, Southern Capitalists: The Ideological 
Leadership of an Elite. 1832-1885 (C hapel Hill: U niversity of N orth  Carolina 
Press, 1986); Vicki V aughn Johnson, The M en and the V ision of the 
Southern Com m ercial Conventions. 1845-1871 (Columbia: U niversity of 
M issouri Press, 1992); Paul F. Paskoff, 'Inven tion  and C ulture in  the Old 
South, 1790-1860," U npublished Paper delivered at W orks-in-Progress 
Sem inar, Louisiana State U niversity, N ovem ber 1991.
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H enry Clay, the father o f the A m erican System, asked rhetorically  after 
view ing northern textile m ills, "W ho has no t been deligh ted  w ith  the clock­
w ork movements of a  large cotton factory?"2
Such com m entators dem onstrate that progressive southerners did 
not fear economic m odernization b rough t on by the railroads o r industry. 
This is not to say, how ever, that reform ers did not face resistance from 
upcountry farm ers and those who feared  the effects of m odernization.3 
N evertheless, sou thern  reform ers transform ed new  in d u stria l ideas of 
system , technology, organization, an d  control into a  unique vision of 
m odernization based on  agriculture and  slave labor. They applied  
organizational structures, usually associated w ith the n o rth ern  states, to 
several aspects of sou thern  society. A gricultural and educational reform , as 
well as agricultural and com m ercial organizations, w ere the clearest 
expressions of these new  organizational innovations.
2"Domestic Industry—M anufactures at the South," D e Bow 's Review 8 
(February 1850): 142; 'T he Seven W onders of New England," Southern 
C ultivator 6 (December 1848): 186; (Hay quoted in  G utm an, "W ork, Culture, 
and Society," 551.
3O n southern resistance, see especially Eugene D. G enovese, The 
Political Economy of Slavery: Studies in  the Economy and  Society of the 
Slave South (New York: Pantheon Books, 1965); T hornton, Politics and 
Pow er in a Slave Society. 267-342; Ford, Jr. O rigins of Southern  Radicalism . 
308-337; Gavin W right, The Political Economy of the C otton  South; 
H ouseholds. M arkets, an d  W ealth in  the N ineteenth C entury  (New York: 
W. W. N orton & Com pany, 1978), 89-127.
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Both the N orth an d  the  South em braced econom ic m odernization 
and  the new  organizational structures associated w ith  it. For example, 
sou thern  agricultural reform ers espoused making "factories in the fields."4 
Southern  agricultural jou rnals trum peted  the virtue o f system  and 
uniform ity and proposed a m ore efficient organization of plantation labor, 
the adoption  of new  agricu ltu ral im plem ents, and b e tte r accounting 
m ethods. Similarly, educational reform ers encouraged order, efficiency, and 
bureaucratic control for sou thern  schools. They averred  that technical 
schools and agricultural colleges w ould allow the South to reap the benefits
4James Oakes, The R uling Race: A H istory o f A m erican Slaveholders 
(N ew  York: Alfred A. K nopf, 1982), 153-191; Kenneth M. Stampp, The 
Peculiar Institution: S lavery in  the Ante-Bellum South  (New York:
V intage Books, 1956), 34-85; Robert W illiam Fogel an d  Stanley L. Engerman, 
Tim e on the Cross: The Econom ics of American N egro Slavery (Boston: 
L ittle, Brown and Com pany, 1974), 191-209; John H ebron Moore, The 
Em ergence of the C otton K ingdom  in the Old Southwest: Mississippi, 1770- 
1860 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988), 77-115; Jacob 
M etzer, "Rational M anagem ent, M odem  Business Practices, and Economies 
of Scale in  the A nte-Bellum  S outhern  Plantations," Explorations in 
Economic H istory 12 (1975): 123-150; R. Keith A ufhauser, "Slavery and 
Scientific M anagem ent," Toumal of Economic H istory 33 (December 1973): 
811-824; Giorgio C anarella an d  John A. Tomaske, "The O ptim al U tilization 
of Slaves," Toumal of Econom ic H istory 35 (September 1975): 621-629; 
C hester M cArthur D estler, "D avid D ickson's 'System o f Farm ing' and the 
A gricultural Revolution in  the D eep South, 1850-1885," A gricultural History 
31 (3) (1957): 30-39; G. M elvin H erndon, "A gricultural Reform in 
A ntebellum  Virginia: W illiam  G alt, Jr., A Case S tudy," Agricultural H istory 
52 (3) (1978): 394-406; W eym outh T. Jordan, "Noah B. C loud and the 
'A m erican C otton P lo tte r/"  Agricultural H istory 31 (3) (1957): 44-49; Robert 
W. W illiam s, "Thomas A ffleck: M issionary to the P lan ter, the Farmer, and  
the G ardener," A gricultural H istory 31 (3) (1957): 40-48.
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of technological progress w ithout disturbing the social order based on 
slavery.
In  addition , the introduction of the railroad  an d  the expansion of the 
m arket spurred  the grow th of agricultural and com m ercial organizations. 
Southern farm ers and plantation ow ners form ed agricultural societies for a 
variety of purposes. Prim arily, they organized them selves to take advantage 
of the m arket expansion that resulted from  the railroad . These 
organizations encouraged better farm ing techniques, efficient plantation 
m anagem ent, crop diversification, and technological progress. 
C orrespondingly, sou thern  commercial conventions, form ed by the elite in  
southern society, prom oted railroad expansion, riv er m aintenance, 
agricultural im provem ent, and industrial developm ent.5
The antebellum  South, like the N orth, struggled  w ith  m odernization 
and reform . Southerners d id  not live in  an  econom ic o r social vacuum .
They perceived the changes created by industry and the railroad. By the 
1840s and 1850s, southern reformers accepted the ideas associated w ith a 
m odem  economy: system , uniform ity, technology, organization, and 
bureaucratic control. In  defense of their agrarian culture they applied them  
to the plantation, to education, and to the m arket. Progressive southerners 
perceived them selves as rational m en adapting to a  changing economy and
5Johnson, Southern Com mercial C onventions. 1-12.
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society. They envisioned a  society that un ited  technology, organization, and 
education. They em braced b o th  m odernization and the "peculiar 
in stitu tion ."6
The introduction o f the railroad, the expansion of the m arket, and the 
em ergence of the A m erican system  of m anufacturing created a  new  
organizational m entality in  the antebellum  N o rth  and South. S outhern 
reform ers saw  them selves as p a rt of, not separate from, industrial changes 
and the expanding m arket structure. M odem  technology and organizational 
ideas captured their im agination. In the 1840s and 1850s, southerners 
com m ented frequently o n  the influence of m achinery and steam  pow er. 
Progressive southerners em ployed m achines and  steam  pow er as m etaphors 
for social progress. E ditorialists wrote of the transform ing pow er of steam  
and the railroad in the South. De Bow's Review , the South's leading  
industria l journal, com pared  "civil society" to  a  "machine" w here 'lab o r, 
capital, and  intelligence" form ed essential p arts of social progress. "It cannot 
be denied," m arveled an  ed ito ria l w riter from  Alabam a, "that th e  Steam 
engine has the sodal, m oral, and  political, as w ell as a  potent physical 
energy" to create a "m odem  civilization" by converting "the w ilderness into
6O n the m odernization debate see, Eugene D. Genovese, T he 
Slaveholders' Dilemma: Freedom  and Progress in Southern C onservative 
Thought. 1820-1860 (Colum bia: University of South Carolina Press, 1992); 
Sm ith, M astered by the d o c k . 70-92; Drew G ilpin Faust, "The R hetoric and 
R itual of A griculture in  A ntebellum  South C arolina," Journal of Southern  
H istory 45 (November, 1979): 541-568.
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a garden." Steam  pow er, a sym bol of the age, brought effusive praise in 
southern journals: "The revolu tion  occasioned in  the w orld  by the 
application to purposes of land  com m unication of the w onderous elem ent 
of steam," one jou rnal crow ed, w ill im prove the South "m orally, socially, 
politically . . .  fo r a  century of progress." Steam pow er had. "dim inished 
labour, destroyed space, lengthened tim e, and created a new  world."7
The new  w orld  of the railroad , industry, and the m arket influenced 
how  Southerners view ed their farm s and plantations. B ureaucratic ideas 
grew  m ore fertile  as Southerners tried  to fit their slave econom y into an 
increasingly m echanized and organized  national economy- A gricultural 
reform ers espoused a  system  of p lan tation  m anagem ent th a t differed little 
from  the bureaucratic structures and  business practices of railroads and 
factories. System , uniform ity, and  control became their m antra.
Southern agricultural reform ers shared railroad and  factory 
m anagers' respect for rules, regulations, control of time, system , and 
rudim entary bureaucratic structures. Furtherm ore, system atic m anagem ent 
encouraged accounting practices, proper slave m anagem ent, and  the use of 
new  technology. It also became the subject of many articles in  southern 
journals. For instance, a w riter fo r the Southern P lan ter  urged  his fellow
7"Com m ercial Spirit of the South," De Bow's R eview  2 (September
1846): 120: "Rail Roads." A m erican C otton P lanter 1 (18531: 25; "Railway 
Systems and Projects in  Europe an d  America." De Bow's R eview  3 (February
1847): 138.
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southerners to  ru n  their p lantations efficiently. "System" he w rote, "is as 
essential in  farm ing as in  any o th er occupation of life." By system , he m eant 
m aking strategic plans for planting, keeping a  tight inventory, an d  using an 
accounting book.8 O ther southerners echoed the call fo r system  and 
connected technological progress w ith  plantation m anagem ent. As one 
reform er w ro te, "a plantation m ight be considered as a  piece of machinery; 
to operate successfully, all its parts should be uniform  and  exact, and the
im pelling force regular and steady; and the m aster should be their
im pelling force.”9 Thus, a p lan tation  should run  m uch like a m achine, w ith 
system an d  uniform ity of action. Clearly, these agricultural reform ers 
accepted new  ideas developed by an  industrializing society.
By the 1850s, the virtue o f system  and uniform ity had  become such an 
ingrained idea tha t a contributor to  the Southern P lan ter signed his editorial 
"A Lover o f System .” He applied the ideals of business efficiency to 
southern agricu ltu re. The first item  of im portance in  running  a  system atic 
farm, he asserted , w as the use of a  "day book." In it all w ork w as to be 
recorded and  arranged in the m ost efficient m anner. Regulations had to be 
strictly enforced. The farm er needed to "be firm and  unflinching in  seeing 
that" his "ru les are carried out to the letter by overseer and  slaves. Do not
8"Svstem ." Southern P lan ter 1 (February 18411: 29.
9”M gm t. of Slaves," Southern  C ultivator 4 (M arch 1846): 44.
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let rules be violated." Finally, the farm  or plantation should  be w ell ordered 
and im plem ents placed in  assigned locations. "Let system  be found on every 
part of your farm ," he w rote, "and in  all your m anagem ent, [and] you w ill 
certainly prosper."10 The practices he prepared for farm ing followed the 
bureaucratic m ethods associated w ith  m odem  m anagem ent: rules, 
regulations, p roper accounting, and control of labor.
C areful record keeping becam e an  especially im portan t com ponent in  
the system atic m anagem ent o f plantations. A Louisiana p lanter listed 
proper accounting as the first ru le  of successful m anagem ent. All item s on a 
plantation, he m aintained, m u st be accounted for w ith  "a full, perfect, and 
accurate list, or inventory." To keep a firm  grasp of p ro fit and  loss, accounts 
needed to be updated on a  quarterly  basis. As a consequence of the emphasis 
upon system atic bookkeeping, advertisem ents for accounting books 
flourished in  antebellum  sou thern  journals and new spapers. By all m atter 
and m eans, agricultural reform ers encouraged the use of these books to 
control costs, labor, inventory, and  planting inform ation.11
These agricultural reform ers often noted how  railroads, banks, and 
other businesses used accounting m ethods to im prove system  and  control. 
"The m erchant, banker, tradesm an, and alm ost every o ther business m an
10"N ecessity of System," Southern Planter 10 (January 1850): 30.
n,,Rules in  the M anagem ent of a  Southern Estate" De Bow's Review 
21 (December 1856): 617.
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keeps an  account of his affairs regularly and punctually /' one observed. 
Farms, he explained, m ust n o t be ru n  in  a  "hap-hazard m anner," w ithout 
"system” o r "clockwork regularity." A nother agreed. As m anufacturers 
cannot operate  by  "guessw ork,” neither can the farm er. "In alm ost every 
other business," he m aintained, "regular accounts are deem ed necessary to 
the proper conducting of its affairs."12
A long w ith  accounting m ethods, tim e m anagem ent also becam e a 
much discussed topic. Southern reform ers again looked to  o ther enterprises 
for exam ples of how  best to ru n  a  plantation. A n Alabama p lan ter 
com plained th a t "the m erchant, the banker, the m echanic a n d  the  
m anufacturer, all have defined  hours of labor an d  business," w hile the 
planter has left his operations to "chance and circum stances." H e suggested 
better tim e m anagem ent w ith a  "signal, a t a  prescribed hou r —  for rising" 
and another "for starting to . . .  work." By clock m anagem ent, he concluded, 
a planter could  ensure "uniform ity and  system" of labor.13
M any p lanters and farm ers took tim e m anagem ent seriously. They 
incorporated a m odem  view  of tim e that resem bled that of ra ilroad  and
12"P lantation Register and  A ccount Books," Southern C u ltivato r 12 
(February 1854): 55; "Farm Accounts," Southern C ultivator 12 (January 
1854): 31: "Farm Book-keeping." Southern C ultivator 13 (February 1855): 
54.
13 "P lantation  Regulations," The Soil of the South 1 (February 1851).
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factory m anagers into their p lan tation  rules.14 'I t  is strictly  required," one 
reform er w rote, th a t "the m an ag er. . .  rise a t daw n o f day  every morning; 
that he blow  a  h o rn  assem bling o f the hands" and  requ ire  the hands to be in  
place "in ten  m inutes after the blow ing of the horn." Jam es Tait, an 
A labam a p lan ter, blew  "the h o rn  a t sunrise for the negroes to start to work— 
To m ake them  g et off quick after the horn is blow n, alw ays w hip the last one 
out." T ait also tim ed lunch an d  d inner m eticulously.15 A Louisiana planter 
com m ented th a t tim e m anagem ent and accurate record  keeping of all facets 
of the farm 's operations w as su p erio r to intuition an d  m em ory. "When a 
farm er rises in  th e  m orning," he advised, "he should  know  precisely the 
w hole w ork of the day." In fact, he added, he should  inform  his workers the 
night before of the next day 's operations. The p lan ter concluded his rem arks 
w ith  a  jerem iad: "W ithout system , no m an should en te r upon a farm er's
life; w ithou t system  he will not, cannot succeed; unless system  guides
every project and  order presides over every departm ent of his farm."16
14See especially, Smith, M astered by the Clock. 69-92; Gutman, "W ork, 
C ulture, and  Society," 551-557.
15"M anagem ent of N egroes." De Bow’s Review  14 (February 1853):
177; Jam es A. Tait Diary, N ovem ber 15,1852, Box 1, Folder 8, in  Tait Family 
Papers, A uburn  U niversity A rchives, A uburn, A labam a.
16 "System  in  Farm ing," S outhern  C u ltiv a to r  7 (June 1849): 82-83: O n 
the im portance of tim e see especially, Smith, M astered  by the Clock. 69-92; 
G utm an, "W ork, C ulture, and  Society," 551-557; and  E. P. Thom pson, "Time, 
W ork-D isdpline, and  Industrial Capitalism ," Past and  Present. 38 (1967): 56- 
97.
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M ost agricultural reform ers agreed. A common refrain , as expressed 
by one reform er, w as that p lan tation  m anagem ent requ ired  "uniform ity in  
governm ent" th a t included ru les and a labor hierarchy com parable to 
"m ilitary governm ent.” Rules an d  regulations should contro l laborers' 
tim e, responsibilities, and w ork habits. If m anaged properly, a plantation 
could "move off like clockwork" and  the labor operated w ith  "uniformity 
and system ."17 For this reason, the  Southern P lanter stressed that "good 
m anagem ent consists not only in  providing w ork for your laborers but in 
the m anner in  w hich the laborers them selves are controlled." The journal 
criticized fau lty  p lantation  m anagem ent in  the South "arising either horn 
ignorance o r w ant of system." A plantation required strict ru les "calculated 
to com m and an d  control others" and  to provide "system, o rder, and 
m anagem ent."18
As a resu lt of the trend tow ard a bureaucratic system , rules and 
regulations on  som e plantations resem bled those of a  m ilitary, railroad, or 
factory organization. Reformers often argued that a p lantation needed to be 
broken dow n in to  departm ents w ith  specialized jobs and tasks.19 "In the
17Soil o f the  South 1 (February 1851).
18,’Slavery." Southern P lan ter 1 (September 1841): 157.
19Oakes, The Ruling R ace. 153-160; Fogel and Engerm an, Time on the 
Cross. 184-209; Chandler, The Visible H and. 64-67; A ufhauser, "Slavery and 
Scientific M anagem ent," 816-820; M etzer, "Rational M anagem ent," 123-126.
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different departm ents o n  the plantation/' w ro te  one contributor to the 
Southern C ultivator, "as m uch distinction an d  separation are kep t up  as 
possible, w ith a view to  create responsibility." The w riter m aintained that a 
p lantation should be d iv ided  into separate departm ents, each w ith  an  
overseer responsible for "subordinate persons."20 For m anagerial control of 
slaves, Joseph Acklin added , a planter had "to establish some accountability 
am ongst the negroes" w ith  each having "special assignm ents." W ith this 
m ethod, the planter or overseer could contro l his labor because he knew 
who w as responsible for specific tasks.21
P. C. W eston of South Carolina also h e ld  m any of these view s of 
system  and control. H e outlined a bureaucratic structure of labor 
m anagem ent that assigned every slave a  specific job. U nder the w hite 
overseer, the slave drivers w ere responsible fo r "discipline and order." They 
rang the m orning bell and  ensured that the o th er slaves got up  and to work. 
Slave drivers also held responsibility for the "proper perform ance of tasks," 
and they inspected and approved all work. W eston outlined the different 
jobs on the plantation, including watchm en, truck-m inders, nurses, cooks, 
and house slaves. In W eston's view, a labor h ierarchy and  job specialization
20"Mgmt. of Slaves," Southern C u ltivato r 4 (M arch 1846): 44.
21"Rules in the M anagem ent of a S outhern  Estate," De Bow's Review
22 (April 1857): 380.
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created system  and accountability.22 Such arrangem ents, if not 
com m onplace, existed o n  m any plantations. A n observer of G overnor 
George M cDuffie's co tton  plantation  discovered a  sim ilar bureaucratic 
structu re for field hands. There, he found laborers d iv ided into separate 
classes: "1st, the best hands, em bracing those of good judgem ent and quick 
m otion. 2d, Those of the  w eakest and m ost inefficient class. 3d, the second 
class o f hoe hands." The observer noted tha t the "classified" positions 
created an  efficient and w ell-organized labor system .23
D espite the reform ers' ideals, and their adoption  of many, a  large 
num ber of plantations d id  no t ru n  efficiently. W ithin  the bureaucratic 
system  of plantation m anagem ent, the position o f overseer posed a 
significant problem . O verseers w ere caught betw een the dem and for high 
yields and  proper treatm ent of slaves. U nfortunately, slaves suffered the 
b ru n t of this contradiction.24 Plantation ow ners b itterly  com plained th a t 
overseers w ere uneducated, d id  no t properly care for the slaves, and d id  not
“ "M anagem ent o f a S outhern  Plantation," De Bow's Review 22 
(January 1857): 42-43.
“ "G overnor M cD uffie's C otton P lantation," De Bow's Review 6 
(A ugust 1848): 149-150; See also, Charles G. Steffen, "In  Search of the G ood 
O verseer: The Failure o f the A gricultural Reform  M ovem ent in 
Low country South C arolina, 1821-1834," Toumal o f Southern H istory 63 
(Novem ber 1997): 753-802.
24James O. Breeden. A dvice Among M asters: The Ideal in Slave 
M anagem ent in  the O ld South (W estport. Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 
1980), 291.
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ru n  a  p lan tation  efficiently. These com plaints p rom pted  reform ers to 
suggest that overseers becom e a  tightly controlled p a rt of the plantation 
organization. Regulations fo r the proper system  of p lantation  m anagem ent 
w ere in terw oven w ith  ru les to  control m iddle m anagem ent.
The problem s posed by  the ineptitude and b ru tality  of overseers could 
be solved, reform ers believed, by w ritten rules to  control abuse and provide 
for system atic m anagem ent. A ndrew  Flynn, a Yazoo-M ississippi D elta 
p lanter, developed rules based  upon suggestions m ade in  southern 
agricu ltu ral journals. The ru les for overseers included the regular 
inspection of ditches, fences, im plem ents, anim als, an d  slave quarters every 
m orning and night. All aspects of the plantation, Flynn m aintained, should  
be kep t in  "m inute detail" in  an  accounting book.25 A nother M ississippi 
p lan ter am plified this advice: "The overseer shall keep a plantation book" 
in  w hich he w ould record the health  of the slaves, w eather, and the 
condition of the crop. M oreover, he would "keep in  it the weights of the 
daily picking of each hand; th e  m ark, num ber and  w eight of each bale of 
cotton, an d  the time of sending  the same to m a rk e t/'26 A nother reform er 
w rote, an  overseer "should be orderly and system atic in  everything; he
25W illiam  Kauffm an Scarborough, The O verseer: Plantation 
M anagem ent in  the O ld South  (Baton Rouge: L ouisiana State University, 
1966), 68-70.
26Ibid., 71.
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should have sense enough to  m ake just and sensible regulations for the 
governm ent of the negroes an d  firm ness to execute them .”27
h i addition  to controlling the overseer, agricultural reform ers stressed 
the proper treatm ent of slave labor, especially as sectional discord increased 
in the 1850s. They expected th a t set rules and bureaucratic control w ould 
create a  m ore hum ane and ra tio n a l working environm ent. They proposed 
m ore system atic and uniform  m anagem ent and pun ishm ent of slaves. As a 
result, ru les for the behavior an d  actions of slaves resem bled m ilitary, 
railroad, and  factory regulations, w ith one critical exception: plantation 
rules requ ired  the "entire subm ission and obedience . . .  on  the p art of every 
negro." D rinking, adultery, fighting, and trading w ere strictly forbidden.28 
"The negroes," Joseph Acklen w rote, "must be certain ly  punished  for 
abusing the stock" and "losing their implements o f work." O nly by "strictly 
and rigidly adhering" to these rules could a p lantation  be ru n  efficiently.29
Physical force was em ployed to enforce these rules. W hipping was 
common. Southern agricultural reform ers, how ever, even tried  to m ake 
violence system atic. "Never p u n ish  a negro w hen in  a  passion," advised an
27Tow nes, James M. "To a Young Friend” S outhern  C ultivato r (1847 )  
quoted in  Breeden, Advice A m ong M asters. 298.
28"Rules in  the M anagem ent of a Southern Estate," De Bow's Review 
22 (April 1857): 378.
29"Rules in  the M anagem ent of a Southern Estate," D e Bow's Review 
21 (December 1856): 617.
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A labam a planter, because "no one is capable of properly regulating the 
punishm ent for an offense w hen angry." In  o ther w ords, to ru n  a 
p lan tation  rationally an d  system atically, a slaveholder needed to  avoid 
em otional excesses. P lanters should "always attem pt to govern by reaso n . . .  
and reso rt to force only w hen reason fails." If w hipping took place, the
ow ner should clearly sta te  the offense to the slave and "never leave the
im p ressio n . . .  you take pleasure in  his punishm ent." In this way, 
punishm ent could becom e "a regular and  system atic plan of operation" on a  
w ell-run plantation.30
O ther slave holders agreed w ith this view  of slave m anagem ent. A 
V irginia p lan ter w rote th a t "the m anagem ent of negroes" should  be done
w ith  "perfect uniform ity of conduct tow ard them  The best evidence of
good m anagem ent of slaves" he believed, "is the im partiality of 
treatm ent."31 James T ait lam ented tha t he had  no t im plem ented rules to 
regulate his slaves earlier. "Oh! if I had  adopted them  10 or 15 years ago," 
he w rote, "how vastly better for m y interests, and for my negroes good." H e 
believed that w ell-regulated and "properly treated" slaves w ill do more
^'M anagem ent o f Slaves." De Bow's Review  18 (June 1855): 717-718.
31"On the M anagem ent of Negroes. A ddressed to the Farm ers and 
O verseers of Virginia," Farm ers' R egister 1 (February 1834): 564-65.
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w ork in  10 hours, th an  those that are pushed  all the tim e, will do in  12 
hours."32
Clearly, then, sou thern  agricultural reform ers saw  no contradiction 
betw een slavery and m odem  business practices. By the 1850s, they had 
succeeded in  m aking th e  system atic m anagem ent o f plantations an ideal, if 
n o t a general reality. Southern agricultural reform ers stressed new 
bureaucratic ideas: system , uniform ity, accounting, tim e m anagem ent, and  
labor control. They adop ted  the bureaucratic structures tha t developed 
sim ultaneously in  n o rth ern  industry and o n  railroads. In  general, the ir 
approach to m anagem ent differed little from  th a t of northern  factory ow ners 
o r railroad  m anagers. They em braced m odernization and  new 
organizational ideas, in to  w hich they in teg ra ted  the "peculiar institu tion."
In  accordance w ith  their encouragem ent of system atic plantation 
m anagem ent, southern  reform ers also h igh ligh ted  the advantages of 
technology and m achinery. The railroad, in  th e ir view , provided the first 
step  in  the transform ation of the southern econom y. De Bow's Review , for 
instance, observed th a t the "power of steam , an d  its application to the 
engine and to m achinery" had  accom plished in  a  few  years w hat had taken  
"centuries before . . .  to  accomplish." In a sim ilar fashion, A. G. Sum m er
32James Tait D iary, M arch [?], 1850 and  N ovem ber 22,1850, Box 1, 
Folder 8, Tait Family Papers, A uburn U niversity A rchives, A uburn, 
A labam a.
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to ld  the Southern C entral A gricultural Society that "engines w ith  life- 
throbbing pulsations, sn o r t. . .  ready to p ropel useful m achinery." Southern 
farm ers, he counselled, needed to adop t th is new  technology "to go on 
steadily  in  the w ork  of im provem ent."33 Southern reform ers saw  that 
technology, organization, and economic progress were interw oven.
Therefore, they im plored farm ers an d  planters to use scientific 
m ethods and new  technology. They constantly  chided "hum bugs" who 
attacked "bookfarm ing" and "yankee" farm  im plem ents. T hat farm ing 
could be m astered by science and technology became part of the progressive 
ideal, and it w as identified  w ith an increasingly m echanized economy. One 
p lanter captured th is po in t clearly w hen he com pared the know ledge of 
running a p lan tation  to the complex operations of running a railroad.
"Place the levers o f a  locomotive in  the hands of one w ho h ad  never before 
seen the pow erful m achine,” he w rote, "and instead of being able to run  it 
w ith  the speed of the w ind," he will be sadly  "puzzled." H e also com pared 
know ledge of farm ing to a textile factory. "W hat could a plow m an do if 
required to supervise a  cotton factory?" H e argued that farm ers and planters 
needed the same expertise and know ledge of technology required  of railroad
“ "Com m ercial S p irit at the South," De Bow's Review  2 (September 
1846): 122; "A nniversary Address delivered before the Southern C entral 
A gricultural Society, M acon, Georgia, O ctober 4,1852, by A. G. Summer, of 
South Carolina," Steam  Power Press of C hronicle & Sentinel, A ugusta, 
Georgia, 1853.
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engineers and  cotton factory m anagers. He thereby related plantation 
m anagem ent, not to old ideas, b u t to the new ideas of an  industrializing 
society. A plantation, he m aintained, had  to be m astered like a m achine. A 
m achine o r farm  could not be ru n  "w ithout the know ledge of all its parts" 
nor a "m astery of facts and principles." He also asserted that Southerners 
needed m ore "yankee ingenuity" and  to become "inventors of farm  
m achines" w ho were 'b o ld  enough to lead" the South in to  the future.34
The bonding of science and technology w ith the ideas of system  an d  
uniform ity perm eated southern  agricultural literature in  the late 
antebellum  period. South C arolina's James H enry H am m ond, for exam ple, 
drew  the connection betw een technology and the system atic m anagem ent of 
a farm  in  an  1850 speech to the South Carolina Institute. "In the 
construction of machinery," he lectured, "it is necessary th a t its sm allest 
parts should be as perfectly adapted as its largest. . .  and the nicest care is 
necessary in  keeping it in  operation." In the same w ay, he concluded, 
southern  farm ers needed to oversee their farm s and plantations w ith 
"thorough and  system atic care on sm all m atters, w hich is absolutely 
indispensable to successful husbandry."35
34 "Forces of the Farm," Am erican Cotton P lanter 1 (1853): 139-140.
35"Progress of Southern Industry. Governor H am m ond's A ddress 
Before the South Carolina Institu te, 1850." De Bow's Review  2 (June 1850): 
506-507; For a fascinating study  on how  Ham m ond tried  to im plem ent 
system atic m anagem ent an d  control on  himself, his plantation, and his
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By the 1840s and 1850s, technology and system  had become 
inseparab le in  the m inds of so u th ern  agricultural reform ers. "The farm ers 
fsicl objection to machinery," the Southern P lan ter w arned "m ust be
overcom e The day has passed  by w hen it w as im agined that the
com prehension of a farm er d id  no t extend beyond a  hoe or an axe." To 
com pete, the P lanter a sser ted , the farm er "m ust be a mechanic. H e w orks 
w ith  tools, and  therefore, is. a  m echanic. M any o f his operations are 
com plicated, and may be facilitated by more or less of labor-saving 
m achinery." The journal concluded that "farm ers m u s t . . .  apply science to 
agricu ltu re . . .  by becoming thoroughly versed i n . . .  mechanical 
principles."36 As they did  in  su p p o rt of bureaucratic reform s, the reform ers 
bu ttressed  their argum ents for technological advancem ent by citing railroads 
and factories as examples. "Since m achinery has been applied, better roads, 
turnpikes, railroads . . .  have been  constructed." The "jenny" and the 
'loom ," one w rote, had "trebled the production o f m any articles." 
N evertheless, the w riter lam ented , "there have been  less im provem ents in  
ag ricu ltu ral im plem ents than  in  m achinery for m anufacturing purposes—
slaves, see D rew  Gilpin Faust, Tames H enry H am m ond and the O ld South:
A D esign for M astery (Baton Rouge: Louisiana S tate University Press, 1982), 
69-134.
^"M achinery." Southern  P lan ter 1 (June 1841): 91-92.
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b u t th is is the age of im provem ent. Let machinery be applied  to husbandry
also.”37
A  contributor to the S ou thern  Cultivator agreed w ith  these view s o f 
technological progress: "We go in to  our gin-houses, and , am idst the 
rum bling of w heels and the w heezing of bands” w e look o n  "with pleasure." 
These m achines, he observed, w ere created from "the principles of 
M echanical Philosophy." These principles needed to  be applied  to "the 
system  of agriculture." J. P. Benjam in drew  the sam e conclusion. W ith 
"skill in  cultivation , system  in  m anagem ent, econom y in  adm inistration , 
both agricu ltu ral and m echanical, and  a judicious application  of labor saving 
devices," the South could create "m odels of plantership."38 As these 
exam ples dem onstrate, sou thern  agricultural reform ers m ade a real 
connection betw een efficiency, system atic organization, and  technology.
In  add ition  to system atic m anagem ent and technology, reform ers also 
proposed scientific m ethods fo r p lanting  and cultivation. They encouraged 
farm s an d  plantations to incorporate the latest scientific findings in  plow ing, 
crop ro tation , ditching, and in  the use of fertilizer. In  this cam paign, they 
fought a n  uphill battle against trad itional fanning practices. Critics of
37"Benefits of M achinery," Southern Planter 8 (December 1848): 367.
38"A ddress Extracts," S ou thern  Cultivator 4 (A ugust 1846): 123; "J. P. 
B enjam in's A ddress on A griculture," De Bow's R eview  5 (January 1848): 44- 
45.
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scientific agriculture deprecated  w hat they called "book farming." Southern 
journals com plained abou t "hum bugs" an d  "old fogies" w ho refused to  
change their agricultural practices. O ne progressive fanner w rote: '1 [am] 
determ ined to brook taun ts and jeers, and  in  some m easure, a t least, tu rn  
'book farm er.'” Southern  ag ricu ltu ral journals encouraged this view  of 
agriculture as a science, no t an  art. A n article in  one urged tha t "every 
departm ent of the g reat business of farm ing is . . .  that A griculture is a 
Science" and a farm er should  "attend the application of H ydraulics in  
M achinery . . .  and chem istry" in  the production of crops.39
Southern reform ers persisted  in  connecting the need for scientific 
agricu lture w ith new  technology and the changing economy. "Look to the 
o th er departm ents of hum an labor: M echanics build bridges, steam boats, 
railroads and . . .  sp in  textile m aterials," one exclaimed. They achieved these 
accom plishm ents w ith  "chem istry and  o ther sciences" and yet the "farm er 
tu rns away." Farm ers, in  other w ords, had  to incorporate the ideas of 
science as other professionals d id  o r they w ere doom ed to "failure." This 
type of argum ent rem ained qu ite  com m on. "The farmer," a Georgia farm er
39"Plantation M anagem ent and  Practice," American C otton P lanter 
an d  Soil of the South 12 (December 1857): 372; "Agriculture as a  Science," 
A m erican Cotton P lan ter and  Soil o f the South 12 (August 18571: 253; 
"Reasons why every Farm er should  pu rsue his Business as a  Science," 
Sou thern  C ultivator 13 (January 1855): 19-20; See also, Carville Earle, "The 
Price of Precocity: Technical Choice and  Ecological Constraint in  the C otton 
South, 1840-1890," A gricultural H istory 66 (3) (1992): 25-60.
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observed, "in these days of steam  and electricity, m ust n o t stand still." 
Indeed, he "m ust q u it laughing a t book farm ing." A nother w rote th a t 
farm ers m ust follow  the "highest o rd er” of the "m echanic arts" an d  use 
"new and im proved methods" of business and science.40
By the 1850s, southern agricultural reform ers believed that 
m odernization could take place in  the South w ithout challenging slavery.
To m odernize the southern econom y, how ever, m ore than  farm s and  
plantations needed reform. They argued that schools needed to be changed 
and bureaucratized. Calls for scientific agriculture, the use of new 
technology, and the systematic m anagem ent of farm s and plantations 
prom pted calls for educational reform . The in troduction of the railroad  and 
the expansion of commerce and trade became a justification for this reform . 
If Southerners desired economic progress accom panied by new technology, 
reform ers argued, they needed better schools that taught science, 
engineering, and m anagem ent. The reform ers' links betw een technology, 
science, system atic m anagem ent, and educational reform  w ere quite clear. A 
contributor to the Southern C ultivator understood the nexus: "Our 
steam ships, railroads, mines, foundries and m achine shops require . . .  
inventive, executive and financial ability.” A ccordingly, the South needed
40"Farm ers, Dignify Your Profession." Southern  C ultivator 17 
(January 1859): 5; "A Word for Progressive Farming," Southern C u ltiva to r 2 
(M arch 1853): 78; "Agricultural Reading,” Southern C u ltiv a to r4 (October 
1846): 154.
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to provide the train ing  ground, especially scientific education, to prepare 
Southerners for "professional life" an d  "the stirring occupations of the 
presen t day." In  the sam e vein, an  agricu ltu ral journal ed ito r argued  that 
the introduction o f the railroad m ade educational reform  a  necessity. 
"W ithout an  increase in  popular know ledge," he w rote, "railroads w ill only 
facilitate the depletion  of the soil, m ultip ly  old fields, and depopulate the 
State." Southern reform ers clam ored for better educational facilities. They 
thought the fu tu re  o f the South depended  on  it. They feared  th a t the region 
w ould fall fu rth e r beh ind  the N orth  econom ically w ithout the  in stitu tion  of 
educational reform s.41
Educational reform ers insisted th a t educational reform  w as essential 
to economic m odernization . A. G. Sum m er told farm ers a t the Southern 
C entral A gricultural Society m eeting in  M acon, Georgia, th a t a "system  of 
education" ought to  be devised th a t p repared  students for "future 
occupations as A griculturists and M echanics, such a system  w ould be the 
paten t of undream ed of prosperity to o u r section of the Union." G. D. 
M itchell em phasized the need for education  in  this "utilitarian  age o f . . .  
rap id  progress." In  h is view , education in  m athem atics, engineering, and 
natu ral philosophy th a t taught "the phenom enon of force and  m otion,
41"A gricultural Colleges," S outhern  C ultivator 17 (Septem ber 1859): 
258; "The Educational W ants of G eorgia," Southern C ultivato r 14 (July 1856): 
205.
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sound, light and  heat, m echanical pow ers and their application, the 
available pow er of steam ” had  to be incorporated in  a  m odem  education 
along w ith  the m ethods of "farm  accounts, including precision, m ethod and  
accuracy."42
Reform ers envisioned technical schools and agricultural colleges as 
the m eans to accelerate the S ou th 's technological and  economic progress. J. 
V. Jones, a G eorgia agricultural reform er, believed th a t the next generation 
of Southerners needed state agricu ltu ral schools to teach "the m echanic arts, 
for the education of men for p rac tid e  fsicl life, instead  of m ultiplying in  an  
alarm ing degree the present school & college system  w hich is dem oralizing 
the largest num ber of youth" an d  producing only "professional diseases & 
vagabonds.” H e to ld  Daniel P ra tt, an  industrialist w ho m anufactured cotton  
gins in  A labam a, and  Bolling H all, an  Alabama agricultural and educational 
reform er, th a t m echanical education  w as "the sign of the times."43
Jones w as no t alone, h i response to the rise of the railroad and the 
factory system , in terest in  engineering education burgeoned in the South.
The U nited States M ilitary A cadem y became the m odel for scientific
S u m m e r, "A nniversary A ddress," 1853; "A gricultural E ducation,” 
Southern C u ltiva to r 11 (October 1853): 307.
43J. V. Jones, A tlanta to M ess. Bolling Hall, D aniel P ratt and O thers. 
Executive Com m ittee of the A utauga County Agl. Association, October 22, 
1853, LPR 39, Box 4, Folder 3, in  Bolling Hall Papers, A labam a D epartm ent of 
Archives and  H istory, M ontgom ery, Alabama.
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education. Southern reform ers hoped  the Virginia M ilitary Institute w ould 
becom e the South 's W est Point.44 M ilitary schools grew  in  popularity in  the 
South because they stressed engineering skills as well as m ilitary 
organization an d  discipline. A South Carolina educational journal, The Self 
Instructor, m ade explicit the connection betw een the grow th of railroads and  
the need for m ilitary schools. "The com plicated operations of a railroad
com pany are no t unlike the strategic m ovem ents of an  arm y "
Therefore, the  article continued, it w as in  the South's "public interest to see 
th a t the highest talen t of the country be developed, especially in  the 
engineer departm ent of the m echanical art, for upon the w isdom  of her 
railroad operations does much of the South's chance for d irect trade and 
com m ercial independence rest." To accom plish this end, the South had to 
"support our m ilitary schools as near as possible on the m odel of West 
Point, and there w ill be no w ant of m echanical talent and  theoretical 
know ledge am ong our youth, to supply  any dem and we make."45
John W hitford, a N orth C arolina p lanter and railroad  builder, heard 
the same argum ent from  fellow N orth  Carolinians. Charles F. Fisher
**Dan R. Frost, "A Confederate Education in the N ew  South: 
Southern A cadem ia and the Idea of Progress in the N ineteenth Century" 
(Ph.D. diss., Louisiana State University, 1994), 13-79.
45"Railroads," The Self Instructor: A M onthly Toumal. Devoted to 
Southern Education and to the D iffusion of a Knowledge of the Resources 
and Power of the South, as represented bv The Negro. The Rail and the 
Press. I (Novem ber 1853): 39-40.
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com plained that the W estern N o rth  C arolina R ailroad Com pany h ad  
difficulty finding a qualified engineer. "Who is to  take charge as C hief 
Officers," he observed, "is an  undeterm ined & som ew hat em barrassing 
question—you know  how hard  it is to find any com pentency—and o u r 
W estern people have not been situ a ted  to learn  m uch of the m atters." 
A nother correspondent, noting the  im portance o f railroads to N orth  
C arolina’s future, advocated better schools. "N orth Carolina w ants a school 
of science as m uch as sh e  d o e s  railroads."  he explained. "I am determ ined  
she shall have one if I can bring it about."46
Reform ers saw  engineering an d  technical education as a rational step  
in  adapting to a changing economy. If the South adopted  agricultural and 
educational reform , they believed, it w ould enjoy the fruits of econom ic 
change. If not, the South w ould fall fu rther beh ind  the industrializing 
N orth. Classical education, reform ers w ere convinced, did not prepare the 
South for the future. An advocate o f m ilitary schools in  South C arolina 
m ade this clear: "The taste for literary  pursuits, am ong the people o f South 
C arolina, have m ade them  conspicuous in the forum ; bu t has it  rendered  us 
properly useful to ourselves, or independent of o ther States? H as it 
extended our commerce, im proved our arts, or established our
46Charles F. Fisher to John D. W hitford, A ugust 31,1855, Box 89.1, and 
Francis L. H aw ks to John D. W hitford, M arch 3,1855, in  John D. W hitford 
Papers, N orth  Carolina State A rchives, Raleigh, N o rth  Carolina.
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m anufactures? Is South C arolina know n, in  the world, for h e r discoveries 
o r her inventions? A re her natu ra l resources yet developed?” To these 
questions, th e  w riter gave a  resounding "no." For that reason, he argued, 
the South h ad  to  change from  an educational system  based o n  literary 
pursuits to one based on science an d  technology. "A crisis, fo r the South, 
may be a t hand," die w riter w arned. "O ur p resent system has to be changed, 
and we m ust effect a  commercial, productive, and m anufacturing 
revolution, if  no other." This step  could  only be taken if the South 
introduced schools th a t taught new  technology and scientific m ethods.47
R eform ers rem ained adam ant. Econom ic m odernization, 
agricultural reform , and educational reform  w ere all connected. They 
understood th a t economic m odernization required  change. They knew the 
next generation needed an appropriate education to prepare them  for the 
adm inistration of railroads, m ines, factories, and  plantations. "If we had a 
son who w as to  be an  Engineer, a M iner, a M achinist, a M erchant or a 
Planter," one w rote, "his early train ing  should  be very d ifferent from  that 
which we should  give if he were to  be a Lawyer, a Clergyman, o r a 
Statesm an.” H e explained that "special pursu its require special preparation.
47"M ilitary Schools of South-C arolina," Southern Q uarterly  Review 3 
(November 1850): 527.
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To p u t one o f o u r sons, ju st o u t of a Classical Institution, to m anage a 
Factory w ould  be as unw ise as to pu t him  a t once to manage—a plantation-"4® 
A lthough southern  reform ers expressed concerns over train ing the 
future generation  for trades in  industry, railroads, and com m erce, the South 
rem ained an  econom y dom inated by cotton. M ost of the discussion 
surrounding educational reform , as a result, centered on the need for 
scientific agriculture. W ith expanding railroads and an in ternational 
m arket, sou thern  reform ers looked for w ays to train future farm ers and 
plantation m anagers. They envisioned agricultural colleges th a t w ould 
teach science, technology, plantation organization, and m ilitary discipline. 
Edm und Ruffin, the South's leading spokesm an for agricultural reform , 
presented his case for agricultural colleges in  the American C otton Planter. 
A t college, Ruffin w rote, students should learn  all the skills necessary for 
com petent p lan tation  m anagem ent. Required subjects w ould include 
arithm etic, geom etry, and chemistry. A long w ith these basics, students 
should stu d y  "mechanical hydrostatics an d  hydraulics," as w ell as "operative 
chem istry" that analyzed soils, m anure, an d  crops.49
48 "M r. C alhoun's A ddress, a t the C arolina Fair," Southern C ultivator 
18 (January I860): 21.
49E dm und Ruffin, "On A gricultural Education," A m erican C otton 
E lante£l (July 1853): 194.
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In R uffin's opinion, learn ing  how to ru n  a  farm  or p lan tation  w ith  
system  and  uniform ity was as im portant as know ledge of chem istry, botany, 
deep plow ing, tillage, crop rotation, and the use of fertilizer. H e strongly 
advocated teaching bureaucratic m anagem ent. A  student, he argued, should 
learn  how  to control labor and h o ld  an overseer to "strict and unrim m itting 
rsicl atten tion  to his duties." Furtherm ore, he said, agricultural colleges 
needed to teach their students to ru n  farms and  plantations in  such a  way 
that "the discipline of the whole establishm ent should be strict, even to the 
degree of m ilitary precision." T his m ilitary precision entailed tig h t labor 
control based on a strict hierarchy. In addition, students had to be trained in 
keeping a "regular journal" th a t allow ed for "a system atic plan, o f all the 
proceedings on the farm." A ccounts should be kept of labor parties and  their 
efficiency, as well as im plem ents, machines, and  agricultural experim ents. If 
the South enacted his plan for agricultural education, Ruffin concluded, it 
w ould create "the best system of husbandry and  general m anagem ent" in  
the country.50
The Soil of the South advocated the sam e ideas for agricultural 
education. It lam ented that sou thern  states h ad  m ade no "provision in  our 
system  of education, for im parting instruction in  agriculture." P lanters, and 
especially overseers, needed to "be educated as farm ers and m anagers of
“ Ibid., 194-195.
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slaves" an d  "regularly and system atically taught every thing necessary to an 
uprigh t an d  enlightened perform ance of their duties." W ith agricultural 
education, they could m anage a  "hundred slaves, and  conduct the 
com plicated concerns of a large plantation." As so m any others d id , this 
southern  journal connected educational and agricu ltu ral reform .51
F urther, an  agricultural education that taugh t system atic 
m anagem ent also instilled in  its  students a bureaucratic m entality. Planters, 
as w ell as railroad  engineers an d  factory m anagers, needed training in  a 
m ilitary environm ent. The Self Instructor m a in ta in ed  that all sta te colleges 
needed "strictly military" discipline. M ilitary education, the journal 
averred, p rov ided  students w ith  the basics needed for "good m anagem ent." 
In addition , m ilitary discipline "taught students to do system atically and  for 
considerable spaces of time, th a t w hich though useful, is irksom e and 
uninviting." In  this way, m ilitary  discipline com bined personal control 
w ith system atic m anagem ent. The journal argued  that this com bination 
provided students "the best m ethods of applying know ledge to the practical 
business of the farm ers and p lan ter."52
51 "A gricultural Science," The Soil of the South 3 (December 1853): 
740-741.
52"O n A gricultural Schools," The Self Instructo r 1 (February 1854): 
106,109,107.
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Even as reform ers advanced grand view s of educational 
m odernization, they o ften  com plained about "old fogies" who d id  n o t 
understand  the connection betw een education and  economic 
m odernization . The Soil of the South reprinted an  editorial from  the N ew  
England C ultivator th a t attacked "old fogies" w ho "shun railroads an d  
steam boats as inventions of the devil, preferring to tru st the old grey m are 
of th e ir fathers, rather than  foster m odem  enterprise." The southern  ed ito r 
recognized the same problem  in  the South. O ld ideas had to be abandoned. 
The railroad , telegraph, steam  pow er, and factory system  m ade education a 
p rio rity  in  reform ers' eyes. It w ould, they believed, prepare future 
generations for a new  econom y through the extension of railroads, the 
expansion of industry, and  the practice of scientific agriculture.53
Educational reform  also had  another im portan t aspect. As the 
railroads and  plantations incorporated new bureaucratic structures, a 
m odem  state educational system  w ould as w ell. Southerners debated the 
need  for a  m odem  educational system  w ithin the  context of a stronger, 
bureaucratic state structure. Like their northern counterparts, reform ers 
called for centralized sta te  funding, uniform  texts and  curriculum , qualified
53"Book Farm ing,” The Soil of the South 4 (January 1854): 18; Robert 
E. H u n t, "Organizing a  N ew  South: Education Reform ers in  A nte-bellum  
A labam a, 1840-1860" (Ph.D. diss., University of M issouri-Columbia, 1988), 
78-80.
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teachers, and  state control of local schools.54 Southern journals criticized the 
lack of a school system  in  sou thern  states. The Southern Q uarterly Review 
reported th a t "the organization o f ou r common schools has been faulty" 
w ith "im perfect and injudicious m ethods of teaching and  discipline" and 
w ith teachers w ho "have not infrequently  been sadly deficient in proper 
qualification." According to th e  journal, the m ajor problem  w ith southern  
education w as the lack of uniform ity and centralization.55
To develop control and uniform ity  in  public education, the journal 
suggested a  bureaucratic structure of management. States, it suggested, 
should set u p  school districts w ith  a  board of directors that would supervise 
the uniform ity of buildings, books, teaching m ethods, and  discipline. W ith 
a district structure, the journal m aintained, states could provide the order 
that "is indispensable in any w ell regulated system  of schools established on  
the popular plan." It also insisted tha t the district system  reflected the "age
^H u n t, "Organizing a N ew  South" 194; See also, Robert C. Reinders, 
"New E ngland Influences on th e  Form ation of Public Schools in New 
Orleans," Toumal of Southern H isto ry  30 (May 1964): 181-195; Albert 
Fishlow, "Levels of N ineteenth-C entury A m erican Investm ent in 
Education." Toumal of Economic H istory 26 (December 1966): 418-436; 
A lexander Jam es Field, "Economic an d  Dem ographic D eterm inants of 
Educational Commitment: M assachusetts, 1855," Toumal of Economic 
History 39 (June 1979): 439-460; M ichael B. Katz, "From V oluntarism  to 
Bureaucracy in  American Education," Sociology of Education 44 (Sum m er 
1971): 297-332.
55,,System  of Common Schools," Southern Q uarterly  Review 6 
(October 1844): 461-462.
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and  state of progress" occurring in  the econom y and society. Further, it 
com pared the p resen t system  to a piece of broken m achinery: the 
"system . . .  like the m odel of a steam  engine on paper, unpropelled  by the 
life-im parting elem ent, o r like the engine itself, w hich has lo st itself, which 
has lost its propelling pow er by the bursting  of its boiler.”56 E ducation in the 
South, in other w ords, failed because it  lacked system and uniform ity. 
M achinery, again, provided a m etaphor for a w ell-organized an d  orderly 
society, and in  this case, an  educational system . The Southern P lanter also 
decried the need for an  updated system  in  public education. It used  West 
Point as an example. Like the m ilitary academ y, public schools required 
uniform ity and control. "O rder and  regularity" the article averred , "are the 
presiding principles of system .”57
De Bow's R eview  shared this opinion. It outlined a  bureaucratic state 
school system headed by a  superintendent of public education. The 
superintendent w ould  oversee each coun ty 's school com m issioner. In turn , 
each com m issioner w ould  supervise th ree  trustees from  each tow nship. As 
a quality  control m echanism , every county  w ould have several inspectors in  
each school d istrict to ensure the enforcem ent of uniform  standards. 
Feedback contributed an  im portant p a rt o f the system. Teachers w ould
“ Ibid., 460-464.
^"Education," Southern P lanter 5 (M arch 1845): 49.
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provide m onthly reports on  prescribed forms to  the State Board of 
Education. The reports w ould include attendance, deportm ent, diligence, 
and  learning progress fo r each student.58
A t the end of each year, according to De Bow 's plan, the county 
com m issioners w ould convey, along w ith the reports of the inspectors, the 
"condition of the Schools and  the w orking of the system ." The State B oard 
of E ducation w ould th en  review  each of the counties' schools. A fter this 
review , the Superintendent w ould report to the sta te legislature. The Board 
w ould also examine all prospective teachers in  the  state as well as oversee 
the adoption  of school texts. W ith this system, D e Bow’s argued, state 
schools could m aintain talented  teachers, uniform ity of instruction, and  
education  of the "highest order."59 N ot surprisingly, the journal proposed  a 
state school system w ith  m any of the ideas found in  a m odem  bureaucracy: 
contro l m echanism s, ru les and  regulations, inform ation feedback, an d  a 
m anagerial hierarchy.
A lthough m ost sou thern  states took only halting  steps tow ard reform , 
N orth  Carolina, A labam a, Tennessee, and Texas m ade significant strides
58"Sketch of a Public School System for a  State," De Bow’s Review  3 
(January 1847): 80-81; Benieer. The C ontrol R evolution. 174-177.
59Ibid., 83.
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tow ard creating state school systems.60 In 1854, Alabama passed a school 
reform  law  th a t centralized pow er in  the hands of a  state superintendent. Its 
system  follow ed closely th a t outlined in  De Bow 's Review. A state 
superin tenden t oversaw  county  com m issioners w ho controlled the 
adm inistration  a t the local level. The com m issioners regulated the schools 
and  supervised local teachers. Alabama reform ers believed a strong 
superin tenden t system  w ould lead to uniform ity in  the hiring of trained  
teachers rather than the w ide variations of com petence found at the local 
level. Further, standardization of curriculum  an d  textbooks allow ed for 
contro l and  accountability over w hat students learned. Finally, the A labam a 
system  taught students discipline and self control.61
h i m any ways, A labam a's school reform  act foreshadowed the 
industrialized  and bureaucratic South that em erged during and after the 
C ivil W ar. Educational reform ers in  the state reacted to the technological 
an d  econom ic changes occurring in the 1850s. They w anted a professional 
school system  to create w ell-educated persons to  advance scientific farm ing, 
railroads, and industry. Indeed , educational reform  in  Alabama occurred 
along w ith  rap id  grow th in  railroads, m anufacturing, mining, and a 
resurgence in  agricultural reform . State school system  advocates saw
60Fishlow , "Levels of N ineteenth-C entury A m erican Investm ent,"
418.
61H unt, "Organizing a  N ew  South,” 51,67-76.
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them selves as part of a  larger movem ent in  the econom y and society. 
Educated Southerners, reform ers argued, w ould  generate the inventive 
pow er to build telegraphs, railroads, and steam ships.62 They proposed a 
bureaucratic system of education that stressed th e  same principles of 
standardization, uniform ity, control, and discipline operative on  railroads 
and on  plantations. In o ther w ords, they reordered  the education and  built 
new  institutions to prepare students for a m echanized, industrialized, and 
organized economy. In essence, southern agricultural reformers, 
educational reformers, and  railroad m anagers becam e part of the sam e 
organizational process.63
The form ation of agricultural and com m ercial organizations in  the 
1840s and  1850s offered another im portant m anifestation of the spread  of an 
organizational m entality am ong southerners. Increasing railroad m ileage, 
com m ercial expansion, and sectional discord contributed to the proliferation 
of these organizations. P lanters and farm ers realized that the in troduction  
and grow th  of the railroad had  prom oted the expansion of the cotton 
m arket. They also knew th a t they had little contro l over the price o f cotton 
or railroad  rates. Consequently, calls for som e form  of organizational 
control of the m arket intensified as railroad m ileage spread. These
62Ibid., 16-17,67-78,103; Thornton, Politics and  Power in a Slave 
Society. 291-305.
63H unt, "Organizing a  N ew  South," 245.
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reform ers believed that th rough  organization they  could take advantage of 
an expanding market.64
M arket expansion changed the position o f the individual farm er an d  
p lan ter because of the com plex nature of the econom y. Some southerners 
realized  this change required  an  organized response to m aintain their 
p osition  of pow er in the econom y. "U nion/' th e  Southern P lanter b lared  in  
its firs t volum e in  1841, "is the guardian  sp irit of o u r institutions." Farm ers 
lagged behind other trades and  professions, the journal com plained, because 
they rem ained unorganized. W ithout organization, it w arned, farm ers 
w ould be relegated to second-class citizens. "All classes bu t the agricultural 
have fe lt the benefit of un ited  action" and the tim e had  come for farm ers to  
form  "agricultural societies."65
Southern agricultural associations had  tw o goals: individual 
im provem ent and collective pow er. A gricultural organizations em phasized 
the need  for scientific agriculture and efficient m anagem ent of labor. As the 
S outhern  C ultivator stated  clearly, "the object o f these associations is to 
bring the  farm ers together, [and] com pare their view s on  m atters of deep
“ See especially, Faust, "The Rhetoric an d  R itual o f A griculture," 541- 
568; Jam es C. Bonner, "Genesis of A gricultural Reform  in  the Cotton Belt," 
Toumal o f Southern H istory 9 (November 1943): 475-500.
65"Association." S outhern  P lanter 1 (October 1841): 188; See also, 
C harles Sellers, The M arket R evolution: Tacksonian Am erica. 1815-1846 
(New York: Oxford U niversity Press, 1991).
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practical in te rest to them." In this w ay, farm ers m ight "secure an  im proved 
system  of operations." The idea of in d iv idual im provem ent through 
organized action  ran  through m uch o f the  literature. John C. C alhoun 
noted agricultural societies that published scientific findings, journals, and 
papers w ould enhance agricultural progress by dissem inating valuable 
inform ation to  p lan ters and form ers. Furtherm ore, by helping to im prove 
planting techniques they w ould raise farm ing to the state o f a  profession. 
Professionalization of farming becam e a key idea behind agricultural 
organization. "N othing great and valuable has been achieved in  the w orld 
w ithout an  association," stated the S ou thern  C ultivator. U nlike "m ilitary 
men, lawyers and  physicians," it observed, farm ers failed to  professionalize 
them selves.66
Besides the advocacy of farm ing as a profession, agricultural 
associations em phasized reform. T heir m eetings, m ainly led  by the 
southern elite, prom oted railroads an d  educational reform  as well as 
agricultural techniques such as ditching, crop rotation, and  the use of 
fertilizer. Reform ers lam ented the practice among m any farm ers of 
destroying the soil and then m oving to  the m ore fertile lands of the
“ "A gricultural Societies," S ou thern  C ultivator 7 (N ovem ber 1849): 
171; "A ddress by  John C. Calhoun before Barbour County A gricultural 
Society on Decem ber 26,1846," S outhern  C ultivator 5 (May 1847): 76-77; 
"Farm er's C lubs an d  Associations," S ou thern  C ultivator 8 (August 1850): 
120.
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southwest. They proffered a  combination, of agricultural societies, railroad 
developm ent, an d  agricultural education as a means to create m ore efficient 
fanning. A t agricultural association m eetings, they aw arded prizes for the 
best cotton crop and best m anaged plantation, and gave m edals for the best 
farm  equipm ent such as cotton gins, plow s, and other m achinery. Farms 
w ith efficient m anagem ent served as m odels. The associations d id  
w hatever they could to promote progressive agricultural techniques.67
In the vortex  of railroad developm ent, internal im provem ents, the 
growing pow er of state governm ents, and northern criticism  of slavery, 
antebellum  agricultural reform ers em phasized the need for m ore 
im provem ent of individual farms. They also stressed the necessity for 
organized control of the market. P e  Bow's Review and o th er southern 
agricultural journals led the call fo r com m ercial and cotton grow ers 
conventions to control cotton prices. De Bow's dem onstrated th a t "isolated” 
farm ers had no econom ic pow er w ith o u t "concentration" an d  "uniform ity 
of action.”68
67Faust, "The Rhetoric and R itual of A griculture," 541-568; See also, 
Carville Earle, "The M yth of the S outhern  Soil Miner: M acrohistory, 
A gricultural Innovation, and E nvironm ental Change," chap. in  
Geographical Inquiry and American H istorical Problems (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1992), 258-299.
68"A gricultural and M anufacturing Prospects of the South and  W est," 
P e  Bow’s Review  1 (March 1846V. 237.
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Southern reform ers feared that if  sou thern  planters and farm ers d id  
no t organize they w ould be crushed by northern  and  European industry . A t 
first, they  called for industrial and agricu ltural diversification. Subsequently, 
they proposed m arket controls over the price of cotton. If planters 
organized, they reasoned, they could se t the m inim um  cotton price. Indeed, 
th is id ea  anim ated C otton Planters C onventions in  the 1850s. W illiam  
T errel told the C otton Planters C onvention of Alabam a, for exam ple, th a t
"our adversaries h erd  in  the public m arts . . .  they com bine They
estim ate our productions, and, too often, regulate the prices upon d ata  m ade 
for the occasion." It followed, then, th a t cotton planters needed to gather 
statistics on the control of their own crop and  w rest it from  the hands of 
speculators.69
Shortly thereafter, another convention outlined greater m easures of 
co tto n  control. It dem anded the form ation of "a m am m oth com bination of 
co tton  planters" tha t w ould guarantee p lan ters a "fair price . . .  under any 
and  a ll circum stances, and w ithout regard  to the ruling rates in Europe."70 
As an  organized entity , reform ers believed, cotton planters would control 
the am ount, the m anufacture, and the m arketing of cotton.71 The S ou thern
69"The C entral A gricultural Society, To the C otton Planters' 
C onvention of A labam a," The Soil of th e  South 2 (July 1852): 289-290.
70M ontgom ery A dvertiser 28 October 1851.
71Ibid., 20 A pril 1852.
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C ultivator added that, "such a system  as th is w ould protect us against the 
consequences of irregu lar production, bu t i t  could  never be carried in to  effect 
by  individual action." O nly a C otton Planters A ssociation could set u p  
w arehouses, com m ission m erchants, insurance, in te rest on investm ent, and  
control purchases and  sales.72
Reformers also discussed the idea of d irec t trade w ith Europe. They 
encouraged bypassing northern  factors and textile m ills. De Bow's R eview  
explored this idea in  a  series of articles. This proposal became a staple issue 
a t conventions th roughou t the 1850s. Southern states w ould develop 
steam ship lines tied  to  sou thern  railroads a t C harleston, Savannah, an d  
N ew  Orleans, w hile p lanters w ould build w arehouses for their cotton. By 
controlling transportation  and storage, as w ell as production, southern 
p lanters w ould thereby guarantee a  profit on  cotton.73
These dream s, how ever, never gained m uch influence or pow er. As 
one critic noted, ’"A C otton  P lanters' C onvention,' for South! N onsense, 
hum bug! No m ore o f this praying to H ercu les.. . .  Think ye a C otton 
P lan ters' C onvention w ould m ake the w orld p lan t less Cotton. N onesense!
72"Cotton P lan ters ' Convention" S outhern  C ultivator 9 (Septem ber 
1851): 140; See especially, H arold D. W oodm an, King Cotton and His 
Retainers: Financing and  M arketing the C otton Crop o f the South. 1800-1925 
(Columbia: U niversity of South Carolina Press, 1968), 139-153.
73"Cotton, an d  the only practical m ethods presented to its producers of 
advancing and controlling its price," De Bow 's Review  7 (July 1849): 49-51.
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One m an can lead  a  horse to w ater, b u t tw o can’t  m ake him  drink." The 
ed ito r of the M ontgom ery A dvertiser expressed skepticism as well. He 
believed the regulation  of cotton prices w as a  "chimerical idea.”74 These 
critics w ere justified . The rhetoric on  the cotton m arket produced little real 
control. Still, i t  reflected the em ergence of an  organizational m entality in  
the antebellum  South.
Indeed, southern  reform ers, a ttitudes tow ard m odernization differed 
little  from  their northern  counterparts. They encouraged bureaucratic 
m anagem ent o f plantations, scientific agriculture, and the use o f new  
technology. They pursued educational reform  based on  scientific and 
technical instruction. They incorporated new  bureaucratic structures of 
system , uniform ity, and centralized control in  their educational reform  
efforts. And, reform ers discussed the  need for organization of the cotton 
m arket, h i sum , Southern reform ers had  the same outlook tow ard 
m odernization as railroad m anagers and  factory m anagers. They based their 
reform s on technology, system, bureaucratic control, and  the "visible hand" 
of m anagem ent. Like Isham H ow ze, reform ers believed the South had to 
em brace the changing world.
74"A talk  abou t A griculture." S outhern  C ultivator 7 (M arch 1849): 41; 
M ontgom ery A dvertiser 28 October 1851.
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CHAPTER 3
ORGANIZING FOR WAR: SOUTHERN RAILROAD MANAGEMENT
DURING THE CIVIL WAR
O n the eve of the Civil W ar, m any Southerners h ad  already embraced 
the new  industria l ideas of system , uniform ity, and bureaucratic control and 
applied them  to railroads, plantations, and educational reform . M odem  
war, how ever, required system and  organization on a m uch larger scale. 
Technology and organization w ould have a significant role the w ar's 
outcom e. Railroads played a key p a rt in  the organization and m obilization 
of the w ar effort. A debate occurred, how ever, over w ho should control the 
railroad system . Railroads were already built, had rudim entary bureaucratic 
structures, and for the m ost p art w ere in  the hands of private corporations. 
Railroad m anagers believed they understood bureaucratic operations better 
than the m ilitary and resisted the idea of centralized control by the 
governm ent. For m uch of the w ar, those w ho thought railroad  companies 
could best m anage themselves struggled against those w ho argued that the
94
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governm ent should centralize control. The C o n fe d e ra c y  never reso lved  the 
dispute.1
In  the spring of 1861, southern  railroads enjoyed both profits an d  
grow th. Railroad mileage had  grow n to close to 9,000 miles, and efficiency 
increased as lines adopted bureaucratic m ethods of m anagem ent. The 
M em phis and  Charleston crow ed th a t it h ad  never operated w ith  g reater 
"economy and  efficiency" an d  the "degree of perfection" could "rarely be
found on  any road ” The line stretched 271 m iles, controlled 50
locom otives and 805 cars. The M obile and  O hio laid  its last bar of iron— 
w hich com pleted its connection to the O hio River—as artillery fire echoed 
over C harleston. Southern railroad  m anagers saw  the future as b righ t, and
1The m ost im portant w ork  on C onfederate railroads rem ains R obert
C. Black, IE, The Railroads o f the Confederacy, w ith  a  Foreword by G ary W. 
G allagher (Chapel Hill: The U niversity of N orth  Carolina Press, 1998);
O ther im portan t works include C harles W. Ram sdell, "The C onfederate 
G overnm ent and the R ailroads," A m erican H istorical Review 22 (July 1917): 
794-810; R obert C. Black, 'T he Railroads of G eorgia in  the Confederate W ar 
Effort." Toumal of Southern H istory . 13 (Novem ber 1947), 511-534; A ngus 
James Johnston, 0 , V irginia R ailroads in  the  C ivil W ar (Chapel Hill: The 
U niversity of N orth C arolina Press, 1961); G eorge Edgar Turner, V ictory 
Rode the Rails: The Strategic Place of the R ailroads in the Civil W ar 
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-M errill, 1953). For a  recent w ork that examines the 
C onfederate governm ent's ro le  in  in terlink ing  railroads, see Scott N elson, 
"The C onfederacy Serves th e  Southern: The C onstruction of the S outhern  
Railway N etw ork, 1861-65," C ivil W ar H istory . 41, no. 3 (1995), 227-243; For 
an excellent analysis of the N o rth  C arolina Railroad during the w ar, see 
A llen W. Trelease, The N orth  C aro lin a  R a ilroad . 1849-1871. and the 
M odernization of N orth C arolina (C hapel H ill: The University of N o rth  
Carolina, 1994). For a good overview  o f sou thern  logistics during the C ivil 
W ar see R ichard D. Goff, C onfederate Supply (D urham : Duke U niversity 
Press, 1969).
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m any lines planned fu rth er expansion. But as P resident Samual T ate o f the 
M em phis and  Charleston observed, a "civil w ar on  a gigantic scale" had  
begun  "disturbing and to tally  changing the entire character of the trade and 
com m erce of the country —  and entirely changing the nature and  character"
3
of railroad  operations. Tate d id  not overstate the change in the scope of 
business o r the character o f the w ar. Despite the emergence of bureaucratic 
ideas and  m ethods on  sou thern  railroads, the South now  had to organize 
them  effectively for w ar.
The m ost advanced bureaucratic system  in  the South before the w ar— 
railroads—deteriorated and  declined in  efficiency during  the long an d  
destructive conflict. F irst, the South did no t have enough com pleted 
railroad  mileage, and significant gaps rem ained in  the system. D ifferent 
gauged track and lack of connecting roads also created problems. Second, the 
South faced an  ever increasing shortage of rolling stock and iron rail. The 
prim ary  cause for the shortcom ings of southern railroads, however, becam e 
the lack of efficient and centralized, bureaucratic control. The C onfederate 
governm ent d id  not im plem ent on  a larger scale the bureaucratic lessons
S e v e n th  Annual R eport of the Board of D irectors to the 
Stockholders in the M em phis and  Charleston Railroad Co. (M emphis,
Tenn., 1861), 13: Proceedings o f the Thirteenth A nnual Meeting o f the 
S tockholders of the M obile & O hio Rail Road Com pany (Mobile, A la., 1861), 
3; Black, "Railroads of Georgia," 511.
E leven th  A nnual R eport o f the Board of D irectors, to the 
Stockholders in  the M em phis and Charleston R ailroad Co. (M emphis,
Tenn., 1861), 9.
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learned  by the railroad m anagers during the antebellum  period. It never p u t 
the railroads under centralized control or enforced cooperation am ong 
different railroad com panies. This lack of coordination led to significant 
difficulties.4
The influence of railroads on  warfare can hardly  be overstated. 
Southern  railroad m anagers understood their im portance to the w ar e ffo rt 
The East Tennessee and G eorgia, for example, adopted  a  resolution that 
proclaim ed: "A new era has arisen  in  the history of Railroads— 
dem onstrating m ost fully the im portant and essen tia l. . .  [of] their purposes 
in  advancing the interests of the country in tim es of peace," bu t m ore 
im portantly  it continued "their capacity for usefulness is still more obvious 
and potential for defence and security in  w ar." The resolution w ent on to 
assert that the war "presented itself to test the efficiency of Railroads as one 
of the m ost pow erful instrum entalities both  in  inflicting injury upon the 
enem y and protecting an d  rescuing our friends." Southern railroads also 
pledged their patriotism  to  the cause. "Of one th ing . . .  w e can speak w ith  
confidence," the Mobile an d  Ohio Railroad president told  stockholders,
"your road , running th rough  four States, w ill fu rn ish  in  tim es of peace a  
great artery of commerce an d  in  w ar a pow erful arm  of defence."5
‘‘Black, Railroads o f the Confederacy. 294; Ram sdell, "Confederate 
G overnm ent and the Railroads," 796-797.
5Proceedings of the  A n n u a l Convention o f Stockholders in the E ast 
Tennessee & Georgia Rail Road Com pany (Knoxville. Tenn., 1861), 4-5;
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As early as April 25,1861, P. V. D anial, the President of the R ichm ond, 
Fredericksburg and Potom ac Railroad, w rote Major General Robert E. Lee 
w ith  suggestions on how  railroads could help the war effort w hile 
m aintaining efficiency, system , and  control. First, he explained, unneeded 
cars should be moved o ff lines in  o rder to use the road m ore efficiently. 
Second, every im portant term inal needed to  have a locom otive ready a t "a 
m inute's w arning'' to m ove troops and  m unitions. It should be fueled w ith  
bo th  w ood and w ater a n d  an  engineer and firem an on constant du ty . Third, 
every railroad should have an  arm ed w atch to guard tracks, bridges, and 
culverts that could be sabotaged. Finally, the m ilitary needed to understand 
tha t railroads represented, a new  technology that required system  and control 
and could not be run  in  a n  ad  hoc fashion. "Safety to lives and the 
protection both of trains a n d  roads from  destruction by collisions," Danial 
explained to Lee, "make i t  im peratively necessary that all trains should be 
regulated in  their speed a n d  m ovem ents by no one except the conductors o r 
engineers of such trains, in  accordance w ith  the regulations and tim e-tables 
of the company." "D isregard of this regulation will inevitably resu lt in  
collisions," and therefore ru les "cannot be too rigorously observed and 
enforced." Lee neither responded  to this letter nor sent guards to protect the
Proceedings of the T h irteen th  A nnual M eeting of the Stockholders of the 
M obile & Ohio Rail Road C om pany (Mobile, Ala., 1861), 4.
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line. To their dism ay, railroad leaders found that m any m ilitary officers d id  
n o t understand  railroad  m anagem ent.6
As a further gesture of cooperation w ith the new  governm ent and  the 
call to arm s, a convention of sou thern  railroad  m en m et in  M ontgom ery a t 
the end of A pril 1861 to discuss a  transportation  plan. Some of the m ost 
im portan t railroad  presidents, Sam ual T ate of the M em phis & Charleston, 
W illiam  Johnson of the C harlotte & South Carolina, an d  R. R. Cuyler of the 
C entral of Georgia and Southw estern G eorgia, attended. N o one thought 
the w ar w ould last long; thus, they m ade no  long-range plans. The railroad 
presidents and the Postm aster General o f the Confederacy, John H. Reagan, 
se t up  m ail contracts and  service. For m oving troops, the railroads and 
governm ent adopted a fare of two cents a  m ile and half the local rate for 
m ilitary  freight. That was it. No discussion of centralized control, logistical 
problem s, o r coordination took place. The die had been cast for future
problem s.7
6P. V. Daniel, Jr., President R ichm ond, Fredericksburg and Potomac R. 
R. Co. to M ajor-General Lee, April 25,1861, Ser. 4, v. 1, 240-241; P. V. Daniel, 
Jr., to H on. J. P. Benjamin, Secretary of W ar, Novem ber 10,1861, Ser. 4, v. 1, 
724-725, W ar of the Rebellion: A C om pilation of the O fficial Records of the 
U nion and  C onfederate Armies (127 volum es; W ashington, D. C., 1880- 
1901). H ereafter cited as Official Records.
7D anl. H . Cram , Secretary to H on. L. P. W alker, Secretary of War,
A pril 30,1861, Official Records. Ser. 4, v. 1,269; L. P. W alker to the Presidents 
of the Several Railroad Companies, A pril 25,1861, Official Records. Ser. 4, v. 
1,238; Black, R ailroads of the Confederacy, 52-56; Goff, Confederate Supply,
17.
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By the sum m er o f 1861, w ith  soldiers and  m ilitary supplies clogging 
southern  railroads, i t  becam e d e a r that die earlier p lan  m ight be 
insufficient. In response, a  second railroad m eeting took place on July 19, 
1861. To solve the logistical problem s, railroad presidents announced that 
m unitions and troops had  top priority , even if it m eant stopping o r delaying 
civilian traffic. T heir pledge, how ever, was an  inform al agreem ent w ith  no 
m echanism  for enforcem ent. N evertheless, m ost railroads reported  to 
stockholders that they  follow ed this policy. The key problem , how ever, 
rem ained. Railroads lacked coordination am ong different lines and 
governm ent bureaus. Southern railroads had  m ade strides during the 
antebellum  period in  control an d  coordination of their ow n lines. N ational 
and  regional coordination  w ith  o ther lines and  a new  governm ent w as 
ano ther m atter indeed. R ailroad m anagers felt pressure from  several 
directions. The C onfederate governm ent, state governm ents, field 
com m anders, local quarterm asters, the O rdnance departm ent, and the 
Com m issary departm ent all m ade dem ands of the railroads. Of course, each 
saw  their own needs as the top priority. As the w ar progressed, conflicts 
betw een railroad m anagers and  the m ilitary heightened and became b itter.
Black, Railroads of the Confederacy. 56-63; Tw enty-Seventh R eport. 
C entral Railroad and  Banking Com pany of G eorgia (Savannah. Ga., 1861), 
201; N elson, "C onfederacy Serves the Southern," 229-235; Angus J. Johnson, 
"V irginia Railroads in  A pril 1861" Toumal of Southern H istory 23 (A ugust 
1957): 314; For a  very  harsh  view  of the m ilitary 's handling of the railroads, 
see Jeffrey N. Lash, D estroyer of the Iron Horse: G eneral Joseph E. Tohnson
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N evertheless, railroad com panies lobbied against any governm ent 
action and argued th a t m en trained in  such w ork should control each line. 
Their position ignored the fact th a t railroads required coordination of their 
m ovements on  a  larger scale than before the w ar. Individual control of 
railroads could no t provide the flexibility needed for a coordinated 
transportation system . Railroad com panies, for example, experienced 
endless difficulties w ith  the interchange of cars and transshipm ent. 
G overnor Joseph E. Brow n pointed o u t th is problem  w hen he com plained 
that the sta te-run  G eorgia Railroad lo st cars answering governm ent 
dem ands. "We have le t the East Tennessee roads have the use of our cars 
and engines this sum m er," he com plained, "and they have abused  and 
broken them  till w e shall be very h ard  pressed for motive pow er and 
rolling-stock to do o u r w inter's business." Brown asserted th a t "if we let our 
engines and cars go for further use off our road we shall very soon be obliged 
to suspend our ow n business." Brow n m ay have overstated his case, but his
9
com plaints becam e com m on am ong railroad  m anagers.
In addition, the lack of an organized interchange system  caused 
frequent delays as trains had to be unloaded and reloaded on different
and Confederate Rail Transport. 1861-1865 (Kent. Ohio: Kent State 
University Press, 1991).
9Joseph E. Brown to J. P. Benjamin, Secretary of War, O ctober 2,1861, 
Official Records. Ser. 1, v. 1,646; Black, Railroads of the Confederacy. 63-74; 
Ramsdell, "C onfederate G overnm ent an d  the Railroads," 797-798.
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com panies' cars. The lack of connections in  several cities slow ed m ovem ent 
to a  craw l. M oreover, the shortage of laborers needed to load the massive 
am ounts of m ilitary supplies added to  logistical problem s. It w as not 
unusual for supplies, troops, and passengers to sit for days o r w eeks w aiting 
transsh ipm ent.10
In  add ition  to  a  lack of coordination and  control, railroad  com panies 
faced num erous additional difficulties. The transport of cotton fell because 
the C onfederate governm ent im posed regulations that ended free export of 
the crop. The am ount of cotton shipped declined. The Southw estern 
Georgia reported  that the governm ent action and  the federal blockade 
"discouragefd] the m ovem ent of cotton to the sea ports." In response, the 
railroad cu t salaries by forty percent and  suffered a  loss of revenue. The 
Mobile an d  O hio m ade a sim ilar com plaint. "Your Road,” it averred , 
"running from  a Blockade a t Mobile to a blockade at the m outh  o f the Ohio 
m eeting hostile fleets and arm ies a t both  poin ts, has had its com m ercial
connections broken The shipm ent of cotton, heretofore ou r source of
income, has been  entirely suspended." In  the place of cotton, tra in s now  
m oved troops and supplies. These shipm ents, how ever, usually  traveled in
10Black, Railroads of the Confederacy. 63-74; Ramsdell, "Confederate 
G overnm ent and  the R ailroads,” 797-798.
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one d irection  and  created inefficiency as only em pty railroad  cars m ade the 
re tu rn  trip .11
F urther still, the unprecedented tonnage on sou thern  lines created 
m aintenance problem s. Track, locom otives, and rolling stock suffered a 
higher th an  average pounding. D uring  the first year o f the w ar m ost 
railroads rep o rted  th a t they could m eet these m aintenance needs w ith  
supplies on  hand. M any continued the ir prew ar m aintenance program s.
The East Tennessee & Georgia, for exam ple, replaced 30,000 cross ties in  1861. 
The C harlo tte and  South Carolina purchased  new T-rail, a new  locom otive, 
and continued to grade and track 25 m iles of new road. The Seaboard and 
Roanoke repo rted  tha t "a regular system  of gravelling has been introduced" 
and "several m iles had  been done d u rin g  the year." The C entral of Georgia 
declared its  track in  good condition during  the first year of the conflict. On 
hand, it h ad  390 tons of rail and 475 tons rerolled. The C entral also reported, 
om inously, th a t its car and m achine shops had  been used  to produce 
m aterials fo r the C onfederate governm ent, mainly m unitions, and  had  not 
m ade any new  engines or cars. R ailroad m anagers w arned th a t supplies 
w ould soon ru n  ou t and  that iron, m achinery, locom otives, ro lling  stock,
F ourteen th  A nnual Report. South-W estern R ailroad C om pany 
(Macon, Ga., 1861), 400: Fourteenth A nnual M eeting of the Stock-holders of 
the M obile and  O hio Railroad C om pany (Mobile, Ala., 1862), 1-2; Black, 
Railroads o f the Confederacy. 80.
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spikes, and  even cord w ood an d  w ood for trestles, would become scarce. By 
1862, railroads began to feel the pinch of these shortages.12
In  O ctober 1861, railroad representatives again m et to discuss their 
problem s. The Chattanooga m eeting d id  no t focus on logistical problem s 
bu t instead  on financial difficulties. Southern railroads w anted a m ore 
rem unerative rate  for transporting  troops and supplies. The C entral of 
G eorgia com plained that profits w ould have been m uch higher if the 
governm ent paid  the m arket ra te . In  response, the governm ent set higher 
rates in  Decem ber and m ade them  uniform  for all carriers. The rates were 
div ided by class: livestock, stock feed, am m unition, and m iscellaneous. 
Livestock now  had a fixed rate of $20 per car load and $15 for feed. The 
transport of am m unition cost 45 cents per hundred rate per h undred  miles. 
All o ther governm ent freight w ould  be charged 20 cents per hundred  miles. 
Im portantly, the local rate included  no reduction in price for governm ent 
shipm ents. This last point greatly  increased the cost of governm ent 
shipping, especially w hen inflation spiraled out of control and local rates
Proceedings of the A nnual C onvention of Stockholders in  the East 
Tennessee & Georgia Rail Road C om pany (Knoxville. Tenn., 1861), 9; 
T hirteenth  A nnual Report of th e  P resident and D irectors to the 
Stockholders of the Seaboard and  R o an ok e R ailroad C om p an y  (P ortsm ou th  
Va., 1861), 11: Twenty-Seventh R eport. C entral Railroad and Banking 
Com pany of Georgia (Savannah. Ga., 1861), 202-203; Black, Railroads of the 
Confederacy. 80; Ramsdell, "C onfederate G overnm ent and the Railroads," 
798-799.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
105
rose dram atically. A lthough it gained concessions in  price, the Chattanooga 
m eeting d id  nothing to clear up  the problem s of coordination and control.13
The burden  of trying to get governm ent troops an d  supplies moved 
efficiently fell predom inantly on the Q uarterm asters' D epartm ent. It, 
how ever, d id  not have enough power to regulate the railroads. A t the sam e
tim e, Southern railroads faced a crisis in  control.14 They needed  centralized 
m anagem ent w ith a  bureaucratic structure. Railroad m anagers understood 
this challenge, bu t a debate raged over how  to solve the problem . In January 
1862, W illiam Goodman, President of the M ississippi and  C entral, suggested 
to Jefferson Davis that the Confederate Governm ent take a  larger role in 
coordinating transportation. "Hie more reflection I give the subject," he 
w rote, "the better am  I satisfied that w ritten contracts should  be entered into 
w ith  the several railroad com panies of the Confederacy for the 
transporta tion  of G overnm ent troops, m unitions of w ar, and  supplies." 
These contracts should stipulate the price and "G overnm ent trains should 
ru n  day and night." The governm ent should also own its  ow n freight cars
Tw enty-Seventh Report. Central Railroad and B anking Company of 
Georgia (Savannah, Ga., 1861), 201; Black, Railroads of the Confederacy. 81- 
82; Ram sdell, "Confederate G overnm ent and the Railroads," 796.
14James R. Beniger, The Control Revolution: Technological and 
Economic Origins of the Inform ation Society (Cambridge: H arvard 
U niversity Press, 1986), 248-255; Alfred D. Chandler, The Visible Hand: The 
M anagerial Revolution in Am erican Business fCambridge: H arvard 
U niversity Press, 1977), 104-121; Black, Railroads of the Confederacy. 95-96; 
Ram sdell, "Confederate G overnm ent and the Railroads," 798.
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and it should  also assign "general freight ag en ts. . .  in  different sections of 
the C onfederacy as superin tendents of G overnm ent transportation, and  to 
see th a t th e  conditions of the contracts were com plied w ith, and that these 
general agents should have th e  pow er to select m essengers to travel w ith  
G overnm ent trains to prevent delays and secure speedy delivery."
G oodm an also proposed th a t the governm ent consolidate and centralize 
railroad shops a t the m ajor term inals. He thought Savannah, A ugusta, 
A tlanta, H untsville, N ashville, and  Am ite City, M ississippi, w ould serve 
these purposes well. In addition, Goodm an encouraged the use of the 
Tredegar W orks and other shops for the rerolling o f iron. He thought th a t 
a t the nex t railroad convention these ideas be addressed  and "some m ethod" 
of provid ing  supplies and resources created.15
D espite Goodman's suggestions, the C onfederate governm ent refused  
to take such action. Q uarterm aster General A braham  M yers adopted a  
conservative position tow ard contro l of the railroads and  argued th a t m ost 
railroad presidents opposed the idea. In  response to  Goodm an's letter,
Myers defended the present railroad  system. He claim ed that "every possible 
arrangem ent has been adopted  to secure prom pt transportation of public 
stores, an d  to  this end m any o f the railroads have been em ployed to the ir 
utm ost capacity." Delays had occurred but, he asserted, "no arrangem ents
15W . G oodm an to Hon. Jeff. D avis, P resident Confederate States of 
America, January 25,1862, Official Records. Ser. 4, v . 1,880-882.
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can be m ade so com plete as to entirely  prevent their recurrency." He w ent 
on to argue th a t governm ent interference w ould destroy  each railroads' 
bureaucratic system  and control. "Governm ent freigh t agents,” Myers 
believed, "w ould interfere seriously w ith the m anagem ent of details, w hich 
should be left entirely to the control of trained and  experienced railroad 
employes." As for the paym ent system , Myers contended that it worked 
effectively. He closed his le tter by noting that the departm ent welcomed 
ideas and  w as "looking to the adop tion  of a system  w hich w ill secure m ore 
com plete, prom pt, and economical transpo rta tion .. . . "  M yers d id  not th ink  
the governm ent w ould do a  better job a t running the railroads than the 
railroad com panies them selves.16
The C onfederate Congress w ould  not hear of governm ental control 
on constitutional grounds. It d id  n o t like the idea of centralized control 
because of qualm s over the sanctity of private property , states' rights, and a 
fear of centralized governm ent pow er—in other w ords, the ideals for w hich 
Southerners asserted they fought. A  contradiction betw een these ideals and 
the requirem ents of m odem  w arfare helped create paralysis w hen it came to 
the transportation  system. U nlike o ther fields, such as ordnance production,
16 A. C. M yers to Jefferson Davis, January 31,1862, Official Records. Ser. 
4, v. 1,896-897; Goff, Confederate Supply. 40-41.
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railroads had been in  private hands before the w ar, and the governm ent 
rem ained reluctant to  assert control.17
By April 1862, how ever, some in  the Confederate Congress believed 
th a t centralized control had  become a necessity. William Boyce of South 
C arolina proposed a  p lan  in  the House Com m ittee of M ilitary A ffairs to
investigate w hether governm ent control m ight increase the efficiency of 
18the railroads. In  response, the com m ittee developed an  innovative plan 
for centralized control w ith  a bureaucratic structure. First, the b ill created a 
"m ilitary chief of railroad  transportation,” w ith  a  rank of L ieutenant 
Colonel, who w ould be selected from a southern railroad so th a t he w ould 
have the "judgement, skill, and  experience in  the practical details of railroad
operations and m achinery " The m ilitary chief of transportation  w ould
have the pow er to d iv ide railroads into four separate m ilitary d istricts, 
u n d er the supervision o f a major. These superintendents w ould  also be 
d raw n  horn  the field of railroad m anagem ent. M oreover, the b ill stipulated 
th a t all railroad m anagers w ould become m ilitary officers w ith the m ilitary
17Goff, ConfederateJiupply, 40-41; Black, R ailroads of the Confederacy. 
63-70; O n southern ideology and how it translated into governm ent action, 
see George C. Rable, The Confederate Republic: A Revolution A gainst 
Politics (Chapel Hill: U niversity of N orth Carolina Press, 1994).
18
William Boyce strongly supported centralization, especially w hen he 
w as chairm an of the C om m ittee on N aval A ffairs. W hen it cam e to the w ar 
effort he w anted "Audacity! Audacity! Audacity!" Ezra J. W arner and  W. 
Buck Yearns, Biographical Register of the Confederate Congress (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State U niversity Press, 1975), 27-28.
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ran k  of captain. All o ther railroad  personal w ould be given m ilitary ranks 
determ ined by their duties. Roadm asters, for exam ple, w ould have the rank 
of first lieutenant. Thus, the  b ill created a centralized system w ith  a  
bureaucratic hierarchy. This bureaucratic structure, however, w as controlled 
by  the very men who had b u ilt and  understood railroad operations. The bill 
sta ted  th a t "the officers herein  nam ed shall have com plete and exclusive 
control, and be subject to no  interference or control of any m ilitary officer of 
w hatever rank, not engaged in  the m anagem ent of any rai lroad. . . Any
interference w ould be considered a "military offense."19
These new  m ilitary railroad  officers w ould have the pow er to 
establish through schedules and  oversee the interchange of cars in  o rd er to 
"insure, as far as practicable, their uninterrupted, safe, and prom pt 
continuous transportation along their several railroads, w ithout
unnecessary delays " If a  railroad refused o r neglected to "conform  to
such  schedules" the m ilitary superin tendent w ould have the pow er to  take 
"m ilitary possession" of the line and be "controlled and m anaged" by  the 
m ilitary superintendent. The bill also gave au thority  to railroad officers for 
the im pressm ent and m ovem ent of needed m achinery, rails, w ater stations, 
o r o ther structures deem ed necessary. In this w ay, locomotives and  rolling
19"A bill to provide fo r the safe and expeditious transportation of 
troops and m unitions of w ar by railroads." v. 5,251, journal of the Congress 
of the Confederate States of Am erica. 1861-1865 ( 7  volum es; W ashington,
D. C.: 1904-1905). Hereafter cited as loum al of the Congress.
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stock could be m oved from  one line to ano ther w hen needed. T he com pany 
w ould be com pensated by  the governm ent fo r the property. The H ouse 
com m ittee offered a far reaching p lan that addressed many of the 
bureaucratic problems th a t southern railroads faced. Indeed, it allow ed for 
the system atic control o f tim e, speed, m en, and  m achinery th a t th is new
technology required.20
Its adoption m ight have led to centralized system  that w ould  have 
dram atically changed how  southern railroads operated. It m ight have 
increased efficiency, control, coordination, com m unication, and 
m aintenance. The p lan  m ost likely cam e from  W illiam  M. W adley, a noted  
railroad  m anager. W adley had been superin tendent of the C entral of 
G eorgia and  other im portant southern railroads. He com pletely understood 
railroad  m anagem ent an d  bureaucratic control. But the full H ouse rejected 
the plan. M any legislators believed that the b ill w as autocratic an d  p u t too 
m uch control in  the hands of the m ilitary an d  governm ent. T hus, although 
it p rov ided  an excellent b lueprin t, the p lan  w as no t im plem ented. The 
Q uarterm asters' D epartm ent also had come ou t against the bill an d  
continued to try to contro l governm ent shipm ents w ith  no regu lato ry
pow er. A t the same tim e, logistics continued their nightm arish lack of
21coordination and tracks began to deteriorate.
20Ibid., 252-253.
2IIbid., 253; Black, R ailroad s o f  the Confederacy. 98; Goff, C onfederate
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In  N ovem ber 1862, Secretary o f W ar Randolph tried  to bring  order to 
railroad operations w ithout involving the legislature. H e appointed  
W adley as a  colonel and  assistant ad junct general in  the C onfederate Army. 
W adley's o rders stated  th a t he w as "to take supervision an d  control of the 
transportation  for the G overnm ent o n  all the railroads in  the Confederate 
States." H e had  the pow er to m ake contracts and agreem ents w ith  the 
railroads. N evertheless, W adley h ad  no real power and h ad  to depend on 
the cooperation of individual railroads. Randolph hoped tha t W adley, a 
railroad m anager, could bring about th is cooperation. W adley w anted to 
create a system  w here railroad m anagers reported directly to him  and 
subm itted weekly reports. He also supported  a through schedule for trains
betw een M ontgom ery and Richm ond. U nfortunately, W adley had difficulty
22w ith  both the railroad  m anagers an d  w ith  other governm ent departm ents.
Both the Com m issary D epartm ent and the Q uarterm asters 
D epartm ent com plained about W adley's appointm ent an d  argued  that he 
only com plicated m atters. Q uarterm aster General M yers w rote Seddon a 
blistering le tte r. "The control of this im portant means o f transportation," he 
argued, "has been one of the m ost responsible duties of th is departm ent,
Supply. 41; C urtis A rthur A m lund, Federalism  in the Southern Confederacy 
(W ashington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1966), 65-79.
22R andolph to R. E. Lee, N ovem ber 14,1862, Official Records. Ser. 1, v. 
19, pt. 2,716-717; Black, R ailroads o f  th e  Confederacy. 109-110; Goff, 
Confederate Supply . 106; Ram sdell, "Confederate G overnm ent and the 
Railroads," 800.
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m ainly because of its in tim ate connection w ith  the m ovem ents o f our
arm ies in  the field " If control was taken aw ay from the d ep artm en t
"m uch inconvenience, confusion, and em barrassm ent w ill resu lt if their 
supervision be transferred to  another depar tment . . . He w ent on  to say, 
how ever, that W adley’s com petence as a  railroad  manager w ould be 
welcom e w ithin the Q uarterm asters' D epartm ent. Meaning, of course, that 
W adley w ould have to rep o rt directly to him . Thus, W adley's position  
rem ained ill-defined w ithin the m ilitary's hierarchy, and his orders carried 
little w eight.23
W adley im m ediately called for another railroad convention. He 
pursued  three goals: cooperation in setting through train schedules, a 
system  of freight-car interchange, and a revised tariff schedule. In  his 
opening rem arks, he told the assem bled railroad presidents and 
superintendents that "with you r cordial co-operation I am sure all 
difficulties w ill vanish, and w ithout that co-operation I am equally certain 
th a t m y appointm ent w ill be of no avail." He then  laid out a  general plan 
for the transshipm ent of cars and  locomotives onto different railroad  lines. 
H e hoped that an organized system  w ould "prevent cars from  being 
scattered” and that rules for the  interchange of cars would be "rigidly 
enforced." He set up three separate com mittees to address the issues.
23
A. C. M yers to James A. Seddon, Secretary of War, December 9,1862, 
Official Records. Ser. 4, v. 2,231-232; Goff, Confederate Supply. 107.
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W adley thought a plan could be w orked out. He then  w atched as railroad 
executives rejected his initiatives. Railroads jealously refused to pool their 
cars in  an interchange system . They also dem anded an  increase in  
governm ent freight rates. A nd finally, no through schedules w ere agreed to. 
W adley left dism ayed and dejected. He reported to A djutant and Inspector 
General C ooper th a t the m eeting "in m y judgem ent failed  to accom plish 
anything practicable ”24
N evertheless, W adley knew  better than anyone the plight of railroads 
due to m aintenance problems, labor scarcity, and the m yriad dem ands p u t 
on them. As fo r problem s, W adley asserted, "the first and  m ost im portan t is 
the disregard m any army officers have for the private property  of railroad 
companies." A rm y officers, W adley asserted, order "rolling-stock from  one 
road to another w ithout m aking any effort or provision for retu rn ing  it, o r 
even w ithout exam ining into the safety  of the cars to  run." F urther still, the 
m ilitary acted too quickly to im press railroads. W adley believed that only 
m en trained in  railroad  m anagem ent should be in  charge of m anaging the 
roads. "The railroad  em ployes " h e  contended, "are m uch m ore com petent 
to perform  all the duties pertaining to the safe and rap id  transportation  of 
freights than  any one not conversant w ith  the very m any details connected
24Wm. M. W adley, A ssistant A djutant-G eneral to  P residents and 
Superintendents of Railroads in  th e  Confederate States, December 1 5 ,1 8 6 2 ,  
Official Records. Ser. 4, v. 2 ,2 7 3 ;  W m. M. W adley to G eneral S. Cooper, 
A djutant and Inspector General, Decem ber 3 1 ,1 8 6 2 , Official Records. Ser. 4, 
v. 2 ,270-272; Black, R ailroads n f  the  Confederacy. 111-112.
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therew ith, b u t they can only rem ain efficient so long as they  are held to an
*25entire and stric t responsibility.
W adley w as rig h t Southern railroads, by the end of 1862, fought to
m aintain system  and control u n d er the duress of constant m ilitary
dem ands. C hronic congestion becam e the norm , and the w ar took its toll.
Conflict betw een m ilitary authorities an d  railroad m anagers added  to the
tension and coordination problem s. The situation becam e so bad  that
A ssistant A djutant-G eneral W. H . Taylor ordered the end  of unw arranted
m ilitary dem ands and interference w ith  the railroads. 'T o  avoid the danger
. . .  of frequent collisions . . .  as w'ell as obstruction to all transportation,"
Taylor w rote, "it is absolutely necessary th a t the m ovem ents of railroad
trains should be u n d er one und iv ided  control." This m eant th a t "all trains
should be regulated  in  their m ovem ents and  speed only by  their conductors
an d  engineers, in  accordance w ith  the regulations and tim e-tables of the
com pany." The superin tendent o f each railroad "controlled" all orders for
m ovem ent of trains. "D isregard o f this ru le,” Taylor w arned, "will
26inevitably be attended  w ith disastrous consequences."
The problem  d id  not end, how ever. Campbell W allace, president of 
the East Tennessee & Georgia R ailroad, and  Jonathan B ranner, President of
^W adley to Cooper, December 21,1862, Official Records. Ser. 4, v. 2,
271.
26W. H. Taylor, A ssistant A djutant-G eneral, G eneral O rders, No. 1, 
M arch 20,1862, Official Records. Ser. 4, v. 1,1010-1011.
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the East Tennessee & Virginia R ailroad, threatened to resign  their positions 
if the governm ent d id  not stop in terfering  w ith railroad  operations. "The 
m ilitary,” they reported, has "taken possession of the runn ing  of our trains, 
ordering them  out in the face of incom ing trains, thereby endangering the
lives of all on  board Further, the Q uarterm asters-G eneral set tariffs that
"will in  a sho rt tim e break dow n every railroad com pany in  the South.” 
W allace and Branner concluded th a t "the movements o f the trains and the 
control of the finances of the com pany are ordered by m en incom petent, 
irresponsible and  reckless—maybe very good military m en, b u t certainly very
27
bad railroad m anagers. O ther railroad  managers agreed. L. J. Fleming, 
superin tendent of the Mobile and O hio, believed that "but for interference 
in  its m anagem ent, the G overnm ent and  public w ould have been better 
served, the m achinery w ould have been in  better condition." George W. 
Adam s, superintendent of the C entral of Georgia, com plained that 
"although our effective means of doing the work have been  constantly
28
dim inishing" th e  dem ands from  the governm ent had b een  "increasing."
27C. W allace, President East Tennessee and Georgia Railroad Company 
and Jno. R. Branner, President East Tennessee and V irginia Railroad 
Com pany to J. P. Benjamin, December 4,1861, Official Records. Ser. 1, v. 52, 
pt. 2,227-28.
28Fifteenth Annual M eeting o f the Stokholders fsicl of the Mobile and 
Ohio Rail Road Co. (Mobile, Ala., 1863), 8; Twenty N inth  R eport. Central 
Railroad and Banking Company of G eorgia (Savannah. G a., 1863), 258.
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R ailroad m anagers resen ted  governm ent interference and  dem ands. 
The superin tendent of the M obile and  Ohio asserted th a t m ilitary 
com m anders d id  not understand the operation o f railroads and always m ade 
last m inute dem ands that p u t th e  railroad out of o rder and off schedule. 
Railroad m anagers also p ro tested  the interchange of cars w ith  o ther roads 
because they usually never saw  them  again. George W. Adam s the 
superintendent of the Central o f Georgia m ade this point clear. "For 
m onths," he reported, "constant dem ands have been m ade on us for 
Engines an d  Cars for use on o th er Roads, w ith m any of w hich we have been 
unable to com ply w ithout sacrificing our ow n business." H e observed th a t 
"many of o u r Freight Cars are now  scattered over the roads of sam e gauge, 
from  A labam a to Virginia, in  u se  of those roads, w ithou t com pensation to
-29us, and I fear w e shall loose a  num ber of them  entirely .’
O ther railroad superin tendents m ade sim ilar com plaints. Flem ing of 
the M obile and  Ohio angrily to ld  stockholders th a t "m ilitary authorities 
assum ed the supervision of the Road, and trains w ere forced to ru n  o u t of 
time, w hile the cars were forced upon other Roads, and m utilated and 
destroyed w hile thus diverted from  the control of the Com pany's officers." 
He then ou tlined  why he tho u g h t the interchange of cars "will ru in  every 
Road in  the Confederate States." H e argued that each railroad had cars
29Fifteenth Annual M eeting of the Stokholders fsicl of the M obile and  
Ohio Rail Road Co. (Mobile, A la., 1863), 6; Tw enty-Eighth Report. C entral 
Railroad and  Banking Com pany of Georgia (Savannah, Ga., 1862), 231.
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"constructed from  peculiar patterns" and  "when set upon  an o th er Road that 
Road has n o t the necessary parts to repair them , so that w hen  o u t of order, 
they are placed on the side tracks, m any of the parts w hich cannot be 
replaced are lost, they are rendered  useless, and  are frequently broken up and 
destroyed." He figured th a t his railroad had  already lost 141 cars in  the first
30
two years of the war.
A t the same tim e coordination  problem s plagued so u th ern  railroads, 
they also fell into disrepair. The blockade and  a  lack of iro n  created a 
shortage of m aterials. M otive pow er, boilers, tires, and every other
31im aginable m echanical need  w en t u n m e t The Southw estern of Georgia 
reported th a t it had a  shortage of iron, tim ber, and tires. It possessed ten 
locom otives "but any of th e  te n  are liable to fail a t any tim e." Freight and 
passenger cars also suffered "owing to the impossibility of procuring  
m aterial to  repair them." The M obile and  Ohio com plained i t  could not 
procure rolling stock, rail, o r  spikes because of the blockade. The Charlotte 
and South Carolina lam ented th a t w hile incom e had increased  because of 
governm ent shipm ents, th e  "w ear and  tear" on the line h ad  been "in a 
corresponding ratio." "The rails," it reported , "in the track have been m uch 
w orn; the engines are w ith o u t th e ir usual efficiency; notw ithstanding many
30Fifteenth Annual M eeting of the Stokholders fsicl o f th e  M obile and 
Ohio Rail Road Co. (Mobile, A la., 1863), 6.
31Black, R ailroads of the Confederacy. 124-125; Ram sdell, "Confederate 
G overnm ent and  the R ailroads," 798.
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cars have been bu ilt in  the shops during the w ar, the num ber on hand is 
reduced fifty p er centum  below  the average su p p ly /' In  1863, the C entral of 
G eorgia superin tendent asserted  it was "in fair condition, notw ithstanding
the em barrassm ents under w hich  w e have labored  The continuance o f
the w ar sw ells up, every day , the am ount w hich w e shall need, a t its close, to
32reinstate the stock of engines, cars and  m aterials."
R ailroad  m aintenance also suffered. The Southw estern 
acknow ledged that in 1862 its  tracks experienced dam age from heavy rains.
In peacetim e this was a  norm al occurrence that could be rapidly fixed. In  
w artim e, how ever, it entailed large expenditures an d  severe resource 
reallocation. The superin tendent w rote that because of delays in repairs, 
freight an d  m ail had been d iverted  to boats. The C entral of Georgia 
im parted  th a t regular m aintenance "has not been furnished and kept up  as 
it w ould have been under o rd inary  circum stances." The line estim ated it 
needed $200,000 in  repairs. The Charlotte and South Carolina pointed o u t 
"that the engines, cars, and track  have suffered m uch, and  w ith our lim ited 
resources, require great energy and  vigilance to m aintain  them in  proper 
order." The M obile and O hio also noted iron rail, m ost o f it rerolled, w as
S ixteenth Annual R eport. South-W estern Railroad Com pany 
(Macon, Ga., 1863), 469; Fifteenth A nnual M eeting o f the Stokholders fsicl of 
the M obile and Ohio Rail Road Co. (Mobile, Ala., 1863), 3; FTOttfidUlgS of the 
Stockholders of the C harlotte & South Carolina Railroad Company 
(Columbia, S. C., 1863), 8; Tw enty-N inth Report. C entral Railroad and 
Banking C om pany of Georgia (Savannah. Ga., 1863), 249.
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defective and could not take the w eight of the engines. A s w ell, spikes and 
tim ber became increasingly scarce, and  some roads resorted  to making spikes 
by hand.33
A scarcity of labor added to  th e  railroads' plight. R ailroad managers 
com plained th a t skilled labor had  either enlisted to fight o r had left for m ore 
lucrative em ploym ent in ordnance factories. In addition, railroads argued 
against the d raft of skilled m echanics. A lthough the governm ent exem pted 
m ost railroad w orkers, after G ettysburg and Vicksburg, this tension betw een 
railroad m anagem ent and the governm ent rose and exem ptions fell. 
M oreover, railroads had difficulty h iring  slave labor. Slaveholders knew 
that many slaves employed by the railroads escaped or suffered serious
34injuries and becam e less anxious to  ren t them. In response, railroads 
purchased slaves. In 1863, the C harlotte and South C arolina continued its 
prew ar policy and  bought 40 slaves, the Mobile and Ohio purchased 60 for 
$98,500 and planned to buy a 100 m ore. The East Tennessee and Georgia 
bought 32 slaves during the w ar for $36,374. The Central of Georgia declared
Fifteenth A nnual Report. South-W estern R ailroad Com pany 
(Macon, Ga., 1862), 438; Twenty-Eighth Report. C entral Railroad and 
Banking Com pany of Georgia (Savannah, Ga., 1862), 219,231-232,234; 
Proceedings of the Stockholders of the Charlotte & South Carolina Railroad 
Com pany (Columbia. S. C., 1864), 7; F ifteenth Annual M eeting of the 
Stokholders fsicl of the Mobile and O hio Rail Road Co. fMobile. Ala., 1863), 3; 
Seventeenth A nnual Report. South-W estern Railroad C om pany (Macon, 
Ga., 1864), 496.
^Black, R ailroad s of the Confederacy. 83,129-130.
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as early as 1862 that "the advanced prices we are com pelled to  pay for labor, 
and  all supplies of m aterials, provisions, clothing, (for ou r negroes) wood, 
&c., w ill largely increase our expenses for the year." The next year, the line
35doubled the am ount of slave labor used.
Inflation, as w ell, h u rt the railroads’ operational abilities. O n paper, 
southern  railroads experienced huge profits during  the w ar. But, because of 
the decreasing pow er of Confederate money and  bonds, these profits proved
36m ore of an  illusion than  a  reality . Railroad presidents dem anded higher 
freigh t rates horn the governm ent in order to offset the inflationary spiral. 
R ailroad m anagers com plained about the high cost of supplies and  labor. 
The C harlotte and South C arolina report discussed these problem s in  detail. 
"All G overnm ent heigh ts, w ith  slight exceptions, have been conveyed at 
rates m uch below the average charges in tim es of peace." O rdinarily  this 
h e ig h t w ould have yielded a  $200,000 profit. H ow ever, "prices of every 
elem ent w hich enters in to  the operating expenses of railroads have 
advanced horn  50 to 1,000 per cent." Because supplies on  hand  had  ru n  out, 
the com pany paid "for m any essential articles ten  tim es their form er rates."
^Proceedings of the Stockholders of the C harlotte & South Carolina 
R ailroad Company (Columbia, S. C., 1863), 7; F ifteen th  A nnual M eeting Of 
the Stokholders fsicl of the  M obile and Ohio Rail Road Co. (M obile. Ala., 
1863), 3; Twenty-Eighth A nnual Report. C pntral Railroad and Banking 
Com pany of Georgia (Savannah, Ga., 1862), 235-236; Tw enty-N inth Report- 
C entral R ailroad and Banking Company of G eorgia (Savannah, Ga., 1863), 
249.
^Black, Railroads o f the Confederacy. 134-135.
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O ther railroads echoed th is concern. The M obile and  Ohio dem anded 
higher governm ent freight rates to  offset the price of supplies. "The low  rate 
fixed for the transportation  of Troops and m unitions of war" coupled w ith  
the "high price o f provisions and  supplies used  in  operating the road" had  
created a need for higher rates. As the w ar dragged on, im pressm ent and  
lack of paym ent from  the governm ent created financial ruin. By the end  of 
the w ar, southern railroads w ere ow ed thousands of dollars from  the
37defeated C onfederate governm ent.
In addition  to  the lack of m aterials, poor m aintenance, and a labor 
shortage, sou thern  railroads struggled to m aintain  system  and control. 
Bureaucratic structures created by railroad m anagers before the w ar collapsed 
un d er the strain  o f the conflict and  m ilitary dem ands. Logistics, as has been 
noted , became a nightm are for railroad m anagers. M oreover, accounting on 
m any lines fell in to  disarray. Several railroads repo rted  th a t they had  little  
know ledge of how  m uch they shipped, their costs, o r even where m any of 
the ir freight cars w ere located. "Our statem ent of C ars is taken from  ou r 
shop books," the C entral rep o rt adm itted, b u t "the num ber in existence" 
cannot be "actually ascertained." The superin tendent doubted "if three 
fourths of the actual num ber w e ow n will be found." In 1862, the M obile
Proceedings of the Stockholders of the C harlotte & South C arolina 
Railroad Com pany (Columbia, S. C., 1863), 9; Fourteenth Animal Meeting of 
the Stock-Holders of the M obile and Ohio R ailroad Com pany (Mobile, Ala., 
1862), 3.
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and Ohio had to hand w rite its rep o rt and  provided no accounting statistics 
o r other data. M any roads sim ply stopped printing annual reports or 
keeping statistics.38
Com m unication and  control also becam e more difficult, b u t railroad 
m anagers still tried  to exploit new  technology and  to attem pt better m ethods 
of control. The telegraph, for instance, m ade a  significant im pact on 
coordination an d  control. The C harlotte and  South C arolina's 
superintendent explained the im portance of telegraph com m unication.
"The m agnetic telegraph," E. H ulbert w rote, "is fast coming in to  use as a 
m eans of com m unication along the line of railw ays, and no th ing  serves so 
w ell the purpose of adjusting the m ovem ent of trains, of transm itting  
orders, and of keeping the General Superintendent inform ed a t all hours of 
the exact condition, in detail, of the w hole road, and of all its trains." He 
explained that "In m oving trains by telegraph, nothing is left to  chance. 
O rders are com m unicated to the conductors and engineers of the opposing 
trains, and their answ ers returned, giving their understanding of the order, 
before either is allow ed to proceed." This m ethod differed from  controlling 
trains w ithout a  telegraph because "in the absence of a telegraph, conductors 
are governed by general rules" and it becom es "a question w hether a
Twenty N inth  Report. Central Railroad and Banking Com pany of 
Georgia (Savannah, Ga., 1863), 261; F ourteen th  Annual M eeting of the 
Stock-Holders o f the M obile and Ohio Railroad Company (M obile. Ala., 
1862).
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reliance on these general ru les m ay not, in  m any cases, lead to danger by 
producing recklessness, and  thus increase, instead of dim inishing, the 
danger sought to be avoided." He "earnestly" recom m ended that the
3 9
railroad  install telegraph line a t all "our agencies."
Despite the use of the telegraph, as w ell as rules and regulations 
introduced before the war, accidents increased during  the conflict A large 
num ber of them  occurred because of lack o f m aintenance. Boilers exploded 
from  overuse, trains derailed, and in  some cases collided due to
40coordination problem s, h i 1863, for exam ple, the Central of Georgia had  a 
night passenger train derail, injuring several passengers and killing two 
railroad employees. In  another incident, the  Engine Beauregard exploded 
killing the engineer and firem an. Trains also had to reduce speeds because 
of the deterioration of the track. Because o f the lack of repairs, including 
iron, jo int fastenings, spikes, and  cross-ties, the Mobile and Ohio declared 
that the only way to keep its trains runn ing  was w ith  "careful m anagem ent" 
and "slow speed." Sabotage also became a problem . The Southw estern of
Proceedings of the Stockholders of th e  C harlotte & South Carolina 
Railroad Com pany (Columbia. S. C., 1863), 13; J. B. Jones reported that the 
Secretary of W ar introduced the telegraph in  the Secretary's office in  late 
1862. T. B. Tones. A Rebel W ar C lerk s P iarv  a t the Confederate State Capital 
v. 1 (New York: Old H ickory Bookshop, 1935), 162; O n the southern 
telegraph system  during the w ar, see J. C utler A ndrew s, "The Southern 
Telegraph Company, 1861-1865: A C hapter in  the H istory of W artime 
C om m unication." Journal o f Southern H istory  30 (August 19641: 319-344.
40Black, Railroads of the Confederacy. 92.
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G eorgia related  one such incident. An engine and three cars derailed
41because of "the rem oval of a rail by some m alicious person."
O f course, the N orthern  arm ies had  a  lo t to do w ith  the p light of 
sou thern  railroads. D efeat on the battlefield took its toll. The U nion arm y 
understood the im portance of railroads and tried  to destroy as m any 
sou thern  lines as possible. The incursion in to  Tennessee in  1862 cut off one 
of the Confederacy's m ost im portant railroads, the M em phis and 
C harleston, from  M em phis to H untsville, A labam a. Secretary of W ar
42W alker had  accurately called it "the vertebrae of the Confederacy." On 
A pril 11,1862, the federal arm y took H untsville. It captured all of the 
M em phis and  C harleston Railroad's rolling stock there, eighteen  
locom otives, one hundred  freight cars, six passenger cars, m achinery, tools, 
and  cross ties. The railroad  tried to move w hat it could to  p reven t capture, 
b u t "this m ovem ent w as m ade in g reat confusion, and m uch loss of 
p roperty  necessarily took place." Some equipm ent m ade it safely to the
Twenty Ninth Report. Central Railroad and Banking Company of
Georgia (Savannah, Ga., 1863), 259; Black, Railroads of the Confederacy. 81; 
S ixteenth A nnual M eeting of the Stockholders of the M obile & Ohio 
R ailroad Com pany (Mobile, Ala., 1864), 4; Fourteenth  A nnual Report. 
South-W estern R ailroad Com pany (Macon. Ga., 1861), 408.
42Black, Railroads of the Confederacy. 139-142; R ichard E. Beringer, 
H erm an H attaw ay, A rcher Jones, and W illiam  N . Still, Jr., W hy the South 
L ost the Civil W ar (Athens, Ga.: University o f Georgia Press, 1986), 313.
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43M obile and Ohio. A s the U nion arm y m ade deeper and  deeper incursions 
into the South, they m ade railroad tracks and  equipm ent a  prim ary target. 
They tore up track as they advanced, and  they captured or destroyed huge 
am ounts of rolling stock. In addition, Confederate authorities destroyed 
track, locomotives, and  freight cars to keep them  out of the hands of the 
Union. General R obert E. Lee, for exam ple, reported in  N ovem ber 1862 that 
he had  "ordered the railroad from  Fredericksburg to Aquia Creek to be 
entirely destroyed; the bridges, culverts, &c., to be broken; the cross-ties piled
4 4
and fired, w ith the rails piled on to p  ” By 1865, m any southern
45railroads existed on paper only.
To deal w ith  these problem s and  to try  to solve disagreem ents 
betw een the m ilitary an d  the railroad  com panies, A djutant and  Inspector 
G eneral Cooper, apparently  at W adley's suggestion, put o u t another order in  
early 1863 to correct m ilitary officials' m ishandling of the railroads. He 
stressed that m ilitary officers m ust allow  the railroad m anagers "full control 
of their business, in  o rder to insure safety and dispatch in  transportation."
43Twelfth A nnual Report of the Board of Directors to  the  Stockholders 
of the M emphis and C harleston R ailroad Co. (Memphis, Tenn., 1866), 2-3.
^R . E. Lee to George W. R andolph, Novem ber 14,1862, Official 
Records. Ser. 1, v. 19, n. 2,717-718.
45For an  overview  o f southern  railroads after the w ar, see The Reports 
of the Com m ittees of the  House of R epresentatives m ade d u ring  the Second 
Session Thirty-N inth Congress. 1866-’67 4 vols. (W ashington: G overnm ent 
Printing Office, 1867), 692-703.
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"M ilitary officers" w ere "prohibited from  interfering w ith the engines, cars, 
running of trains, o r w ith  the control an d  m anagem ent, in any w ay, of 
railroads." He ou tlined  a p lan in  w hich quarterm aster and com m issary 
officers w orked w ith  each railroad's superintendent. The m ilitary officer 
had  to notify the superin tendents in  advance of any freight m oving "out of 
the usual routine." In  the event of em ergency m ovem ents, the m ilitary 
officers should "com m unicate fully the character and extent of the 
service . . .  and ask the personal supervision of the proper railroad  officers to 
the duty." Cooper u rged  th a t m ilitary officers use more "discretion" in  w hat 
constituted an em ergency and w hat could be m oved on a regular schedule. 
Violations of these orders by m ilitary officers or the lack of cooperation by
railroad m anagers w ere to be reported to Colonel Wadley.46
A few days after Cooper's orders w ent out, Q uarterm aster M yers 
com plained to Secretary of W ar Seddon th a t W adley’s new  position  outside 
of the Q uarterm asters D epartm ent w ould cause "much inconvenience and
46S. Cooper, A djutant and Inspector General, General O rders, Ho. 2, 
January 3,1863, Official Records. Ser. 4, v. 2,295; Lt. General J. C. Pemberton 
com plained to C ooper about this prohibition. 'D uring this tim e (Jan. 1863] 
stores in large quantity  w ere being rapidly collected at various depots, but the 
difficulty of transportation, owing to the w retched condition of the Southern 
Railroad, the obstacles th a t w ere continually throw n in  the way of railroad 
authorities, and the clam or raised a t any attem pt o f mine to m ake private 
interests subservient to  G overnm ent necessities, had  the effect o f preventing 
effectually the rap id  accum ulation of supplies: Positive prohibition had 
been issued from  th e  W ar D epartm ent against interference of com m anding 
generals or other officers w ith  railroad transportation." J. C. Pem berton to S. 
Cooper, August 2,1863, Official Records. Ser. 1, v. 24, p t  1,289.
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confusion w ill result." M yers w anted W adley u n d er his direct control. He 
believed th a t the Q uarterm asters' departm ent had  authority  and "sole 
supervision an d  m anagem ent of railroad transportation." W adley, he 
protested, d id  not. Therefore, W adley's proper position  in  the hierarchy 
rem ained in  question, as d id  his authority.47
W hile this debate occurred, both  m ilitary interference w ith railroad  
operations an d  chronic congestion continued. W adley understood the 
railroads' problem s, b u t he also became convinced th a t centralized control 
m ight alleviate som e of them . H e saw  firsthand the  chaos brought on  by the 
dem ands p u t on  railroads by field com m anders and  o ther governm ent
bureaus.48 H e w rote Seddon th a t he had  "hoped to  induce the officers of all
the ro ad s to co-operate w ith  each o the r . . .  bu t m y experience thus far has
convinced m e that in  this I shall be d isappo in ted .. . . "  W adley then m ade 
his point clear: "I therefore have recently had m y atten tion  directed to  som e 
m easure th a t w ill tend  to cure this evil, and have concluded that the best 
and probably the only rem edy capable of reaching the difficulty will be an  act 
of Congress provid ing  for G overnm ent to take possession of any railroad  
that fails to perform  prom ptly G overnm ent transportation." He
47A. C. M yers to James A. Seddon, January 8,1863, Official Records. 
Ser. 4, v. 2,304; A. C. M yers to James A. Seddon, January 26,1863, Official 
Records. Ser. 4, v. 2,372-373.
48Black, Railroads of the Confederacy. 115.
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acknowledged, how ever, that the constitutionality  of this m easure w ould be 
questioned.49
Continued ra ilroad  congestion only  heightened W adley’s belief in  
centralization. In  early  February, w hile inspecting the N orth  Carolina 
railroads, W adley w rote tha t "Every day 's experience confirm s me stronger 
in  the belief that, u n d er existing circum stances, I can do b u t little  tow ard 
expediting G overnm ent transpo rta tion .. . . ” A  few days la ter h e  reported  to 
the Secretary of W ar th a t "everything is in  th e  utm ost confusion on  the 
N orth  Carolina R a ilro ad .. . ."  O thers confirm ed this view . M ajor-G eneral 
G. W. Smith lam ented  th a t "railroads are  an  uncertain reliance; they w ill 
w orry me ou t o f m y life yet I think."50
In response, Secretary of W ar Seddon and W adley began serious 
discussions of railroad  difficulties. They analyzed the problem s facing 
southern railroads an d  d rew  up another p lan  of action. A gain, they m et in  a 
convention w ith  railroad  presidents an d  m anagers to p resen t their ideas.
The plan stressed coordination. Railroad presidents and m anagers, 
how ever, contended that coordination w as secondary to financial need. By
49Wm. M. W adley to James A. Seddon, January 26,1863, Official 
Records. Ser. 4, v. 2,373.
^W m. M. W adley to General S. C ooper, February 6,1863, Official 
Records. Ser. 1, v. 25, p t. 2,610*611; W. M. W adley to James A. Seddon, 
February 10,1863, Official Records. Ser. 1, v . 18,874; G. W. Sm ith, M ajor 
G eneral to James A . Seddon, January 26,1863, Official Records. Ser. 1, v. 18, 
859.
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1863, railroads desperately w anted  governm ent assistance. They 
underscored the need for skilled labor, general labor, and  supplies. R. R. 
Cuyler, chairm an of the convention, pointedly stated  th a t the A tlanta 
Rolling M ills, w hich had produced  rail and machines before the war, had  
been taken over by the governm ent for ordnance production. "That 
establishm ent," he com plained, "as w ell as all or nearly  all the other iron­
works in  the country, have been  during  the w ar engaged by the 
G overnm ent, and  thus the railroads have been deprived  of every means of 
supply." As for skilled labor, "many mechanics absolutely necessary tow ard 
keeping u p  railroad  works are now  in  the Army.” R ailroad m anagers also 
w anted less interference in  th e ir operations from  governm ent and m ilitary 
officials. They asserted that if they w ere left alone the system  would w ork 
better and  m ore efficiently. The conference broke dow n in  recrim ination as 
each side blam ed the other for their difficulties. The railroads rejected 
governm ent control while the governm ent refused m uch aid w ithout it.51
It h ad  become clear th a t voluntary cooperation betw een railroads and  
the governm ent had  failed. A fter the A pril 1863 convention, Seddon w rote 
several m em bers of the C onfederate Congress that railroads required 
governm ental control because of "the selfish instincts inheren t in  money­
making corporations." He proposed th a t control of the railroads should be
51R. R. Cuyler, Chairm an to J. A. Seddon, A pril 22,1863, Official 
Records. Ser. 4 , v . 2 ,509-510; Black, R ailroads of the Confederacy. 119-120; 
Goff, C onfederate Supply. 109.
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p u t under an  executive officer w ho w ould have the authority  to  enforce 
decrees by seizing the property of any railroad that d id  not follow  orders. In 
this proposal, he echoed W adley's position.52
A t the end of A pril, the Confederate Congress passed and  Jefferson 
Davis signed the first im portant railroad law. It provided the necessary 
power to regulate the railroads. It gave the governm ent pow er to  m ake any 
railroad support the arm y and obliged railroads to follow governm ent 
schedules. The governm ent could im press any railroad equipm ent, such as 
locomotives, cars, rails, and  m achinery. In theory, this law  gave the 
governm ent the authority  it needed to control and coordinate southern 
railroads. The law  gave the Q uarterm aster General the pow er to regulate 
the railroads, set through rates, and interchange cars as necessary. If a 
railroad refused to cooperate, it could be seized and the w orkers conscripted. 
This law d id  no t solve centralization problems, how ever. R ather than  
giving this governm ent pow er to W adley and the Railroad B ureau, 
supervision of the railroads stayed under the control of the Q uarterm asters' 
D epartm ent. M oreover, the m an behind the railroad centralization law, 
Wadley, lo st his job. A lthough it rem ains unclear w hy, the Senate refused 
to confirm him . Business jealousies and politics appear to have been at the
52Q uote from  Black, Railroads of the Confederacy. 121; Goff, 
Confederate Supply. 110.
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root of this action. Thus, a  railroad law  h ad  finally been passed, b u t its 
operation  rem ained uncertain .53
Frederick W. Sims took  charge of the  R ailroad Bureau. H e had 
w orked under W adley as a  transporting agen t for the Central o f Georgia and 
understood railroad m anagem ent. U nfortunately, he inherited  a  bureau 
w ithout adm inistrative contro l of transportation. Sims had  to  try  to  assert 
pow er through the Q uarterm asters' D epartm ent. More im portan t than  this 
bureaucratic chaos, how ever, became the action  of the Confederate 
governm ent. The executive branch refused to enforce the new  law  for fear
54of alienating the railroads an d  state governm ents.
D espite the obstacles he faced, Sims tried  to build the R ailroad Bureau 
into an organization w ith  pow er. He placed subordinates a t key railroad 
crossroads to facilitate m ovem ent. He gained significant control w hen 
A lexander Lawton, a W est Poin t graduate, becam e the new  Q uarterm aster 
G eneral in  A ugust 1863. Law ton and Sims h ad  been long-tim e friends and 
w orked w ell together. Sims now  fit into th e  Q uarterm asters’ chain  of
Black, R ailroads o f  the Confederacy. 121-123; Goff, Confederate 
Supply. 110-111; Ramsdell, "Confederate G overnm ent and the Railroads," 
800; This jaundiced view  of railroads becam e prevalent by 1863. J. B. Jones 
asserted th a t "the Southern Express Co. has m onopolized the railroads, 
delivering cotton for speculators, who send i t  to the U nited S tates, while the 
C onfederate States cannot place enough m oney in  Europe to pay  for the 
supplies needed for the arm y." Jones, Rebel W ar Clerk’s D iary, v. 2,82.
^Black, R ailroads of the Confederacy. 164-167; Goff, C onfederate 
Supply. 195.
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com mand and  h is orders carried m ore authority. H e also traveled widely in  
an  attem pt to solve problem s and  clear up  congestion-55
Sims, un like m any m ilitary officers and civilian critics, rem ained 
sym pathetic to the p light of the railroads. He told Law ton that railroad 
companies had  served the Confederacy "with patrio tism  w hich I fear has
never been properly  appreciated-----The m anagers of them  embraced the
best business ta len t and  exhibit as m uch patriotism  as any class in  the 
country." H e thought the governm ent had  squandered this talent by 
dem anding too m uch and giving too little. Freight rates paid  by the 
governm ent rem ained  m uch too low . M ore im portant, the lack of a 
consistent governm ent policy had  led  to chaos in  runn ing  lines. "To 
com plete w hat G overnm ent officers first thought to be the best plan for 
transportation," he asserted, "but w hich every railroad  m an knew  to be a 
m ost destructive one," the m ilitary "ordered engines an d  cars from  road to 
road, irrespective of ow nership, and  m aking no provisions for their return." 
M oreover, he attested  that "this valuable property w as used  and abused 
from  one end of the Confederacy to the other, cars w ere ru n  from  point to
56poin t w ithout a tten tion  and only found  rest in total d e s tru c tio n .. . ."
55Black, Railroads of the Confederacy. 168-171.
56
F. W. Sims, M ajor and Q uarterm aster, to Brig. Gen. A. R. Lawton, 
Q uarterm aster-General, October 23,1863, O fficial Records. Ser. 4, v. 2,881- 
883.
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Sims believed that the problem  w ith interchange of cars now had a  
"wiser policy" because of orders th a t kept rolling stock under the control of 
railroad superintendents. N evertheless, the deterioration and destruction of 
the lines posed a  significant barrier to im proving transportation. Sims 
explained th a t the  lack of supplies and  the lack of repair of locomotives and  
cars had left m ost railroads in  poor shape. By 1863, even "the richest and 
m ost provident com panies are feeling severely the w ant of the most 
ordinary articles." He asked rhetorically, "Is it any w onder that 
transportation is deficient? Is it n o t rather a w onder th a t we have any 
transportation by  rail a t all?" He blam ed this situation on the governm ent, 
n o t the railroad companies. "Every im portant article o f consum ption by 
railroads," he asserted, "can be produced in the Confederate States, but so 
long as the G overnm ent controls an d  denies the roads, you may say, 
practically everything, there w ill be no perm anent relief for them." He 
argued that rolling mills, foundries, and machinery should be applied to 
supplying the railroads. He noted th a t the only way there was enough 
equipm ent a t the  present time w as from  "contraction of our territory" and 
"the time w ill soon  come w hen the G overnm ent itself w ill be incom petent
to render even th is assistance.”57
In order to  address these problem s, Sims called yet another railroad 
convention in  N ovem ber 1863. As W adley had before him , he tried to se t
57Ibid.
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up a coordinated car interchange system. The railroad  presidents balked. 
They continued to resist car interchange and asked for a  freight rate increase. 
Because the Davis adm inistration  refused to im plem ent the new  railroad 
law, Sims had  little pow er. Sims did, how ever, m ake progress on 
concentrating rolling stock on  im portant lines. Locom otives and cars from 
railroads th a t had been m oved from  captured territo ry  w ere p u t under 
governm ent authority an d  sh ifted  to roads th a t had  the m ost use and 
congestion. In  this way, Sim s unplugged im portan t dogs on some railroads.
This stop-gap m easure, how ever, d id  not create a coordinated railroad
58system.
N onetheless, Sims also understood the com plaints of railroad 
m anagers tha t m any m ilitary  m en did not have a  d u e  how  to ru n  a  railroad. 
If railroads required centralization, system, and control, they needed to be 
under a separate Railroad B ureau operated by railroad  m anagers. A railroad, 
he w rote, "can only be m anaged by one who has been educated to it. and it is 
to this ex tent a spetialty differing from any elem ent heretofore entering into 
m ilitary operations. The im portance of p roperly  m anaging transportation, 
thus rap id ly  concentrating troops or supplies, can  only be m anifest to those 
whose daily  business enables them  to see the difficulties arising from  a w ant
58Black, R ailroads of the  Confederacy. 172*173; Ram sdell, "Confederate 
G overnm ent and the R ailroads, 807.
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59of contro l of the m ovem ent o f trains." In other w ords, railroads needed 
the governm ent's visible hand  of m anagem ent staffed  by  railroad managers 
w ho understood bureaucratic control and coordination.
W ith the goal of centralized control under m en w ho understood 
railroad  operations, Sims drew  up legislation for a  pow erful, independent 
R ailroad Bureau. B endy H asell, w ho w as also p residen t of the Charleston Sc  
Savannah Railroad, g o t h is nephew  Lewis Cruger to  subm it it  to the House.
It d id  no t even m ake the  legislature's calendar.60 Thus, the problems that 
p lagued  southern  railroads in  1861 continued. Sims com plained that the 
m ilitary h u rt the railroads in  two critical ways. F irst, by im pressing railroads 
and  dem anding im m ediate service, they ruined w h at efficiency remained.
"It is no t a t all unusual," h e  w rote, "for persons to suppose th a t they can 
m anage railroads w ith  m uch m ore ability than those w ho have them in 
charge." Second, Sims also disagreed w ith further d ra ft calls that included 
m echanics and m achinists. "I am  w illing to do all th a t I can do," he 
com plained, 'b u t to im prove transportation w ithou t m en and  materials is 
the requisition of the E gyptian  taskm aster. Give m e the m en and you shall 
see advantages from  them . Refuse and I can prom ise nothing."61
59Q uoted in  Black, Railroads of the Confederacy. 174.
6°Ibid., 175.
61F. W. Sims to A . R. Lawton, February 22,1864, Official Records. Ser.
4, v. 3,92-93.
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A t the same tim e, Sims became increasingly frustrated w ith railroad  
presidents and m anagers. He complained to  Law ton that they w ould not 
cooperate. W hen he tried  to consolidate th ree lines under one com pany in  
N orth  Carolina, he no ted  heatedly that "three presidents and as m any
superintendents w ill be sure to find reasons w hy no good could resu lt from
62 .
such  an  arrangem ent." Early the next m onth, Sims replied to questions 
from  W illiam Burwell o f the Virginia leg islature about problem s w ith  the 
railroads. Sims explained that car interchange rem ained a conundrum . 'I t  
is alm ost an  im possibility for those who have had  no t practical experience to 
understand  how any difficulty can arise from  interchanging cars," he w rote, 
"and yet it is m ost fru itfu l of destruction to property." Once out of the 
control of the railroad com pany, "cars never get the proper attention . . .  and 
w ith  the present scarcity it is the true policy to husband them w ith care." 
Sims now  concluded the rem edy for controlling railroads was direct 
governm ent supervision. "That railroads shou ld  com e under m ilitary 
control," he averred, "I am  becoming every day  m ore satisfied. There seems 
to be a desire to w ork fo r the road's interest ra th e r than  sacrifice all 
convenience for the country 's cause." He though t m ilitary control had  
becom e the only way to  build  a coordinated system  and "greater harm ony." 
R ailroad m anagers, he believed, should "retain th e ir positions, b u t should
62F. W. Sims to A . R. Lawton, March 31,1864, Official Records. Ser. 4, 
v. 3,258.
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be directly am enable to  Government, and  m ade to feel th a t the interests of
63G overnm ent w ere param oun t to every o th er consideration." Thus, Sims 
w anted railroad m anagers who understood railroad  m anagem ent under the 
control of m ilitary officers. He thought th is setup was the only w ay the rail 
system  could work.
That centralized control of the railroads m ight succeed w as shown in  
M arch 1864. In order to  feed Lee's troops in  V irginia, the W ar D epartm ent 
follow ed Sims' suggestion and put the A ugusta-C harlotte-W eldon railroad 
line under m ilitary control. It canceled all passenger trains, and  freight 
m ovem ent received to p  priority. U nder governm ent control, the railroad 
delivered 3,000 bushels of com  and sufficient m eat to feed Confederate 
troops. When the ra ilro ad  presidents protested, Q uarterm aster General 
Law ton replied, "The resu lts have fully vindicated the act of the W ar D ept 
M ore Govt, stores have been transported from  W ilm ington & C harlotte to 
Richm ond in the last five days, than ever before, during  this w ar, in  the
64 _sam e space of time." This success convinced m any in  the Confederate 
governm ent that centralized  control could w ork. Jefferson Davis, however, 
disagreed. He w rote Seddon in  April 1864 th a t'T  am  no t encouraged by the
63F. W. Sims to A . R. Lawton, A pril 1,1864, Official Records. Ser. 4, v.
3, 228; The next m onth, J. 6 . Jones reported th a t "a list is being prepared at
the W ar Departm ent (by M r. Assistant Secretary Campbell) for Congress to
pass, authorizing the seizure of all the railroads in  the Confederacy." Jones,
Rebel W ar Clerk's D iary , v. 2,213.
“ Quoted in  Goff, Confederate Supply. 199.
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p ast to expect that a ll difficulties w ould be rem oved by  transferring the 
m anagem ent of these extensive organizations to the agents of the War 
D epartm ent." The governm ent gave control back to the  railroads and 
shipm ents declined. I t is no t clear w hether Seddon o r D avis canceled 
m ilitary control, a lthough  N orthrop argued that Seddon backed dow n due 
to  political pressure.65
D espite the lack of centralized governm ent control, southern  
railroads continued to operate. Sims defended his departm en t and  the 
railroads despite his ow n frustrations. W hen it was suggested  that the 
railroads had  no t m ade any progress in  supplying the A rm y of N orthern 
V irginia, he vehem ently pro tested . "Great efforts have been  m ade, and w ith 
success," he argued. Betw een A ugusta and  Richmond, "probably 15 
locom otives and  200 freight cars are now  working betw een those two points 
w hich w ere no t there last year." As for com plaints about com  not being 
delivered from  G aston, he pointed ou t that it happened because General 
P ickett seized the ra ilroad  and caused a com plete "stoppage of business on
65Ibid., 199-201; J. Davis to Secretary of War, A pril 23,1864, Official 
Records. Ser. 1, v. 51, p t. 2,852; J. B. Jones w rote that "the deplorable 
conditions of the railroads, o r ra ther of the m anagem ent o f them . Col. 
N orthrop, Com m issary-General, said to-day that Gen. Lee and  the Secretary 
of W ar w ere responsible for the precarious state of affairs, in  n o t taking all 
the m eans of transporta tion  for use of the arm y; and th a t o u r fate was 
suspended by a  hair." J. B. Jones, A Rebel W ar Clerk's D iary  v. 2,188.
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this road." He asked if "such delays [were] chargeable to transportation or 
the system  under w hich it is conducted?"66
Tighter conscription laws also h indered  the railroads’ abilities to 
operate. Sims com plained w hen the w ar caused rem oval of w orkers from  
the N orth  Carolina R ailroad. He argued th a t w ith  railroads in  such poor 
condition , m aintenance of m achinery and  track  m ade skilled lab o r even 
m ore essential. "The w o rst feature in  reducing the force upon  a railroad /'
he explained, "is that the deterioration consequent upon such a  step  " He
labored to  explain th a t the N orth Carolina h ad  run  efficiently because the 
governm ent gave it needed  m en and m aterials. "We have fostered  it and 
encouraged it un til its condition is vastly im proved," he com m ented, bu t 
th is new  law  w ould destroy  these gains. H e closed by calling it "a short­
sigh ted  policy that runs the road's m achinery dow n No lesson seems to
have been learned by experience."67
By this point, m ilitary  losses m ade conditions even w orse. In order to 
keep railroads running, track  was ripped up  and  rolling stock m oved to 
areas no t threatened by m ilitary conquest. In  1864, the Mobile an d  Ohio 
repo rted  tha t Sherm an and  his troops had "energetically engaged" in  tearing 
u p  the road 's track in  M ississippi. The C entral of Georgia told stockholders
66F. W. Sims to A. R. Lawton, February 22,1864, Official Records. Ser.
4, v. 3,92-93.
67F. W. Sims to G eneral Lawton, A ugust 16,1864, Official Records. Ser. 
4, v. 3,598-599.
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in  1865 that Sherm an's arm y had destroyed 139 miles of track and  that the
road  did  not have the m aterials to rep air them . Virgil Pow ers, of the
Southw estern Georgia, reported that "Our m otive power has depreciated
m aterially in  the p ast four years," b u t it had  done well "considering the
68difficulties of procuring m aterial and  labor for necessary repairs."
Finally, o n  M arch 9,1865, the H ouse M ilitary A ffairs Com m ittee put 
fo rth  another resolu tion  to  take control of the railroads: "An Act to provide 
fo r the more efficient transportation of troops, supplies and m unitions of 
w ar upon the railroads, steam boats and canals in the Confederate States, and 
to control telegraph lines em ployed by the Government." W ith the passage 
of the act, the Secretary of War took charge "of any railroad . . .  considered as 
form ing part of the land forces of the Confederacy " He also had
69authority  to set through trains. N onetheless, railroad presidents and 
superintendents still believed that governm ent interference caused more 
problem s than it solved. '1 am  fully persuaded that w ith different 
m anagem ent," Lem. Peebles, President of the South Side R ailroad wrote,
68Sixteenth A nnual M eeting of the Stockholders of the  M obile & Ohio 
Railroad Company (Mobile, Ala., 1864), 5; T hirtieth Report. C entral Railroad 
and Banking Com pany of Georgia (Savannah, Ga., 1865), 278; Eighteenth 
A nnual Report. South-W estern Railroad Co. (Macon, Ga., 1865), 513.
69"A bill to provide for the m ore efficient transportation of troops, 
supplies, and m unitions of w ar upon the railroads, steam boats, and  canals 
in  the Confederate States," loum al of the Congress, v .7 ,584-585; Charles 
Ram sdell, Laws and Toint Resolutions of the Last Session of the Confederate 
Congress (November 7 .1864-March 18.1865) Together w ith the Secret Acts 
of Previous Congresses (Durham . N. C.: D uke University Press, 1941), 60-61.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
141
that "more can be done than is proposed by this change. Indeed, I  think that 
the G overnm ent w ill gain nothing, an d  it m ay resu lt in  positive injury to
. . .  „70th is com pany.
The governm ent and railroad m anagers d id  not heed th e  lessons 
learned by the individual railroad corporations before w ar—the im portance 
of bureaucratic control. The Confederacy never properly organized its 
railroad system . Indeed, it lacked m en, supplies, motive pow ers and  cars. 
Yet, many of the problem s m ay have been alleviated to som e extent w ith 
proper organization and control. A centralized system  m ay have advanced 
the South’s m ilitary  efforts. The irony rem ains that the South’s first big 
business, w hich h ad  incorporated m any new  bureaucratic ideas during the 
1840s and 1850s, suffered from  a control crisis during the w ar. N ear the end 
of the hostilities, Sims lam ented the fact "that the hand of G overnm ent" 
had  rem ained an  "undefined idea" th roughout the w ar w ith  regard  to the 
railroads. The only authority over the roads, he com m ented, h ad  "resulted 
in  a law so fu ll of loopholes that it is inoperative."71 Thus, a lthough  some 
understood the need for system and organization of railroads, they could not 
im plem ent them . N evertheless, lessons learned during the w ar w ould be 
adopted in creating a New South. O ther areas of the Confederate w ar effort,
/0Lem. Peebles, President South Side Railroad to J. C. Breckinridge, 
M arch 23,1865, Official Records. Ser. 1, v. 46, pt. 3,1335.
71F. W. Sims to Brigadier-General Lawton, February 10,1865, Official 
Records. Ser. 4, v. 3,1092.
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how ever, especially the O rdnance D epartm ent, incorporated new  ideas of 
system, uniform ity, an d  bureaucratic contro l effectively.
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CHAPTER 4
SYSTEM AND WAR: THE CONFEDERATE ORDNANCE
DEPARTMENT AND UNIFORM PRODUCTION OF 
AMMUNITION*
The poor coordination and  control of the Confederate railroads 
dem onstrated the im portance o f bureaucratic organization. A lthough they 
had developed m anagem ent hierarchies, railroads had failed under the 
pressure o f w ar. By w ar's end the Confederate governm ent could barely feed 
and clothe its troops. A m m unition and gunpow der, how ever, continued to 
be produced in adequate am ounts. Brigadier General Josiah Gorgas, chief of 
the O rdnance D epartm ent, L ieutenant Colonel John W. M allet, com m ander 
of the Confederate laboratory a t Macon, Georgia, and George W ashington 
Rains, com m ander of the C onfederate Pow der W orks at A ugusta, Georgia, 
enhanced the Confederacy's ability to wage a long and destructive w ar.1
* Copyright © 1999 The Society for the H istory of Technology. This article 
first appeared in  Technology and C ulture. Volume 40, Issue 3, July, 1999, 
Pages 517-544, published by Johns Hopkins University Press.
I #
The m ost im portant w ork on  the Confederate O rdnance D epartm ent 
rem ains F rank E. V andiver Ploughshares into Swords: Tosiah Gorgas and 
Confederate O rdnance (Austin: U niversity of Texas Press, 1952). The m ost 
significant article on this topic is W. Stanley Hoole, "John W . M allet and the
143
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The C onfederate O rdnance D epartm ent created a m inor industrial 
revolution in  the South th a t incorporated th e  latest ideas of the Am erican 
System of M anufacturing. These ideas h e lp ed  transform  the South. W ith 
the application of m odem  m anagem ent techniques, control processes, and  
bureaucratic structures, they brought a system  of order and uniform ity to the 
fabrication of am m unition and gunpow der. Indeed, by the end of the w ar, 
Gorgas, M allet, and Rains had successfully incorporated into the Ordnance 
D epartm ent the principles and methods of w h at w ould later be recognized 
as the bureaucratic system  of corporate m anagem ent. These m en and the 
m anagem ent m ethods they used w ould la te r help to create a New South.
The need for standardized w eapons an d  am m unition posed a 
daunting challenge for Gorgas and M allet. A lthough they never com pletely 
overcame the D epartm ent's internal problem s, they d id  take significant steps 
tow ard system atizing its m anufacture of am m unition by incorporating the 
bureaucratic changes th a t evolved in ordnance production and m anagem ent
Confederate O rdnance Laboratories, 1862-1865," The Alabama R e v ie w  26 
(January 1973): 33-72, which focuses on M allet7s visits to the many arsenals 
and the construction of the laboratory. A nother valuable source is M aurice 
Kaye M elton, "M ajor M ilitary Industries o f th e  C onfederate Governm ent" 
(Ph.D. diss., Emory University, 1978). For a good overview  of the 
Confederate supply system  see Richard Goff, Confederate Supply (Durham , 
N.C.: Duke U niversity Press, 1969). For a  m ore sym pathetic view of the 
Confederate Com m issary D epartm ent see Jerro ld  N orthrop Moore, 
Confederate Com m issary General: L u ciu s B ellinger N orthrop and the 
Subsistence B ureau of the Southern Arm y (Shippensburg, Pa.: W hite 
Mane, 1996).
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after the W ar of 1812.2 D uring the W ar of 1812, the m ilitary 's lack of 
p reparation  and  poor perform ance taugh t Am erican officers an d  astute 
politicians, such as John C. Calhoun o f South Carolina, th a t a  centralized 
system  for the production of firearm s w as required. In 1815, consequently, 
Congress placed the national arm ories a t Springfield, M assachusetts, and 
H arpers Ferry, V irginia, under the supervision of the O rdnance D epartm ent. 
A t that tim e, the O rdnance D epartm ent looked to the French m ilitary 's 
system  of arm s production, as outlined  in  M ajor Louis de T ousard 's three- 
volum e tex t en titled  A m erican A rtillerist's Com panion. T ousard was one 
of m any French officers w ho em phasized th a t arm s making needed " 'a  
system  of uniform ity and regularity7 based on scientific theory and 
experim entation." The French system  had depended on the introduction of 
standardized parts, im proved production techniques, and inspection of arms
2See especially M erritt Roe Sm ith, H arpers Ferry A rm ory and the
New Technology; The C h a llen ge  of C hange (Ithaca: Cornell U niversity 
Press, 1977); O tto M ayr and Richard C. Post, eds., Yankee E nterprise: The 
Rise of the A m erican System of M anufacturers (W ashington, D.C.: 
Sm ithsonian Institu tion  Press, 1981); M erritt Roe Smith, ed., M ilitary 
E nterprise and Technological Change: Perspectives on the A m erican 
Experience (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1985); James J. Farley, 
M aking Arm s in  the M achine Age: P hiladelphia 's Frankford A rsenal. 1816- 
1870 (U niversity Park, Penn.: The Pennsylvania State U niversity Press, 
1994); D avid A. H ounshell, From the A m erican System to M ass Production. 
1800-1932: The D evelopm ent of M anufacturing Technology in  the United 
States (Baltim ore: The Johns H opkins U niversity Press, 1984); A lfred D. 
Chandler, Jr., The Visible H and: The M anagerial Revolution in  Am erican 
B usiness (Cam bridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1977); James R. Beniger, The 
C ontrol Revolution: Technological an d  Economic Origins o f the 
Inform ation Society (Cambridge, M ass.: H arvard University Press, 1986).
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and am m unition . In  1817, M ajor Sylvanus Thayer in troduced  the French 
ideas of scientific accuracy and m ethods to the curriculum  of the U nited 
States M ilitary Academy. W est Point cadets began to study  chemistry, 
m athem atics, physics, engineering, an d  m ilitary draw ing. Thereafter, the 
military academ y produced a new  breed  of "soldier-technologists" who
understood the nexus between technology and w arfare.3
The O rdnance D epartm ent's em phasis on uniform ity  in  the 
production of m unitions also encouraged the grow th of bureaucratic 
structures to ensure quality control. M oreover, these structures began to 
perm it the  control of production, accounting, and d istribu tion  of arm s as
3
M erritt Roe Smith, "Army O rdnance and the 'A m erican System ' of 
M anufacturing, 1815-1861," in  M ilitary Enterprise and Technological 
Change. 42-46: Farlev. M aking Arm s in  the M achine Age . 36: See also 
Stanley L. Falk, "Soldier-Technologist: M ajor A lfred M ordecai and the 
Beginnings of Science in  the U nited States Army" (Ph.D. diss., Georgetown 
U niversity, 1959); For an excellent analysis of the French adoption and 
abandonm ent of interchangeable parts, see Ken A lder, Engineering the 
Revolution: Arm s and Enlightenm ent in  France. 1763-1815 (Princeton: 
Princeton U niversity Press, 1997) and  his article, "Innovation and Am nesia: 
Engineering R ationality and the Fate of Interchangeable Parts 
M anufacturing in  France," Technology and C ulture 38 (April 1997): 273-311; 
A lder m akes a  convincing argum ent th a t technological change, in this case 
the uniform ity system  in  arm s m aking, does not take a  predeterm ined path . 
M yriad factors, including social, cu ltural, economic, and  political constraints, 
can lead to  the m odification or abandonm ent of a new  technology. 
Technological change, therefore, does n o t occur in  a vacuum  and the 
possibility of alternative paths, A lder argues, should be examined. The idea 
that technological change does no t follow  a  predeterm ined p ath  is also 
exam ined in  M erritt Roe Sm ith's stu d y  of antebellum  arm s making a t 
H arpers Ferry. Sm ith found considerable resistance to technological change 
from supervisors and  workers a t H arpers Ferry A rm ory. Sm ith, Harpers 
Ferry Armory, 104-252.
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w ell as coordination betw een the separate arm s factories. For O rdnance 
officers, uniform ity and  control became key concepts. Slowly, and  w ith 
considerable opposition from  some civilian supervisors, the O rdnance 
B ureau im plem ented its program . By the 1820s, the O rdnance D epartm ent 
introduced m onthly, quarterly, and annual reports, all done w ith  double- 
en try  bookkeeping for m aterials, production, payroll, equipm ent, buildings, 
and  inventory. A ccurate inventory control allow ed coordination of arms 
shipm ents, especially helpful in times of em ergency or w ar. By the 1830s, 
the officers of the O rdnance Bureau operated like a m odem  bureaucracy 
w ith  clear lines of au thority  and com m unication which provided
m anagerial control over their large geographic network.4
The com plicated introduction of uniform ity of w eapons developed as 
decision makers incorporated  machine tools technology and m anagerial 
techniques that allow ed for more rigorous standards. For exam ple, frequent 
inspections and the use of m ore sophisticated steel gauges to m easure the 
accuracy of com ponent parts greatly enhanced the standardization of arms 
and  am m unition. By the late 1820s, this system  enabled the O rdnance 
B ureau to im plem ent the "Springfield standard" which used  m aster gauges 
to inspect and report on  the uniform ity a t each of the arsenals. The
4Smith, "Arm y O rdnance and the 'A m erican System /" 56-58,69; 
C harles F. O 'Connell, Jr., "The Corps of Engineers and the Rise of M odem  
M anagem ent, 1827-1856," in  M ilitary Enterprise and Technological Change. 
88-116; Alfred D. C handler, Jr., "The A m erican System and M odem  
M anagem ent," in Yankee Enterprise. 153-170.
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continued stress on  uniform ity, standard ization , and the im provem ent of 
machine tools p roduced  the first fully interchangeable firearm s 
m anufactured in  large num bers, the M odel 1841 percussion rifle and 1842 
percussion m usket. In  the four decades before the Civil W ar, the U. S. 
Ordnance D epartm ent, through m uch tria l and  error, struggled  to introduce 
system, uniform ity, and  control.5
During the w ar, the South had  to tu rn  to  W est Point graduates and 
other technical specialists to arm  and equip  its army. The regularity, 
uniform ity, and  o rder th a t dom inated m ilitary thinking by the m id­
nineteenth century  now  had to be applied  on a  larger scale than  Southerners 
could have ever im agined. The bureaucratic system  of control developed by 
the U. S. O rdnance B ureau and railroad m anagem ent p rovided  a fram ework 
that Josiah Gorgas and John W. M allet tried  to adopt for the Confederacy. 
W ith their scientific and  technical backgrounds, they understood the 
"control revolution" occurring in m anufacturing, com m unication, and
5Smith, "A rm y O rdnance and the 'A m erican System /" 59-64,74,83; 
H ounshell, From  the A m erican System . 21-25; Paul Uselding, "M easuring 
Techniques and M anufacturing Practice," in  Yankee Enterprise. 103-123; For 
a detailed discussion see Smith, H arpers Ferry Armory. 184-251,280-292; 
N athan Rosenberg, "Technological Change in  the M achine Tool Industry, 
1840-1910 " The Toumal o f Economic H istory 23 (December 1963): 414-420; 
M erritt Roe Sm ith, "John H . Hall, Sim eon N orth , and the M illing Machine: 
The N ature of Innovation  am ong A nte-bellum  Arms M akers," Technology 
and Culture 14 (October 1973): 573-591.
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transportation. Indeed, Gorgas and M allet bo th  personified the idea of 
"soldier-technologists."
B om  in  Running Pum ps, Pennsylvania, in  1818, Josiah G orgas 
graduated  from  W est Poin t in  1841, upon w hich he entered ordnance duty  
as a brevet second lieutenant. In  1845, he v isited  several European arsenals 
as w ell as m ilitary schools an d  factories in  France. D uring the M exican War, 
he experienced firsthand the chaos created by poor planning and logistics at 
the Vera C ruz ordnance depot. A fter the w ar, he served a t m any m ajor 
arsenals. G orgas' educational, technical, and  organizational experience 
placed him  in  the forefront o f his profession w hen  the sectional crisis 
erupted.7 As such, he w as am ong the relatively sm all num ber of early
6(yC onnell, "The C orps of Engineers," 103-105; Beniger, The C ontrol 
R evolu tion . 202-218.
V an d iv e r, P loughshares into Swords. 11-14; See also Frank E. 
V andiver, "A Note on Josiah Gorgas in the M exican W ar," The Toum al of 
Southern H istory 11 (February 1945); Gorgas to Com m ander of the Baton 
Rouge A rsenal, 1847, U nited States Army C ollection, O rdnance D epartm ent, 
Louisiana and  Lower M ississippi Valley Collections, LSU Libraries, 
Louisiana State U niversity, Baton Rouge; Farley, M aking Arms in  the 
M achine A ge, 70-71; See also K eir B. Stirling, Serving the Line w ith  
Excellence: The Developm ent of the U. S. A rm y O rdnance Corps 
(W ashington, D.C.: U.S. G overnm ent Printing Office, 1987), 25-26; Sarah 
Woo If oik W iggins, ed., The T oum als o f  Tosiah G orgas. 1857-1878. w ith  a 
forw ard by Frank E. V andiver (Tuscaloosa: The U niversity of A labam a 
Press, 1995), 4-37; Vandiver, Ploughshares in to  Sw ords. 51-53; For an  
overview  on Jefferson D avis' selection of G orgas see Stanley L. Falk, "Notes 
and  Docum ents: Jefferson Davis and Josiah G orgas, an  A ppointm ent of 
Necessity." The Toumal of Southern H istory 28 (February 19621: 84-86.
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organizers of what, after the Civil War, w ould become recognizable as the 
m odem  bureaucratic system  of production.
John W. M allet arrived  a t his position as G orgas' assistant a t the 
Confederate Ordnance Bureau by a very different route. N ot a  soldier by 
training, he w as a m an of science and technology. M allet was bom  October 
10,1832, in  Dublin, Ireland. H is father, Robert, a trained  engineer, a Fellow 
of the Royal Society, and an  ow ner of a m etal foundry, studied  the 
construction of guns and  the com position of explosives and  powders. John 
M allet follow ed his father's footsteps and studied the classics, physics, and 
chem istry. H e took p rivate instruction from  a lecturer a t the Royal College 
of Surgeons of Ireland, D r. Jam es Apjohn, w ho taught h im  how  to analyze 
m inerals chemically and d irected  him  tow ard the serious study of organic 
chem istry. A t the same tim e, M allet and his father stud ied  different 
gunpow ders and evaluated their shock value. A t the U niversity of Dublin 
M allet distinguished him self as a gold m edalist in Experim ental Physics. A 
year la ter, he m ade a nam e for him self w ith  the publication of his first 
article in  the Toumal of the Geological Society of D ublin.8
8John W. M allet, "M em oranda of My Life for M y C hildren," TMs 
[photocopy] p. 1-3 ,26 , Special Collections/M anuscripts, A lderm an Library, 
The U niversity  of V irginia, C harlottesville; Desm ond Reilly, "John W illiam 
M allet (1832-1912): His E arlier W ork in  Ireland," T oum al of Chemical 
Education 25  (Novem ber 1948): 634; M elton, "Major M ilitary Industries," 
299; H oole, "John W illiam M allet," 36; A pjohn is best know n for his study 
on determ ination  of dew  po in t. Reilly, 'Jo h n  W illiam M allet," 634; Robert 
M allet, Third Report on the  Facts of Earthquake Phaenom ena: Catalogue of
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In  1852, M allet earned his doctorate a t University of G ottingen where 
he received additional training from the well-know n chem ist Friedrich 
W dhler. In  July 1853, M allet and his father traveled to the U nited States to 
exam ine the Ericson caloric engine, and although M allet h ad  p lanned  to 
return  to Europe, he decided to remain in  America. In 1854, he began 
teaching analytical chem istry at Amherst College. In January 1855, he 
accepted the position of chem ist for the State of Alabama's Geological 
Survey team  located in  Tuscaloosa. The U niversity of A labam a offered 
M allet a position as a chem istry professor, which he accepted in  addition to 
his du ties w ith  the Geological Survey. By this time he had  published more 
than sixteen scholarly articles, many in The American Toumal of Science
9
and A rts. M allei's em ploym ent was p a rt of the educational reform  taking
Recorded Earthquakes From 1606 B.C. to A.D. 1850 (London: Taylor and  
Francis, 1852).
9M allet, "M em oranda of My Life," 3-4,20,26-27; W hen M allet arrived 
at G ottingen, W ohler had  begun to focus his research on "inorganic and  
m ineralogical chem istry." Frank N. M agill, ed. The G reat Scientists 
(Danbury, Conn.: G rolier Educational Corporation, 1989), v. 12,146-151 
"Friedrich W dhler," by John A. Heitm an; Reilly, John W illiam  M allet," 
635-636; F. P. D unnington, "A  Sketch of D r. John William M allet, as a 
Chem ist and a Teacher," Toumal of rhom ical Education 5 (January 1928): 
184: The A m erican Toumal of Science and  A rts began publication in  1818, 
and becam e one of the m ost im portant scientific journals in  the country 
w ith articles from  the forem ost American scientists. Among M aileds 
articles were: "Analysis of Tin Pyrites" 17 (May 1854): 33-35; "O n Phosphate 
of Iron and  M anganese from  Norwich, M ass." 18 (November 1854): 33-34; 
"Analysis o f Idocrase from  Ducktown, Polk Co., Tenn." 20 (Novem ber 1855): 
85; "On a  Zeolitic m ineral (allied to Stilbite) from  the Isle of Skye, Scotland" 
22 (Novem ber 1856): 179; "Re-determ ination of the Atomic W eight of 
Lithium " 22 (Novem ber 1856): 349-356; "Results of some A nalysis m ade for
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place in  the antebellum  South. Southern  institu tions, su ch  as the 
University o f A labam a, w ere h iring experts to teach science and technology 
to a  new generation. It w as no coincidence that M allet lived  and  taught in 
Alabama in  th e  late 1850s.
In 1860, M allet began teaching chem istry as a  m em ber of the medical 
faculty at the new ly established M edical College of A labam a in  Mobile. He 
still held a position  as a lecturer a t d ie U niversity of A labam a and, in the 
secession spring of 1861, returned to  Tuscaloosa to teach a  class. He then 
proceeded to V irginia to visit Colonel Robert E. Rodes w ho com m anded the 
5th Alabama regim ent located at Bull Run. The tw o w ere friends, having 
m et when R odes w orked in Tuscaloosa as a professional railroad  engineer. 
On this visit, M allet saw  firsthand the carnage and destruction  left after the 
first Battle o f Bull Rim. Upon his re tu rn  to Tuscaloosa, M allet enlisted as a 
private in  a the  local cavalry un it an d  w ent through several weeks of drill 
w ith the brigade. W hen Colonel Rodes received a prom otion  to brigadier 
general, he sen t for M allet to becom e his aide-de-cam p. M allet accepted the 
position and received a com m ission as a first lieu tenant on  N ovem ber 16, 
1861, on the fie ld  of Bull Run.10
the Geological Survey of the State of A labama" 23 (May 1857): 181; "On the 
Separation of M agnesia and Lithia" 24 (November 1857): 137-139; "On 
Schrbtterite from  Cherokee Co., A labam a" 26 (Novem ber 1858): 79-81; and 
"O n the A tom ic W eight of Lithium " 28 (November 1859): 349-354.
10M allet, "M em oranda of My Life," 5-6.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
153
In  the spring of 1862, w hen Colonel Briscow  Baldwin, the Chief of 
O rdnance for the Arm y o f Virginia, visited h is o ld  friend General Rodes, he 
m et Rodes' aide-de-cam p, Lieutenant M allet. Im pressed w ith the young 
scientist's know ledge of ordnance, Baldw in inv ited  M allet to visit the office 
of Colonel Gorgas. G orgas, badly in need of an  officer w ith  the scientific skill 
to deal w ith  the abundance of am m unition problem s, w anted to in terv iew  
M allet. "The result of several interview s," M allet rem em bered, was "to a t 
once endeavor to bring o rd er ou t of the co n fu sio n .. .
M allet's description of affairs was ap t. In  o rder to m eet the im m ediate 
dem ands of an army p u t together largely in  an  ad  hoc fashion, the 
C onfederate Ordnance D epartm ent initially purchased weapons from 
private dealers or paid volunteers who brough t their ow n. As a result, the 
C onfederate army had a variety  of arm s ranging from  1812 flintlocks to the 
m odem  Enfield rifle. The Confederate O rdnance D epartm ent faced the 
daunting task of trying to bring about a  system  to overcom e this lack of 
standardization. "In the scram ble of the early p a rt of the w ar to obtain a t 
once arm s of some kind, b o th  a t home and abroad, a m ost heterogeneous 
collection w as gathered," M allet wrote, and "as a  natural consequence there 
was serious trouble a t the arsenals and in  the field , from  confusion in  regard  
to am m unition-trouble w hich was m ade w orse by the gauges in use in  the
uIbid.; John W. M allet, "W ork of the O rdnance Bureau of the W ar 
D epartm ent of the C onfederate States, 1861-1865," Southern Historical 
Society Papers 37 (1909): 8; Vandiver, P loughshares in to  Swords. 113.
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ordnance shops, w hich were not very accurate and often d id  n o t agree
12am ong them selves."
Throughout 1861 and  1862, the call for arm s and am m unition from  
the field became incessant. "Our troops, [are] raw, unequipped, not half 
arm ed and accoutered, [and] untented," Brigadier General H enry A. Wise 
com plained in  July 1861. Brigadier G eneral M. L. Bonham concurred and 
w rote General Lee th a t the troops had "little  am m unition, b u t exhibit 
adm irable spirits." As arm s trickled in from  the efforts of blockade running, 
am m unition standardization  became a prim ary concern, especially because 
the w idely scattered southern arsenals had  few mechanisms to  ensure 
quality control. Bullets for the same caliber gun often varied in  size and 
w eight depending on  w hich arsenal m ade them . An ordnance officer in 
Tennessee com plained of the "great difficulty . . .  in  obtaining cartridges to 
su it the calibre of the guns in  this division." He further observed that the 
am m unition sent "frequently" contained the w rong type and the Enfield 
am m unition was alm ost always too large, "causing m en w hose guns 
become choked to throw  them  away as useless." Such com plaints appeared 
frequently in officers' reports. One officer observed that the soldiers had 
difficulty lodging "the bu llet home" after firing "15 or 20 rounds."13
12Frank E. V andiver, "M akeshifts of Confederate O rdnance," The 
Toumal o f Southern H istory 17 (May 1951): 181; Melton, "M ajor M ilitary 
Industries," 296-297; M allet, "W ork of the O rdnance Bureau," 3,7-8.
13Report of B rigadier General H enry A. Wise, July 17,1861, Ser. I, vol.
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In addition to the problem s w ith bullets, no system  of packaging and 
identifying of am m unition existed. Furtherm ore, tim e fuses rarely  
detonated w ith accuracy. General P. G. T. Beauregard com plained of faulty 
fuses that caused inaccuracy, misfires, and failed tim ed explosions. Brigadier 
G eneral John B. M agruder lam ented the "defect[s] about our shells" w ith  
one-half exploding "at the  m uzzle of the piece," a condition he blam ed on 
the  com position of the shells, and he dism issed the friction tubes as 
"worthless." "We shall be ruined," he concluded, "unless you [Gorgas] can
14send  me good shell and spherical-case shot and good friction prim ers.”
In A pril 1862, the production of am m unition appeared so poor that 
G eneral Daniel H. Hill, com m ander at Yorktown, charged that there m ust be 
"treachery" in the O rdnance Departm ent. Gorgas responded that the 
problem s associated w ith  am m unition production  were not sin ister in 
nature, bu t bureaucratic. "If an experienced ordnance officer could have 
supervised the laboratory here [Richmond]," Gorgas wrote, then, "bad 
am m unition and worse guns could not now  be com plained of." H e d id  
adm it, however, that there w as "ample reason for criticism  in  the products
II, 290; M. L. Bonham to R- E. Lee, May 25,1861, Ser. I, vol. II, 43; Riley to 
H eadquarters Army of Tennessee, October 1,1863, Ser. 1, v. 30, p t. 2,314; 
O ladow ski to Johnson, M arch 1863, Ser. 1, v. 23, p t. 2,763, W ar of the 
Rebellion; A Com pilation of the Official Records of the Union an d  
C onfederate Annies (127 volum es: W ashington. D. C.: 1880-1901). H ereafter 
cited as Official Records.
14M elton, "Major M ilitary Industries," 297; Beauregard to Cooper, 
Septem ber 16,1863, Official Records. Ser. 1, v . 27, p t. 2,365; M agruder to
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of our laboratories and foundries "15 d e a rly , the Confederate Ordnance
D epartm ent faced a control crisis in  the production  of am m unition.
Gorgas believed that centralization of production could provide the 
solution to h is control problem s. H e planned a  centralized laboratory w ith  a 
general superin tendent to oversee and  inspect die production  of
am m unition .16 h i addition, G orgas expected to em ploy m odem  m ilitary 
principles w ith  the bureaucratic control structures th a t included rigorous 
guidelines, schedules, procedures, records m anagem ent, and  quality 
control.17 In  o ther words, he w anted  to  create a  system  of organization 
m odeled after the U . S. Army O rdnance D epartm ent.
Gorgas, October 8,1861, Official Records. Ser. 1, v. 4,674-675.
15Gorgas to Randolph, M ay 1,1862, quoted in  V andiver,, 
in to Swords. 112.
16Some definition of term s is needed here. "A n arsenal in  the strictest 
sense was a depository  w hich h ad  u n d er its supervision an  arm ory (which 
d id  the m anufacturing of arm s), a  laboratory  (w hich m ade am m unition as 
well as setting standards and construction procedures), and a depot (which 
was located a t som e detached place and could have the missions of 
collection, repair, and  issue of arm s)." M ark M ayo Boatner, The Civil W ar 
Dictionary (New York; David McKay Com pany, Inc., 1959), 27; It should be 
noted "that w hile basically this setup  rem ained the sam e, exigencies of w ar 
caused m any changes. Some D epots becam e A rsenals and  viceversa, while 
some establishm ents such as H olly Springs an d  the B riarfield Arsenal 
m elted aw ay com pletely." W illiam  A. A lbaugh HI and  Edw ard N.
Sim m ons, C onfederate Arms (N ew  York; Bonanza Books, 1957), 76.
17Josiah G orgas, "Notes on  the O rdnance D epartm ent of the 
C o n fed era te  G overnm ent." Southern H istorical Society Papers 12(1884): 87- 
89.
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In May 1862, Gorgas gained M allet as an  ally in  his battle  for system, 
uniform ity, an d  bureaucratic control o f am m unition production . A lthough
on Ordnance d u ty , M allet served w ith  his hom e brigade in  the Battle of
18Seven Pines on M ay 31,1862. Front-line service did  not keep the new  
ordnance captain  from  inspecting the nearby Richmond arsenal on May 27. 
M allet discovered several deficiencies. H e reported  to Gorgas th a t the 
G ardner m achine u sed  to make bullets "frequently" m olded the mini€ ball 
in  "im perfect form ." Furtherm ore, he suggested, the process of filling small- 
arm s cartridges w ith  pow der needed im provem ent in accuracy because the 
pow der loads varied  considerably, thus m aking the same rifle fire a t a 
different force. Based on  his know ledge of technology, M allet offered 
solutions. For exam ple, he found filling percussion caps by h an d  inefficient 
and  suggested m echanization to perm it "the filling [of] several hundred  caps
19
a t a single operation." In  the area of operations and organization, M allet,
18M allet, "M em oranda of My Life," 6-7.
19M allet to G orgas, M ay 27,1862, "Letters Sent Superintendent of 
Laboratories, 1862-1865," W ar D epartm ent Collection of C onfederate 
Records, Record G roup 109, chapter IV, volum es 24, 28, N ational Archives, 
W ashington, D.C. (from  microfilm  copy E502, reel 2a located a t Amelia 
Gorgas Library, U niversity of Alabama, Tuscaloosa); H ereafter cited as 
Superintendent L etters: The G ardner m achine w as invented by  Frederick J. 
G ardner of N orth  C arolina. The C onfederate O rdnance M a n u a l of 1863 
describes the G ardner m achine in a  footnote: "A  m ethod of attaching the
paper cartridge d irectly  to the ball " A lthough the m achine saved tim e
and paper, com plaints from  the field about the cartridges led to  its 
cancellation. G ardner received a C onfederate paten t for his invention, b u t a 
search did not locate a  U. S. p a ten t The O rdnance M anual for the Use of the 
Officers of the C onfederate States Armv (Evans & Cogswell, 1863; reprint,
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like Gorgas, believed centralization-both  for strategic and operational 
reasons—the m ost pressing need. "The point," M allet w rote Gorgas, "w hich 
seems to require m ost im m ediate attention, and the im portance of w hich 
overshadow s that of all others, is the desirability—n o t to say pressing 
necessity—of rem oving, w ithout delay, this entire Laboratory to some other 
locality—secure for the present, and, as far as can be judged, for the future, 
from disturbance by the enem y —  to [create] for reliable instead of possibly 
precarious supply."20
O nce M allet began full-tim e duty w ith the O rdnance Bureau, Gorgas
sent him  to inspect arsenals throughout the South.21 Gorgas directed that
Dayton, Ohio: M om ingside Bookshop, 1976), 253 (page references are to 
reprin t edition); Richard N . C urrent, ed. Encyclopedia of the Confederacy 
(New York: Simon & Shuster, Inc., 1993), v. 4,1469-1471 "Small Arms: 
M unitions," by Dean S. Thom as; CSA Patent Office Reports, "Patent 12,
08/17/1861 Frederick J. G ardner of Newbem, NC for Cartridges." Only a list 
rem ains of the 266 Confederate patents issued because the Confederate 
Patent Office w as burned upon  the evacuation of Richm ond. For a 
discussion of the Confederate P atent Office and an  entire list of Confederate 
patents see Kenneth W. Dobyns, The Patent Office Ponv : A History of the 
Early Patent Office (Fredericksburg, VA: Sergeant K irkland's, 1997), 167-170, 
207-216.
20M allet to Gorgas, M ay 27,1862, Superintendent Letters: Robert E. Lee, 
albeit a  year later w hen conditions of the railroad m ade it impossible, 
recognized the same need, w riting  Jefferson D avis, '1 think, too, Colonel 
Gorgas should  commence a t once to enlarge his m anufacturing arsenals,
&c., in  the in terior ” Lee to  Davis, September 11,1863 in  Clifford
Dowdey, ed.. The W artime Papers of R.E. Lee, w ith  connective narratives by 
Clifford D ow dey (Boston: Little, Brown, and Com pany, 1961), 599.
zlThese orders specified the arsenal laboratories in  Petersburg, 
Virginia; Raleigh and Fayetteville, N orth Carolina; C harleston, South 
Carolina; A ugusta, A tlanta, M acon, Savannah, and Colum bus, Georgia;
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M allet m eet and  discuss w ith  the com m ander w h at the best distribution of 
w ork shou ld  be, exam ine the "order and uniform ity" of am m unition 
production, and suggest changes to solve ind iv idual arsenal difficulties. 
M allet la ter described the situation  as "not far rem oved  from  chaos." A t the 
end of his inspection tour, M allet forw arded a rep o rt w ith  recom m endations 
for changes and im provem ents to the Chief of O rdnance. Such inspection 
and inform ation feedback w ith in  the bureaucracy w as critical to the order, 
efficiency, and control at the w idely scattered arsenals. G orgas' primary
concern in  this endeavor w as to ensure that each laboratory  instituted
22
rigorous uniform ity in  the  caliber of sm all arm s am m unition.
A t Petersburg, V irginia, one of the first stops o n  his inspection tour, 
M allet surveyed a lead sm elting works, which he described as "well 
planned," needing only "an abundant supply of ore to tu rn  out lead in  large
23
am ount and  regularity." In  Raleigh, N orth C arolina, M allet planned to 
examine a  pow der w orks factory erected by W aterhouse & Bowes, but he
M ontgom ery and Mobile, A labam a; and Colum bus an d  Grenada,
M ississippi; M allet was then  supposed to m ake his office in  A tlanta so he 
would be centrally located to  travel when necessary to  trouble spots. Hoole, 
"John W. M allet," 37.
22M allet, "M em oranda of My Life," 7; V andiver, Ploughshares into 
Sw ords. 114; Benieer. The C ontro l R evolution. 174-177; M allet believed that 
inspection reports w ere "the m ost usefull fsicl in  character that I have seen, 
stating distinctly  the faults com plained of, and giving m eans of the A rsenals 
from w hich the defective am m unition was sent o u t."  M allet to Gorgas, June 
9,1863, Superintendent L etters.
“ M allet to Gorgas, June 8,1862, Superintendent L etters.
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never had  the chance. W hen only th ree-fourths of a mile aw ay from  the 
gunpow der factory, M allet heard "three loud  explosions in  quick 
succession." The explosion left four w orkm en, in  M allet's description, 
"horribly m utilated." The accident destroyed the stam ping house as well as 
several other bu ild ings, w hich on inspection M allet found "most 
injudiciously . . .  d o se  together," an exam ple, in  M allet's opinion, of poor 
p lann ing  and m anagem ent.24
M allet's sense o f urgency intensified a t th e  Charleston arsenal when 
he discovered th a t it d id  no t have any percussion cap-making m achinery.
In addition, cartridges for sm all arm s w ent unlabeled or w ere m islabeled, 
w hich m ade logistics and  shipping m ore d ifficu lt for ordnance officers in  the 
field. W hen he arrived  a t Augusta, the arsenal laboratory had no t yet 
becom e fully operational. M oreover, a  "great want" of lead ham pered the 
w ork started  there, a  problem  that persisted throughout the Confederacy for
25
the duration  of the w ar. A t a m eeting in  A ugusta, Colonel George
24M allet to Gorgas, June 11,1862, Ibid.
^H oole, "John W. M allet," 43; M allet to  Gorgas, June 24,1862, 
Superintendent Letters. In  September 1863, M allet wrote Gorgas that 
"A lthough I tru st o u r m ore im m ediate and pressing wants as regards 
Laboratory stores—especially lead—w ill be relieved by the arrival—now  taking 
place—of shipm ents m ade by Major H use . . .  the difficulty of obtaining 
alm ost all the stores from  the internal resources of the Confederacy has 
increased en o rm o u sly .. . . "  Because of this shortage M allet continued, "lead 
we m ust im port, and  largely as no Arsenal—except Richmond—can 
otherw ise be depended  on  for sm all-arm 's am m unition." M allet to Gorgas, 
Septem ber 7,1863, Superintendent Letters: E. M erton C oulter and  W endall 
H. Stephenson, ed., A H istory  of the South . vol. VII, The Confederate States
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W ashington Rains, w ho w as in charge o f building a large-scale factory for 
the production of gunpow der, agreed w ith  Gorgas' and M allet's assessm ent 
th a t a central laboratory was needed for the standardization, control, and 
production  of am m unition. M allet's v isit to A tlanta confirm ed this view. 
W hen he arrived there for his inspection of the ordnance w orks, M allet 
discovered that the buildings rented from  the city were so sm all, they 
increased the danger of fire or explosions from  the large am ounts of volatile 
ordnance m aterials cram ped together. D ue to the problem s arising from  
inadequate space for a laboratory, the local com m ander had  relocated m ost 
of the m unitions w ork to  "tem porary w ooden buildings" on the  outskirts of 
the city .26
A t this point. M allet decided quick action was needed. He sent 
G orgas a list of suggestions based on w hat he had  observed. First, because 
every arsenal com plained of a lead shortage, the Confederacy needed to find 
a "workable lead vein" and  begin m ining a t once. Second, m achinery was
27 _needed  to make "reliable" bullets. Third, standardization am ong the
of America 1861-1865. by E. M erton C oulter (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
U niversity Press, 1950), 204-205.
26M allet to Gorgas, June 24,1862, Superintendent Letters.
27
Ibid.; Bullets could be m anufactured in  various ways. The m ost 
prim itive m ethod w as casting, where m olten lead was p oured  into a  m old. 
By the mid-1850s m achinery had been developed and constructed a t 
A llegheny A rsenal in  P ittsburgh for the production  of minig ball bullets. 
This probably w as th e  type of machinery tha t M allet w anted. D ean S.
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arsenal products required  uniform m olds, swages, and  gauges. Fourth and 
m ost im portant, w ork should begin im m ediately on  one large central 
laboratory. As M allet wrote:
To establish a t som e one point a  regu lar and  perm anent Ordnance 
Laboratory, capable of turning o u t w ork upon a large scale, and 
furnished w ith  all necessary build ings, including m agazines for 
storage of fixed am munition, pyrotechnic products, &c., If you 
approve the p o licy . . .  of p u tting  up  perm anent buildings upon a 
liberal scale, i t  w ould seem to be tim e to begin the establishm ent of a 
Laboratory of perm anent character a t some p o in t. . .  both as to
security from  invasion, facilities fo r m anufacture, and w ide-spreading
28com m unications for purposes of d istribution.
In  early July, M allet reiterated the need for a central location for production 
and  experiments. H e stated that the d ifferen t arsenals w ere producing 
bullets of the w rong size. For exam ple, the firms m ade a t C harleston "were 
assum ed at .70 and m ade at .673." W ith this idea in  m ind, M allet traveled to 
Tuscaloosa, Alabama, to obtain draw ings for an English pressed bullet
29m achine.
Gorgas concurred w ith M allet's assessm ent of the necessity to begin 
operations of a centralized laboratory an d  thought A tlanta a suitable
Thom as, Ready . . . Aim . . .  Fire! Sm all Arm s A m m unition in the Battle of 
Gettysburg (Biglerville, Pa.: Osborn P rin ting  Co., 1981), 6-9.
28Mallet to Gorgas, June 24,1862, S uperin tendent Letters: Hoole, 
"John W. M allet," 47.
29Mallet to Gorgas, July 1,1862, S uperin tendent Letters.
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location. A tlanta, how ever, d id  no t prove a n  ideal site for construction. 
M allet listened, to  advice from  James H. B urton, the Superintendent of 
Arm ories, w ho h ad  already com pared A tlanta and  Macon as possible
30
locations for a  national arm ory and found M acon m ore suitable. In 
A ugust 1862, a fter M allet inspected Macon, he agreed w ith B urton th a t "the 
advantages bo th  as regards position and cheapness [are] decidedly in  favor of 
M acon~at this place a m ost eligible spot m ight be secured upon reasonable 
terms." M allet d rew  up  plans for a  laboratory and  estim ated a to ta l cost of 
$75,000. He hoped  to m ake the laboratory large enough to replace the 
"hastily go tten-up and  tem porary" arsenals, w hereupon he could issue
31"uniform  and  stan d a rd  am m u n itio n .. . . ”
30V andiver, P loughshares into Swords. 114; Burton began building a 
central arm ory in  M acon in  1862. He had been em ployed at H arpers Ferry, 
Springfield, an d  helped  set up  the American System  of m anufacturing a t the 
Royal Small A rm s Factory in  Enfield, England. M atthew  W. N orm an, 
Colonel Burto n 's  Spiller & B urr Revolver: A n U ntim ely V enture in  
C onfederate Sm all-A rm s M anufacturing (M acon: M ercer U niversity Press, 
1996), 6-7; Lynda Lasswell C rist and  Mary Seaton Dix, eds., The Papers of 
Tefferson D avis (Baton Rouge: Louisiana S tate U niversity Press, 1992), v. 7, 
1861, 228; V andiver. Ploughshares into Sw ords . 79,145,172,247; Sm ith, 
H arpers Ferry A rm ory. 285n, 302n, 312; Sm ith, "A nte-bellum  Arm s M akers," 
583. Burton to G orgas, June 11,1862; Burton to  W. Graham, June 21,1862; 
Burton to G orgas, July [?], 1862; Burton to M ayor and  City Council o f Macon, 
A ugust, 19,1862, "Letters Sent Macon Arm ory, G eorgia 1862-1865," W ar 
D epartm ent C ollection of Confederate Records, Record Group 109, chapter 
IV, volum es 20, 29, and  31, N ational Archives, W ashington, D.C. (from  
microfilm copy E502, reel la  located at Amelia G orgas lib rary , U niversity of 
Alabama, Tuscaloosa); H ereafter cited as A rm ory L etters.
31M allet to  G orgas, A ugust 12,1862, Superintendent Letters.
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As he planned a centralized laboratory, M allet began the arduous task 
of in troducing conform ity in  the p roduction  of am m unition in  all the 
southern arsenals. H e needed a better system  of control. In  A ugust 1862, 
M allet issued new  guidelines for C onfederate laboratories th a t addressed 
internal organization, security, safety, standardization, p roper packaging, 
and  record m anagem ent. To obtain un iform ity  of am m unition, M allet 
instructed th a t all bullets "be frequently verified by means of gauges" as w ell 
as "carefully cast and  trim m ed." He directed each arsenal to adhere to 
specific calibers for the principal arm s in  use by the Confederate army. As 
the Ordnance D epartm ent standardized w eapons in the field, M allet hoped 
tha t the w ide assortm ent of am m unition w ould eventually be replaced by 
one standard-size bullet. "In [the] future, ball cartridges for all muzzle- 
loading rifled arm s (as for instance the M ississippi rifle, Enfield rifle, Minie 
m usket and Belgian rifle)," he stated, "w ill be m ade of one uniform  pattern, 
nam ely, that of the English Enfield rifle cartridges (with three w rappers)."32
32 "Rules: To be observed in  the Laboratories of C. S. A rsenals and 
Ordnance D epots," Confederate States of America. O rdnance Bureau. 
Richmond S. N . 1862. Confederate Im prints, 1861-1865. M icrofilm  4106, 
Reel 30, no. 1437. Louisiana State U niversity, Troy H. M iddleton Library, 
Baton Rouge, 4; These different size bu llets included the M ississippi rifle 
(cal. .54) fabricated a t .525, the Enfield rifle (cal. .577) and the M inie musket 
(cal. .58) at .562, the Belgian rifle (cal. .69) a t .675, and the sm ooth-bore 
m usket, round b all (cal. .69) at .650; M allet also w anted an extra set of gauges
"for verifying the accuracy of the gauges themselves." M allet to M. H.
W right, October 18,1862, Superintendent L etters.
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M allet also outlined specific pow der loads for each rifle as well as 
particular packaging and labeling for am m unition. B undles of am m unition 
had to undergo inspection for "neatness and  com pactness" and all packing 
boxes had to be "m ade of regulation size." M oreover, all bundles of 
cartridges an d  packing boxes required specific inform ation prin ted  on the 
box: the num ber of rounds, the character of the arm , the caliber, the 
character of the projectile, the nam e of the arsenal, and  the year of 
m anufacture. A ll of this inform ation helped logistics an d  ordnance officers 
in  the field. Furtherm ore, the proper labeling of boxes m ade it easier for 
M allet to find  the  source of any faulty  am m unition delivered  to the army.
He therefore could  focus on the problem s a t arsenals w hose am m unition 
received frequent com plaints. He insisted that each arsenal im plem ent a 
strict "system  of accounts" that included the "am ount and  condition" of 
am m unition produced and stored for each arsenal. These accounts gave the 
Ordnance D epartm ent the logistical inform ation necessary for proper
33distribution o f am m unition to its d ifferent arm ies in  the  field.
Much like the m anagers of the railroads who faced a crisis in  control 
because of increased distances in  travel during the 1850s, M allet 
im plem ented an  organizational structure w ith clear lines of authority and 
com m unication, as well as specific departm ents to handle the m yriad tasks 
involved in  ordnance production. H e clarified the chain  of com mand at
33M allet, "Rules: To be O bserved," 4-7.
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each arsenal and gave the responsibility for fully tested and  approved 
am m unition to  the arsenal's superintendent. The laboratory  
superintendent for each arsenal answ ered directly to the A rsenal or 
Ordnance D epot's com manding officer, inspected and issued all fixed 
am m unition, finished fuses, and  percussion caps. In  add ition . M allet 
wanted every laboratory to be located in  a  building separate from  the arsenal 
building to p revent confusion betw een the two operations. W ithin each 
laboratory, M allet introduced specific departm ents w ith a  forem an 
responsible for the operations of each branch. A large laboratory m ight have 
as many as seven departm ents, ranging from  a carpenter's shop to a
34 .departm ent that fabricated fuses and rockets. Thus, M allet im plem ented a 
departm ental structure not m uch d ifferent from  a m odem  corporation.
To increase safety standards, M allet instructed each arsenal 
com m ander to build a separate room  for filling small arm s cartridges. He 
insisted upon a separate building for highly dangerous operations, such as 
making fulm inate of m ercury, filling percussion caps, d riv ing  fuses, 
charging shells, and for breaking up  old am m unition. H e d irected
construction of w ooden floors in  the laboratories w ith "n a ils  carefully
stink below the surface and puttied  over." All of these buildings were to be
34M allet outlined the organization of a large arsenal, w ith  a forem an 
for each departm ent, as follows: carpenter's shop, tin  shop, casting room (for 
bullets), sm all arm s cartridges and cannon cartridges shop, fixing and 
packing of am m unition shop, m aking percussion caps and  friction  prim ers 
shop, and m aking fuses, rockets and portfires shop. Ibid., 1-2.
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sw ept "carefully" everyday to prevent gunpow der from  accum ulating. Only 
"rubber over-shoes o r w oolen socks" could be w orn by w orkm en in  these 
areas. Of course, sm oking o r even carrying m atches were prohib ited  in the 
laboratory buildings. All lights needed fo r n igh t w ork had to be placed 
outside of the buildings. Only employees w ere allowed on the  grounds, and 
visitors had  to  be approved by the arsenal com m ander. M allet also directed 
that every laboratory have a guard to enforce rules and prevent
unauthorized  persons h o rn  entering it.35 These procedures created a more 
efficient chain of com m and, helped im prove quality  control, an d  reduced 
safety hazards. A lthough the struggle to achieve uniform ity an d  an  efficient 
system  of production  w as far from over, M allet's strict guidelines for 
arsenals and  laboratories began to bring o rd er to the various establishm ents 
that p roduced  am m unition.
M allet's plans for constructing a cen tral laboratory, on th e  o ther hand, 
ran  into insurm ountable difficulties. It soon  becam e clear th a t h is hope of 
quick construction of a central laboratory w ould  no t be realized. Indeed, by 
the end of 1863, a  m anpow er shortage, a lack of building m aterials, 
increasing inflation, and  a  deterioration o f the railroad system  m ade 
centralization m ore a goal than  an accom plished fact.
A t first, the building of the laboratory w ent well enough. In  order to 
induce M allet to select it over A tlanta, the city  of Macon donated  land.
^Ibid., 2-3.
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M allet began p u ttin g  together a staff to bu ild  and run the laboratory. He 
hired clerks as w ell as technical specialists,, such as Captain George Little, a 
chem ist M allet h ad  know n from his tenure a t the U niversity of Alabama. 
M allet's staff becam e essential in the construction of the laboratory because 
Gorgas m andated th a t M allet make trip s a t least once a m onth  to inspect the 
"im portant arsenals” as w ell as the "principle arm ies in  the field  and the 
chief fortified seaports."36
M allet p rep ared  for the building of the arsenal in  his usual 
m ethodical m anner. In order to acquire enough land, he negotiated the 
purchase of an  additional 103 acres in  O ctober 1862. He also hired an 
architect for the build ings and began discussions w ith several contractors for 
m aterials and construction. In N ovem ber 1862, he started advertising in 
newspapers for slave labor to construct bricks for the laboratory and for 
w hite skilled carpenters to start work a t the first of the year. Because the 
hired slaves needed to be sheltered, clothed, and fed, M allet asked Gorgas to 
arrange for the C om m issary D epartm ent to provide him  the provisions he 
required. Gorgas obtained~at least tem porarily—perm ission for the 
Commissary officer a t Savannah to provide the needed food for the slave 
labor. By December 22,1862, Mallet had com pleted the purchase of land
^W alter A. H arris, "By Right of C onquest: The C onfederate 
Laboratory at M acon," Georgia Bar Journal 10 (May 1948): 430; Hoole, "John 
W. Mallet," 55-56; M allet to Gorgas, October 20,1862, Superintendent Letters: 
M allet, "M em oranda of M y Life," 7; M allet, "W ork of the O rdnance 
Bureau," 9.
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outside of M acon for a brickyard w here he hoped to produce 35,000 bricks a 
day. In  addition. M allet contracted for the purchase of nails, glass, and  sm all 
item s such as locks, hinges, and screws. He advertised for lime and lum ber 
in regional new spapers and com pleted the designs for the buildings by
37January 6,1863.
A t this point, however, Gorgas reconsidered his overall strategy of 
centralization. He w orried most about the deteriorating railroad system  
that, he believed, actually made centralization m ore of a liability than an 
asset. M oreover, Gorgas observed the increasing scarcity of manpower. He, 
therefore, decided that decentralization had to be practiced w ith each arsenal
supplying the arm y nearest it.3* Early in  January 1863, Gorgas inform ed 
M allet of this change in  policy, w riting that "it w ould be better to go on and 
get results" from  the existing arsenals than risk "delay in order to erect better 
ones." Gorgas w anted M allet to focus all of his attention on inspecting and 
im proving the existing arsenals, exam ining sam ples sent from  each. In
M allet to Gorgas, October 20,1862; M allet to Savannah Republican. 
N ovem ber 28,1862; M allet to Gorgas, December 1,1862; M allet to Major J. L. 
Locke, December 15,1862; Mallet to M ayor and City Council of Macon, 
December 22,1862; M allet to Captain Edw ard Smith, December 24,1862; 
M allet to  Gorgas, January 6,1863. Superintendent Letters: Hoole, "John W. 
M allet," 56,59.
38V andiver, Ploughshares into Swords. 115; Melton, "Major M ilitary 
Industries," 314.
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other w ords, he em phasized m aking b etter am m unition a t the scattered 
arsenals, ra th er than  constructing a  large centralized laboratory.39
G orgas' decision to modify the organization o f am m unition 
production w as bo th  a  rational and pragm atic solution based on the 
changing conditions caused by the w ar. Gorgas saw  decentralization as a  
m ore efficient w ay to arm  the arm ies in  th e  field. M allet, on the other hand , 
d id  no t agree w ith this policy change because his conception of how best to 
m anufacture am m unition depended on th e  central laboratory. He w rote 
Gorgas that "every step  that I have taken has been w ith  a  view  t o . . .  
founding a 'regu lar and  perm anent' Laboratory establishm ent—This alone
40was called for by the orders I had received " G orgas replied that "your
progress and  the energy displayed is satisfactory," bu t, he continued, the 
situation  had  changed, and it was now  m ore im portant to get the army 
am m unition rather than  spend excess resources on a  p lanned, but not y e t 
constructed, laboratory. "I m ust caution you  not to extend your plans too 
m uch," on the M acon laboratory, Gorgas w rote, because "I fear you will 
attem pt w hat m ay delay results [in am m unition production], which are 
m ost im portan t."41
39Edw ard B. Sm ith to M allet, January 14,1863, quo ted  in  Vandiver, 
P loughshares into Sw ords. 158; M elton, "Major M ilitary Industries," 313.
40M allet to Gorgas, January 19,1863, Superintendent Letters.
41Gorgas to M allet, January 22,1863, quoted in  V andiver,
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D espite these instructions M allet still tried  to continue, w ithout 
h indering his inspections, the construction of the w orks. Gorgas, it  appears, 
gave his tacit approval to the continuation of construction as long as it  d id  
no t interfere w ith  im plem entation of standardization  a t the other arsenals. 
As instructed, M allet com pleted tem porary w orks for the production of 
percussion caps, bu t his construction of the perm anent laboratory slow ed
42considerably. He found him self ham pered at every tu rn . By A pril 1863, 
because of his need for laborers and  because of increasing inflation, he had  to 
offer $20 a m onth for slave labor. The Com m issary D epartm ent cut back on 
the regular arm y ration supplied for each slave. M allet com plained th a t "its 
p resen t dim inished form  proved  quite insufficient to support N egro 
laborers a t hard  work."43 These problem s m eant delays, bu t the m ost 
significant problem  rem ained "the im possibility o f procuring transportation  
over the railroads." By June, how ever, enough lim e had  arrived to 
continue the brick w ork and enough lum ber w as on  hand  to allow lim ited 
carpentry w ork on the floor.44 In  September 1863, M allet reported to Gorgas
Ploughshares into Swords. 159.
42M elton, "Major M ilitary Industries," 315; V andiver, P lo u g h sh a res  
in to  Sw ords. 158-161; H oole, "John W. Mallet," 62.
43M allet to D. M. M cIntyre, A pril 28,1863; M allet to Gorgas, February
24,1863, Superintendent L etters; V andiver, P loughshares into Swords. 164.
44M allet to Gorgas, A pril 1,1863; M allet to G orgas, February 21,1863, 
Superin tendent Letters: M elton, "Major M ilitary Industries,” 430-431.
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that "the rate of progress is slow—the great difficulty being the w ant of 
bricklayers of whom—good workm en—I find it  im possible to procure a 
sufficient num ber."45
T he conditions for m aintaining labor continued to worsen. M allet 
could no longer prom ise adequate care of slaves, as the Commissary 
D epartm ent cut back further on  supplies. "It is probable that an 
arrangem ent m ay be m ade by w hich the governm ent w ill supply shoes and  
even clothes," M allet stated honestly to one slave ow ner, "but this I cannot 
yet prom ise." Many slaves ran  away, and injury, sickness, and pregnancy 
also took their toll on the labor force.44 As the year 1864 dawned, the 
situation had  become so desperate that M allet begged for permission to 
im press slaves, w hich he finally received in June 1864.47
N or w as the situation m uch better for skilled w hite laborers needed 
for bricklaying, carpentry, and  ordnance production. In  September 1863,
45M allet to Gorgas, Septem ber 7,1863, Superintendent Letters.
^M allet to A. M. Lockett, November 20,1863; M allet to Thomas 
H ardem an, July 30,1863; M allet to Gorgas, February 24,1863, and passim, 
Ibid; M elton, "Major M ilitary Industries," 429-430; B urton to W.H. D oughty, 
February 25,1863, Armory Letters: For an excellent discussion of the 
transform ation of the paternalistic m aster-slave relationship in the urban- 
industrial clim ate of Macon an d  M allet's dealings w ith  slaves and slave­
owners see Joseph P. Reidy, From  Slavery to A grarian  Capitalism in the 
Cotton P lantation South: C entral Georgia. 1800-1880 (Chapel Hill: The 
U niversity of N orth Carolina Press, 1992), 108-135.
47Reidy, From  Slavery to A grarian Capitalism . 130.
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M allet com plained of wage com petition between departm ents and the h igh  
inflation rate . H e foresaw that "unless perm itted to raise the wages paid 
here I feel alm ost satisfied that the detailed m en w ill all ask to be returned to 
their com panies and the exem pt m en w ill go to seek o th er em ploym ent 
from private sources (which they can very readily find)." By the end of 
November, M allet could not supply  shoes or clothes to  h is workers and h is 
medical supplies became scarce. In  fact, M allet reported  early in  1864, his 
skilled labor found it difficult to  procure "the bare necessaries of life a t their
49present rate of wages."
M allet's supply of building m aterials dim inished over the same 
period of tim e as well. The railroad system , how ever, cannot take all of the 
blame for the inadequacy of supplies. Lumber needed for the laboratory 
went instead to  the building of slave quarters. Slate in tended  for the 
laboratory's roof was accidentally sent to the wrong location. O ther 
problems included delays caused by  the contractor's inability to furnish
M allet to  Gorgas, September 3,1863, Superintendent Letters: B urton, 
facing the sam e problem s in building the Armory, w rote Gorgas: "I am 
having som e trouble w ith the m en em ployed in  this A rm ory in  regard to 
the question of wages—I am paying $4.00 per day to first class machinists,
Blacksmiths, P atte rn  Makers &c The m en w ant to be paid  the same rates
of wages th a t are  now  paid in  Richm ond which they sta te  are higher than 
the rates here—"  Burton to Gorgas, M arch 17,1863, A rm ory L etters.
49H oole, "John W. M allet," 62; M allet to Gorgas, February 18,1864, 
Superintendent Letters.
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50m aterials on the prescribed delivery dates. Furtherm ore, the constant rains 
during the sum m er of 1863 "ruined large quantities of un-bum ed bricks, and 
greatly retarded the operations of the brick yard .” Also, carrying out Gorgas' 
orders to visit the im portan t arsenals, M allet believed, had  "som ewhat
retarded the general progress of the w ork . " Even so, he reported, '1 have
by your orders m ade it secondary to  the pressing claim s of the active 
laboratories."51
D espite M allet's m ounting difficulties in  bu ild ing  a centralized 
laboratory, he m ade steady progress in im proving the quality of 
am m unition produced a t the  active arsenals. H is original orders had 
directed him  to v isit each arsenal a t least once a m onth, b u t M allet found 
such frequent inspections "quite im possible to . . .  accom plish." Instead, he 
only inspected the arsenals th a t experienced significant difficulties. He 
m onitored the production standards of all the arsenals by receiving m onthly 
samples from  each and then  testing the accuracy on  his m aster gauges. 
M allet's correspondence w ith  the m any arsenals w as volum inous and 
showed his atten tion  to detail. He m easured and  w eighed all of the sam ples 
received and sent back ten- to  fifteen-page reports on  the specific weaknesses
M allet to Gorgas, M ay 7,1863; M allet to W adley, Jones and 
Company, June 26,1863; M allet to Dever, May 29,1863; M allet to Wood, 
M eador, and Com pany, June 9,1863, Ibid.; M elton, "Major M ilitary 
Industries,’’ 371-374,438.
S1M allet to Gorgas, A ugust 3,1863, S uperintendent Letters.
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of the am m unition  sam ples and  explained  w here im provem ents should be 
m ade.52
W hile M allet's quality control and  record keeping brought the 
different arsenals into closer approxim ation of standards, som e arsenal
\ l a l l e t  had  directed Caleb H use, a Confederate agent in  Europe, to 
purchase these "accurately tested steel guages fsicl."  and  he provided each 
arsenal w ith  them  so all had the sam e m easuring system . M allet, "W ork of 
the O rdnance Bureau," 8-9; M allet inform ed Gorgas in  M ay 1863 that he had 
issued the "principle Ordnance D epots new  gauges for the Enfield pattern" 
bullet. M allet to  Gorgas, May 14,1863, Superintendent Letters.
M allet sen t ou t critiques of th e  sam ples each m onth  to the arsenal 
com m ander and  to Gorgas, passim , Superintendent L etters. A n example of 
M allet's inspections is the following abbreviated report to  Gorgas:
"C olonel: I have the honor to  subm it the follow ing sum m ary 
statem ent o f the principal points deserving  notice in the resu lts of 
inspection ju s t m ade of m onthly sam ples of sm all arm s' am m unition, 
friction prim ers, &c. for May 1st.
Richm ond A rsenal-O nly 85 grains of pow der are used for the charge 
of the sm ooth-bore m usket w ith ro u n d  ball, instead of the standard  100 grs. 
The bullets fo r M iss, rifles, Enfield rifle, and rifle m usket I still th ink too 
large in  view  o f the danger of 'jam m ing7 in  the barrel of a  foul gun. The use 
of the recently issued guages having been suspended by your o rder there is 
no rule on  th e  subject. Deep flaws are  observable in  the bottom  of the cavity 
a t base of conical bullets from G arduers' machine [probably G ardner's 
m achine], ow ning to defective m olding—they are likely to  cause the ball to 
tear on discharge-----
Lynchburg Ordnance Depot—charge of pow der used for Enfield rifle 
bu t 61-62 grs. instead of 75-cartridges m ade on Spillm ans' plan, b u t folding 
the paper exclusively w ithout tying—very neat in appearance (but 
objectionable from  the difficulty w ith  w hich the ball is disengaged from the 
paper? . . .
A tlanta A rsenal—Very well m ade cartridges (of o ld  U.S. pattern) w ith 
tw o w rappers. Several caps exploded b u t feebly (defective drying after 
varnishing?). Friction prim er tubes of brass—soldered—objectionable on 
account of danger of splitting and spiking the gun—Friction com position or 
pow der w as flaw ed, as several tubes 'hung  fire.' Loops on  w ires not large 
enough to receive hook of lanyard freely." M allet to G orgas, M ay 11,1863, 
S uperintendent Letters.
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com m anders chaffed under h is dem ands for perfection. For instance.
Colonel J. L. W hite of the Selma, Alabama, arsenal com plained about the
rigid requirem ents for the filling of pow der cartridges. He asked why "a few
grains" m attered anyway? U ndeterred, M allet responded:
I am  aw are that it is difficult to obtain absolute uniform ity in the w eight 
of charges filled by m easure—such uniform ity should  however be aim ed 
at, and  pains taken to instruct the fillers of cartridges to make the charges 
as nearly  equal as possib le.. . .  I cannot think i t  an  unim portant m atter 
tha t the am ount of pow der used  should vary by "a few  grains" more o r 
less than  the proscribed quantity.
N evertheless, on the day  he responded to W hite, M allet wrote to
Gorgas o f the plight arsenal com m anders were having in  attem pting to m eet
the D epartm ent's strict standards:
A good deal has been done tow ards im proving and  rendering more 
uniform  o u r am m unition, b u t m uch still rem ains to  be done—There are  
difficulties alm ost w ithout num ber in  the way of even slight changes and  
im provem ents under ou r p resen t circum stances, an d  it is difficult to get 
com m anding officers—harassed by daily obstacles of every kind—to make
54the changes required unless they are convinced of their necessity.
Still, Gorgas rem ained optim istic about the increasing uniform ity of 
C onfederate am m unition. He expected eventually to  enforce his June 9,
1862, requirem ent that all O rdnance arsenals adopt the .577 caliber of the
53M allet to White, Decem ber 5,1863, Superintendent Letters.
54M allet to Gorgas, December 5,1863, Ibid.
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English Enfield rifle.55 in  a rela ted  m ove. M allet began to test bullets of 
different sizes for the Enfield rifle. He found the .576 diam eter bullet m ade 
in  m ost arsenals "excessive” in  size. "[A jlthough they can be fired  from  the 
.58 rifled m usket, or even from  a (clean) Enfield," he w rote, "they w ould in  
all probability soon begin to ’jam ’ in  the barrel as the piece becam e foul.”
The use o f black pow der that caused fouling, the filthy conditions of com bat, 
and the inability  to clean w eapons du ring  the heat of battle , apparently 
convinced M allet that a sm aller b u lle t w as necessary. H e experim ented 
w ith a sm aller caliber bullet th a t could "easily" drop dow n the barrel even 
w hen fouled. A lthough the lig h ter bu lle t tended to fire low , M allet 
m aintained th a t w as not a problem  because soldiers tended  to fire high in  
combat. Besides, M allet believed, i t  w ould be better to "accept such inferior 
accuracy o f fire than run the risk  o f having all fire stopped by the jam m ing 
of a bullet in  the gun.” He eventually  concluded that .560 w orked w ell
V andiver, "M akeshifts," 187; V andiver, Ploughshares in to  Sw ords. 
115-116; H istorian  Maurice K. M elton argues that "Gorgas w ould soon have 
second thoughts" on this circular because the caliber in  the English Enfield 
being im ported  w as .577, but the C onfederate Enfield, basically bu ilt on  the 
Am erican Springfield Pattern (w hich w as based first o n  the B ritish Enfield) 
had a caliber of .58. The English Enfield loaded the cartridge paper w ith the 
ball, but the Confederate Enfield had  separate cartridges betw een pow der and 
ball, so the ball w as loaded "naked." Thus, the size of the balls should  be 
different. The size was no t a problem  at first because th e  Enfield bullet w ith  
paper fit the bore reasonably tigh tly  in  the Confederate Enfield. By 1863, 
however, the Confederacy had a  p ap er shortage. In addition , the sm aller 
English size m ini€ ball beoune the object o f com plaints about accuracy 
because it  d id  n o t fit tightly in  the bore. M elton, "Major M ilitary Industries," 
324-337; F rederick W ilkinson, ed .. The Illustrated  Book of G uns and Rifles 
(New York: H am lyn Publishing, 1979), 84,89.
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enough to  prevent jam m ing w ithou t unduly  reducing the accuracy of the
56Enfield and  rifled m uskets.
M allet's proposal fo r sm aller bullets m et w ith som e criticism . Two 
lieu tenants, D inw iddle and  Tucker, tested  M allet's sm aller gauged Enfield 
am m unition. They judged th e  bullets too sm all, due to excessive windage 
and inaccuracy. M allet w as unim pressed w ith  their findings. They 
presented, he w rote wryly, "no evidence w hatever. . .  of any o ther cause of 
inaccuracy than  extrem ely b ad  m arksm anship."57 Colonel W hite of the 
Selma arsenal also questioned the size of the sm aller gauged bullet. His 
experim ents show ed there w as no difficulty in  loading the sm aller bullet 
w ith a rifle fouled by 100 firings, b u t because accuracy fell sharply, he 
concluded th a t the ball m ust be too sm all. M allet found W hite's conclusion 
"rem arkable." "That this conclusion shall be logically draw n," he 
responded, "it obviously m ust be assum ed that continued firing (at any rate 
up to 100 rounds) ought to cause good am m unition to 'jam ' in  the barrel of 
the gun ." That, M allet thought, had  been the whole point, because "the 
prevention  of such difficulty in  loading w as the very object in  view  in  
reducing the calibre of the balls, and  as I certainly did not anticipate that any 
question could arise as to the desirability of facilitating loading " Besides,
^M allet to Gorgas, A pril 17,1863, Superintendent L etters: M elton, 
"Major M ilitary  Industries," 304,326.
57M allet to  Gorgas, A pril 27,1863, Superintendent Letters: M elton, 
"M ajor M ilitary Industries," 335-336.
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M allet argued, the accuracy d id  not fall until after 300 yards, and he doubted 
the average line of fire betw een infantry lines w as farther than that distance. 
To bu ttress his argum ent, M allet reported that he knew  of soldiers in  the 
field w ho sought out M ississippi rifle am m unition (cal. .54) for their Enfield 
rifles an d  rifled muskets (cal. .577 and .58 respectively).58
D espite these com plaints, M allet w on support from  the Chief of 
O rdnance to issue the gauge a t .560. As a result, standardization im proved.
It d id  n o t last, however. By 1864, paper shortages and  field complaints about 
the English Enfield cartridges not fitting well into the cartridge boxes, thus 
exposing them  to the w eather, underm ined M allet's efforts. As a result,
58M allet to Gorgas, M ay 8,1863, Superintendent Letters: M elton, 
"M ajor M ilitary Industries," 381-382; M allet's prim ary concern w ith 
jam m ing w as "not how  m any rounds of am m unition can be fired from  a 
clean m usket —  but how m any rounds will a soldier probably be able to fire 
from  a g u n  no t previously in  the best condition, loaded  hastily in  the 
excitem ent of battle, w ith am m unition m ore or less sm eared w ith pow der & 
grease from  shaking about in  the cartridge box and  certain therefore soon to 
foul the gu n  to a serious extent." H e w ent on to sta te that "giving the results 
of inspection  of am m unition for May I said that I  could  not help still
thinking the Miss, rifle bullets and old size Enfield bullets too large "
M allet to Gorgas, June 9,1863, Superintendent L etters. It is interesting to 
note th a t this debate m irrors in  some ways the debate over cannons in  18th- 
century France. In his work, A lder shows that "technological facts" are 
"am biguous." Alder. Engineering the Revolution. 87-112; Using this idea. 
M allet an d  W hite had differing views of the "technological facts" regarding 
the p roper size of bullets. O ne of the flaws in the O rdnance D epartm ent's 
organization concerned M allet's position of ensuring quality control. H e 
could n o t issue direct orders to  the arsenal com m anders, many of w hom  
outranked  him . M allet inspected the m aterials an d  then  forw arded his 
findings to  Gorgas. M allet h ad  to convince the arsenal commanders of the 
need for uniform ity, and had  to encourage Gorgas to issue directives.
M elton, "M ajor M ilitary Industries," 514-516.
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Gorgas, o rdered  a return  to th e  U. S. pattern  of am m unition. M allet 
cautioned Gorgas "that all the b u lle t m oulds, com pressing dies, and swages 
now in  use w ill have to be changed, and this involves . . .  serious 
interference w ith  other work." Nevertheless, M allet realized th a t Gorgas 
had no alternative. Consequently, he forw arded G orgas’ orders, despite the
59harm  it w ould do to standardization.
Besides attem pting to standard ize sm all-arm s am m unition, M allet 
also w orked to improve artillery  shells. In A ugust 1862, after less than four 
m onths on  ordnance duty, M allet suggested the use of a better anti­
personnel projectile. He had observed that, w hen artillery  shells exploded, 
there was no set size of pieces fo r the projectile. M allet concluded that, 
w hen the shell broke into "num erous" pieces, the "destructive effect" 
became "insignificant." The re su ltan t small pieces d id  n o t have enough 
force to kill. O n the other h an d , if the shell broke in to  two large pieces, the 
chances of h itting the target g reatly  dim inished. Therefore, M allet reasoned, 
the shell should  break "into as m any equal fragm ents o f the given size . . .  
and that these fragments should be projected as equally as possible in  all
M allet to Gorgas, A pril 2,1864; A year earlier M allet had w ritten  
Major M. H . W right that "suitable paper stands in  the w ay of m aking Enfield 
cartridges after the English p a tte rn  w ithout too great a  reduction of the 
calibre of the bullet—When p ro p er paper for these cartridges cannot be had 
we shall have to make the old U . S. pattern." M allet to  M. H. W right, A pril
23,1863. Superintendent L ettersr M elton. "Major M ilitary Industries," 476- 
477.
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directions about the centre of explosion."60 A lways the scientist, M allet 
developed the polygonal shell. H is shell broke along designed weaknesses 
o r "lines of easy fracture," rather than  along lines of weakness from  
im perfections of the m old or iron  defects. M allet designed the structured 
w eakness by m aking the shell w ith  sharp com ers and straigh t lines in  a six- 
o r eight-sided prism  shape. The fragm ents exploded evenly, the  size of each 
calculated to be large enough to kill a  m an o r a  horse. The new  shell became 
popular, and Gorgas introduced it for general artillery use.61
M allet also im proved the accuracy of tim ed fuses, the loading of
62percussion caps, and the quality of friction prim ers. In the sum m er and
60M allet to Gorgas, A ugust 23,1862, Superintendent L etters.
61"M em orandum : In  R egard To Shells W ith Polygonal Cavities," 
C onfederate States of Am erica. O rdnance Bureau. Circulars from  C. S. 
C entral Laboratory. (O rdn.), Macon, Ga., Richmond. January 21,1863. 
Special Collections D epartm ent, Robert W. W oodruff Library, Em ory 
U niversity; V andiver, P loughshares into Sw ords. 192; M elton, "Major 
M ilitary Industries," 308-310.
62M allet, "W ork of the O rdnance Bureau," 9,14-15; M allet to Colonel 
P. Stockton, N ovem ber 13,1862, Superintendent Letters: M elton, "Major 
M ilitary Industries," 460-479 and  passim . M allet also w orked to  im prove the 
identification of am m unition boxes. For exam ple, he w rote the com m ander 
of the A rsenal in  Richm ond: "D uring m y recent v isit to C harleston I found 
a  num ber of boxes o f 10 inch Colum biad shell (filled) which w ere n o t 
m arked w ith the nam e of any A rsenal o r w ith  the date of fabrication. On 
exam ination of Invoices, &c. it  w as ascertained th a t they cam e from  
Richm ond Arsenal. I t is essential in  o rder to  enable m istakes and. faults to 
be corrected that the ru le  requiring the A rsenal and  date of fabrication to be
alw ays m arked upon th e  boxes should be uniform ely observed The
im portance of a tten tio n  to ru le in  these little  m atters is no t seen  unless the
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fall of 1863, he made a  concentrated effort to  solve the problem  of tim ed 
fuses. From  a telegraphic instrum ent m anufacturer in  South C arolina, he 
o rdered  a specially m ade electro-m agnetic tim er th a t allowed him  to  
m easure accurately die ra te  of b u m  on tim ed fuses. W ith this device, he 
w orked to correct prem ature shell explosions by firing a  num ber of
63experim ental rounds a t Jam es Island. M allet elim inated some of the 
prem ature explosions by finding that "quick-m atch prim ing" created a m ore 
"certain" b u m  and th a t i t  helped to "'ream ' o u t about an eighth of an  inch of 
com position from  the h ead  o f the fuze." These tw o im provem ents brought 
"excellent results" in  his testing.64
products of several d ifferent Arsenals are exam ined side by side or—as they 
often are in  the field—m ixed together." M allet to Lieut. Col. W. LeRoy 
Broun, Septem ber 3,1863, Superintendent L etters .
^M allet to  C. T. M ason, June 30,1863, Superintendent Letters: 
D unnington, "A Sketch o f D r. John W illiam M allet," 184; M allet found 
Jam es Island an  efficient place for systematic testing  because "I have no 
su itable range here [M acon], and  m oreover dislike to waste am m unition in  
m erely experim ental firing  w hen it is possible to  use it against the enem y." 
M allet to Col. G. W. Rains, O ctober 7,1863, Superintendent Letters: M ajor 
E dw ard M anigault w rote on  A ugust 23,1863 tha t, "M ajor M allett [sicl. of the 
C onfederate O rdnance D epartm ent, came to L egare's Point for the purpose of 
inspecting, and , if possible, rem edying the defects of the fuses and other 
ordnance stores. He rem ained, w itnessing the firing &c., for two hours, and 
had  full evidence of the w orthlessness of the fuses." Report Maj. E dw ard 
M anigault, C.S. A rtillery, Com m anding A rtillery a t Legare's Point, James 
Island, A ugust 28,1863, Official Records. Ser. 1, v. 28, p t  1,557.
^M allet to  Gorgas, July 14,1863; M allet to J. T. Trezevaut, A ugust 30, 
1863; M allet to Gorgas, O ctober 3,1863, Superin tendent Letters.
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A lthough the O rdnance D epartm ent had taken significant steps 
tow ard increasing uniform ity by 1863, M allet failed to receive the m odem  
m achinery th a t w ould have im proved production. To equip the slowly 
progressing C entral Laboratory w ith  the m achinery required for large-scale 
production, he depended on C onfederate agents in Europe. In  A pril 1863, 
Gorgas sent Colonel James H. B urton, Superintendent of A rm ories, to 
procure rifle-m aking m achinery in  Europe. Along w ith  purchases of 
m achinery for the Arm ory, Burton o rdered  for M allet bu lle t m aking 
machines, p lu g  m aking machines, percussion-cap m achines, and  friction 
prim er equipm ent from  Greenwood and Batley in Leeds, England.65 Fraser, 
Trenholm , and  Com pany shipped the m achinery in  mid-1864 to Bermuda. 
U nfortunately, blockade-runners no longer m ade the trips from  Berm uda to 
the South w ith  ease. The increased vigilance of federal naval patrols and
6 The choice of Burton m ade sense because of his vast experience in  
the field of arm s production. Frank E. V andiver, "A Sketch of Efforts 
Abroad to Equip the Confederate A rm ory a t Macon," The Georgia H istorical 
Quarterly 28 (M arch 1944): 33-37; See also Burton's after repo rt of the 
mission to Gorgas, Burton to Gorgas, O ctober 30,1863, Arm ory Letters: 
M allet, "Work o f the Ordnance Bureau," 5; M allet to G orgas, Septem ber 7, 
1863, Superintendent Letters: Burton w as quite pleased w ith  the machinery 
he ordered for M allet. He w rote, "I have been authorized by M ajor Huse to 
include in  the contract a  bullet m aking m achine . . .  the sam e as those at 
Woolwich A rsenal; and  they are to be delivered w ith the first lo t of 
m achinery." B urton also ordered "excellent m achines fo r m oulding shot & 
shell w ith unskilled labour, resulting in  g reat economy of cost. It m ight be
well to order a  few  of these machines for C a p t Mallet " Col. Jas. M.
Burton, Leeds, England, to Col. J. Gorgas, Richmond, July 11,1863, April 13, 
1863, Burton Papers, Ramsdell Collection, The Center for A m erican History, 
The University o f Texas at A ustin (m icrofilm  roll 398). H ereafter cited as 
Burton Papers-
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the loss of im portan t ports m ade the ru n  difficult and dangerous. 
Consequently, only a  small p roportion  of the m achinery reached the 
Confederacy.66
The inability  to deliver the m achinery rapidly became a  m oot point 
w ith the C onfederacy's collapse. In  M ay 1864, M ajor G eneral W illiam T. 
Sherm an in itia ted  his advance in to  G eorgia. M en were called from  all 
stations to m eet the challenge. As a  result, few er workm en w ere available. 
"As to 'im ped im en ts/" Gorgas reported , "I know  of none w hich I cannot 
overcom e, except the persistent and  continuous interference w ith  our 
w orkm en on account of m ilitary operations. If this source of 
disorganization and  weakness be n o t finally disposed of, there is no 
possibility of sustaining the operations of the Bureau."67 He also argued for 
the exem ption o f skilled mechanics from  m ilitary service. M uch of the
66B urton to Gorgas, July 30,1863, B urton Papers. A good overview  of 
blockade runn ing  is Stephen R. W ise, Lifeline of the Confederacy: Blockade 
Running D uring  the Civil W ar (Colum bia, South Carolina: The U niversity 
of South C arolina Press, 1988); See also Frank E. Vandiver, ed ., Confederate 
Blockade Running through Bermuda. 1861-1865: Letters and Cargo 
M anifests (Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1947).
67Gorgas to Breckinridge, February 9,1865, in Robert G. H . Kean, 
"Resources of the Confederacy in  February, 1865," Southern H istorical 
Society Papers 2 (1876): 58; Gorgas w rote in  his diary on January 31,1864: "In 
such a w ar as th is—a w ar for national existence the whole m ass of the nation 
m ust be engaged. I t m ust be divided in to  those who go to the field and fight, 
& those w ho stay  a t hom e to support the fighting portion, supplying all the
food, and m aterial o f w ar It is sim ply absurd to call on all to  fight. Some
m ust labor or all w ill starve." W iggins, The jo u rn a ls  of Insia h  Gorgas. 92.
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arsenals' m achinery laid  idle, due to the loss o f skilled labor.68 M oreover, 
the need for slave-labor in  A tlanta created a  labor shortage for the
69construction o f the M acon laboratory.
The w eaknesses of the South a t the ou tse t of the w ar—the lack o f a  
w ell-developed industrial infrastructure and a  sm aller population—finally 
caught up  w ith  the O rdnance D epartm ent. For the  arm y to allow its  m en 
w ork in  ordnance duty , it w ould have to increase its  num erical 
disadvantage o n  the battlefield. D iarist John B. Jones underscored the 
dilemma, w hen he reported  on M arch 1,1865, th a t G eneral Lee "rebuked" 
Brigadier G eneral Gorgas "for constantly striv ing  to get mechanics o u t of the
service [T]he tim e has arrived w hen the necessity of having able-bodied
m en in  the field  is param ount to all other considerations."70
In his final year at M acon, M allet confronted the Ordnance 
D epartm ent's extrem e difficulties. In early 1865, he com pleted the C entral 
Laboratory's "fron t line of buildings." M allet considered them ready for the
68Gorgas to Seddon, October 13,1864, in  K ean, "Resources of the 
Confederacy," 59-60.
69Gorgas to Seddon, February 2,1865, Ibid., 63; Gorgas to Seddon, 
October 13,1864, Ibid., 59; In  A ugust 1864, G eneral H ood directed tha t all of 
M allet's slave labor em ployed in  construction o f the laboratory be sen t to 
A tlanta. H ood to  Cuyler and M allett fsic]. A ugust 1,1864. Official R ecords. 
Ser. 1, v. 38, p t. 5,939.
70John B eaucham p Jones, A Rebel W ar C lerk 's D iary . condensed, 
ed ited  and annotated  by Earl Schenck Miers (N ew  York: Sagamore Press, 
1958), 510.
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m achinery stranded  in  Bermuda, b u t he estim ated th a t he needed another 
forty sm aller buildings for a  com plete laboratory complex.71 W hen Sherm an 
threatened A tlanta, the percussion-cap m achinery and other ordnance 
equipm ent along w ith w orkm en w ere m oved to  M acon. As a result, the 
M acon operation  began to m anufacture friction prim ers as w ell as 
percussion caps. In  addition, two sm all com panies and one section of 
artillery pro tected  the tem porary arsenal, the incom plete laboratory works, 
and the C entral Arm ory in  Macon. M ost of the m en in  the companies w ere 
local w orkers. O nly a few soldiers in  the line of trenches surrounding the 
city had com bat experience. In July 1864, G eneral George Stoneman's 
cavalry advanced upon the town. The C onfederate force a t Macon,
72however, successfully repulsed the raid .
D espite this successful defense, the situation  only w orsened in Macon. 
The O rdnance D epartm ent encountered greater difficulties in m eeting the 
m unitions needed by the army. In A ugust 1864, M allet telegraphed Gorgas 
that the M acon arsenal could not m eet "heavy requisitions from  several
7yquarters." O n September 5, two days after Sherm an sent notice to
71M allet, "M emoranda of My Life,” 7-8.
72Ibid., 7-9; M allet, "Work of the O rdnance Bureau," 14-17.
73M allet to  Gorgas, A ugust 23,1864, "Telegrams Sent Superintendent 
of Laboratories, 1863-1865," W ar D epartm ent Collection of Confederate 
Records, Record G roup 109, chapter IV, volum e 52, N ational Archives,
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W ashington th a t "A tlanta is ours, and  fairly w on," M allet sent the 
disturbing new s to Gorgas th a t General Hood had  blow n up his ordnance
74train before departing A tlanta. W ith A tlanta u n d er federal control, M allet 
began shipping "surplus laboratory stores" to w hat seem ed a safer location at 
Selma, A labam a. His difficulties increased w hen, in  October, he lost one- 
fifth of h is w orkm en to conscription. Things go t even worse. The next
m onth Sherm an began his "M arch to the Sea."75 Because M allet thought 
the U nion arm y intended to destroy Macon, he loaded  his m achinery on
W ashington, D.C., (from m icrofilm  copy E502, reel 3a in  the Amelia Gayle 
Gorgas Library, University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa); H ereafter cited as 
Superintendent Telegrams.
74Sherm an to Major G eneral H. W. Halleck, Septem ber 3,1864, Official 
Records. Ser. 1, v. 38, pt. 5,777; M allet to  Gorgas, Septem ber 5,1864, 
S uperintendent Telegrams.
75M allet to White, Septem ber 6,1864; M allet to Gorgas, October 25, 
1864, S uperintendent T elegram s: In 1864-1865, the Confederate G overnm ent 
expanded the draft pool, and few er waivers w ere given to workers for 
deferm ent from  service. G eneral O rders, No. 82 sta ted  that 'T he Chief of the 
Bureau of O rdnance will, w ithout delay, take m easures to place in  the field 
one-fifth o f all the m en em ployed in  his departm ent (including contractors 
and their em ployes) of the classes specified.. . .  To this end he will d irect the 
several officers in  charge of arsenals, workshops, depots, &c., to tu rn  over to 
the nearest enrolling officer, by list, showing their ages, occupation, and  
residence, such proportion of their em ployes. . .  of the class above referred 
to as w ill constitu te in the aggregate one-fifth of the whole num ber in  the
said classes. Three days are allow ed for the execution of this order after
its reception a t any post or station  of the Ordnance D epartm ent." G eneral 
Orders No. 82, Adjutant and Inspector General's Office, October 20,1864, 
Official Records . Ser. 4, v. 3,741.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
188
railroad cars for Savannah. The effort was w asted, however, because of
76dam age to  the railroad line.
U nder these adverse conditions the laboratory  a t Macon continued to 
m ake am m unition , although  M allet had no m oney to pay his m en. In  
addition, several arsenals alm ost ground to a  standstill for w ant of lead.
Even w ith  th e  rem oval of lead pipes from M obile, Alabama, it rem ained a 
critical need .77 Still, M allet continued to produce percussion caps and  
friction p rim ers. Because of the circum stances, how ever, he had to decide 
w hether to  m ove his equipm ent. Six days after Lee's surrender, he 
telegraphed Colonel George W ashington R ains in  A ugusta that "G eneral 
Mackall advises that, question of moving cap factory or not be decided a t 
once. Enem y are m oving on Columbus. W here is General Gorgas?" 
U nbeknow nst to M allet, Gorgas and  most of the Confederate hierarchy had 
fled R ichm ond on A pril 2, after new s came from  Lee that his lines had  been
78broken. O n A pril 20, eleven days after Lee’s surrender, M allet once again
76M allet to Gorgas, N ovem ber 21,1864, S uperintendent Telegram s: 
M allet, "W ork of the O rdnance Bureau," 18.
^M allet to Gorgas, February 2 and 9,1865; M allet to J. L. N ott, February 
11,1865, S uperin tenden t Telegram s.
78M allet to Rains, A pril 15,1865, Ibid.; Jones, Rebel War C lerk's D iarv. 
530-532; A m elia G orgas, "As I Saw it: One W om an's Account of the Fall of 
R ichm ond," ed . Sarah W oolfolk W iggins, The C ivil W ar Times Illustrated  
(May 1986): 40-42; V andiver, Ploughshares in to  Sw ords. 266-267; W iggins, 
The Toumals of losiah G orgas. 158-162.
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pu t his m en in  the trenches to defend against an  expected cavalry attack.
The a ttack  never came. A telegram  from  G enerals Johnson and Sherm an 
preceded it, "ordering an  im m ediate cessation o f hostilities."79
N otw ithstanding the S outh 's defeat, the accom plishm ents o f the 
C onfederate O rdnance D epartm ent, in  terms of organizational control and  
technological im provem ent, w ere impressive. The departm ent m ade 
significant progress tow ard the standardization o f am m unition an d  the 
creation of a m odem  bureaucratic system of production. It m arshaled raw  
m aterials. It assembled, trained, and  directed a large w ork force. It planned 
and b u ilt p roduction  sites. The departm ent also established control 
m echanism s for the production o f am m unition. This involved the 
arrangem ent of production processes, the im position of size and quality  
standards, and the introduction o f systematic testing and site inspections. 
Beyond this, it developed strict rules and procedures in  packaging m aterials 
to control logistical problems, an d  it introduced accounting procedures for 
the d istribu tion  of arms. Further still, it made technological progress 
through the use of system atic experim entation of am m unition, tim ed fuses, 
and the polygonal shell. Accordingly, it was no t a failure of vision, b u t 
defeat o n  the battlefield, that prevented the Confederate Ordnance 
D epartm ent from  its full realization of m odem  organizational structu res
79M allet, "W ork of the O rdnance D epartm ent," 18; Mallet, 
"M em oranda of My Life," 9.
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and technology. Indeed, during the th irty  years after the w ar, the 
organizational principles that G orgas and M allet im plem ented became 
integral p a rts  o f the bureaucratic system  of big business. W ith these ideas, 
Gorgas a n d  M allet w ould help create a  New South.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTERS
SYSTEM, TECHNOLOGY, AND CONFEDERATE GUNPOWDER
PRODUCTION
For a  society based on  agriculture, the South m ade significant strides 
in  incorporating industrial m ethods and ideas du ring  the war. These 
organizational ideas d id  no t d ie w ith the w ar b u t helped create a  N ew  South. 
A n Englishm an who toured  the Confederacy in  the spring of 1863 found 
that Confederate soldiers had  "every variety o f weapon." In M ississippi, 
after the evacuation of Johnston’s arm y, he saw  "great num bers of pikes and  
pikeheads," which reinforced his belief that the Confederacy rem ained in  no 
condition to carry on the w ar. Once he m oved in to  the eastern theater, 
how ever, his view point changed. Besides the noticeable im provem ent of 
the arm s carried by the troops, w hat im pressed the English visitor the m ost 
w as the governm ent pow der works in  A ugusta, Georgia. He scarcely 
believed the am ount of gunpow der produced a t the m ill, entirely b u ilt after 
the Civil W ar began.1 The G overnm ent P ow der W orks he view ed 
exem plified the strides the Confederate O rdnance D epartm ent m ade under
'A rth u r James Frem antle, Three M onths in  th e  Southern S tates. 
April-Tune. 1863 (New York: JohnB radbum , 1864), 6, 74,106,174-177,225.
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Gorgas and  his subordinates as they began a  program  of home m anufacture 
and industrialization  in  the hope of self sufficiency. Like the production  of 
am m unition, gunpow der m anufacturing included a  variety of tasks: the 
procurem ent of raw  m aterial, large-scale m achinery, skilled labor, m ass 
production, system , control, and bureaucratic structures. As M allet and  
Gorgas, George W ashington Rains w ould also teach the lessons of w ar to a 
new  generation of southerners after the w ar th a t stressed the need for 
system , science, and  technology.
A t the beginning of the w ar the supply of gunpow der was lim ited. A t 
first, the C onfederate governm ent obtained a  sm all accum ulation of pow der 
from  a variety of sources. The initial supply  cam e from  the capture of 
N orfolk N aval Yard and some m inor am ounts located a t the Baton Rouge 
and  M ount V ernon arsenals. Gorgas estim ated th a t in  all the sou thern  
arsenals, no m ore than 60,000 pounds of pow der existed. "The en tire  supply  
of gunpow der in  the Confederacy at the beginning of the conflict," recalled 
George W. Rains, the head of the C onfederate governm ent's efforts to 
m anufacture gunpow der, "was scarcely sufficient for one m onth of active 
operations." H e continued that "to en ter upon  a  g reat w ar w ithout a  supply 
of this essential m aterial, and w ithout effective m eans of procuring i t  from
abroad, o r of m anufacturing it a t hom e, w as appalling.
2Charles Edgew orth Jones, "Confederate Pow der Works a t A ugusta," 
The C onfederate V eteran M agazine 26 (January 1918-December 1918): 208;
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For hom e m anufacture of gunpow der, Gorgas decided on  a two-tier 
effort of perm anent and  tem porary w orks. Perm anent works served the 
purpose of providing centralized, large-scale production, w hile tem porary 
w orks scattered th roughout the South m et "im m ediate dem ands." 
Tem porary w orks used  the resources available in  each region, supplied the 
nearest army, and could be moved quickly to new  locations if the enemy 
approached. Tem porary works, how ever, could no t make large am ounts of 
pow der. G unpow der needed to be produced in  large quantities of high 
quality, a task that could only be done in  a perm anent, large-scale
m anufacturing p lan t w ith  economies of scale.3
The C onfederacy had some sm all pow der m ills in Tennessee, 
Louisiana, and South Carolina. A shortage of equipm ent and a  lack of 
saltpeter, an essential elem ent in  the m aking of gunpow der, plagued 
production a t these m ills. A t first, a variety  of problem s kept production at 
the sm all mills to about 300 pounds of pow der a  day. Therefore, a  shortage 
of gunpow der becam e especially acute in  the early stages of the w ar. Major
Josiah Gorgas, "Notes on the O rdnance D epartm ent of the C onfederate 
G overnm ent." Southern Historical Society Papers 12 (1884): 68. George 
W ashington R ains, H istory of the C onfederate Pow der Works (Augusta. 
Georgia: Chronicle an d  Constitutionalist P rinters, 1882): 3.
3John W. M allet, "Work of the O rdnance Bureau of the W ar 
D epartm ent of the Confederate States, 1861-1865," Southern H istorical 
Society Papers 37 (1909): 4; Rains. C onfederate Pow der Works. 4: Gorgas, 
"Notes on the O rdnance Departm ent," 72-73; Jefferson Davis, The Rise and 
Fall of the C onfederate Governm ent, vol. 1, (New York: D. A ppleton and 
Company, 1881), 474-475.
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General D avid E. Twiggs, the first com m ander of New Orleans, noted this 
shortage in  a le tte r to Secretary of W ar W alker. ’1 do not wish to appear 
pettish o r to  be im portunate in  the m atter of pow der," he com plained, "but 
if it cannot be obtained the sad spectacle will be presented to the Confederacy 
of the M ississippi Valley falling into the hands of the enemy because of the
4
lack of am m unition."
In o rder to bring about system, uniform ity, control, and large-scale 
production of gunpow der, Gorgas turned to George W ashington Rains.
Rains fit the definition of a "soldier-technologist" perfectly. A native 
southerner, Rains w as bom  in  Craven County, N orth Carolina, in  1817. He 
received his early education a t New Bern Academy. He accepted an 
appointm ent to the U nited States M ilitary Academ y in 1838, and quickly 
progressed th rough  the cadet grades from Corporal to First C aptain of Cadets. 
He ranked firs t in  his class in scientific studies and  third overall in  his 
senior class. W ith such high achievem ent a t the Academy, he chose the 
Engineer C orps as his specialty w hen he received his commission in  1842. 
Rains and G orgas probably knew  each other a t W est Point since Gorgas
graduated in  1841, and both  excelled in the sam e areas of study.5
4M aurice K. M elton, "Major M ilitary Industries of the C onfederate 
Government" (Ph.D. diss., Emory University, 1978), 41-42; Twiggs to W alker, 
September 6, 1861. Official Records. Ser. 1, vol. 6,728.
5T w enty-N inth A nnual Reunion of the A ssociation G raduates of the 
United States M ilitary Academy a t W est Point. N ew  York. Tune 9.1898.71-72
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Rains' first assignm ent sen t him  to  B oston w here, as a  young 
engineer, he engaged in  the construction o f F ort W arren and  gained 
valuable experience in  design and practical im plem entation o f architectural 
plans. D espite his technological skill, Rains becam e bored w ith  die 
"monotony" of engineering w ork and d isp layed  a "predilection for the 
parade and  excitem ent of m ilitary life." H e petitioned G eneral W infield 
Scott to arrange a highly unusual transfer to  the 4th A rtillery a t Fort M onroe 
in  V irginia. Rains only served a  year in  artillery  duty before he received 
orders in  1844 to teach chem istry, m ineralogy, and  geology a t W est Point, 
w here he stayed until the w ar w ith  M exico. A t the outbreak of the Mexican 
W ar in  1846, Rains requested and was transferred  back to an artillery  
regim ent. H e served as Acting A ssistant Q uarterm aster and A cting 
Com missary of Subsistence a t a large logistical base at Port Isabel, w here the
in  G eorge W ashington Rains Papers, Southern H istorical C ollection, The 
U niversity of N orth Carolina, C hapel H ill, N o rth  Carolina. H ereafter cited 
Rains Papers; M aurice M elton, "’A G rand A ssem blage’: G eorge W. Rains 
and  the A ugusta Powder Works," Civil W ar Tim es Illustrated  11 (January 
1973): 28; M elton, "Major M ilitary Industries," 43-44; Rains' b ro ther, Gabriel, 
w as also a  w ell-know n soldier technologist. H e developed the land m ine 
during  the Seminole W ar and also used it against Union troops during  the 
Civil W ar. See. Milton F. Perry. Infernal M achines: The Story of 
C onfederate Submarine and M ine W arfare (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
U niversity Press, 1965); For an analysis of th is debate, see N orm an E. 
Y oungblood, "'The M ost M urderous and B arbarous Conduct': The 
D evelopm ent of Mine W arfare in  the N ineteen th  C entury A m erican 
M ilitary," (M.A. Thesis, Southw est Texas S tate U niversity, 1990).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
196
Rio G rande m eets the Gulf of M exico. H e later becam e an  aide to General 
W infield Scott an d  an  A ide-de-cam p to General Pillow .6
After h is service in  Mexico, Rains accom panied Pillow  back to his 
com m and in  N ew  O rleans. Once there, he received o rders to travel to 
F lorida w here clashes w ith  the Sem inole Indians escalated in to  ou trigh t 
w arfare. D uring the Seminole W ar, Rains' duties involved  road  building, 
bridge construction, and erection o f forts. He rem ained in  Florida for 
eighteen m onths and  gained valuable engineering experience. Once the 
conflict ended, Rains served a t a variety  of posts, including Fort Ham ilton, 
Fort Colum bus, and  Fort M ackinaw. In 1855, he becam e C om m andant of 
Recruits a t G overnor's Island. U pon m arriage, Rains decided to pursue 
engineering in  p rivate enterprise fo r higher pay. As p residen t of the 
W ashington Iro n  W orks in  N ew burgh, N ew  York, he helped  design a new 
steam  engine.7
In 1861, Rains m ade the decision to render his services to his native 
South. The inv itations of Jefferson D avis and Gorgas p layed an  im portant 
role in  this decision. Rains po in ted  ou t th a t Davis, a form er W est Point 
graduate and Secretary of War, understood the need fo r soldier- 
technologists. D avis knew  m ost of the talented people in  the m ilitary,
6ReiUliOIL. 72-73.
7
Ibid.; M elton, "A G rand Assem blage," 28; Joseph B. M ilgram , Jr., and 
N orm an P. G entieu, George W ashington R ains-G unpow derm aker of the 
Confederacy (Philadelphia: Foote M ineral Company, 1961), 4.
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w hich allow ed him  "to select his agents for the  different services required." 
Davis and  Gorgas w anted Rains to build a  gunpow der factory to supply  the 
Confederate army. U pon h is arrival in  R ichm ond, Rains received from  
D avis and Gorgas a v irtual "carte blanche" to  select a location in  the  in terio r
of the Confederacy to bu ild  a  perm anent factory to supply gunpow der.8
In  his new  job, Rains had  to perform  several tasks at once. H e had  to 
select a suitable site for a perm anent pow der p lan t, design the architecture 
and  layout, obtain the needed machinery for production of pow der, and  
develop a continuous supply  of saltpeter. A t the  sam e time, Rains had  to 
im prove the production capabilities a t the sm all pow der works in  
N ashville, N ew  O rleans, and  South Carolina. "I im m ediately left 
Richm ond," Rains recalled,
to begin  the w ork n o t w aiting even for m y com m ission in the arm y to be 
m ade out, which I received afterwards. D ay and night for several 
m onths I alm ost lived  on  railroad cars; devising plans, exam ining the 
country  for a location, hunting up m aterial, engaging workm en, m aking 
contracts, and em ploying m ore or less every available machine shop and
foundry from  V irginia to  Louisiana.9
Rains m ade a w hirlw ind to u r of the South, an d  w hile looking for a suitable 
site, inspected the sm all pow der works, especially the Sycamore M ill in
8R eunion. 74; Rains, Confederate Pow der W orks. 4.
9Extract of G eorge W. Rains' speech to the Confederate Survivors' 
A ssociation in  A ugusta, Georgia on April 26,1882, in  George W ashington 
Rains Papers. H ereafter d te d  as Rains' Speech to  Survivors.
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N ashville. These m anufacturing plants had  to  m eet the Confederacy's 
im m ediate dem ands, and  Rains believed "the utm ost energy was requ ired  to 
p reven t the loss of a battle b y  a  failure in  am m unition." Therefore, they 
requ ired  his "first attention." Upon arriving a t the Sycamore Pow der Mill, 
Rains took over the state contracts for the C onfederate governm ent and  
begin enlarging the p lan t as w ell as im proving its technology. He ordered  
stam pers constructed to mix th e  ingredients o f gunpow der.10
Saltpeter, how ever, rem ained in short supply  in  1861, and ham pered 
production  a t all the pow der m ills. G unpow der required four elem ents: 
potassium  nitrate and saltpeter, constituting 75 percent of the m ixture, and 
equal parts charcoal and su lfur, making up  the  other 25 percen t Saltpeter 
included a com bination of n itrates and potash  lye. The nitrates could be 
m ined from  "nitrous earth" th a t forms natu rally  in  lim estone caves, cellars, 
and  under buildings, or it  could  be m anm ade w ith  the nitrates from  rotting  
carcasses, m anure, and urine. "Porous fine-grained wood" provided the 
ingredients for charcoal; the b est type of w ood in  the South came from  the 
w illow  that, in  Rains’ opinion, proved favorable over other types because it 
left "very little ashes w hen burned." The elem ents w ere mixed together 
either by a stam ping process (used a t the Sycamore Mill) that pounded the 
ingredients together o r by a  rolling m ethod th a t com bined the elem ents
l°Rains, Confederate Pow der Works. 4-5.
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under the w eight of heavy cylinders. The mixing process, Rains observed, 
m ust be done u n d e r the "most favorable conditions, w hen  there should be 
the m ost in tim ate approxim ation o f the com ponent m olecules." If the 
m ixture contained the wrong proportions, or was no t com bined correctly,
the explosive force became inaccurate.11 Therefore, system , uniform ity, and  
control proved critical in the production  of gunpow der.
U nderstanding that the large-scale production o f pow der relied on a 
constant supply o f saltpeter, Rains w rote a pam phlet, N otes on Making 
Saltpetre from  The Earth of the Caves, in  the hope of creating large 
diversified sources of this m aterial. The booklet p rov ided  instructions on 
how  individuals an d  com m unities could leach n iter. I t included details on 
how  to prepare a  barrel to hold n itrous earth, so that the n iter could be 
separated and d ra in ed  from the soil. H e then w ent on  to explain the process 
of com bining lye w ith  the separated n iter in the p ro p er proportion to form  
saltpeter. W hen these two com pounds coalesced, the m ixture was boiled in  
o rder to rid  the saltpeter of any im purities, leaving it in  crystal form.12
Rains estim ated  that "twelve barrels of the e a rth  of the caves w ill in  
general, make n o t less than one h u n d red  pounds of Saltpetre," and he stated
URains, C onfederate Pow der W orks. 16-17; M elton, "Major M ilitary 
Industries," 49-50; M ilgram, G unpow derm aker of the Confederacy. 7-8; 
M elton, "A G rand Assemblage," 33.
1ZGeorge W . Rains, Notes on M aking Saltpetre from  the Earth of the 
Caves (Augusta, Georgia: Steam Pow er Press Chronicle & Sentinel, 1861).
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that even if tw elve barrels produced only  67 pounds, it w ould  still be w orth 
$23.45, or the equivalent of 35 cents p e r pound, a price the O rdnance 
D epartm ent w ould  gladly pay. Published in  N ashville, R ichm ond, and N ew  
O rleans in  1861 the pam phlet included a ll o f the regions in  the  South. Rains 
hoped that "crude saltpetre" would "rapidly" be obtained by the efforts of 
private citizens and  contractors throughout the South. M uch of the region 
had rich, n itrous earth , and  a survey by  governm ent officials and  private 
individuals located  num erous caves fo r developm ent in  east Tennessee and 
the northern  reg ion  of Alabama, as w ell as the foothills of V irginia, 
Arkansas, and  G eorgia. Eventually, m ost of the niter caves an d  the 
collection of n ite r in  tow ns fell under th e  control of the N itre and M ining 
Bureau set u p  by Gorgas in  1862.13
The O rdnance D epartm ent fulfilled the im m ediate dem and for 
saltpeter by purchasing 240 tons horn th e  State of Georgia. In  addition, 
several tons of su lfu r th a t had been im ported  to Louisiana for use in  sugar 
factories, m et pressing needs. The efforts of Confederate purchasing agents 
in  Europe becam e an  im portant source o f supply  for saltpeter through the 
blockade. Some 2,700,000 pounds came from  blockade-runners, prim arily a t
I3Ibid.; R ichard C. Sheridan, "Production of Saltpetre from  Alabama 
Caves, " A labam a Review  33 (January 1980): 27; Rains, Confederate Powder 
W orks. 6; C oulter, H istory o f the South. 206; G lenna R. Schroeder, "'We 
W ill Support the G ovt, to  the Bitter End': The A ugusta Office of the 
C onfederate N itre  and  M ining Bureau," Georgia H istorical Q uarterly 70 
(Summer 1986): 289.
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the po rts of Charleston and  W ilm ington. D uring the sam e period, m ining 
and n iter beds in  the Confederacy produced 300,000 pounds.14
In  A pril 1862, Gorgas appoin ted  Major Isaac M . S t John to handle 
contracts fo r m ineral resources and  the procurem ent of pow der. This 
organization, called the N itre and  M ining Bureau, quickly ballooned in  size 
and im portance, and it eventually becam e an independent departm ent It 
also becam e one of the m ost pow erful organizations in  the Confederate 
governm ent late in  the w ar because of its ability to im press slaves, caves,
mines, iron , and  other needed  m aterials.15
To supply niter, S t John depended on two sources. The prim ary 
source becam e nitrous soil from  caves throughout the South. In order to  
mine as m any areas as possible, S t John divided niter-bearing areas into 
districts w ith  each district having an  officer in charge. These officers h ired  
white w orkm en and used slaves to m ine the caves an d  process the soil in to  
saltpeter. M uch of the w ork took place in  "Union districts," which Gorgas 
characterized as "a rude, w ild so rt of service"; he suggested that "the officers
14A nsw er to interrogatories under resolution of Congress of July 27, 
1861, from  O rdnance Office, W ar Departm ent, A ugust 12,1861, Official 
Records, Ser. 4, vol. 1,555; Bell Irv in  Wiley, The Life of Johnny  Reb (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State U niversity Press, 1980), 304; Rains, Confederate 
Pow der W orks. 7.
15G eneral O rders No. 85, A djutant and Inspector G eneral's Office, 
"AN ACT to  Establish a N iter an d  M ining Bureau," June 16,1863, Official 
Records. Ser. 4, vol. 2,594; F rank E. Vandiver, "M akeshifts of Confederate 
O rdnance." Toumal of Southern H istory 17 (May 1951): 187.
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in  charge of these districts, especially . . .  h ad  to  show  m uch firm ness in  their 
dealings w ith the turbulent people am ong w hom , and by whose aid , they 
w orked." N evertheless, G orgas recalled th a t w ith  St. John's bureaucratic 
system , "we brought up  the nitre production, in  the course of a year, to  
som ething like half o u r to ta l consum ption."16
The second process St. John used consisted of m aking niter beds; he 
tried  diligently to get every tow n to develop one. This m anm ade process 
used  ditches approxim ately tw o-feet deep, filled  w ith hum an urine, 
carcasses, m anure, decaying vegetables, and organic liquids as active 
ingredients to make n iter. It ferm ented in  about a year and a half; it w as 
then  placed in  hoppers an d  the n iter drained th rough  it. A lthough little  
n ite r recovery actually occurred in  this fashion, it is estim ated that th ree to 
four m illion pounds w ere "ripe enough to be leached" a t the end of th e  w ar.
St. John reported to Secretary of W ar R andolph: "On A ugust 1 the 
furnaces w ere up and w ork under way a t six teen G overnm ent caves, w ith  
an  average force of 272 w hite hands and 115 negroes. This does not include
labor on private works Referring to the n ite r districts in  detail—in
V irginia fifty contracts have been closed w ith  p rivate parties, some of w hom  
have w orked well, b u t from  their slow progress and  the frequent loss of 
caves by the enemy . . .  w ork has been undertaken  on G overnm ent 
acco u n t.. . .  In Georgia there are several n iter caves in  the northw estern 
counties—one in Bartow C ounty, very v alu ab le .. . .  In Tennessee are several
very large and  rich caves. The m ost valuable are  under hostile control___
In N orthern  Alabama the presence of the enem y has occasioned a  general
suspension of work, including the valuable S anta Cave In low er
A labam a a vigorous effort is being m ade to induce planters in  the lim estone
and  m arl counties to w ork p lan tation  earth  " St. John to Randolph, July
31,1862, Official Records. Ser. 4, vol. 2,26-30; G orgas, "Notes on the 
O rdnance Departm ent," 76-77.
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In  the area of n ite r production, the Confederacy m ade progress, and Gorgas 
looked a t the n ite r beds as a long-term  solution. "Our chief supply of 
chem icals/' G orgas adm itted , "continued to  come, how ever, from  
abroad — ’’ b u t "these w orks, as w ell as ou r nitraries, w ere as m uch 
preparation against the day w hen the blockade m ight seal all foreign 
su p p ly .. .  .’*17
W hile Rains p repared  plans for a centralized gunpow der 
m anufacturing p lan t, the O rdnance D epartm ent signed a  series of contracts 
to m eet im m ediate dem ands. Bowen and  Com pany near Pendleton, South 
Carolina, and  J. M. O stendorf of W alhalla, South Carolina, produced sulfur 
and saltpeter fo r the  departm ent. In  addition, the M ilitary Com m ittee of 
Tennessee and  th e  governor of Tennessee contracted the construction of a 
pow der m ill a t M anchester. These w orks em ployed the ro lling  process in 
m ixing the pow der instead  of the stam ping process traditionally  used. This 
process allow ed Rains to  experim ent w ith different m ethods of refining 
w hile he b u ilt the C onfederate Pow der W orks.18
17St. John w anted  "to stim ulate private enterprise by  circular and 
new spaper publications, personal appeal, and instruction, and  by affording 
facilities for w ork in  p rom pt paym ent and a  liberal supply of tools and 
utensils." St. John to R andolph, July 31,1862, Official Records. Ser. 4, vol. 2, 
26-27; Gorgas, "N otes on  the O rdnance Departm ent," 76-77; C oulter, History 
of the South. 206; M allet, "W ork of the O rdnance Bureau," 10.
18A nsw er to interrogations, A ugust 12,1861, Official Records. Ser. 4, 
vol. 1,555; Rains, C onfederate Pow der W orks. 7; Rains originally requested 
stam pers a t M anchester, b u t G orgas decided to have rollers m ade instead. 
Gorgas to Rains, Septem ber 30,1861, Rains Papers.
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D espite these efforts, the South C arolina mills produced only 300 
pounds of pow der a  day combined, an d  the Nashville w orks proved 
disappointing, h i a letter to Rains in  Septem ber 1861, G orgas com plained 
that "if w e cou ld  get 1200 lbs a day  from  the Nashville m ills we should do 
very well, b u t those mills seem to be a m irage—constantly reced ing .. . ."  In 
Gorgas' opinion, the plants should have been producing "400 lbs a  day," but, 
"W right says they will in  a few days produce a 100 pounds per week— 
patience, patience, patience, & yet again  patience!"19
The lack o f standardization and  control produced inferior pow der at 
the scattered m ills. Moreover, pow der brought from  abroad often was poor 
or got w et on the  run  through the blockade. A C onfederate artillery 
com m ander along  the Potomac rep o rted  th a t "the am m unition found in  the 
m agazine for the  large guns was very indifferent." F urther still, "the 
pow der was a  m ixture of blasting w ith  rifle powder." Because of this 
m ixture, he reported , "the A rm strong g u n  a t the same elevation w ould not 
throw  a shell m ore than  halfway across the river; then again  far over the 
river." A nother officer com plained th a t artillery shots fell sho rt of their 
m ark because "of the inferiority of ou r pow der com pared to th a t of the 
enemy.” G iving Gorgas confidence, how ever, Rains had  decided on a 
location for the G overnm ent Pow der W orks and construction had  begun in
19A nsw er to interrogations, A ugust 12,1861, Official Records. Ser. 4, 
vol. 1,555; G orgas to Rains, Septem ber 30,1861, Rains Papers.
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earnest. The groundw ork for high quality , uniform , m ass-produced pow der 
had been laid.20
In July 1861, Rains studied the city of Augusta, Georgia, as a  potential 
site for the pow der works. "It was rem arkable," he m arveled, "that the m ost 
favorable conditions required in  the erection of an  extensive Pow der 
m anufactory, w ere all m et a t this location, and  nowhere else attainable." He 
found many reasons for its selection. It lay deep w ithin Confederate 
territory. It connected to the major railroad  network. In addition , the 
location of the A ugusta Canal, on w hich an  old  U. S. arsenal rem ained, 
provided tw o attractive features: it supplied water-power for the assorted 
buildings constructed and provided transportation during th e  different 
processes betw een buildings. The buildings Rains planned covered a two- 
mile area along the canal, w ith each building separated by a t least 1,000 feet 
for safety. Spreading out the different processes in  the m aking of 
gunpow der by th is distance made a chain-reaction of explosions, and thus 
the loss of the w hole m anufacturing w orks, less likely. The A ugusta Canal 
had  little com m erce or traffic which m ade the possibility of an  accident 
im probable; the vicinity around the canal held a sparse population  on the 
w estern p art of the city limits which kep t civilians at a safe distance.21
20W iley, Tohnny Reb. 303-304; R eport of Brigadier G eneral Johnson K. 
Duncan to M ajor J. G. Pickett, A pril 30,1862, Official Records. Ser. 1, vol. 6, 
525.
21Rains, Confederate Powder W orks. 10-11; Milgram,
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R ains also considered the availability of labor, especially mechanics, 
w hen he chose A ugusta as the site for the Pow der W orks. He noted that 
having the w orks n ear a populated  center allow ed for the recruitm ent of 
skilled labor. Fortunately for Rains’ w orks, the beginning of the hostilities 
left m any m anufacturers and  builders idle and  skilled labor "throw n ou t of 
em ploym ent, w hich enabled contracts to be m ade advantageously a t the 
usual prices"—a luxury tha t w ould n o t be present in  the later stages of the
w ar. A quick s ta rt in  construction proved im portant in  procuring  the
22needed m aterials and  labor.
The basis of the plans fo r the G overnm ent Pow der W orks relied on 
"an invaluable pam plet," w ritten  by M ajor J. Fraser Bradley, Superintendent 
of E ngland 's W altham  Abbey W orks. This pam plet becam e Rains' guide in  
designing th e  Pow der W orks, "and the entire process and m achinery 
em ployed a t th a t factory, the best existing in any country, w as succinctly 
stated." H ow ever, Bradley's explanation of the W altham  W orks d id  not 
include draw ings, w orking plans, or any details of how  he organized the 
layout of th e  buildings. Rains failed to find any publication w ith  these 
specifics and  therefore "w as throw n upon" his "ow n resources to supply
23these deficiencies.'
G unpow derm aker of the Confederacy. 13.
22R ains, C onfederate Pow der Works. 11.
23Ibid., 8; M elton, "A G rand Assemblage," 30.
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W hile traveling betw een d ifferen t pow der factories, Rains m ade 
rough draw ings o f the buildings along w ith  their dim ensions. He also drew  
sketches of th e  m achinery required and  forw arded them to  Gorgas for 
construction a t the Tredegar Iron W orks. He gave the rough  outlines o f the 
buildings to C . Shaler Smith, an architect and  civil engineer em ployed a t the 
Tredegar W orks, to com plete after the selection of A ugusta becam e final. 
Rains w anted to  construct a  system atic an d  efficient p lant th a t produced 
large am ounts o f uniform  gunpow der.24
C onstruction of the G overnm ent Pow der Works sta rted  in  Septem ber 
1861, after Rains purchased the needed m aterials and m ade construction 
agreem ents. H e signed contracts for the bricks for the buildings w ith the 
A ugusta and H am burg yards. The stones needed for the foundations, 
lintels, copings, and  sills came from Stone Mountain, G eorgia, by way of the 
Georgia R ailroad. The construction contract for the erection of the works 
w ent to D enning and  Bowe of Augusta. Once the plans, contracts, and 
construction g o t underw ay, Rains m ade inspection trips to the sm all pow der 
w orks to try  to  g e t their production u p  and  complete the building of the 
M anchester W orks w hich experienced production difficulties. He left the
24Rains, C onfederate Powder W orks. 8,13; Melton, "M ajor M ilitary 
Industries," 56-58.
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progress o f the factory buildings in  the hands o f C. Shaler Smith, w ho took
25directions from  Rains by m ail.
Rains technological expertise served him  w ell in draw ing up  the 
operational plans for the gunpow der plant. In  late July, he advised Gorgas 
to order the  necessary m achinery im m ediately so th a t it w ould be com pleted 
by the tim e construction finished in  A ugusta. The pow der mill required  
m achinery for "making charcoal, refining n iter, refining sulfur, breaking 
cake, pressing, granulating, dusting , pulverizing, glazing, &c." Rains 
estim ated it w ould take the T redegar Iron W orks "working night and day . . .  
at least th ree m onths before any of the m achinery can be pu t into 
operation." Rains also needed tw enty rolling m ills and predicted a  lag tim e 
of four m onths for Tredegar to  produce the necessary rolling cylinders. 
A dded to the m achinery m ade in  Richmond, Rains purchased two sm all 80- 
horse pow er steam  engines an d  one large 130-horse pow er steam engine in  
A tlanta. These steam  engines proved extrem ely valuable to the Pow der 
Works because they ran a sixteen foot gear box w ith  an engine shaft tha t
gave each building power.26
^R ains, Confederate Pow der W orks. 12; M elton, "A Grand 
Assemblage," 31.
26Rains to Gorgas, July 25,1861, Official Records. Ser. 4, vol. 1,557. 
Rains, C onfederate Powder W orks. 9; Milgram, G unpow derm aker of the 
Confederacy. 15.
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O ther purchases m ade by Rains during his travels included iron 
evaporating pans cast at an iro n  w orks on the C um berland River in  
Tennessee, two hydraulic presses brought from Richm ond, and large copper 
pans for dry ing  the pow dered saltpeter m ade in  N ashville. The A ugusta 
C onfederate Foundry built four cast iron retorts, eight cast iron  coolers, and  
twelve sheet iron  slip cylinders. C opper boilers m ade from  turpentine stills 
were purchased  in  W ilm ington, N orth  Carolina, and  the H ights Foundry in 
A ugusta m ade large steam pipes. Raw m aterials such as iron  and coal for 
casting cam e from  Alabama and  northern  Georgia, and  the Ducktown,
Tennessee, m ines supplied copper un til it fell into U nion hands.27 Thus, 
Rains h ad  tw o m ajor processes running sim ultaneously: the construction of 
the Pow der W orks and the build ing  of machinery.
In  O ctober 1861, with construction underw ay in  A ugusta, Rains se t 
out to solve several deficiencies. In N ashville "a special refinery for 
saltpetre'* to  help m eet the South 's dem and neared com pletion and 
produced 1,500 pounds of refined saltpeter a day. Rains hoped to increase 
the total to  3,000 pounds a day. Unfortunately, a scarcity of skilled labor 
curtailed production. "For som e days," Rains noted "every p art of the 
operations w ere carried on un d er m y personal instruction." In an attem pt 
to solve the  problem  of the lack of trained laborers, Rains h ired  skilled labor
^R ains, Confederate Pow der W orks. 10.
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throughou t the South. Instead  o f sending them  to Augusta, w here they 
w ould  sit ideally until construction was com pleted, he sent them  to  th e  
M anchester W orks. The M anchester m ill served  as a  "school o f in stru c tio n  
for a  few  selected men, so as to have them  ready  for service” w hen the 
A ugusta W orks started operation . These m en w orked w ith the ro lling  
m ethod, m ixing the ingredients under the crushing w eight of cy linder 
barrels, the sam e incorporating process to be u sed  a t Augusta. O ther laborers 
w orked a t the new  saltpeter refinery learning how  "to refine saltpetre and
d istill charcoal.”28 W ith this instruction, Rains p rovided  the O rdnance 
D epartm ent w ith  trained w orkers.
W hile building the A ugusta works and  train ing  labor, Rains traveled  
to  N ew  O rleans. The city appeared  to have prom ise as a possible m ajor 
m anufactory o f gunpow der. In  October, G eneral Lovell reported th a t he had  
"tw o m ills w hich will give us 6,000 or 8,000 pounds per day if we can get 
sa ltp e te r .. . . "  In  November, Lovell further assured  Secretary of W ar 
Benjam in th a t three pow der m ills w ould be in  operation "in a few  days . . .
•29tw o of w hich are private property .' These forecasts, however, p roved
m uch too optim istic. On D ecem ber 5, Lovell repo rted  only two m ills 
p roducing gunpow der, and  one of these existed in  a  m akeshift bu ild ing  of
28
Ibid., 5 ,7 ; Gorgas to Rains, September 30,1861, Rains Papers.
29Lovell to Benjamin, O ctober 25,1861, Official Records. Ser. 1, vol. 6, 
754-755; Lovell to Benjamin, N ovem ber 19,1861, Ibid., 769.
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the o ld  M arine H ospital. Rains v isited  these two mills and to ld  Lovell that 
they should easily produce two tons o f pow der a day. N evertheless, their 
m axim um  production had  only been 1,500 pounds. From th is p o in t on, 
events disintegrated in  the New O rleans W orks. On December 28,1861, 
8,000 pounds of gunpow der exploded a t the M arine Hospital com pletely 
destroying the m ill. W hat was left, Lovell m oved to H andsborough, 
M ississippi, across the river. Private contractors ran  the o ther tw o m ills  in 
the city, but turned to Confederate officers, especially Rains, for supplies and 
technical advice. These m ills, how ever, never m et expectations an d  fell into 
U nion hands w ith  the capture of N ew  O rleans in  A pril 1862.30
O n the brighter side, the construction of the Augusta Pow der Works 
m oved along as scheduled w ith an  adequate supply of labor an d  m aterials. 
The layout of the buildings allow ed for system atic and efficient production; 
each building served a  specific purpose in  each phase of the pow der making 
process w ith each lined  up  accordingly. The first building, the refinery 
build ing, sat nearest the city and served a variety of purposes. The structure 
fronted the canal and m easured 250 feet w hile extending back 275 feet. Each 
of the com ers of the building had tow ers serving as office space. W ithin the 
in terior, the east w ing provided w arehouse space for supplies an d  had  the 
capacity to hold 1,500 tons of saltpeter and  sulfur. The west end  of the
30Benjamin to Lovell, December 23,1861, Official Records. Ser. 1, vol. 
6, 786; M elton, "Major M ilitary Industries," 54-55.
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building contained a charcoal departm ent as well as a m achine shop 
equipped w ith a steam  engine. "Rifle and  ballistic pendulum s" filled the 
northeast section, and  a steam boiler house in  the northw est portion  
com pleted the ou ter sections inside the building. The saltpeter refinery 
"occupied the righ t central portion" taking u p  approximately 3,600 square 
feet. In the center of the refinery building, a  thirty-six square foot area "was 
sunk four feet to allow  w ater from  the canal to pass around the bottom s" of
31the large evaporating pans used in  the refining of saltpeter.
G unpow der production began in  the refinery building. In  Rains' 
view, "the best quality  gunpow der can only be made from the purest 
saltpetre." If the saltpeter proved im pure o r had  "deliquescent salts 
present," the strength  and uniform ity of the pow der would be considerably 
affected, causing cannon balls and mini6 balls to fall short or to overshoot 
their m ark. The equipm ent o f the refinery included two evaporating pans 
each w ith a separate furnace—the smoke passing through a flue to the huge 
chim ney w hich left the refining room  "entirely free from ashes, d u st and 
sm oke.” W ith this m achinery and the labors of two or three w orkers, 
saltpeter could be purified. The crude saltpeter had water added to  it and 
evaporating pans heated it. Once this procedure took place, w orkers poured 
boiling fluid into a draining trough where the saltpeter crystals collected and
31Rains, C onfederate Pow der Works. 12-13; Milgram, 
G unpow derm aker o f the Confederacy. 13.
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the w ater drained off. Once separated, these crystals w ent into a 
crystallization m achine w hich ag ita ted  them  and broke them  into small 
particles. The final step in purifying the saltpeter consisted of rem oving any  
m o ther-liquor, the solution rem aining afte r crystalization, w ith  a thorough 
w ashing in  pure w ater. Rains found the A ugusta Canal w ater sufficiently 
pu re  because the d istrict had no lim e o r earthy salts; therefore, it was "as
32nearly pure as possible."
The w est end  of the refinery bu ild ing  housed the area for the drying 
of w ood for charcoal, m ostly willow. As the w ar dragged on, willow becam e 
increasingly scarce, so the more abundan t cotton wood becam e the prim ary 
source. After the w ood dried properly , it w ent into the "distilling process.” 
Iron  retorts heated the w ood w ithin slip  cylinders, cast iro n  cylinders four 
feet in  diam eter and  six feet in length. Placed over furnaces, each retort 
rem ained sealed on  one end and the o th er end had a  m oveable cover. O ver 
the heat of the furnace, the open end allow ed "the escape of the vapors and 
gases." The w ood rem ained in the h ea t fo r two hours an d  form ed into 
charcoal. Cranes pulled  the hot slip cylinders containing the w ood out of 
the retorts and placed it in cast iron coolers located below  the floor in the 
canal w ater circulating through the build ing. This process rapidly cooled the 
new ly form ed charcoal. The cranes then  dum ped the charcoal on a large
32Rains, Confederate Powder W orks. 11-13; M ilgram  
G unpow derm aker o f the Confederacy. 16-17.
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table. A t this po in t an im portant control process took place w hen workers 
inspected the charcoal for im purities.33
The charcoal that passed  inspection w ent in to  "pulverizing barrels 
w ith bronze balls,” and these barrels revolved by  a  m achine process crushing 
the sticks o f charcoal into a  "fine pow der." Then, the saltpeter and charcoal 
m ixed to  form  gunpow der. Sulfur had  to be "pulverized and bolted like 
flour," done w ith  the use of tw o tw elve-inch iro n  w heels w eighing 600 
pounds each. Revolving w heels crushed the su lfu r on iron beds. Carefully 
w eighed fo r the proper proportions in  the m ixing process, the saltpeter, 
charcoal, and  sulfur then w ent through a process called "mingling." The 
m ixture m ade sixty-pound charges—45 pounds o f saltpeter, 9 pounds of 
charcoal, and  6 pounds of sulfur. The next step, incorporation, by far the 
m ost dangerous, allowed the greatest possibility of an  explosion and
34disaster.
Tw elve incorporating m ills extended dow n the canal aw ay from the 
refinery bu ild ing . Incorporation involved the crushing of the com pounds 
to m ake gunpow der. Safety during  this process rem ained a central concern. 
Rains requ ired  1000 feet as the m inim um  space betw een the buildings. Each 
incorporating m ill m easured 296 feet long, and as Rains described "the walls
33R ains, Confederate Pow der Works. 16-17.
34R ains, Confederate Pow der Works. 16-17; M ilgram, 
G unpow derm aker of the Confederacy. 19-21.
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w ere m assive, being from  four to ten feet thick, the horizontal section of 
each being  th a t of a huge m ortar of seventeen feet w ide by tw enty-four feet 
long; the  height of the w alls w as tw enty-eight feet." These huge walls 
surrounded  three sides; w ood and glass com prised the front of each build ing  
and the roof consisted of ligh t sheet zinc. Thus, any explosion traveled 
upw ard  an d  out of the fron t in  a  controlled direction. To prevent a chain- 
reaction o f explosions, the buildings "faced alternately in opposite 
directions." Rains also b u ilt an  autom atic flooding system . In each 
incorporating mill, a set of 30-gallon w ater barrels hung above the cylinders 
m ixing th e  highly volatile ingredients. An iron  shaft connected these 
barrels in  each of the buildings. In the event of a n  explosion in one 
building, the shaft w ould tu rn  (from  the force) in  the eleven other 
buildings, flooding the bed plates full of unprocessed pow der, thereby
35reducing the chance of explosion due to flying debris and sparks.
The accidents that d id  occur a t the w orks in  Rains' opinion "were 
rendered . . .  by the carelessness of the powder-m akers." Rules, a p riority  of 
bureaucratic control, w ent unobserved in these instances. Three explosions 
occurred a t the plant during  the incorporating process, and all occurred in  
the early m onths of its operation. In the first accident, a pow der m aker 
m istakenly added a new  charge of pow der under the incorporating rollers 
w ithout rem oving the caked pow der from  an  earlier process. W hen the
35R ains, Confederate Pow der Works. 18-19.
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rollers crushed these two m ixtures together a fire started  and produced w hat 
Rains term ed "a pow erful explosion." The explosion blew  ou t the roof an d  
fron t of the building but d id  little  other dam age. The o ther m ills  had th e ir 
incorporating pans flooded, a n d  only one w orker suffered injuries. Rains 
characterized the other two explosions, where no w orkers w ere hurt, as
"insignificant."36
The incorporation process followed the sam e technique as the 
W altham  Abbey Powder W orks in  England. The three ingredients had  to  
m esh perfectly in order to secure uniform ity and accuracy as well as safety. 
Rains described how the process w orked if observed under a microscope. "A 
fine particle of charcoal was seen  to be a mass of carbon" he explained, 
"penetrated by num erous po res w ith  the saltpetre to have the best 
condition." A ugusta em ployed the rolling m ethod process rather than the  
stam ping m ethod. The sixty-pound charges of saltpeter, charcoal, and 
sulfur, w ere brought to the incorporating  m ill from  the refinery building. 
W orkers spread it out on "horizontal cylinders of sheet copper thirty inches 
long by eighteen inches in  d iam eter" that revolved around a "common 
axis" m ade ou t of "heavy brass tube three inches in  diam eter" w ith holes in  
it. Steam  sent through the ho les of the tube m oistened and brought the 
com pounds to a boiling poin t a s  the cylinder ro tated . This reduced the
^Ibid., 19-20.
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m aterial "to a sem i-liquid slush." The w hole process lasted  eight m inutes. 
The m aterial then cooled an d  "became a dam p solid cake," bu t at the sam e 
time, the  boiling and cooling process allow ed the saltpeter in  the "saturated 
solution" to enter "the m inu test pores of the charcoal,” and the cake started
.  37crystalizing.
O nce the m aterial becam e cake-like, laborers m oved it to the 
incorporating mills. The incorporating m ill h ad  "an iron  circular flat bed of 
seven feet diam eter," and  up o n  this flat bed tw o large iron  rollers weighing 
five tons each turned. A large cast iron shaft located underground turned 
the gears w ith  130 horse-pow er engine to all tw elve incorporating mills. 
W orkers placed the caked m aterial on this flat bed , and  other workers 
located behind  the m assive w alls pulled the levers to low er the cylinders 
w hich crushed and ro tated  the bed. Rains described the incorporating 
process as the "crushing, grinding , mixing, an d  com pressing" of sulfur, 
charcoal, and  saltpeter. As the m aterial pressed together under the w eight of 
the cylinders, steam  kept the  com pound m oist an d  hot. A  scraper located on 
one side of the bed continually broke the pow der cake allow ing for 
continuous m ixture and pushed  w ayw ard scraps back under the path of the 
rollers. The entire process lasted  an  hour as th e  rollers revolved at ten 
revolutions a m inute. The finished pow der m easured  five-eights of an  inch
37Ibid., 17-18.
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thick called "mill cake,” and had a "blackish grey color" once it cooled. N ext 
in  the process cam e the granulation of th is m ill cake.38
The granulation  building, located 1,500 feet dow n the canal from  the 
incorporating m ills, had  th in  walls m ade o f brick  and a light roof. In  this 
building, w orkers placed the mill cake on  a  tu rn ing  table. "Bronze too th  
cylinders" broke the  cake into small pieces, and  the powder, forced th rough 
different size screens, became the desired dim ension and weight. H eavy 
grained pow der served prim arily for artillery  usage, and the sm aller pow der 
g rain  for use in  sm aller cannons and sm all arm s. Through his ow n 
technological ingenuity, Rains devised a  w ay to combine the granulating  
process and the final process of glazing an d  dusting. Rains hollow ed the 
revolving cylinders so ho t a ir could be blow n on  the pow der as it  becam e
,39granulated, joining this step  w ith glazing an d  dusting  "at the sam e tune.'
The w orst accident occurred in the tem porary granulation building. 
Again, Rains blam ed a lack of regard for ru les and  regulations. The 
forem an, who had  earned  Rains' trust in  safety  and  procedural operations, 
had  been called aw ay, w hich left no im m ediate supervision over the 
w orkers. A t the tim e, the w orkers had n o  w ork and sat waiting fo r a  m ill 
cake delivery by boat from  the incorporating mills. Against regulations, the
38Ibid., 18,20-21.
39Ibid., 22-23.
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m en started  to sm oke, and  an errant m atch ignited  three tons of pow der. 
"The explosion w as heavy,” Rains recalled, "shaking the earth  for some 
distance, and throw ing up  a column of flam e and white sm oke five 
hundred  feet in  height." Seven men, a boy, and  a mule in  and around  the 
build ing  had been "reduced m ainly to sm all fragm ents" and "the sentinel 
w as killed by the shock." Rains pointed ou t, how ever, that because of the 
construction techniques, no other buildings sustained dam age. A nd, as a 
com plim ent to Rains' safety standards, th is incident rem ained the only
accident that caused fatalities.40
Upon com pletion of the gunpow der, boats carried it 1,500 feet 
upstream  to the packaging area. In the packaging building, w orkers weighed 
and loaded the gunpow der into wood boxes tw o and a half feet by one foot 
in  size. Rains found these boxes safer th an  barrels because of their 
durability, size, ease o f loading, and portability. He observed that the only 
tim e this packaging exploded was an "occasional Railroad" accident. After 
the filling of the pow der boxes, a boat transported  them three-quarters of a 
m ile up  the canal to  the magazine. The w ood building w hich functioned as 
the m agazine, had the capacity to hold 100 tons of gunpowder. G uards
4°Ibid., 21-22; M elton, "Major M ilitary Industries," 115; M ilgram , 
G unpow derm aker of the Confederacy. 33.
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posted around the clock protected this valuable m aterial from  robbers and 
sabotage.41
Two o ther buildings provided pow er and facilities for quality control. 
A boiler house located 200 yards aw ay from  the granulating building 
produced steam  pow er which ran  th rough pipes to the incorporating mills. 
In addition, a chim ney 100 yards aw ay funneled out sm oke and sparks 300 
yards betw een the release of the sm oke and  the closest incorporating m ill for 
safety. The o ther facility, a laboratory, located next to the refinery building, 
tested the pow der to m eet the highest standards possible. Rains exam ined 
random  sam ples of pow der for uniform ity, granulation accuracy, and 
sufficient processing. The proper strength  of the pow der underw ent analysis 
w ith ballistic tests. Rains em ployed an  "electro-ballistic m achine" sim ilar to 
one used at the U. S. M ilitary Academ y in  these exam inations. Because of 
this type of inspection and control process, the quality of pow der rem ained 
consistently high. John W. M allet deem ed the pow der "the very best 
quality." Even d ie  London Tim es. Rains noted, com plim ented the 
gunpowder. Jefferson Davis lavished praise on the w orks in  his memoirs: 
"Under the w ell-directed skill of G eneral Rains, we w ere enabled, before the 
close of the w ar, to boast of the best pow der-m ill in  the w orld." A fter the 
w ar, the captured pow der a t A ugusta underw ent testing a t the School of
41Rains, Confederate Pow der W orks. 22-24.
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A rtillery fo r the Boards of A rtillery and Infantry Officers at Fort M onroe.
42The testing ra ted  the pow der superior.
Rains com pleted the G overnm ent P ow der W orks in A pril 1862. In  a 
little less th an  th irteen  m onths a fte r site selection, the mill produced 
gunpow der. 'T he w inter of 1861-2 w as the darkest period of my 
departm ent," Gorgas recalled, b u t "after the pow der mills at A ugusta w ent 
into operation  in  the fall of 1862, w e had little  trouble in  supplying
43
am m unition ." The daily production  varied  according to the dem ands 
from  the field , b u t the m ill never w orked o n  n ights o r Sundays to com plete
44w orkloads. Gorgas reported to the Secretary of W ar in  November 1863, 
that the w orks "kept up an  adequate supply . . .  notw ithstanding the vast 
consum ption and  loss at C harleston, V icksburg, an d  Port Hudson." R ains
42Ibid., 23-25; M allet, "W ork of the O rdnance Bureau," 4; Davis, S ho rt 
History. 75.
43G orgas, "Notes on the O rdnance D epartm ent," 75; Rains started  
m aking pow der in  the fall as soon as som e of the buildings were com pleted, 
bu t full p roduction  d id  not start u n til the spring  of 1862.
^R ains, Confederate Pow der W orks. 26; "[At] the Augusta pow der- 
mills . . .  no  less than 7.000 lbs, of pow der are now  m ade every day in  th e
pow der m anufactory-----[T]he w ants of the State d id  no t render it necessary
to keep these establishm ents open  o n  Sundays." Freem antle, Three M onths. 
175-176.
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observed th a t the only thing lim iting production  at all w as "the am ount of 
sa ltpetre  on  hand."45
Com plaints about the quality  of pow der d id  not, how ever, 
im m ediately dim inish. Rains stud ied  reports from  field com m anders in 
o rder to perfect his pow der-m aking processes. Many of these com plaints 
p roved  unfounded. Captain R. Jones, C om m ander of the N aval Foundry 
and O rdnance W orks in Selma, A labam a, com plained that the pow der 
charges caused his cannons to sp lin ter or fire inaccurately. Rains tested 
Jones' critique on  the ballistic range in  A ugusta. In a long letter, Rains 
explained that the inaccuracy and  the unbum ed pow der left after a  shot was 
no t d u e  to the com position of the pow der, b u t to the im proper am ount of 
pow der for "the w eight and dim insion . . .  o f the projectile to be employed." 
If the tw o are no t properly in  balance, the gun w ould not fire "w ith the 
required  velocity to attain its object w ith  the greatest predssion." Therefore, 
Rains reasoned, artillerym en needed to be very particular in  the pow der 
load added  and the type of pow der used. In discussions w ith  General 
B eauregard, he also discovered that in  the Blakely gun, an airspace should be 
left betw een the pow der and the cartridge allow ing "inflamed gasses" to 
"expand," w hich allowed a better b u m  ratio  of the powder and, therefore,
45Gorgas to Seddon, N ovem ber 15,1863, Official Records. Ser. 4, vol. 2, 
957. Rains. Confederate Pow der W orks. 26.
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greater accuracy.46 Gorgas bluntly  w rote Robert E. Lee about com plaints that 
cam e from  Brigadier G eneral W illiam E. Jones, th a t "officers are alw ays
ready to praise when they succeed and to blame w hen they fail I am
quite as m uch inclined to blam e G eneral Jones' artillerists as he is to blam e 
m y am m unition .”47
As the q u a lity  of Rains' pow der rose though, com plaints dw indled . 
M ost o f the firing problem s concerned artillery and involved fuses, n o t 
necessarily the pow der itself. General Beauregard described the "m ortar and 
colum biad fuses . . .  [as] w retchedly bad." Gorgas' m ajor concern w itli 
pow der became stopping w aste, since saltpeter rem ained in  short supply , 
especially after the blockade runners became increasingly scarce in  1864 and 
1865. In  one particular incident, Gorgas rebuked G eneral Beauregard’s 
m isuse of gunpow der. Gorgas disliked the fact that the Charleston M ercury 
reported that a twenty-one gun  salute had been fired after the a victory by 
General Bragg. This type of w aste, Gorgas feared, could cause a severe
48shortage in  the stock of gunpow der.
Once the G overnm ent Pow der W orks started production, R ains 
becam e concerned about enem y attacks "since the loss of the works w ould
46Rains to Jones, N ovem ber 28,1863, Rains Papers.
47Gorgas to R. E. Lee, January 16,1863, Official Records. Ser. 1, vol. 21,
748.
48Gorgas to Cooper, O ctober 3,1863, Ibid., Ser. 1, vol. 28, pt. 2 ,38&-389.
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49have been follow ed by disastrous consequences." He w orried about an  
am phibious attack  u p  the Savannah River, especially after the U nion A rm y 
took Fort Pulaski an d  closed Savannah in  April 1862. The Federal N avy 
could  transverse th e  Savannah R iver in land  and cause havoc in A ugusta. 
Rains proposed a  defensive position to stop this type o f m ilitary assau lt w ith  
a se t of batteries on  Shell Bluff, 35 m iles below A ugusta, placed a hundred
50feet above the river. Rains asked Jam es H enry H am m ond, a native o f the 
area for an evaluation  o f the proposed site. Ham m ond found a lot of 
problem s w ith the location. If a large U nion force m oved upriver by 
gunboat, "there is no  R etreat." and  the outcom e w ould be a  "massacre o f o u r 
m en." A bluff w hich inclined 45° behind the position blocked a rearw ard  
retreat, and on  one side lay the river and  the other "an im passable creek & 
sw am p." In addition , the position could easily be flanked by an experienced 
com m ander. If a  U nion com m ander encountered the batteries, it could 
re trea t back dow n the river tw o m iles "where a fine road  w ill enable h im  in  
an  hour to p u t his forces on the fire plane above the Bluff, in tercepting in  
the m ean tim e y o u r re trea t dow n the River.” Thus, H am m ond stated  
concisely his conclusion th a t "from  your position at Shell B lu ff. . .  there is 
no alternative b u t to  conquer o r die & th a t therefore it is no strategic
49Rains, C onfederate Pow der W orks. 4.
50Rains to R. E. Lee, February 22,1862, Official Records. Ser. 1, vol. 6,
396-397.
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position at all." Instead, Hamm ond suggested the A ugusta Bluff outside the 
city limits as a  possible alternative.51
Rains accepted Ham m ond's rep o rt as sound advice. In  June 1862, 
Rains requested from  Gorgas 100 Enfield rifles to arm  sharpshooters.52 
Ham m ond outlined  a  plan to place 25 riflem en along each side of the bluff 
w ith  Enfields, m ini£ rifles, or double-barrel shotguns. These m en, along 
w ith  six rifled cannons and two Colum biads (8 inch) could defend the city " if
they are judiciously placed.”53 Rains also erected earth-w orks around the 
city, and he received perm ission from  the Secretary of W ar Seddon to d irect
54a local company in  its defense. He cautioned Seddon th a t "Augusta and 
Chattanooga shou ld  be held at every an d  all hazards. They cannot be lost 
w ithout the loss of Georgia, and that w ould  be fatal to the Confederacy."55
Despite these concerns, the largest industrial p lan t outside of 
Richmond never suffered from a large, w ell-planned enem y attack.
Sherm an chose to bypass Augusta on h is m arch to the sea. In  February 1865, 
Rains prepared to m ove the plant and equipm ent to A thens, Georgia,
51Ham m ond to Rains, May 21,1862, Rains Papers.
52Rains to G orgas, June 7,1862. Official Records. Ser. 1, vol. 14,562.
53Ham m ond to Rains, May 21,1862, Rains Papers.
^Rains to Seddon, August 10,1863, Official Records. Ser. 4, vol. 2,705.
55Rains to Seddon, July 23,1863, Ibid., 661.
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because he feared Federal calvalry attacks from  the Union forces m arching to
56Colum bia. N evertheless, the  call for gunpow der did  not dim inish. In  the 
last m on th  of the w ar, G orgas show ed the  confusion of the situation  w hen 
he w ro te Rains: '1 am  looking anxiously fo r som e news of you—I do n ’t
know  w here you are nor w h a t. . .  your disposition I suppose th a t you
m oved m ost of the pow der m ill to A thens." But, even w ithout know ledge 
of R ains' w hereabouts, G orgas knew the system  they had set up  m ight still 
be runn ing . *1 trust how ever," he w rote, "you w ill so o n . . .  give us som e 
m usket p o w d er.. . ."  This assum ption proved accurate as Rains kep t the 
Pow der W orks in A ugusta, and  by m id-M arch had reassem bled the
equipm ent he had packed up  and again produced pow der.57 Sherm an 
continued north, and A ugusta appeared safe. "The storm  of w ar has sw ept
58by you," Gorgas observed, "Sc you will be left com paratively undisturbed."
The shortage of skilled labor threatened to cu t the capacity of the 
w orks, especially after the d raft pool expanded in 1864-1865, and few er 
w aivers w ent out to w orkers for deferm ent from  service in  the C onfederate 
Arm y. Rains com plained about a  chronic shortage of labor. He queried
56M elton, "A G rand Assemblage," 35; Ruby M abry M cCrary 
P fadenhauer, "History of A ugusta A rsenal in  A ugusta, Georgia," R ichm ond 
C ounty H istory 2 (Summer 1970): 19.
^G orgas to Rains, M arch 4,1865, Rains Papers; Pfadenhauer, "History 
of A ugusta," 19.
58Gorgas to Rains, M arch 14,1865, Rains Papers.
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Secretary of W ar R andolph to gauge the possibility of having "disabled 
m en” who are skilled laborers substituted for those able to perform  field 
du ty . In addition to this request, Rains searched hospitals for m en to 
transfer to A ugusta w hen well enough. G orgas em pathized w ith  Rains' 
p lig h t of losing m en to the arm y and the "cutthroat wage bargaining" for 
w h at skilled laborers rem ained, even betw een different governm ent 
departm ents.59 "This idiocracy,” Gorgas fum ed to Rains, '1 am  trying to 
im press on the m inds of those in  authority  & by perseverance hope 
eventually  to succeed.”60
In the end, neither a shortage of m anpow er, enemy raids, nor 
explosions stopped production of gunpow der. For three years gunpow der 
poured  forth a t a rate of as m uch as 5,000 pounds a day for a final o u tp u t of
2,750,000 pounds.61 Perhaps General Benjam in H uger best described the 
contribution that G eorge W ashington Rains m ade to the C onfederate forces 
w hen  he w rote him , "your getting those w orks in  such order has been of the
59General O rders No. 82, A djutant and  Inspector G eneral's Office, 
October 20,1864, Official Records. Ser. 4, voL 3,741. 'The C hief o f the 
B ureau of O rdnance w ill, w ithout delay, take m easures to place in  the field 
one-fifth  of all m en em ployed in  his departm ent (including contractors and
th e ir em ployes) " M elton, "A G rand Assem blage," 35; V andiver,
P lo u g h sh a res  in to  S w o r d s . 144.
6°Gorgas to Rains, October 30,1864, Rains Papers.
61M elton, "A G rand Assemblage," 37.
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greatest benefit to  us, and you have been of value to us at least equal to two 
G enerals."62
The leaders of the Confederate O rdnance D epartm ent h ad  successfully 
incorporated the ideas of m odem  industry . They m aintained system , 
uniform ity, and control. The departm ent also used  the latest technology 
and organized skilled labor efficiently. The im plications of these 
bureaucratic ideas for the creation of the N ew  South cannot be ignored. To 
be sure, their antecedents existed in  the antebellum  South. N evertheless, 
the C ivil W ar dram atically changed the m indset of m any Southerners 
tow ard technology and industry. N ew  South advocates used m ilitary  defeat 
as justification for the grow th of railroads and  industry. In the process, they 
encouraged bureaucratic system s of control. M any of the C onfederacy's 
bureaucratic leaders, including Gorgas, M allet, and  Rains, later espoused 
these ideas in  academ ia. Indeed, m any C onfederate officers p layed a  
significant role in  higher education reform  in  the postw ar South. From  the 
halls of academ ia, these m en taught the South the lessons they h a d  learned 
in  the w ar and applied them  to southern  society. A New South em erged 
from  the ideas associated w ith railroads, plantations, and war.
62H uger to Rains, [?] 6,1864, Rains Papers.
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CHAPTER 6
ORGANIZING A NEW  SOUTH
In  A pril 1865, the S outh  faced an uncertain  future. Railroads had  
been destroyed during the w ar, plantations and farm s had reverted back to 
sw am p and  weeds, and the  slave labor system h ad  been destroyed. M ilton 
Brown, the president of the  M obile and Ohio R ailroad, captured the 
bew ilderm ent that m any sou therners felt. "As a m ariner," he w rote, "who 
has been d riven  and tossed by w inds and w aves un til hope is nearly 
extinguished," the South m u st "embrace the firs t m om ent of calm  to take a 
reckoning of where he is, an d  calculate the chances of finally reaching the 
shore." Southerners had  to  com e to term s w ith  the "destructive w ar" and  to 
m ove forw ard  w ith "great enterprise."1 The South  not only had to be 
reconstructed, it had to be reorganized.
The South was a very  different place from  the one southerners had  
view ed ju st five years earlier. The 1860 census had  revealed a prospering 
and grow ing region w ith  few  signs of economic stagnation. Indeed, the
1 Proceedings of the E ighteenth A nnual M eeting of the Stockholders 
of the M obile and Ohio R ailroad  C o. (Mobile, 1866), 3.
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1850s had  been a  decade of economic expansion. C otton had fueled the 
grow th  of railroads, steam boats, and plantations. A long w ith this economic 
expansion, new  organizational ideas of system , uniform ity, and bureaucratic 
control had  em erged. Railroads led the way w ith  m odem  business practices 
as sou thern  railroad m anagers applied bureaucratic hierarchies, rules, 
regulations, tim e m anagem ent, and new accounting principles. Progressive 
Southerners, especially W higs, had brought m odem  organizational concepts 
to p lantations and education. Railroads and plantations had helped 
organize the South during the antebellum  period, b u t it was the crucible of 
w ar th a t intensified the organizational m entality.
The Civil W ar fu rther reinforced for southerners the im portance of 
system , uniform ity, and bureaucratic control. The w ar destroyed slavery but 
not the  new  gospel of organization that had m atured in  it. In fact, it 
dram atically changed the m indset of many Southerners tow ard technology 
and industry. New South advocates employed m ilitary defeat to justify 
further grow th of railroads and  industry. In doing so, they encouraged the 
creation and grow th of bureaucratic systems of control. The organizational 
leaders during  the war, W illiam  M. Wadley, John W. Mallet, George 
W ashington Rains, and Josiah Gorgas, taught southerners the lessons of 
organization, system , and uniform ity that they had  learned during the 
conflict. To create a New South, they insisted, railroads, plantations, and 
education needed to be reorganized. Southern railroad  m anagers learned 
from  their w artim e failures, particularly from  the fragm ented system  that
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had hindered the w ar e ffo rt A s a  result, they pushed for organizational 
change and consolidation. A gricultural reform ers continued to stress the 
need for system, control, and  scientific m anagem ent on  farm s and 
plantations. A N ew  South w as abou t to be built on  the foundation of 
railroads, plantations, and w ar.
After the w ar, rebuilding an d  re-im plem enting their control processes 
became the first priority  of sou thern  railroads. M ost large railroads 
accomplished this task relatively quickly because th e ir infrastructure had  
rem ained intact. The principal problem  faced by railroad  m anagers w as the 
dilapidation of their equipm ent. D itches, bridges, tim ber, and rails had been 
neglected for four years. Sm aller lines, which had  n o t been deem ed 
essential to the w ar effort, suffered even more severely because their track 
had  been ripped up  for use on m ore im portant lines.
Railroad m anagers also needed to re-establish their bureaucratic 
system s of control. M ost re tu rn ed  to the system th a t had  served them  w ell 
during the 1850s. But they also im proved their operations through the 
addition of the telegraph, a new  technology that had  proved  its value during  
the w ar. M oreover, m any of the lines im proved their accounting 
procedures. Southern railroads also ended the fragm ented system  of lines by 
consolidating their operations, w hich prom oted the econom ic in tegration of 
the South. In the late 1860s, consolidation rem ained in  southern hands, b u t 
as financial difficulties developed, northern  capitalists asserted control over
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southern, lines. By 1893, w hen the Southern Railway Com pany w as form ed, 
n o rthern  capital contro lled  the vast m ajority  of rail lines in  the South.2
Im m ediately after the w ar southern railroads began to repair their 
lines and  equipm ent. They ordered new  rails from  the N orth and  Europe 
and  repaired depots, pum p houses, and  bridges. William M. W adley, fresh 
from  wartim e service of trying to organize Confederate railroads, took 
charge of the C entral of Georgia. He reported  to stockholders that 
Sherm an's arm y h ad  left the once p ro u d  and  w ell-run railroad in  "u tter 
destruction" and "consequent prostration  o f its once prosperous business.” 
The Richmond and  D anville's 1866 rep o rt suggested sim ilar problem s.
"From w ant of the necessary m otive pow er," it conceded, "the ditches had  
n o t been cleaned o u t during  the w ar, consequently in  many places the m ud 
and  w ater covered the  rails.” M oreover, "a large portion of the cross-ties in 
the m ain track w ere decayed and rotten." The M emphis and C harleston 's 
review  of the situation  w as m uch the sam e. "The ditches," it reported ,
2The im portant w orks that address the com plex operations of 
sou thern  railroads a fte r the Q v il W ar include John F. Stover, The R ailroad s  
of the South. 1865-1900 (Chapel Hill: U niversity of N orth C arolina Press, 
1955); M aury Klein, The G reat Richm ond Term inal: A Study in 
Businessm en and Business Strategy (C harlottesville: U niversity of V irginia 
Press, 1970); M ark W . Sum m ers, Railroads. Reconstruction and the Gospel 
of Prosperity: Aid u n d er the Radical Republicans. 1865-1877 (Princeton: 
P rinceton U niversity Press, 1984); A llen W. Trelease, The N orth  C arolina 
R ailroad. 1849-1871. and  the M odernization of N orth  Carolina (Chapel Hill: 
U niversity of N orth  C arolina Press, 1991); Scott Reynolds Nelson, Iron  
Confederacies: Southern Railways. K lan V iolence, and Reconstruction 
(Chapel Hill: U niversity of N orth Carolina Press, 1999).
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"were filled w ith  earth , the em bankm ents m uch w eakened, an d  the timbers 
—  required renew al."3
The rep air w ork on southern railroads became extrem ely expensive. 
The lines had  to  buy new  rails, locom otives, and m achinery, and  m ost 
found their ro lling  stock scattered all over the South a t the end of the war. 
The Central, for exam ple, had only 14 operating engines in  1866, com pared 
to 49 in  1861. In  1866, the road procured 2,375 tons of new  rail an d  re-rolled 
1,650 tons, and  bought three engines, 150 boxcars, and 75 platform  cars. The 
Richmond and  Danville had to replace 1,100 tons of rail and  p u t in  114,958 
new  cross-ties. The M obile and O hio invested alm ost three m illion dollars 
in  its road by 1867. For these sorts of expensive repairs, southern  railroads 
depended on the sale of bonds, backed by mortgages on  the com panies, in 
the N orth and  in  Europe. The large debts they incurred, along w ith  the 
politics of Reconstruction, opened m any railroads up to no rthern  
dominance, bankruptcy, or both.4
3Thirtv F irst R epo rt Central Rail Road and B a n k i n g  Com pany of 
Georgia (Savannah. Ga., 1866), 303; N ineteenth  A nnual R eport o f the 
Richm ond & D anville Railroad C om pany (Richmond, Va., 1866), 82; 
Twelfth A nnual Report of the Board o f D irectors to the Stockholders of the 
M emphis and C harleston Railroad Co. (Memphis, 1866), 44.
^Thirty F irst Report. Central Rail Road and Banking Com pany of 
Georgia (Savannah, Ga., 1866), 307,332; N ineteenth A nnual R eport of the 
Richmond t r  D anville R ailroad C o m p a n y  (Richmond, 1866), 82; frPCfifidingS 
of the N ineteenth A nnual M eeting o f the Stockholders of the M obile & 
O hio Railroad Co. (Mobile, 1867), 4; Sum m ers, Railroads. R econstruction, 
and the Gospel of Prosperity. 268-298.
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Southern lines also set up repair shops to try  to get as m any m achines 
as they could in  w orking order. These undertakings m eant getting m achine 
shops up and runn ing  w ith system  and  efficiency. Southern railroads d id  
m uch of their ow n repair. The C harlotte and  South C arolina reported  that it 
had  "invested in  im proved m achinery" th a t increased "the capacity for 
economical w ork." The superin tendent also detailed how  th e  line had  
rebuilt its m achinery and its w orkshops. N ew  m achinery included a 
"hydraulic w heel press," a planer, a  steam  ham m er, a "fan b la st for the 
forges," a large crane, and other "necessary appliances for casting iron o r 
brass." The com pany also started build ing  a  shop for car an d  locom otive 
repair.5
For the d itching, graveling, and  rail replacem ent, the railroads 
em ployed the antebellum  system of labor. Railroads m anagers organized 
the men in  gangs a t five- to ten-m ile increm ents w ith a superv isor for every 
tw enty men. The C entral of G eorgia im m ediately set up a lum ber train , 
each w ith a gang o f hands, to repair "tim ber, ties, iron and o th er m aterial." 
A t the same tim e, they  used gravel trains to clear out ditches and  fill in  
abutm ents on bridges. Recently freed slaves constituted a large percentage of 
the labor force. M any, in  fact, d id  the sam e jobs they had perform ed before 
the war. Railro a d  m anagers hoped to m aintain the system and  control of
sProceedings of the Stockholders of the Charlotte & South C arolina 
R ailroad C om pany (Columbia. S. C., 1867), 8, 12.
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labor that they had becom e accustom ed to w ith  slavery. Blacks w orked as 
laborers, firemen, brakem en, o r w oodcutters. As before the war, now  paid  
form er slaves received room  and board, w hile w hite w orkers, who w ere 
paid m ore, d id  not.6
Railroad m anagers com plained that because of em ancipation there 
was a shortage of labor and  that blacks no longer w orked as hard as they had 
as slaves. As a result, they believed, productiv ity  fell. The Columbia and  
A ugusta Railroad reported  tha t it had great "difficulty of com m anding a 
regular laboring fo rce-hav ing , as a general ru le, to com m ence each m onth 's 
operations w ith a  new  se t of hands." W illiam  M . W adley, w ho had gained 
m ost of his thirty years of railroad experience during  the antebellum  period, 
noted a significant difference in  labor costs. H e com plained to stockholders 
that the "system of labor had  . . .  undergone an  entire change, necessitating 
the em ploym ent of a  m uch greater force than  . . .  under the form er system ." 
H e calculated that slaves "made an average of 23 3 /4  days each per m onth" 
while now  black labor averaged "19 2 /8  days each per m onth." In order to 
retain  pow er over w orkers an d  to get "good hands," W adley im plem ented 
strict guidelines. "Our practice," he explained, "is to pay them  prom ptly for
^ re le a se , The N orth  C arolina R ailroad. 220-222,233; Thirty first 
Report. Central Railroad and Banking Com pany of G eorgia (Savannah, G a., 
1866), 327.
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their labor, an d  to discharge them  as soon as they become disobedient or are 
found to be unfaithfu l."7
N evertheless, control o f labor becam e m uch more d ifficu lt after the 
w ar as railroad  w orkers, bo th  black and w hite, became m ore assertive in the 
post-em ancipation South. In  1868, L. J. Flem ing, the superin tenden t of the 
Mobile and O hio, told stockholders that m echanics at the Jackson shops had 
gone on strike and  kep t trains from  m oving for a week. "In th is strike," he 
reported, "there w as no personal violence attem pted; bu t by th reats of secret 
violence they  in tim idated  those who w ere otherw ise disposed to ru n  the 
trains." The M em phis and  C harleston R ailroad, on the o ther hand , tried  to 
acquire "cheap, steady and  uniform  labor" by im proving living conditions. 
The com pany bu ilt "com fortable cottages and  cabins" along its lines to 
encourage w orkers to stay. The m anagers found that the im proved housing 
d id  attract a "good class of laborers w ith families." O ther railroads took a 
different approach and  began to employ convict labor. A G eorgia state 
investigation found that som e railroad contractors brutally enforced 
discipline an d  w hipped nude convicts fo r infractions. As the use of convict 
labor expanded, it underm ined the pow er of unskilled railroad  laborers in
TTrelease, The N orth Carolina R ailroad. 220-222; R eport g f the 
Proceedings o f the Stockholders of the Colum bia and A ugusta R. R. 
Company (A ugusta. Ga., 1866), 8: Thirty F irst Report. Cenfral Railroad and  
Banking C om pany of Georgia (Savannah. Ga., 1866), 326.
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the South. One of the ironies o f the New South w as th a t m odernization 
came on the back of convict labor.8
W ithin a year of the w ar's  end, m ost sou thern  lines had portions of 
their road  operating. M ost roads used the bureaucratic structure developed 
in the 1850s—a departm ental structure for transportation, way, m achinery, 
and road  departm ents, each w ith  a  hierarchy of com m and. W illiam W adley 
organized the Central w ith  the same departm ents as before the w ar, 
transportation, road, m achinery, and used the sam e hierarchy for 
m anagem ent and control. Sam  Tate, of the M em phis and C harleston, also 
m aintained the same bureaucratic structure.9 W hile the lines reta ined  the 
bureaucratic structures developed by the 1850s, m ost updated their 
accounting procedures. In 1867, the Memphis and  Charleston outlined its 
guidelines. It broke dow n its  statem ent into eight parts. The superintendent 
of the C harlotte, Columbia, an d  A ugusta Railroad proclaim ed that its 
accounting had to be "m anaged w ith  skill and ability" because of a railroad 's
SProceedings of the T w entieth Annual M eeting of the StockholderS-Qf 
the M obile and Ohio R ailroad (Mobile, 1868), 18; Sixteenth A nnual R eport of 
the Board of D irectors to the Stockholders of the M em phis and C harleston 
Railroad Com pany (M emphis, 1870), 29-30; N elson, Iron Confederacies. 78- 
79; For an  excellent overview  of convict leasing in  the South, see Alex 
Lichtenstein, Twice the W ork of Free Labor: The Political Economy of 
Convict Labor in the N ew  South (New York: Verso Press, 1996).
^ re le a se , The N orth  Carolina Railroad. 230-235; Thirty First RepfllL 
C pntral R ailroad  and Banking Com pany of Georgia (Savannah. Ga., 1866), 
314-345; Tw elfth Annual R eport o f the Board of D irectors to the 
Stockholders of the M em phis and Charleston Railroad Co. (M emphis, 1866), 
48.
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"com plicated and extensive duties." This railroad  supplied  no few er th an  
tw enty-seven pages of accounting inform ation in  its annual report to  
stockholders.10
Southern railroads also em braced new  technology. The Mobile an d  
Ohio and the Central of G eorgia both adopted the W estinghouse A irbrake in  
the 1870s, and most lines started  replacing iron  for steel track. The increased 
use of the telegraph im proved system  and control substantially by 
im proving precision, m aking accidents less likely, and  m aking the 
synchronization of trains easier. The Southern Express Com pany, the 
Southern  and A tlantic T elegraph Com pany, an d  W estern U nion p rov ided  
telegraph services to sou thern  lines.11 The M obile and  Ohio Railroad, fo r 
exam ple, m ade an agreem ent w ith  W estern U nion for an  independent 
telegraph w ire to give the railroad  exclusive use. The railroad president told  
stockholders that the telegraph w ould "reduce the cost of operating the road  
by adding  to the facility an d  consequent econom y in  the m ovem ent of 
trains." In  1873, L. J. Flem ing, the road’s superin tendent, explained the
10Thirteenth A nnual R eport of the Board of D irectors to the 
Stockholders of the M em phis and Charleston R ailroad Co. (Memphis. 1867), 
33: Proceedings of the Stockholders of the C harlotte. Colum bia & A ugusta 
R ailroad Com pany a t th e ir Second Annual M eeting (Columbia, S. C., 1871), 
19,27-47.
^Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth A nnual M eeting of the 
Stockholders of the M obile and Ohio R. R. Co. (Mobile. 1873), 19-20; Forty- 
T hird Report of the P resident and Directors of the C entral Rail Road & 
Banking Com pany (Savannah. Ga., 1878), 14; Trelease, The N orth Carolina. 
R ailroad. 73.237.
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telegraph's v irtues as a m anagem ent tool. He observed that the telegraph 
had  become "very valuable for the distribution of cars to m eet unexpected 
dem ands . . .  and in  case of accidents, for the concentration of labor and  
m aterials for the necessary repairs." The next year, Fleming organized the 
line into five fre igh t divisions controlled  by telegraph com m unication. The 
telegraph, he reported , had  "enabled [trains] to m ake nearly double ordinary 
schedule speed, w ith o u t runn ing  objectionably fast.” "This system ," he 
continued, "has p roved  a very g reat success in an economical po in t of 
v ie w . . .  and given additional satisfaction to the public, com bining as it  does, 
safety and speed." The telegraph, along w ith im proved tim e-keeping and  
elaborate rules, becam e v ital to m aintaining system , uniform ity, an d  control 
on  southern ra ilro ad s.12
The w ar also tau g h t railroad  m anagers im portant lessons concerning 
logistics. The un loading and  reloading of freight every tim e it m oved from  
one railroad line to  another w as grossly inefficient and caused delays, 
dam aged goods, an d  endless difficulties. To end that practice they adopted  
an  innovation called  "through freight," w hich allow ed freight to m ove 
from  one line to an o th er on  the sam e car. To work, through freight
^Proceedings of the Tw entv-Third Annual M eeting of the 
Stockholders of th e  M obile and O hio Railroad Co (Mobile. 1871), 4; 
Proceedings of the Tw enty-Fifth A nnual Meeting of the Stockholders of the 
M obile and Ohio R. R. Co. (Mobile, 1873), 19; Proceedings of the Tw enty- 
Sixth Annual M eeting o f the Stockholders o f the M obile and Ohio R. R. Co. 
(Mobile, 1874), 10.
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required the cooperation of several connecting lines and  accurate booking. 
This new  arrangem ent required an  expansion of clerical staffs to m aintain a 
clear picture of the location of freigh t and cars. The results justified the 
change as the interstate through system  increased speed, accuracy, and 
efficiency.13
By allow ing full freight cars to transfer from one railroad  line to  
another, freight could be shipped long distances w ithout being unloaded and 
reloaded. Each railroad repaired its ow n cars. W hen a car traveled on 
another road, that railroad charged a fee for the use of its  track and facilities. 
The rental fee for the N orth C arolina Railroad, for exam ple, w as two-and-a- 
half cents p er m ile. Thus, the th rough  freight system enabled southern 
railroads to overcom e logistical problem s that had plagued antebellum  
railroads. The M obile and Ohio no ted  in  1866 that "through rates of freight 
will be m ade w ith  all connecting roads —  and through bills of lading will be 
given for delivery of freight a t all stations on the road." The M aster of 
Transportation for the Central of G eorgia told stockholders that "through 
rates have been  m ade to every accessible station in the in terio r for freight, 
and to all the m ost prom inent poin ts of passage."14
13Trelease, The N orth C a ro lin a  R ailroad . 236; Klein, The G reat 
Richm ond T erm inal. 20-21; N elson, Iron Confederacies. 51-54.
14Trelease, The N orth C a ro lin a  R ailroad . 236; Proceedings of the 
Eighteenth A nnual M eeting of the Stockholders of the M obile ancLOhio 
Railroad C o. (Mobile, 1866),23-24; T hirty  First Report. C entral Railroad and 
Banking C om pany of Georgia (Savannah. Ga., 1866), 316.
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Sam Tate, superintendent of the M em phis an d  C harleston, explained 
to stockholders that through freight also helped achieve economies of scale. 
"The question of profits on  railroads," he w rote, "depends m ore on  the 
extent o f business than  the price you get fo r it.” He asserted th a t "when you 
are so situated that you can run full loaded  trains both  ways, it can be done at 
m uch less cost and w ith  greater profit to th e  Company." Tate thought that 
’’running a day and n igh t through freight train” w ould reduce "the cost of 
freight to about one-half or tw o-thirds of its  present cost." He also believed 
that m any southern railroads were "anxious to cooperate" in  build ing  
connections and through-freight services. De Bow's Review also praised the 
efficiency of the new  system . "Through freights," it m aintained, can move 
goods "cheaper than any other, and w ill m ake fast and sure freights for the 
public."15
Sim ilarly, the through bill of lad ing  unified southern states. The 
uniform  through bill replaced each ra ilro ad 's paper w ork w ith one 
shipm ent order. This consolidation cut dow n on paper work, sim plified 
shipm ent, and  allow ed the through system  to w ork effidently. I t also 
allowed for the fast freight shipm ent of goods. Southern railroad  m en 
brought o rder to southern railroads in  1866 and 1867 by creating w hat they 
called fast speed A ir Line services. The firs t im portant link w as the Seaboard
15T hirteenth A nnual Report of the Board of D irectors to the 
Stockholders of the M emphis and C harleston Railroad Co. (M em phis, 1867), 
13-15; "Illinois C entral Railroad." De Bow’s  Review 5 (April 1868): 446.
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In land  A ir Line th a t ran  on  several lines th rough pooling agreem ents and 
the use  o f through freight. This system represented  a  fundam ental shift in 
the m anagem ent of sou thern  railroads. Before the  war, superin tendents 
controlled their traffic and  railroad trade. A fter the war, a m ore centralized 
financial structu re took the m ovem ent of freight o u t of the h an d s of 
superintendents and  placed the control of traffic it into hands o f a  new  dass 
of railroad  financiers. These finanders m anaged the flow of traffic w ith the 
th rough  b ill of lading, consolidation, pooling, an d  holding com panies.16
Two C onfederate veterans, A lexander A ndrew s and M oncure 
Robinson, learned the lesson of w ar well. They began to consolidate control 
of railroads by m eans of a new  organizational innovation—the holding 
com pany. W ith the Raleigh and  Gaston Railroad as their base o f operations, 
A ndrew s and  Robinson purchased steam ship com panies and  connecting 
railroads. They also m ade agreem ents w ith  o ther lines. It d id  n o t h u rt that 
A ndrew s m arried  the daugh ter of W illiam Johnson, the p resid en t o f the 
C harlotte & South C arolina Railroad and the Colum bia & A ugusta Railroad. 
These tw o railroads m erged in  1868. By using th rough bills of lading, 
A ndrew s and Robinson consolidated their control of trade w ith  the fast- 
freight, the Seaboard Inland A ir Line, that serviced 500 miles of track .17
16Klein, The G reat Richm ond Term inal. 20-25; Nelson, ICOR 
Confederacies. 53.
17N elson, Iron Confederacies. 53-55; Report o f the Proceedings of the 
Stockholders of the Colum bia and Augusta Railroad Com pany a t their
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The C harlotte, Colum bia & A ugusta R ailroad's 1871 annual rep o rt 
spelled o u t how  the system  w orked. "Since the g rea t destruction of th e  
resources of the country by the la te  war," W illiam Johnson w rote, "it w as 
seen th a t this w ould scarcely m ain tain  it in  efficient operation, and  from  
necessity, it had  to extend its term inus to a po in t w hence it could, form  
m ore im portan t through connections." This new  system , Johnson 
explained, was "entirely d istinct from  local rates, an d  are the results o f 
agreem ents m ade w ith all the interm ediate roads to  and from  given points." 
M oreover, he continued, "the ra tes are m ade to centres of trade and po in ts 
of com petition by express contract, that cars may be loaded both ways and  not 
retu rned  em pty."18
A ndrew s, Robinson, an d  Johnson learned th is organizational 
innovation from  the w artim e experience of railroads. N ear the end  o f the 
war, the Confederacy had established the Southern T ransportation Com pany 
to ship goods from  Alabama to V irginia w ith one b ill of lading. The 
Seaboard Airline adopted this practice after the w ar. It tied independent 
com panies together by the th rough  bill of lading, an d  thereby increased 
uniform ity and control as goods m oved under a  single contract across 
diverse lines. Agents for the Seaboard Inland ensured  th a t freight continued
A nnual C onvention (Columbia. S. C., 1868), 4.
iSProceedings of the Stockholders of the C harlotte. Columbia & 
A u gu sta  Railroad Com pany, a t the ir Second A nnual M eeting (Colum bia,
S. C , 1871), 7-8.
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to m ove a t the m ajor entrepots. The agents em ployed the telegraph to 
contro l the m ovem ent of freight from  place to  place and  line to line. Thus, 
the Seaboard Inland became an  im portant in terregional organization.19
A ndrew s and  Robinson envisioned fu rther consolidation of railroad  
traffic. Their plans w ere im peded, how ever, w hen Tom Scott and J. Edgar 
Thom son of the Pennsylvania Railroad attem pted  to gain  com m and of 
sou thern  railroads. Scott sought control of sou thern  lines from  G eorgia to 
V irginia. He intended to build a national railw ay system . A fter the w ar, 
Scott purchased several southern railroads and  created a  holding com pany 
called the Southern Railway Security Com pany. By 1870, he controlled the 
R ichm ond & D anville Railroad, b u t he placed Richm ond natives in 
positions of authority . From there he m oved fu rther south, h i his efforts to 
consolidate southern  lines, he used national banks and appointed local m en 
as railroad  directors. H e gained control of the im portant M emphis and 
C harleston Railroad by 1869. That line reported  to stockholders that "our 
th rough  freight arrangem ents w ith Eastern cities via N orfolk, w ith fast 
Through Schedule east and west, is operating vary fsicl satisfactory, w ith the 
exception that the rates are very low—the resu lt of com petition." In 1872, 
Scott started  building the A tlanta & Richm ond A irline from  C harlotte to
19N eIson, Iron Confederacies. 58-62.
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A tlanta. By 1873, the Southern Railway Security Company operated  2,131 
m iles of track and 13 separate lines from G eorgia to Virginia.20
O ther southern railroads outside of Scott's control also consolidated. 
As one historian has described  the m ovem ent for consolidation, it  "w as 
alm ost an  obsession am ong Southern railroad executives, as it w as am ong 
N ortherners, and a dangerous fascination at th a t."21 De Bow’s Review  
encouraged concentration. "The economy of consolidation,'’ it asserted , "is 
very obvious." The w rite r argued that consolidation allowed ro lling  stock to 
be w orked more efficiently and  allowed economies of scale because 
"m achine shops can be on  a larger and m ore com plete scale." M oreover,
"the cost of officers w ill be greatly  reduced, w hen a single directory will 
control one thousand m iles of road, instead o f com m itting the sam e 
business to ten separate adm inistrations." The Pennsylvania R ailroad 
proved the tru th  of this assertion by "running a  distance of about 850 
m iles."22
20Fifteenth A nnual R eport of the Board o f D irectors to the 
Stockholders of the M em phis and Charleston Railroad Com pany (M em phis, 
1869), 16; Summers, R ailroad s. Reconstruction, and the Gospel of Prosperity. 
177; John F. Stover, "Southern Railway," in  R obert L. Frey, ed., Encyclopedia 
of A m erican Business H isto ry  and Biography: Railroads in the N ineteenth  
C entury (New York: Facts on  File, 1988), 373; Stover, Railroads o f the South. 
99-103.
21Sum m ers, R a ilro a d s. Reconstruction, and the Gospel of Prosperity.
180.
22"Railroad Policy fo r the South," De Bow 's Review 5 (July 1868): 610.
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W illiam W adley realized th a t the C entral of Georgia h ad  to expand if 
it w anted to com pete w ith the Southern Railw ay Security C om pany. The 
C entral’s 1872 annual report asserted th a t "w ith the num erous lines of 
transportation  from  New York to  the South and  S outh-w est. . .  it becam e 
im portant for us to have control" of o ther lines and steam boats "in o rd e r . . .  
to perfect our line." W adley began acquiring lines in  A labam a and  Florida. 
He bought o r leased the Southw estern, M acon and W estern, G riffin &
N orth  Alabam a, W estern R ailroad of A labam a, and the M ontgom ery &
W est Point. Similarly, H. S. McComb w orked closely w ith the  Illinois 
C entral to gain control of the M ississippi C entral and trade w ith  New 
Orleans and the Great Lakes.23
W hen the Panic of 1873 struck, consolidation of sou thern  railroads 
w as well under way. The econom y's collapse, how ever, revealed  the 
financial w eaknesses of southern  railroads. M ost rem ained heavily  in  deb t 
and  had overextended them selves by construction, m uch of w hich  had been 
spurred  on by the Republicans' overzealous policies for railroad  financing a t 
the state level. A t the sam e tim e, sou thern  railroads struggled w ith  
com petition and  low  heigh t rates. Scott an d  the Pennsylvania, because of 
severe financial problem s, pulled  m uch o f th e ir assets o u t of th e  South after
23Thirty-Seventh Report of the P residen t and D irectors o f the C entral 
Railroad and Banking Co. of Georgia (Savannah. Ga., 1872), 16; Klein, The. 
G reat Richmond Term inal. 80-81; Sum m ers, Railroads, Reconstruction, and 
the Gospel ofEroggeiityv 177.
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the Panic. The fall of the Southern R a ilw a y  Security C om pany left a void in  
the southern railroad  system. M oreover, cut-throat com petition and  low 
freight rates threatened those roads th a t had  not fallen in to  receivership. In 
the face of bankruptcy, consolidation becam e a m eans o f survival as 
southern railroads tried  to bring o rd er ou t of the chaotic business climate.24
W adley and  the Central railroad  tried  to rationalize a confusing and 
dangerous business environm ent by  creating a pooling system  in  1875. The 
organization, called the Southern Railw ay & Steam ship A ssociation, 
attem pted to stabilize transportation rates. W adley w rote th a t that he was 
"anxious for the success of the A ssociation." The pooling agreem ents, 
however, d id  n o t bring about the resu lts for w hich railroad  m anagers had 
hoped. Railroad rates continued to fall, as d id  profits, an d  m ore roads fell 
into receivership. As a  result, consolidation accelerated in  the late 1870s.
The Illinois C entral took over the M ississippi Central in  1877. From 1878 to 
1881, the Louisville and  N ashville w en t from  966 miles to  3,231, the East 
Tennessee from  272 to 1,389 miles, an d  the Central of G eorgia from  861 to 
1,754 miles. N orthern  capitalists p layed  a  significant ro le in  this 
consolidation. Thus, the South, like the rest of the nation , experienced the
24Sum m ers, R ailroads. Reconstruction, and the G ospel of Prosperity 
185,269-298; Stover, "Southern Railway," 372-373; Klein, The G reat 
Richm ond T erm inal. 21-23.
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em ergence of a new  organizational age dom inated by pools, trusts, and 
holding com panies.25
The in troduction  of through freight, the telegraph, an d  consolidation 
caused dram atic changes in  southern trade patterns. New O rleans, Mobile, 
C harleston, and Savannah no longer lay a t the heart of the cotton trade. The 
railroads and  the em ergence of through freight system shifted the trade 
through the  N ew  South cities of A tlanta, Charlotte, and N ashville. Goods 
now flow ed N orth  and  into the national system . A t the sam e tim e, this 
shift in  trad e underm ined the dom ination of the cotton m erchant system. 
The telegraph enabled buyers to determ ine prices w ithout going through a 
m iddlem an. System , uniform ity, and organization became the  w ay of 
business in  the New South. By aiding the  grow th of industries such as 
textiles, tobacco, m ining, iron  and steel, and  timber, southern railroads also 
contributed greatly to the grow th of the N ew  South.26
^Fortv-F irst R eport of the P resident and Directors of the Central Rail 
Road and Banking Com pany of Georgia (Savannah, Ga., 1876), 6; 
Proceedings of the C onvention of the Southern Railway and  Steam ship 
A ssociation (Atlanta, Ga., 1875). Albert Fink Papers, Box 1, F o ld er Printed 
M atter: Reports of the R. R. Proceedings & Conventions, L ibrary of 
Congress, M anuscript D epartm ent, W ashington, D. C.; E. D ale Odom , 
"Albert Fink," Railroads in  the N ineteenth Century. 121; Sum m ers, 
R ailroads. Reconstruction, and the Gospel of Prosperity. 177, 277; Klein, Ihfi. 
G reat R ichm ond Term inal. 24.
26N elson, Iron Confederacies. 80-83.
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The destruction of the railroads d u rin g  the war was accom panied by 
the destruction  of the p lantation  system . Plantations, farm s, an d  the labor 
system  now  had  to be rebuilt on  a new  econom ic, political, an d  social 
foundation. The idea of a  N ew  South based  on  system, uniform ity, and 
bureaucratic control em erged im m ediately in  the form of calls for education, 
technology, industry, and  agricultural reform . In  1867, a revived De Bow's 
Review , the voice of the progressive antebellum  South, forecast a  N ew  
South based on railroads, industry, and  diversified agriculture. In  fact, the 
journal gave the im pression th a t the C ivil W ar had  breed the South to grasp 
new  organizational ideas and em brace econom ic change. "A rad ical 
change," the w riter declared, ’h a s  been w rought in  our labor system .” In 
response, the South needed to tu rn  its a tten tio n  to new pursu its.
Southerners should study the m ethods u sed  in  cotton factories and  apply 
them  to southern society. M oreover, the w riter stated, "it is highly 
im portant to the success of popular education, th a t there be system atic 
em ploym ent and associations." A ccording to  De Bow’s, the ou tlines of a 
New South w ere already visible.27
M ore practically, how ever, the first p rio rity  of w hite southerners 
becam e the task of rebuilding the agricu ltu ral system. As G avin W right 
dem onstrated in  his w ork, w ith  the destruction  of slavery, so u th ern
27"The N ew  Era of Southern M anufactures," De Bow’s R eview  3 
(January 1867): 57,65.
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p lan ters, once "labor lords," had  become 'la n d  lords."28 N evertheless, 
co tton  rem ained a labor intensive crop and  sou thern  planters and farm ers 
still needed  their w orkforce. To accom plish this task, they used the system , 
organization , and control developed during  the antebellum  period in  th e ir 
approach  to  m anaging labor. In  the p lanters' view , system  and control h ad  
becom e even more essential after the w ar because laborers had more 
freedom  and  received com pensation for the ir w ork. As John W. M allet, the 
head of the Confederate O rdnance Laboratory and a chem istry professor a t 
the U niversity of V irginia after the w ar, to ld  farm ers in  an  agricultural 
address, free-labor dem anded "economy of tim e, economy of labor, econom y 
of m oney." Southern p lan ters hardly had to be convinced. They had 
already begun to apply the antebellum  system  and  organization of 
p roduction  in  their quest to control free labor. W hite planters and farm ers 
held racist assum ptions th a t blacks w ould n o t w ork efficiently w ithout s te m  
and p ro p er organization an d  discipline. As one historian has argued, 
p lan ters and  farm ers w anted  a  "firm, disciplined, and regular system  of 
p lan ta tio n  m anagem ent" th a t w ould "com pel black people to w ork 
regularly ."29
28G avin W right, O ld South. New South: R evolutions in the 
S outhern  Economy Since the C ivil W ar (N ew  York: Basic Books, 1986), 17- 
50.
29"Address of Prof. J. W. M allet, D elivered a t the A ugusta County 
Fair," Southern  P lanter and  Farm er 30 (Novem ber 1869): 727; M ark M. 
S m ith . M astered by the Clock: Time. Slavery, and Freedom  in the A m erican
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
251
Southern planters and  fanners understood that a regular system  
m eant rules, regulations, and proper accounting procedures. "O rder and 
system ," a Georgia farm er w rote, "are as im portant to success in  farm ing as 
any o ther business." Free labor, southern agricultural journals argued , d id  
no t m ean unruly, uncontrolled , and inefficient labor. Southern farm ers 
needed to assert their pow er over free black labor in  the same w ay northern  
factories and railroads controlled their w orkers—through bureaucratic 
control, rig id  rules, and  the application of a m odem  conception of tim e. 
These journals prin ted  ru les as guidelines for the proper organization of 
labor. Their rules m irrored those that had guided antebellum  m anagem ent 
of plantations. One perceptive planter observed in  1887: "W hatever 
im provem ents we of to-day have m ade upon the m ethods of a n te -b e llu m  
days is due m ore to the grow th of the ideas of our predecessors than  to our 
ow n boasted probity and  enterprise." He found "most of our w isdom  is 
in h erited ."30
T hat the labor ru les in  th e  New South follow ed those of the 
antebellum  South may be seen in  the list of rules published by the S ou thern  
P lanter. O n a large farm , the journal stipulated, "it is of the utm ost 
consequence to have hands especially appropriated for each of the m ost
S o u th  (Chapel Hill: The U niversity of N orth C arolina Press, 155.
^ 'S y s tem  in  Farm ing," The Southern Farm  and  Home 4 (February 
1873): 128; Q uoted in  Sm ith, M astered by the Clock. 158.
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im portant departm ents of labor." A  farm  m anager should guard  against a 
"loss of time" an d  "w o rk . . .  not executed." To accom plish the goal of 
efficiency, farm ers and planters needed to inspect all operations "regularly" 
and arrange w orkers, anim als, and  tools so as "to dim inish labor o r increase 
its power." M oreover, the w riter believed that every w ell-m anaged farm  
dem anded proper accounting to ensure "practical m anagem ent."31
Southern agricu ltural journals also stressed the im portance of tim e 
m anagem ent and  the need to ru n  farm s and plantations like a factory. As in  
the antebellum  period , agricultural reform ers rem ained enam ored w ith  
system, efficiency, and technology. "Labor is money or its equivalent," noted 
a contributor to the Southern P lan ter and Farmer, and it  "should be so 
considered on the farm  as well as in  the workshops." C onsequently, if an  
hour of labor w as lost, "it should b e  counted at its value." This m odem  
conception tied tim e an d  productivity together.32
In a sim ilar essay, entitled "Labor," published in  The P lan tation . A. E. 
Cox prom oted system  an d  control on  farm s and plantations. To get the m ost 
from  a laborer, a supervisor should  "system atize his work" an d  give 
"attention to every departm ent of h is farm." Control of tim e becam e critical 
in  a free-labor system . "One of the hardest things to do," he m aintained, "is
31"Rules fo r Farm ers," S outhern  P lanter 29 (March 1868): 164.
32"Save Y our Labor," Southern P lan ter and Farm er 34 (January 1873):
13-14.
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to bring the negro to tune." Therefore, a planter should  "let every one know
that his tim e is being kept Im press every laborer w ith  the conviction
that no lost tim e can be regained." This control required  stric t guidance 
from  the m anager. A nother contribu tor added th a t "it w ill no t be denied 
that system  is the basis of success in  all departm ents of industry." He 
believed th a t "w ithout system , the  cotton planter is a m ere gam bler." To 
develop such a system , he suggested tha t southern farm ers study northern 
farm ers because they were superior "in the m atter of system atic farm 
econom y."33
O ther reform ers agreed. Francis Fontaine, a C artersville, Georgia, 
farm er, saw  the connection betw een northern  factories and  railroad 
organization, discipline, and tim e m anagem ent. He calculated "if a hand 
loses one half hour each day in  a  year he w ill lose 150 hours o r nearly half a 
m onth's labor." He further observed that factories and railroads did not 
tolerate lost tim e. "Probably no t a  p lan ter or farmer in  G eorgia charges for 
time lost. Yet factories, railroads, m ills . . .  charge one quarter of a day, if a 
hand  losses 15 m inutes." Fontaine found, how ever, th a t m any cotton 
planters ignored the idea of tim e m anagem ent, noting that, "scarcely any 
industry  could  long m aintain itself, if th is one item , lost tim e, were as
33"Labor," The Plantation: A W eekly Devoted to  A griculture. 
M anufactures and  all Industrial P ursu its 3 (March 27,1872): 194; "The South 
M ust Reorganize and D evelop H er O w n System of A griculture," The 
Plantation: A M agazine of Progressive A griculture and Im proved Industry 3 
(December 1872): 56.
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practically ignored, as cotton p lan ters as a  rule do ignore it." Fontaine 
encouraged sou thern  farm ers to em ulate northern factories. If they did, he 
concluded, sou thern  farm s could ru n  w ith  the "system and  discipline of 
labor in  a  N orthern  factory."34
A m ore radical conception o f agricultural labor w as th a t of a South 
Carolina au th o r w ho suggested th a t m anual labor should be view ed as a 
"m achine.” "You can count w ith g rea t certainty w hat your steam  engine 
w ill do, an d  w hat it w ill cost to ru n  it," he wrote. A planter should try to get 
the same type of regularity from h is laborers. However, because a workforce 
was a "m ore com plicated machine," i t  required  an "accurate governor to 
regulate its  m ovem ents." The governor, of course, w as the m anager. The 
farm er w ho d id  not w ork labor diligently  and efficiently "pursues a policy 
suicidal to him self." Indeed, "he is a foe of the social order, as he violates . . .  
the fundam ental rules . . .  for discipline."35 In  a sim ilar vein, a farm er from  
Cam den, South Carolina, wrote th a t "the h ired  labor m ay justly  be regarded 
as a 'm achine' w hose efficiency w ill depend  upon the skill an d  diligence of 
the 'engineer' (em ploying capitalist) w ho runs it." If the "machine" d id  no t 
w ork effectively the "engineer" could  be blam ed for no t determ ining the 
proper o rd er and  for no t using h is labor "advantageously" as a  "machine."
^F rancis Fontaine, "Georgia A griculture—Plantation Economy—Facts 
and Their A nsw ers," Southern C u ltiv a to r 29 (September 1871): 324-326.
3S "Labor and Capital." S outhern  C ultivator 29 ffiilv 1871): 252-253.
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For "machines" to run  well, the w riter asserted, w ork needed to be selected 
"judiciously," well-m anaged, an d  properly organized. If this w ere done, the 
"machine" w ould run "at its h ighest capacity."36
The Southern P lanter and  Farm er reprin ted  an  article from the 
n o rth ern  A m erican  Farm er th a t tied system, order, and efficiency to 
econom ical m anagem ent. To have "proper economy," the w riter averred , 
"the practical farm er should m ain tain  order, system , and  discipline on the 
farm." This economy could only be achieved w ith  p roper planning, 
organization, and  time m anagem ent. Everything needs to n m  like 
clockwork, he wrote, otherw ise, "w hen a farm er gets behind on his w ork, 
one operation  begins to crow d upon  another, confusion and  em barrassm ent 
ensue" o ften  "involving the loss o f m uch tim e an d  labor." He fu rther noted  
that m uch tim e would be saved by the "proper location of buildings, farm - 
pens, and  roads of the farm .” M uch like a factory, a farm  required an  
efficient layout so that tim e w as n o t w asted "hauling and  passing from  one 
end of th e  farm  to the other." M oreover, because tools should be centrally 
located and  protected, "the m aster should see to it th a t the laborers lodge 
them  w henever they stop using  them ."37
^"C riticism s of July N um ber,” Southern C ultivato r 29 (August 1871):
293.
37”Econom v." Southern P lan ter and Farm er 36 (August 18751: 401-
402.
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The organizational ideas to which form er Confederates had  been  
exposed during the w ar also influenced their conception of m anagem ent. A 
C onfederate veteran called for system  and discipline w hen it came to  dealing 
w ith  labor. "I have acted in  a subordinate position myself, under the 
au tho rity  of m ilitary superiors," he w rote. To control one hundred  m en, he 
explained, took "a firm  disciplinarian.” A speaker a t one Georgia State 
A gricultural m eeting believed that running a farm  or a p lantation paralleled  
lead ing  an  arm y. "Our id eal farm er," he w rote, "m ust possess in  an  
em inent degree, w hat is b est expressed by the term  executive ability." H e 
believed tha t laborers should  have the same respect for supervisors th a t 
soldiers had for 'Tee and Jackson." Accordingly, a  farm er "must be a  g reat 
general, w ith  power to system atize, to organize and to make every 
instrum entality  at his com m and co-operate harm oniously in  producing  any 
desired  result." To accom plish this system, a farm er had  to follow  "scientific 
principles" and "embrace . . .  the applications o f those principles."38
Proper accounting w as the key to saving tim e and money. A farm er 
h o rn  G ranville, N orth C arolina, w rote the ed ito r of the Southern P lan ter 
tha t the w ar had changed everything. Before d ie w ar "experience w as 
teaching us, slowly bu t surely" th a t "bookkeeping" w as im portant. The w ar
38'T reatm ent of Laborers," Southern C ultivato r 25 (February 1867): 
42: Transactions of the G eorgia State A gricultural Society. From A ugust. 
1876. to February. 187ft (A tlanta: James P. H arrison & Co., Printers and  
Publishers, 1878), 237.
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and  the em ploym ent of free labor now  w as teaching "us . . .  rapidly  an d
fatally, that w ith the costly labor of freed m e n . . .  the same system  w ill
indeed hasten u s to  w an t and  ruin." Southern farm ers and  p lanters now  
had  to control labor costs strictly . W hen it came to accounting, he 
m aintained "we m u st change o u r tactics." That m eant keeping "strict, and  
fair, and full, and  accurate account[s]." M oreover, a farm er should search for 
all profits and losses. From  this inform ation he could decide on  the p roper 
"systems" of crops, m anures, an d  labor. The only w ay for farm ers to survive 
in  the new m arket w as to have a  "system atic m ethod of keeping farm  
accounts." A nother correspondent to the S ou th ern  P la n ter  agreed. H e 
pointed  out th a t a ll businessm en, except farm ers, understood "the 
advantages of 'keeping accounts.'" Farm ers had to learn  from  the m erchant, 
m echanic, and  professional m en the im portance of m aintaining contro l 
w it h  accounting.39
A N orth C arolina contributor suggested that farm ers m easure all 
expenses in  the sam e w ay m anufacturers and railroads did. Farm ers an d  
p lan ters should keep stric t account of all provisions, im plem ents, stock, 
buildings, seed, m anure, taxes, and w ages paid. Samual B arnett of G eorgia 
concurred. W ith th e  end  of slavery and the "gang system," careful 
m aintenance of p lan tation  accounts becam e critical to  success. Farm ers and
39”Farm  A ccounts—A gain." Southern P lanter 29  (1868): 36; "Farm 
A ccounts-H ow  to  K eep Them ," Southern P lanter a n d  Farm er 29 (A pril 
1868): 208-209.
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planters should alw ays be asking them selves, "What does it cost m e, 
including, food and  extras? Does it pay?" Proper bookkeeping provided the 
only way to answ er these questions accurately. Barnett also offered an 
exam ple of tabular plantation accounts of receipts and expenses, and he 
explained how to balance books. A nother editorial w riter added  that 
farm ers should account for inventory the way that m anufacturers did. 
Fanners needed to find  and record the value of everything on  their farm, 
including "the sm allest im plem ent."40
Along w ith p roper accounting, agricultural reform ers called for the 
use of labor-saving m achinery and stressed that m achinery replaced labor 
and  im proved productiv ity . "This is the age of im provem ent," w rote one, 
"especially in  the reduction  in the cost o f labor-saving im plem ents." Editors 
of agricultural journals understood th a t progress in agriculture depended on 
technological progress. The Southern P lan ter reprinted an  article from  the 
Am erican A griculturist that 'labor-saving implements" reduced  costs, 
increased efficiency, and led to m ore "thorough systems o f farm ing." 
A nother w riter added  th a t despite the "laborious operations on  the farm," 
th a t "ingenious m achines" could replace "brute force" in  com pleting them. 
M ore and m ore, he w rote, fanning relied  on "man’s intelligence."
^ 'P lan ta tio n  Accounts," Southern C ultivator 30 (January 1872): 10- 
15; "Plantation A ccounts," Southern Farm  and Home 3 (January 1872): 86; 
"Plantation A ccounts," Southern Farm  and  Home 2 (May 1871): 250; 
"A gricultural A ccounts," Southern Farm  and Home 3 (July 1872): 324.
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M oreover, he asserted, "machinery” h a d  becom e the "great em ancipator" 
because it b rough t "progress" to both  "agriculture and m anufactures."41
Sim ilarly, a form er Confederate officer, Captain J. N. M ontgom ery of 
Georgia, m ade a speech to the Georgia A gricultural Society, in  w hich he 
encouraged the use of labor-saving m achinery. Steam power, new  plows, 
and new  m achinery, he realized, w ould decrease labor costs and  increase a 
farm ’s efficiency. Steam pow er ran m achinery, created power, and allowed a 
farm to be m ore "easily managed." A nother speaker addressed the same 
group and m ade the sam e argum ent. "If M echanics have indifferent tools," 
he noted, "it adds to his labor, consum es m ore tim e, and his w ork m ust be 
indifferently done. A nd so w ith the Farm er." If a farm er did  n o t invest and 
use proper im plem ents, he lost tim e an d  m oney. A farm  required  "tools 
adapted to it, as m uch so the M echanic requires for his work." M odem  
m anufacturing, he continued, now allow ed farm ers in  the preparation  and 
cultivation o f the soil to economize lab o r.42 A form er Confederate General, 
W. M. Browne, sum m ed up  many ag ricu ltu ral reform ers’ ideals in  an  1870 
speech to the A gricultural fair in Rome, G eorgia. To nm  a farm  efficiently 
and profitably, a  farm er had to have "adm inistrative ability in  the
41"Im proved Farm ing Im plem ents," Southern C ultivator 36 (January 
1878): 15; "Labor-Saving Implem ents," S outhern  P lanter and Farm er 30 
(January 1869): 50; "Letters horn a C ountry  Gentleman," Southern  
C ultivator 29 (March 1871): 91.
tr a n s a c tio n s  of the Georgia A gricultural Society. 246; "A gricultural 
Interests and  Im plem ents," The P lan ta tion  3 (April 17,1872): 242.
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m anagem ent and  d irection  of the business." This adm inistration  w as 
achieved by im plem enting "the proper order, system , discipline and 
economy" to the farm  o r plantation. The only w ay this goal could  be 
reached, he argued, w as through agricultural education, "book-farming," 
labor-saving m achinery, and agricultural organizations.43
S outhern  reform ers also believed th a t education could help  bring 
about m odernization and  econom ic grow th. A fter the war, agricultural 
reform ers revived the antebellum  call for agricultural education and  
agricultural colleges. In  the m atter of educational reform , the lessons 
derived from  the antebellum  period  and from  the w ar converged. Before 
the w ar, progressive southerners had called for colleges to teach engineering 
and agricu ltu ral science. D uring the w ar, the South had depended  on 
"soldier technologists" to  build  industry from  the ground up. The w ar had 
required  m en w ho understood factory m anagem ent, railroads, an d  logistics. 
In  o ther w ords, the "control revolution" dem anded an  understand ing  of the 
m odem  principles of system , uniform ity, and bureaucratic control. Former 
C onfederate officers, w ho had this understanding, played an im portan t role 
in  transform ing southern  education after the w ar. A t the college level, 
significant curriculum  changes w ere introduced th a t stressed engineering,
43"Gen. W. M. Brow ne s Speech a t Rome," Southern Farm  and  Home 
2 (December 1870): 47.
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technology, and agricultural science. O rganizational ideas developed in  the 
crucible o f w ar helped create a  new  university  and  a New South.44
The ideas associated w ith  railroad  management, p lan tation  
m anagem ent, and the w ar effort came together in  post-war educational 
reform . In  an 1868 lecture a t the U niversity of Virginia, M allet m ade it clear 
th a t a  m odem  South depended on technical and scientific education. He 
reflected on  the dram atic changes b rought about by the in troduction  of the 
railroad, the telegraph, and "the w eapons of war." The steam  engine, he 
observed, now  substitu ted fo r "untold m illions of men and  o th er animals." 
Thus, M allet argued, a university m ust educate its students "in the 
principles and application of natural science." In speeches to  agricultural 
associations throughout V irginia, he h ighlighted  the need for scientific 
agriculture, insisting tha t "in the p resen t condition of V irginia—ju st 
beginning . . .  to recover from  the w ounds inflicted by war," farm ers and 
laborers m ust be "more skillful, m ore in telligen t, and m ore econom ically 
directed."45
M allet became a m ajor spokesm an for scientific agriculture and  
agricultural education th rough  num erous speeches and jou rnal articles. In
44See especially, D an R. Frost, "A Confederate Education in  the New 
South: Southern Academ ia an d  the Idea of Progress in the N ineteen th  
Century" (Ph.D. diss., Louisiana State U niversity, 1994), 140-200.
45f. W. Mallet, Chem istry A pplied to  the Arts: A  Lecture D elivered 
before the University of V irginia. May 30.1868 (Lynchburg, Va., 1868), 6.
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a lecture reprin ted  in  the Southern P lanter an d  Farm er, he noted  that 
"practical farm ers” should perform  scientific experim ents on  their farms 
and carefully m easure everything from  m anure to crop yields. In  another
essay, he cautioned against using the "im perfect 'ru le of thum b'” in  crop
cultivation. Farm ers "m ust examine closely the conditions necessary to 
make every acre of ground produce, not only a  crop, bu t the largest crop and 
the best crop which can possibly be obtained from  it; and this w ith the least 
possible expenditure of labor and money."46
M allet's belief in technical and scientific education received support 
from  agricultural reform ers. Reformers rela ted  economic progress to 
educational reform . A le tter to the ed ito r of the Southern C ultivator 
observed th a t the w ar had  "opened upon a  new  era in  everything—The very 
foundations of the old society have been broken up." Consequently, the 
w riter continued, "we m ust begin de nova to educate ou r people for the new  
order of things. We need a new  system of education—new  textbooks and a 
new  o rd er of teachers." M uch of the post-w ar reform  rhetoric m irrored pre­
w ar pronouncem ents. B ut in  the post-w ar years, colleges actually changed 
their curricula to stress science, engineering, and  technology. M en who had 
helped organize the South for war led this assault.47
^"P rofessor M allet’s Lecture." Southern P lanter and  Farm er 30 (April 
1869): 227; J. W. M allet, "Chemical Researches into the Com position of 
Tobacco," Southern P lan ter and Farm er 30 (February 1869): 119-120.
47Southem  C ultivator 33 (June 1875): 225; Frost, "Confederate
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M any of the C onfederate "soldier-technologists" joined the faculties 
of sou thern  universities after th e  w ar. John W . M allet, Josiah G orgas, 
G eorge W ashington Rains, and  W illiam Leroy Broun, taught a  new  
generation  of southerners. From  college lecterns, in  articles, and  in  
speeches, they applied their expertise to the transform ation higher 
education. U nder their direction, southern educators changed sou thern  
education by introducing scientific courses, especially chemistry and  
engineering, to prepare students for careers in  agriculture, m ining, textiles, 
ra ilroad  m anagem ent, and  other professions. If the South hoped for 
econom ic progress, C onfederate veterans insisted it had to em brace the 
v irtues of science, system , uniform ity, and bureaucratic control.48
Indeed, the success of the Confederate O rdnance D epartm ent during 
the w ar gave credence to the opinions of the m en w ho had organized and 
ru n  it. De Bow’s Review , a m ajor advocate of educational reform  in  the 
antebellum  South, reported  in  1868 that the teaching of "applied science" by
Education,” 202-213.
^ r o s t ,  "Confederate Education," 156; In  a  sim ilar vein, see D an R. 
F rost and Kou K. N elson, The LSU College of Engineering: O rigins and 
Establishm ent. 1860-1908. vol. 1 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State U niversity  
Press, 1995), and Robert J. N orrell, A Prom ising Field: Engineering a t 
A labam a. 1837-1987 (Tuscaloosa: University of A labam a Press, 1990). One of 
M allet's students, W illiam C arter Stubbs, p layed a significant role in  the 
m odernization of the Louisiana sugar industry after the war; see, John 
A lfred  H eitm ann, The M odernization of the Louisiana Sugar Industry . 1830- 
1910 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1987): 169-207. O n the 
im portance of m ilitary thought and social change see. Barton C. H acker, 
"M ilitary Institutions, W eapons, and Social Change: Toward a N ew  H istory 
of M ilitary Technology," Technology and C ulture 35 (1994): 826-828.
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sou thern  in stitu tions rem ained "defective." "Thousands of young  m en in  
the  South," De Bow's lam ented, "are o u t o f em ploym ent because they  are 
n o t even qualified for the superintendence o f skilled industry." Because of 
this educational failure, the South lacked railroad  superintendents, 
geologists, chem ists, engineers, and  m achinists. N evertheless, the  journal 
reported  "scientific instruction is being in troduced  in  m any of o u r colleges" 
due to the technical rigor introduced in to  sou thern  educational in stitu tions 
by form er m em bers of the O rdnance D epartm ent.49
Southern educational institu tions eventually  changed u n d er the 
influence of form er Confederate officers. M allet taught chem istry a t the 
U niversity of V irginia. Gorgas becam e presiden t of the U niversity of 
A labam a. Rains taught chem istry a t the U niversity of Georgia. W illiam  
Leroy Broun, the head of the Richm ond A rsenal during the w ar, pushed  
th rough  m ajor educational reform s as P resident of the U niversity of 
G eorgia, the U niversity of Texas, and w hat w ould  be later know n as A uburn 
U niversity .50
They w ere no t alone in  their efforts to  transform  southern 
universities. G eneral W. M. Browne cap tu red  the sp irit of progressive 
education  w hen he told listeners a t a convention in  Rome, G eorgia, th a t 
agricultural education had to be taught to a  new  generation of southerners.
49"Education in  the South," De Bow’s Review  5 (May 1868): 506-514.
s^ ro s t, "Confederate Education," 137.
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"The force of bad  habits," he said , and  "the devotion to 'o ld  w ays,’ the pow er 
of prejudice, and  the inveterate opposition  to theory and  book-farm ing” 
m ust be overcom e if the South w anted  a  b etter future. R ather than 
education based on  the classics, Brow ne argued, the South w ould best be 
served by em phasizing technical an d  scientific training. H e also connected 
education w ith  m odem  business practices: "The farm er should  understand 
w ell the theory; then  how  w hen an d  w hy the theory should  be applied.” An 
educated agriculturist would thereby enforce "the proper order, system, 
discipline and  econom y of the business.” In  addition, an  education  in civil 
engineering an d  chem istry w ould create a  new  vanguard o f southerners 
w ho could b u ild  a new , industria lized  South. "We should then  no longer 
find  it necessary to  send to the N orth  o r to Europe," Browne asserted, "for 
engineers to bu ild  our railroads o r w ork o u r mines, for skilled artisans to 
ru n  our w orkshops and factories, o r fo r m anufacturers to w ork up  our raw  
m aterial."51
To realize this dream  of a N ew  South, form er C onfederate officers 
used  West P o in t and the Virginia M ilitary Institu te as m odels for scientific 
education. They also prom oted the U niversity of Virginia as a  progressive 
educational m odel. In  fact, Broun, Rains, and  Gorgas adopted  its class 
elective system  a t their universities. V irginia's graduates had  im pressed
51"Gen. W. M. Browne’s Speech a t Rome," Southern Farm  and Home 
2 (December 1870): 46-48.
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them  as the only group w ho consistently passed the O rdnance D epartm ent's 
scientific exam  during  the w ar. That h ad  convinced them  th a t the elective 
system  w as superior to the strict curriculum  dem anded by classical 
education.52
In  introducing an  article by Broun, the editor of De Bow's Review 
asked rhetorically: "Why are not our young men the superintendents of our
railroads Why do we im port geologists, m ineralogists, chem ists,
engineers and  machinists?" Because, he answered, the South failed to teach 
applied  science. He offered the French "polytechnic schools" as a m odel for 
the solution. Southern educators needed to follow the exam ple of scientific 
education  developed in  France, he said , the key to which w as the "elective 
system ." By adopting th is organization, "education in the South" would 
p resen t "the highest incentives to industry  and economy in  the student.”53
The ed itor noted that Broun w as an  advocate of the elective 
educational system . He backed this u p  by pointing out Broun's service as a 
C onfederate O rdnance officer and his scientific expertise. As an  ordnance 
officer du ring  the w ar, the editor noted  Broun had "turned his educated and 
practical ability to a departm ent of m ilitary  science" w here he "organized 
and  conducted a departm ent for the preparation  of fixed am m unition."
This position  involved a  know ledge o f chem istry, m echanics, and
52Frost, "Confederate Education,” 205.
53"Education in  the South," D e Bow’s Review 5 (May 1868): 506-508.
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engineering. The success of the O rdnance D epartm ent, the editor argued, 
proved that the South required an  educational system  based  upon science 
and technology, and no group w as m ore "com petent to  speak o r m ore 
w orthy to be listened to o n . . .  the instruction  of Southern  youth” than 
form er Confederate ordnance officers.54
In  the article th a t follow ed, B roun stressed the need  for educational 
reform  freed from  the "restrictive" classical education an d  w hich em braced 
"practical and scientific training." N o t surprisingly, he used  the Confederate 
O rdnance D epartm ent to illustrate w hy scientific train ing  proved necessary. 
The N ew  South required the sam e expertise exercised by  the w ar's ordnance 
officers. The "new age" dem anded a  new  education. "No o ther proof need 
be offered," Broun w rote, "to dem onstrate the necessity of a  radical change 
in  o u r system  of collegiate education." W ithout it, sou therners w ould no t 
be "educated for the age in  w hich they  live."55
The call for scientific and technical education d id  no t fall on deaf ears. 
Broun, Gorgas, M allet, Rains, as w ell as Robert E. Lee a t W ashington 
U niversity, were able to im plem ent educational reform . The U niversity of 
Georgia established a scientific curriculum  based on Broun's ideas. As early 
as 1866, in  fact, the University of G eorgia advertised in  the S outhern
^Ibid., 507-508.
55W. Leroy Broun, "Im provem ents Required in  S ou thern  Colleges," 
De Bow's Review 5 (May 18681: 508-518.
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C ultivator th a t it offered a  "new  feature" to education  "in w hich young m en 
will be carefully and thoroughly trained both  in  the theory and practice o f 
Civil Engineering." By 1870, th e  university 's h igh  school had  strung a 
telegraph line and was teaching students telegraphy.56
Besides Georgia, thirty-five southern schools adopted  the elective 
system. Jam es T. M urfee, a  VM I graduate, C onfederate veteran, and form er 
com m andant of cadets a t the U niversity of A labam a, offered the rationale 
for this new  organization. "U nder the system  of slavery," he said,
"ignorance and  idleness m ight acquire and m aintain  w ealth." U nder the 
new  econom ic order, how ever, the South had  to change. "Under free 
institutions," he w rote, "the ind iv id u al m ust depend  upon  habits of o rder, 
system, self-reliance, and a disciplined m ind.,,S7 Thus, there was a push  for 
a New South education bu ilt o n  engineering, scientific agriculture, and  the  
ideas of system , uniform ity, an d  control. These w ere the values of a new  
bureaucratic and organized post-w ar society. Colonel Robert Beverly, a 
com m encem ent speaker at in  1877 a t an southern agricultural and 
m echanical college, sum m ed u p  the necessity for scientific education. "The 
annih ilation  of tim e and space by  the inventions of Fulton and Morse," he 
argued, m ade it im perative th a t "the young m ind" have "clear insight in to
56Frost, "Confederate Education," 205-206; S outhern  C ultivator 24 
(October 1866): np.
57Quoted in  Frost, "C onfederate Education," 211.
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science" and "com plete m astery of principles." Only w ith such m astery, he 
insisted , w ould the South "meet the dem ands of m odem  life."58
As southerners adap ted  to "the dem ands of m odem  life," m any of 
them  realized the econom y was undergoing significant organizational 
change. No longer was theirs a w orld of p lan ters and yeom an farm ers; it 
w as rapidly becom ing a w orld of big business. By means of consolidation, 
banks, corporations, and railroads were gaining great economic pow er.59 
The organization of the southern economy h ad  been dram atically changed 
by the war, the railroad, and the telegraph. In  1870, southern farm ers and 
planters experienced a very different w orld than  they had in  1860.
Therefore, m any argued th a t scientific education and system atic 
m anagem ent of farm s needed to be coupled w ith  organized pow er to protect 
farm ers' interests. A lthough the push for farm ers' organizations began in
58"Address of Col. Robert Beverley a t the A gricultural and Mechanical 
C ollege Com m encem ent," Southern P lan ter and Farmer 38 (September 
1877): 559-561.
59For discussions of the organizational changes taking place during 
this period see, Robert W iebe, The Search fo r O rder. 1877-1920 (New  York, 
1965); Louis Galambos, ’Technology, Political Economy and 
Professionalization: C entral Themes of the O rganizational Synthesis," 
Business H istory Review  57 (4): 471-493; Steven Hahn, The Roots of 
Southern Populism : Yeoman Farm ers and  the  Transform ation o f the 
Georgia Upcountry. 1850-1890 (New York: O xford University Press, 1983); 
Jonathan  M. W iener, Social Origins of the N ew  South: A lab am a. 1860-1885 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1978); Michael W ayne, The 
Reshaping of Plantation Society: The N atchez D istrict. 1860-1880 (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1983); an d  D on H. Doyle, N ew  M en.
N ew  Cities. New South: A tlanta. N ashville. Charleston. M obile. 1860-1910 
(Chapel Hill: U niversity of N orth  Carolina, 1990).




the 1850s, the results of th e  Civil W ar, the new  industrial econom y, and the 
fall of cotton prices in tensified  interest in  these organizational ideas.
The expansion of th e  railroad and  the grow th of the national m arket 
convinced many sou thern  farm ers to organize ou t of a sense of self-interest. 
Southerners d id  n o t hearken  back to a nostalgic Jeffersonian past; rather, 
they began to adopt the organizational practices employed by large 
bureaucracies like the railroad . As E dw ard A yers has noted, "the nation 
w atched w ith astonishm ent as conservative w hite Southern farm ers 
developed new visions o f economics."60 Significantly, this new  vision 
included the idea of collected, coordinated action.
In a telling S o u th e r n  C u ltiv a to r  ed ito rial in  1867, a sou thern  farm er 
com plained that corporations, bankers, m erchants, and railroads controlled 
the economy. Farm ers, h e  believed, h ad  been  left behind. The solution, he 
argued, was ’association.*’ Farmers needed  to organize "beginning w ith  
neighborhoods, rising to counties, extending to states, and to the nation." 
W ith proper organization, farm ers could gain  "due w eight of d irecting  the 
thought and action of society." h i this w ay, they could com bat "hostile 
associations, and m onopolies." This w ould  give farm ers a "proper voice in  
trade, commerce, and legislation." He po in ted  ou t that "isolated" and  
"disassociated" farm ers h ad  no pow er o r influence. Indeed, w ithou t such
60Edward L. Ayers, The Promise of the  N ew  South: Life A fter 
Reconstruction (New York; Oxford U niversity Press, 1992), x.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
271
organization farm ers and p lan ters w ould rem ain "the beasts of bu rden  of 
every co rporation  and  m onopoly."61
A n advocate for agricultural clubs agreed. Society was becoming 
increasingly organized and bureaucratized, and southern  farm ers had  to 
adapt. "Com bination," he w rote, "seems to m e to be absolute necessity, 
alm ost self-preservation  itself." "An ind iv idual farm er," had little  chance of 
success "in th is age" of bank, industria l, an d  railroad  consolidation. Farm ers 
needed "to com bine for a  stupendous purpose as a railroad." O therw ise, 
railroads, m erchants, cotton factors, and  o ther "centralizing" groups w ould 
run  the econom y for their ow n benefit. Farm ers had  to organize for 
"m utual p ro tec tion ."62
M any editorialists urged farm ers to learn  from  other professions the 
im portance of organization. "There is a p lain  road," one wrote, "and th a t is 
concert of action." He explained th a t m erchants had  their boards of trade, 
teachers th e ir associations, p rin ters and  m echanics their trade unions. "All 
the trades an d  professions," he concluded, "have m eans o f securing 
harm ony," w hile farm ers had "no system  of concerted effort.” A nother 
w riter concurred th a t com m ercial and m anufacturing "capital” possessed
61"U nion of Farm ers—Enquiries." Southern  C ultivator 25 (August
1867), 246-247.
62"G oodw yn A gricultural Club." Southern P lan ter and Farm er 32 
(July 1871): 387-391; "Farmers' Clubs," S outhern  C ultivator 26 (July 1868): 
220-221.
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m ore "pow er" than  "armies” because o f organizational control. A cotton  
p lan ter explained the predicam ent in  w hich southern farm ers found 
them selves. "The m echanic, the m erchant, the m anufacturer and the 
professional m an," he w rote, "fix the ir ow n price." Farm ers, on the o ther 
hand, "m ust sell —  a t the price attached to his productions by other parties.” 
C otton planters, he suggested, should  therefore "devise a p lan  that w ill 
com bine the great body of cotton p lanters into one g rea t cooperative 
organization."63
In  the South, this o rgan izational m entality gained  m om entum  w ith  
the em ergence of the Grange, and  later, the Farm ers' A lliance m ovem ent. 
O ne ed ito rial w riter noted th a t it could no t 'be denied th a t the South has 
lost m uch since the war by the w an t of system atic organization." In 
response, he encouraged sou thern  farm ers to consider a  new  national 
organization called the Patrons of H usbandry, otherw ise know n as the 
G range. This organization w ou ld  "rem odel" the agricu ltu ral system  on 
several fronts. First, it w ould give farm ers an  economic voice. Second, it 
w ould give them  political c lo u t Finally, he argued, the  G range w ould 
prom ote scientific agriculture based  on  chem istry and  system atic 
m anagem ent. Southern farm ers w ould  thereby gain "the best m anaged
63"The Farm er," The P lan ta tion  3 (July 24,1872): 469; "An Essay," The 
P lan tation  3 (June 12,1872): 368;
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farm s, em bracing all the departm ents of farm  econom y . . .  w ith the 
im provem ents, com forts an d  profits in p roportion  to the investm ent."64
A nother w riter w ho supported the G range m aintained th a t 
"com bination and concentration of capital is the sp irit of the age.” He 
continued that the "iron—coal—whiskey—tobacco—wool—dairy—an d  various 
o ther in terests have their associations for protections." M oreover, railroads, 
co tton  exchanges, and stock exchanges held all the power. "W here is the 
farm er?" he asked. Two years earlier, in  1871, E. G. W all, the ed ito r of Field 
and Factory, gave an  address a t the A gricultural Fair in  Starkville, 
M ississippi, in  w hich he ven ted  that, unlike farm ing, "all other professions, 
trades and  m ercantile p u rsu its have their conventions, trade union, and 
board  of trade." Only "the farm er is contented to fight single-handed against 
all o th er com binations."65
The Grange w as founded w ith a w ritten  constitution, m em bership 
requirem ents, and rules and  regulations for m em bers, as well as a hierarchy 
of officers a t the national, state, and local level. Farm ers joined it fo r the 
collective strength it gave them . Far from  rebelling against the new  
econom ic order, they accepted its new organizational tenets. M uch like the
^"T he South m ust reorganize and  develop her own system  of 
A griculture," The P lantation  3 (December 1872): 57; 'Patrons of H usbandry," 
S outhern  C ultivator 31 (May 1873): 164-165.
65'Patrons of H usbandry." Southern C ultivato r 31 (May 1873): 164- 
165; "Extracts from an A ddress by E. G. Wall," The Southern Field and  
Factory 2 (January 1872): 38.
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railroad  com panies w anted  pools to  control cu t-th roat com petition, the 
G range hoped th a t cooperation and  governm ent action w ould raise crop  
prices and  lower transportation  costs. The G range also encouraged farm ers 
to use scientific agriculture and support agricultural education. Broun, 
M allet, and  others supported  this cam paign and  addressed m eetings of the 
G range. The Grange also set up  a cooperative buying netw ork to get cheaper 
goods. The Patrons of H usbandry accepted the new  concepts of corporate 
business. By 1876, m ore than  a  th ird  of the G range's 758,767 members lived  
in  the form er slave sta tes.66
A ssociation w as w idely seen as a solution to  the m ajor problem s th a t 
beset farm ers. F. A. D ulany of Cam den, Alabam a, believed association 
w ould  bring them  "progress and  im provem ent in  all the arts and sciences." 
A nother southerner envisioned "an organization in  every locality in  the 
South to supply its m em bers w ith  all the necessary im proved and labor 
saving  im plem ents, m anures, seed, and stock." A w riter from  M em phis 
clearly articulated the m odem  vision of organization, m aintaining th a t by  
organizing effectively farm ers could use technology in their favor. "Owing 
to the facilities afforded by telegraph and railway," he w rote, "transactions 
am ounting to thousands are frequently negotiated in  advance." If sou thern
^R obert C. M cM ath, Jr., Am erican Populism : A Social H istory. 1877- 
1898 (New York: H ill and  W ang, 1993), 58-59; P roportion of Grange 
m em bers derived from  L inda M arie Thorstad, "The H istorical and C u ltu ral 
G eography of the G range in  M innesota and Louisiana, 1870-1880" (Ph.D. 
diss., Louisiana State U niversity, 1999), 38
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planters created a  "colossal" organization, he believed they  w ould be able to 
set prices by selling together. "The cotton planters have the pow er to form  a  
close union," he argued , "and force the price up." T hrough coordination 
and organizational control, he insisted th a t farm ers w ould  be following the 
sam e m ethods as m erchants and "other industries."67
A n organizational m entality  developed in  the nineteenth-century 
South. The organizational ideal em erged during the antebellum  period and  
gained m om entum  du ring  the Civil W ar. Indeed, the N ew  South em erged 
ou t of the organizational lessons of the antebellum  perio d  and the Civil 
W ar. Progressive southerners preached the virtues of system , organization, 
and bureaucratic control. Railroad m anagers spread new  ideas about time, 
technology, and  organizational control throughout the South, and southern 
reform ers applied these ideas to agriculture and education. They also 
created agricultural organizations in  an  effort to control the m arket. 
Southerners learned  from  the failure of Confederate railroads and the 
success of the C onfederate O rdnance D epartm ent that a  N ew  South w ould 
need bureaucratic and  organizational control. M oreover, under the 
direction of M allet, G orgas, Rains, Broun, and others, sou thern  educators 
reorganized and  m odernized education on the basis of scientific principles.
67”C o-operation A m ong Farm ers," Southern C u ltiv a to r 26 (June
1868): 167; "C o-operation A m ong A griculturists," S ou thern  C ultivator 31 
(February 1873): 55-56.
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In the end, railroads, plantations, an d  the w ar contributed to the m aking of a 
new , organized South.
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EPILOGUE
In the late 1880s, a young N orth  C arolina textile p lant m anager 
nam ed Sam Patterson w rote his m other letters th a t captured the economic 
changes in  the  N ew  South. He saw  a  South transform ed by m anufacturing 
and railroads. He described a trip to A ugusta, Georgia, for a C otton 
Exposition. Traveling on the C harlotte, Colum bia, & A ugusta railroad, he 
"had a good view  of Columbia, Rock H ill, C hester, & G raniteville" where he 
"saw  some large & handsom e m ills." A t the Exposition, he observed 
"m achinery I never in  m y life saw." H e thought i t  the m ost "clever set of 
Exhibitors." W hile in  A ugusta, he v isited  the Sibley Textile m ill, which 
used the old C onfederate Powder W orks buildings for its m anufacturing. 
'T h e  Sibley," he w rote, "is the largest m ill in  A ugusta, & is a m agnificent 
building on  the outside." Inside, the m anufacturing plant em ployed "about 
1000 looms & 35160 spindles." The factory had  a bureaucratic m anagem ent 
hierarchy. The Superintendent m ade "$15.00 a day" and the "Overseers" 
m ade "a little over $5.00 pay [a] day."1 W ith this transform ation of the
1Sam Patterson, Concord, N orth  Carolina, to  Mamma, December 9, 
1888, Box 104.4, in  Patterson Papers, N orth  C arolina State A rchives, Raleigh, 
N orth Carolina.
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C onfederate Pow der W orks into a textile m ill, Patterson saw  firsthand the 
organizational legacies o f cotton plantations, railroads, an d  the Civil W ar.
O ther m em bers o f his fam ily, how ever, noted the contradictions 
associated w ith  this econom ic transform ation. One, probably a brother, 
described the building o f a  new  railroad line. "I w ent over to see the 
convicts a t w ork," he told his m other. "They are changing the road bed," 
and "the stockade is n o t far from  here, ju st across the rail-road." The slave- 
labor legacy of the antebellum  South endured w ith the convict-labor system  
of the N ew  South. A nother fam ily member, H ow ard Patterson, noted th a t 
yet another railroad passed "200 feet" from  his church's sanctuary. "I could 
not help being struck," he observed, "by the contrast, betw een the old and 
the new ."2 The Patterson fam ily saw the outlines of a N ew  South.
R ailroads had  consolidated and  had tied southern trade to northern cities.
A t the sam e tim e, textile m ills started  to do t the southern landscape. 
B irm ingham , A labam a, em erged as an im portant center for the steel and 
iron industry . O ther extractive industries such as tim ber, naval stores, and  
m ining also w ere in  the process of transform ing the South.3
2R. S. Patterson, W alnut Cove, N orth  C arolina, to M am m a, A ugust 
26,1888, and  H ow ard Patterson, Salem, N orth Carolina, to Pard, October 18, 
1888, Box 104.4, in  Patterson Papers, N orth Carolina State Archives, Raleigh, 
N orth  C arolina.
3C. V ann W oodw ard, O rigins of the N ew  South. 1877-1913 (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State U niversity Press, 1951), 107-141; Edw ard L. Ayers,
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As the N ew  South em erged, i t  also becam e p a rt o f the national 
econom ic system. O n Novem ber 18,1883, standard tim e w as introduced 
nation  wide. The national railroad system  dem anded synchronized time. 
The telegraph, railroads, and industrial production b rough t system  and 
uniform ity to the nation  as a w hole. The South did  n o t figh t th is 
m odernization; it em braced it. As early as June 1870, De Bow 's Review had 
argued for standardized time. M odem  business practices, it asserted, 
required "standard clocks" for "railroads," and "banking houses, etc." "The 
system  of controlling" tim e, the journal continued, "at least o u r railroad 
clocks . . .  would be conducive to public com fort and safety." Moreover, "the 
centralization of ou r leading" businesses dem anded a "uniform " system.
The telegraph also m ade this change im perative. "It is n o t an  unreasonable 
anticipation," the journal foresaw, th a t "the tim e of a cen tral point, between 
the M ississippi and the Atlantic" becom es "one standard." In  1883, system,
The Prom ise of the N ew  South: Life A fter R econstruction (New York: 
O xford University Press, 1992), 104-131; See also, David L. Carlton, M ill and 
Tow n in South C arolina. 1880-1920 (Louisiana State U niversity Press, 1982); 
H enry M. McKiven, Iron  & Steel: C lass. Race, and C om m unity in  
Birm ingham . Alabam a. 1875-1920 (C hapelH ill: U niversity of N orth  
Carolina Press, 1995); D on H. Doyle, N ew  M en. New C ities. N ew  South: 
A tlanta. Nashville. C harleston. M obile. 1860-1910 (C hapel H ill: University 
of N orth  Carolina Press, 1990).
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uniform ity, and  control changed the  nature of tim e in  bo th  the N orth and  
the South.4
Southern educational reform ers also m oved on  to the national stage. 
In 1882, John W. M allet became p residen t of the A m erican Chemical Society. 
This professional organization com prised p art of the new  organizational 
synthesis taking place w ith the rise of technology and expertise.5 It should 
not be surprising that one of the m en w ho had helped organize the South 
for w ar and w as a  proponent of a  N ew  South became a  national leader. 
Professionalization, organization, and  technology becam e the sp irit of the 
age, and M allet em bodied them.
In sum , a N ew  South em erged from  the lessons of the past. The 
organizational ideas associated w ith  antebellum  railroads and plantations 
helped Southerners organize th e ir new  economy. F urther still, the lessons 
of w ar were applied to railroads, as w ell as educational and agricultural
4M ark M. Sm ith, M astered by the Clock: Time. Slavery, and Freedom 
in  the A m erican South (Chapel H ill: University of N orth  Carolina Press, 
1997), 178; "U niform ity in R ailroad Time," De Bow's Review. A fter the W ar 
Series, 7-8 (May-June 1870): 464-467.
5O tto Eisenschim l, "John W. M allet: ACS P resident in  1882," 
Chemical and Engineering News 8 January 1951: 110-111; Louis Galambos, 
"The Em erging O rganizational Synthesis in M odem  A m erican H istory," 
Business H istory Review 44 (3) (19701: 279-290; Louis Galambos, 
"Technology, Political Economy an d  Professionalization: C entral Themes of 
the O rganizational Synthesis," Business H istory Review 57 (4) (1983): 471- 
493.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
281
reform . A  N ew  South, then, was b u ilt o n  the organizational foundations 
laid  by railroads, plantations, and w ar.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
M anuscript Collections
Alabam a D epartm ent of A rchives and  H istory, M ontgom ery, A labam a 
Bolling Hall Papers
Civil Engineer, M obile and O hio Railroad, D iary
Robert McKee Papers
M ilner Family Papers
Edw ard M oren Papers
John J. Siebels Papers
U niversity of Alabama, W. Stanley H oole Special C ollections, Tuscaloosa, 
Alabama
Brierfield Iron W orks, L etter Book 
James Bowron Papers 
Josiah Gorgas Papers 
Robert Jemison Jr. Papers 
A uburn  U niversity A rchives, A uburn, A labam a 
James A. Tait Diary
282
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Em ory U niversity, Special Collections, Robert W. W oodruff Library, A tlanta, 
Georgia
Joseph Mackey Brown Papers 
W illiam  Greene R aoul Papers
"M em orandum : In  R egard To Shells W ith Polygonal Cavities." 
Confederate States of America. O rdnance Bureau. Circulars 
from  C. S. Central Laboratory. (Ordn.), M acon, Ga., Richmond.
A lexander Stephens Papers
H istoric N ew  Orleans C ollection, W illiams Research Center, N ew  O rleans, 
Louisiana
Jam es Robb Collection
Library of Congress, M anuscript Division, W ashington, D. C.
C ornelius Chase Papers
A lbert Fink Papers
Franklin H arper Elm ore Papers
Louisiana State U niversity, Louisiana and Low er M ississippi Valley 
Collections, LSU L ibraries, Baton Rouge, Louisiana
C linton and Port H udson Railroad Com pany Record Books. East 
Feliciana Parish  A rchives Collection.
G orgas to Com m ander of the Baton Rouge A rsenal, 1847, U nited States 
Army Collection, O rdnance D epartm ent.
H enry Kirby Diary in  Taylor (Sereno) Papers
Jam es Stew art M cGehee Collection
M ississippi D epartm ent o f A rchives and H istory, Jackson, M ississippi
Isham  H owze Family Papers
Jones-Sm ith P lan tation  Journal
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
284
Joseph Benjam in Lightsey D iary 
Jonathan McCaleb M artin Letters
New O rleans, Jackson, and the G reat N orthern R ailroad Papers
Patrons of H usbandry, M ississippi State Grange, Papers
Benjamin F. W ard Family Papers
N ational A rchives, W ashington, D. C.
'T etters Sent M acon Arm ory, Georgia, 1862-1865." W ar Departm ent 
Collection of Confederate Records, Record G roup 109, chapter 
IV, volum es 20,29, and 31 (From microfilm copy E502, reel 
la  located a t Amelia Gorgas Library, University of Alabama, 
Tuscaloosa).
"Letters Sent Superintendent of Laboratories, 1862-1865." War 
D epartm ent Collection of Confederate Records, Record Group 
109, chapter IV, volumes 24,28 (From microfilm copy E502, reel 
2a located a t Amelia Gorgas Library, University of Alabama, 
Tuscaloosa).
"Telegrams Sent Superintendent of Laboratories, 1863-1865." War 
D epartm ent Collection of C onfederate Records, Record Group 
109, chapter IV, volume 52 (From  microfilm copy E502, reel 3a 
located a t Amelia Gorgas Library, University of Alabama,
Tuscaloosa).
N orth  Carolina S tate Archives, Raleigh, N orth Carolina
Patterson Papers
John D. W hitford Papers
U niversity of N orth  Carolina, Southern H istorical Collection, Chapel Hill, 
N orth C arolina
George W ashington Rains Papers 
Tennessee State Library and A rchives, Nashville, Tennessee 
Shore Fam ily Papers
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
285
U niversity of Texas, The C enter for Am erican H istory, A ustin, Texas
Jam es Burton Papers, R am sdeil Collection
U niversity of Virginia, Special C ollections/M anuscripts, A lderm an lib ra ry , 
C harlottesville, V irginia
John W. M allet, "M em oranda of My Life for My C hildren," TMs 
R ailroad A nnual Reports
A nnual M eeting of the Stockholders of the Richm ond and York R. R. Co. 
(1856)
A nnual Reports. C entral R ailroad and Banking Com pany of Georgia (1838- 
1878)
A nnual Reports. South-W estern Railroad C om pany of Georgia (1854-1869)
A nnual Reports of the Board of D irectors to the  Stockholders in the 
M em phis and C harleston Railroad C om pany (1850-1878)
A nnual Reports of the P residen t and D irectors an d  the General
Superintendent of th e  South Carolina R ailroad Com pany (1856,1867, 
1873)
A nnual Reports of the P resident and D irectors of the East Tennessee & 
C eorgia Railroad C om pany (1851-1869)
A nnual R eport of the P resident and Directors to  the Stockholders of the 
Seaboard and Roanoke Railroad Com pany (1861)
A nnual R eports of the R ichm ond & Danville R ailroad Com pany H852.1859, 
1866,1876)
Proceedings of the A nnual M eetings of the Stockholders o f the Mobile and  
O hio Railroad C om pany (1847-1878)
Proceedings of the C onvention o f the Southern Railw ay and  Steam ship 
A ssociation (18751
Proceedings of the Stockholders of the C harlotte, Colum bia & A ugusta 
Railroad Com pany (1869-1878)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Proceedings of the Stockholders of the C harlotte an d  South Carolina 
R ailroad C o m p a n y  (1847-1869)
M obile and G irard Railroad C o .  Annual Reports. (1873-1879)
R eports of the D irectors of the Georgia Rail Road & Banking Com pany (1868- 
1878)
R eport of the Engineer in C hief of the Georgia Rail Road and Banking Co. to 
the C onvention of Stockholders. May 9 . 1842.
R eport o f the P residen t and Superintendent o f th e  A tlanta & W est P o in t R. 
K£SL(1858)
R eport o f the Proceedings of the Stockholders o f the Colum bia and A ugusta 
Railroad C om pany (1866-1870)
N ew spapers and Periodicals
A dvertiser an d  G azette (M ontgomery. A labam a)
American C otton  P lanter
Am erican C otton  P lan ter and Soil of the South 
Am erican Journal of Science and Arts 
A m erican R ailw ay Tim es 
Am erican R ailroad Toumal 
De Bow's Review
Farmers' Register 
M ontgom ery A dvertiser 
Soil of the South  
South Carolina A griculturist 
Southern C u ltiva to r 
Southern Farm  and  H om e
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
287
Southern Field an d  Factory 
Southern P lanter 
Southern P lanter and Farm er 
Southern Q uarterly  Review 
The Plantation 
The R ural S ou therner 
The Self Instructor
Speeches and A ddresses
A nniversary A ddress delivered before the Southern Central A gricultural 
Society. Macon, Georgia. October 4.1852. by  A. G. Summer, of South 
Carolina. Steam Pow er Press of Chronicle & Sentinel, A ugusta, 
Georgia, 1853.
M allet, J.W . Chem istry A pplied to the Arts: A Lecture Delivered before the 
University of V irginia. May 30,1868. Lynchburg, Va., 1868.
Transactions of the G eorgia State Agricultural Society. From A ugust. 1876. to 
February. 187ft A tlanta: James P. H arrison & Co., 1878.
Tw enty-N inth A nnual R eunion of the A ssociation G raduates of the U nited 
States M ilitary Academ y at W est Point. N ew  York. Tune 9.1898.
George W ashington Rains Papers. Southern H istorical Collection, 
U niversity of N orth  Carolina, Chapel H ill.
G overnm ent D ocum ents
Toumal of the Congress of the Confederate States of America. 1861-1865.7 
vols. W ashington, D. C.: Government P rin ting  Office, 1904-1905.
The Reports of the C om m ittees o f the House of R epresentatives m ade 
during  the Second Session Thirty-N inth Congress. 1866-/67. 4 vols. 
W ashington, D. C. G overnm ent Printing Office, 1867.
W ar of the Rebellion: A C om pilation of the O fficial Records of the U nion 
and Confederate A rm ies. 70 vols. in 128 an d  index. W ashington, D.C.: 
Governm ent P rin ting  Office, 1880-1901.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
288
Prim ary Articles
Allan, William. "R em iniscences of Field O rdnance Service w ith  the Arm y 
of N orthern V irginia—1863-5." Southern H istorical Society Papers 14 
(January to D ecem ber, 1886): 137-146.
[Bayne, Thomas L.]. "Sketch of the Life of Josiah Gorgas." Southern 
Historical Society P apers 13 (18851: 216-228.
Broun, William Le Roy. "The Red Artillery: C onfederate O rdnance during 
the War." Southern H istorical Society Papers 26 f!898): 365-376.
Butler, M.C. "Southern G enius: H ow  War developed it in  an  Industrial and 
M ilitary Way." Southern  H istorical Society Papers 16 (18881: 281-296.
Gorgas, Amelia. "As I Saw It: One Women's A ccount of the Fall of 
Richmond." E dited  b y  Sarah W oolfolk W iggins. The C ivil W ar 
Times Illustrated  (M av 1986): 40-43.
Gorgas, Josiah. "Notes on th e  O rdnance D epartm ent of the Confederate 
G overnm ent." Southern  H istorical Society Papers 12 (1884): 67-94.
__________. "Ordnance of th e  Confederacy, I and  II." Army Ordnance 16
(January and February 1936): 212-216; 283-288.
Kean, Robert G.H. "Resources of the Confederacy in February, 1865." 
Southern H istorical Society Papers 2 (18761: 56-63.
M allet, J. W. "Work of the O rdnance Bureau of the W ar D epartm ent of the 
Confederate States, 1861-1865." Southern H istorical Society Papers 37 
(1909): 1-20.
O lds, Frederick A. "N orth C arolina Troops: H ow  they w ere Arm ed D uring 
the W ar betw een the States." Southern H istorical Society Papers 29 
(1901): 144-151.
Prim ary Books and Pam phlets
Confederate Im prints. 1861-1865 . "Rules: To be observed in  the
Laboratories of C. S. A rsenals and Ordnance Depots." Confederate 
States of Am erica. O rdnance Bureau. R ichm ond S. N. 1862..
Microfilm 4106, Reel 30, no. 1437. Louisiana S tate U niversity, Troy H. 
M iddleton Library, B aton Rouge.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
289
C rist Lynda Lasswell and M ary Seaton Dix, eds. The Papers of Tefferson 
Davis. B aton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1992.
Davis, Jefferson. The Rise and Fall of the Confederate G overnm ent. 2 vols. 
New York: D. A ppleton and  Company, 1881.
_________ • A Short H istory of the Confederate States of America. N ew
York: Belford Com pany, 1890.
Dowdey, Clifford, ed. The W artim e Papers of R.E. Lee. W ith connective 
narratives by  Clifford Dowdey. Boston: Little, Brown, and Com pany, 
1961.
Frem antle, A rthu r Jam es. Three M onths in the Southern States. April-Tune. 
1863. New York: Published by John Bradbum , 1864.
Gorgas, Josiah, ed. The O rdnance M anual for the Use of the O fficers of the 
Confederate States Arm y. Evans & Cogswell, 1863; reprint, D ayton, 
Ohio: M om ingside Bookshop, 1976.
Huse, Caleb. The S u p p lie s  for the Confederate Army: H ow  They W ere
Obtained in Europe and H ow  Paid For. Boston: T. R. M arvin and  Son, 
1904.
Jom ini, H enri. The A rt of W ar. Translated by G.H. M endell and W .P.
Craighill. E dited by Thomas E. Griess and Jay Luvaas. The W est Point 
M ilitary L ibrary Series. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1862; 
reprint, W estport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1971.
Jones, John B. A Rebel W ar C lerk's D iary. Condensed, edited and annotated 
by Earl Schenck Miers. N ew  York: Sagamore Press, 1958.
Kean, Robert G. H . Inside the C onfederate Government: The D iary of 
Robert Garlick Hill Kean. Edited by Edward Younger. New York: 
Oxford U niversity Press, 1957.
M allet, Robert. T hird  Repor t on the Facts of Earthquake Phaenom ena: 
Catalogue of Recorded Earthquakes From 1606 B. C. to A. D. 1850. 
London: Taylor and  Francis, 1852.
Rains, George W ashington. H istory of the Confederate Pow der W orks. 
Augusta, Georgia: Chronicle and  Constitutionalist P rinters, 1882.
__________• N otes on M aking Saltpetre from the Earth of the Caves.
Augusta, Georgia: Steam  Pow er Press Chronicle and Sentinel, 1861.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
290
Ram sdell, Charles. Laws and Toint Resolutions of the Last Session o f the 
Confederate C ongress (November 7 .1864-March 18.1865) Together 
w ith the Secret A cts of Previous Congresses. Durham : D uke 
University Press, 1941.
Richardson, James D . (comp.). A Com pilation of the Messages an d  Papers of 
the Confederacy. N ashville, Tennessee: U nited States Publishing 
Company, 1905.
V andiver, Frank E. ed . The Civil War D iary of General Tosiah G orgas. 
Tuscaloosa, A labam a: U niversity of A labam a Press, 1947.
___________ -e d . C o n fe d e r a te  B lock ad e R u n n in g  th rou gh  B erm u d a . 1861-
1865: Letters and  Cargo Manifests. A ustin: University of Texas Press, 
1947; reprint. N ew  York: Kraus R eprint Co., 1970.
von Clausewitz, C arl. O n W ar. Edited and  Translated by M ichael H ow ard 
and Peter Paret. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton U niversity Press, 
1976.
von G erstner, Franz A nton R itter. Early A m erican: Franz A nton R itter von 
G erstner's D ie innem  C om m unicationen (1842-18431. Edited by 
Frederick C. G am st. Translated by D avid J. Diephouse and John C. 
Decker. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997.
W iggins, Sarah W oolfolk. ed. The Toumals o f Tosiah Gorgas. 1857-1878.




A lder, Ken. "Innovation an d  Amnesia: E ngineering Rationality an d  the 
Fate of Interchangeable Parts M anufacturing in  France." Technology 
and Culture 38 (A pril 1997): 273-311.
A ndrew s, J. Cutler. "The Southern Telegraph Com pany, 1861-1865: A  
C hapter in  the  H istory  of W artime Com m unication." Toumal of 
Southern H istory  30 (August 1964): 319-344.
A ufhauser, R. Keith. "Slavery and  Scientific M anagem ent." Toumal of 
Economic H istory  33 (December 1973): 811-824.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
291
Black, R obert C. "The Railroads o f G eorgia in  the C onfederate War Effort." 
Toumal of Southern H istory 13 (November 19471: 511-534.
Bonner, Jam es C. "Genesis of A gricultural Reform in  the C otton Belt." 
Toumal of Southern H istory 9 (November 1943): 475-500.
Brown, M. L. "Ordnance on  the Jam es: The Story of the Richmond 
A rm ory." M an a t Arms (Septem ber/October 1981): 12-17.
Cappon, Lester J. "A Note on C onfederate Ordnance Records." Toumal of 
the A m erican M ilitary In stitu te  4 (Summer 1946): 94-102.
Capron, John D. "Virginia Iron Furnaces of the Confederacy." V irginia 
Cavalcade 17 (Autumn 19671: 10-18.
Chandler, A lfred D., Jr. 'T h e  Railroads: Pioneers in  M odem  Corporate 
M anagem ent," Business H istory  Review 39 (Spring 1965): 16-40.
Colston, Frederick M. "Efficiency of G eneral Lee's O rdnance." The
C onfederate Veteran M agazine 19 (Tanuary 1911-December 19111; 22-26.
D unnington, F. P. "A Sketch of D r. John W illiam M allet, as a Chem ist an d  a 
Teacher." Toumal of Chem ical Education 5 ffanuary 1928): 183-188.
Destler, C hester M cArthur. "D avid D ickson's 'System  of Farm ing' and the 
A gricultural Revolution in  the Deep South, 1850-1885." A gricultural 
H istory 31 (3) (1957): 30-39.
Donnelly, R alph W. "The B artow  C ounty Saltpetre W orks." Georgia 
H istorical Q uarterly 54 (Fall 19701: 305-319.
Downey, Tom. "R iparian Rights an d  M anufacturing in  A ntebellum  South 
Carolina: W illiam Gregg an d  the O rigins of the 'Industria l M ind.'" 
Toumal of Southern H istory 65 (February 19991: 77-108.
Earle, Carville. "The Price of Precocity: Technical Choice an d  Ecological
C onstraint in the Cotton South, 1840-1890." Agricultural H istory 66 (3) 
(1992): 25-60.
Eisenschim l, O tto. "John W. M allet: ACS President in  1882." Chemical and 
Engineering  N ew s 8 Tanuary 1951: 110-111.
Ellis, L. Tuffly. "Maritime Com m erce on  the Far W estern Gulf, 1861-1865." 
Southw estern Historical Q u a rter ly  77 (October 1973), 167-226.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
292
Falk, Stanley L. "Notes an d  Docum ents: Jefferson D avis and  Josiah Gorgas, 
an  A ppointm ent of N ecessity." The Toumal of S outhern  H istory 28 
(February 1962): 84-86.
Faust, D rew  Gilpin. "The R hetoric and  Ritual of A griculture in  A ntebellum  
South Carolina." Toumal of Southern H istory 45 (Novem ber 1979): 
541-568.
Field, A lexander James. "Econom ic and  Dem ographic D eterm inants of
Educational Com m itm ent: M assachusetts, 1855." Toumal of E c o n o m ic  
H istory 39 (June 1979): 439-460.
Fishlow , A lbert. "Levels o f N ineteenth-C entury A m erican Investm ent in  
Education." Toumal o f Economic H istory 26 (December 1966): 418-436.
G alam bos, Louis. "The Em erging O rganizational Synthesis in  M odem  
A m erican History." Business H istory Review 44 T31 (19701: 279-290.
__________ . 'Technology, Political Economy and Professionalization:
C entral Themes of th e  O rganizational Synthesis." Business H istory 
R eview  57 (4) (1983): 471-493.
G ibson, John M. "The M iracle M an of the Confederacy." The South 
A tlantic Q uarterly 43 (1944): 52-62.
G utm an, H erbert G. "W ork, C ulture, and  Society in  Industrializing
America, 1815-1919." The A m erican H istorical R eview  78 (Tune 1973V. 
531-588.
H acker, Barton C. "M ilitary Institutions, W eapons, an d  Social Change: 
Tow ard a New H istory o f M ilitary Technology." Technology and 
C ulture 35 (1994): 768-834.
H arris, W alter A. "By R ight of Conquest: The Confederate Laboratory a t 
M acon. " Georgia Bar Toumal 10 (Mav 19481: 428-436.
H eath , M ilton S. "N orth A m erican Railroads: Public R ailroad C onstruction 
an d  the Developm ent of Private Enterprise in  the S outh  before 1861." 
Toumal of Economic H istory  10 (1950): 40-53.
H erndon, G. M elvin. "A gricu ltu ral Reform  in  A ntebellum  Virginia:
W illiam  Galt, Jr., A Case Study." A gricultural H istory  52 (3) (1978): 
394-406.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
293
H oole, W. Stanley. "The Confederate A rm ory a t Tallassee, Alabama, 1864- 
1865." The A labam a R e v ie w  25 (Tarmarv 1977^- 3-29.
__________ . 'John  W. M allet and the C onfederate Laboratories, 1862-1865."
The A labam a Review  26 (January 1973): 33-72.
H uston , Jam es L. "The Am erican R evolutionaries, th e  Political Econom y of 
Aristocracy, and the American Concept of W ealth, 1765-1900." The 
A m erican H istorical R ev iew  98 (O ctober 10031; 1079-1105.
Johnson, A ngus J. "V irginia Railroads in  A pril 1861." Toumal of S outhern  
H istory 23 (August 1957): 307-330.
Jones, Charles Edgew orth. "Confederate Pow der W orks a t Augusta." T he 
C onfederate V eteran M agazine 26 (January 1918-December 1918): 208- 
209.
Jordan, W eym outh T. "N oah B. C loud and the 'A m erican Cotton P lan te r/"  
A gricultural H istory 31 131 (1957V 44-49.
K atz, M ichael B. "From  V oluntarism  to Bureaucracy in  A m erican 
Education." Sociology o f E d u cation  44 (S u m m er 1971 )■ 297-332.
M elton, M aurice. "'A G rand Assem blage': George W . Rains and the
A ugusta Pow der Works." Civil W ar Times Illu strated  11 (January 
1973): 28-37.
M etzer, Jacob. "R ational M anagem ent, M odem  Business Practices, and  
Econom ies o f Scale in  the A nte-Bellum  S outhern Plantations," 
Explorations in  Economic H istory 12 (19751: 123-150.
N elson, Scott. "The Confederacy Serves the Southern: The C onstruction of 
the Southern Railway N etw ork, 1861-1865." C ivil W ar H istory 41 (3) 
(1995): 227-243.
O akes, James. "From  Republicanism  to Liberalism: Ideological Change and  
the Crisis of the O ld South." A m erican Q uarterly  47 (Autum n 1985): 
551-571.
Pfadenhauer, Ruby M abry McCrary. "H istory of A ugusta Arsenal in
A ugusta, Georgia." Richmond C ounty H istory 2 (Summer 19701: 5-32.
Ram sdell, Charles W. "The C ontrol of M anufacturing by the C onfederate 
G overnm ent." The M ississippi Valley H istorical Review 8 (December 
1921): 231-248.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
294
__________. "The C onfederate G overnm ent and  the Railroads." T he
American H istorical Review 22 (October 1916-July 1917): 794-810.
Reinders, Robert C. "N ew  England Influences on the Form ation of Public 
Schools in  N ew  O rleans." Toumal of Southern H istory 30 (May 1964): 
181-195.
Reilly, Desmond. "John W illiam M allet (1832-1912): H is Earlier W ork in  
Ireland." Toumal of Chemical E ducation 25 (November 1948L 634-636.
Robbins, Peggy. "Caleb Huse, Confederate Agent.” C ivil W ar Tim es 
Dlustrated 17 (August 1978): 31-40.
Rosenberg, N athan. "Technological C hange in  the M achine Tool Industry , 
1840-1910." The Toumal of Economic H istory 23 (December 1963): 414- 
446.
Savas, Theodore P. "The Life Blood of the C onfederate W ar M achine:
George W ashington Rains and the  A ugusta Pow der W orks.” Tournal 
of Confederate H istory 5 (1990): 87-110.
Schroeder, G lenna R. '"We W ill Support the Govt, to the B itter End': The 
A ugusta Office of the Confederate N itre and M ining Bureau." Georgia 
Historical Q uarterly 70 (Summer 1986): 288-305.
Sheridan, Richard C. "Production of Saltpetre from  Alabama Caves.” The 
Alabama Review  33 (1980): 25-34.
Sm ith, M erritt Roe. "John H. Hall, Sim eon N orth , and  the M illing 
M achine: The N atu re of Innovation  am ong Ante-Bellum  A rm s 
Makers." Technology and C ulture 14 (October 19731: 573-591.
Steffen, Charles G. "In  Search of the G ood Overseer: The Failure o f the
A gricultural Reform  M ovem ent in  Low country South Carolina, 1821- 
1834." Toumal of Southern H istory 63 (November 1997): 753-802.
S teuart, Richard D. "Arm ories of the Confederacy." The Confederate 
Veteran M a g a z in e  35 (January 1927-December 1927): 9-10.
---------------. "How Johnny G ot His Gun." The Confederate Veteran
M agazin e 32  (January 1924-December 1924): 166-169.
   "The Long A rm  of the Confederacy." The Confederate V eteran
M agazine 35 (January 1927-December 1927): 250-253.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
295
Thom pson, E. P. 'T im e, W ork-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism ." Past 
and Present 38 (1967): 56-97.
V andiver, Frank E. "M akeshifts o f Confederate Ordnance." The Toumal of 
Southern H istory 17 (Mav 19511: 180-193.
_________ . "A Note on  Josiah G orgas in  the M exican War." The Toumal of
Southern H istory 11 (February 1945): 103-106.
__________, "A Sketch o f Efforts A broad to Equip the Confederate A rm ory at
M acon. " Georgia H istor ica l Q u arterly  ?S fM arrh 1944V 34-40.
W illiams, Robert W. "Thom as Affleck: M issionary to the Planter, the
Farm er, and the G ardener." Agricultural H istory 31 (3) (1957): 40-48.
Wise, Stephen R. "G reyhounds an d  Cavaliers of the Sea: Confederate 
Blockade Running during  th e  Civil War." Toumal of Confederate 
H istory 4 (19891:61-76.
Secondary Bwks
A lbaugh, W illiam A., I ll and  E dw ard N. Simmons. Confederate Arms.
New York: Bonanza Books, 1957.
A lder, Ken. Engineering the R evolution: Arms and  Enlightenm ent in 
France. 1763-1815. Princeton: Princeton U niversity Press, 1997.
A m lund, C urtis A rthur. Federalism  in  the Southern Confederacy. 
W ashington D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1966.
A shw orth, John. Slavery. C apitalism , and Politics in  the Antebellum
Republic. Vol. 1: Com m erce and Compromise. 1820-1850. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995.
Ayers, Edward L. The Prom ise of th e  N ew  South: Life A fter Reconstruction. 
New York: Oxford U niversity Press, 1992.
Batem an, Fred and Thom as W eiss. A Deplorable Scarcity: The Failure of 
In d u stria liza tion  in  the  S lave Economy. C hapel H ill: U niversity of 
N orth Carolina Press, 1981.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
296
Beniger, Jam es R. The Control R evolution: Technological and Economic 
Origins o f the Inform ation Society. Cam bridge: H arvard U niversity 
Press, 1986.
Beringer, R ichard E., A rcher Jones, a n d  W illiam N . S till, Jr. W hy the  South  
Lost the C ivil W ar. A thens: U niversity of G eorgia Press, 1986.
Black. Robert C.. m . T he R ailroads of the Confederacy. C hapel Hill: The 
U niversity of N orth C arolina Press, 1952; rep rin t, w ith  New Forw ard 
by G ary G allagher. C hapel H ill: The U niversity of N orth C arolina 
Press, 1998
Boatner, M ark M ayo., IE. The C ivil W ar D ictionary. N ew  York: D avid 
McKay Com pany, 1959.
Bond, Bradley G. Political C ulture in  the N ineteenth-C enturv South:
M ississippi. 1830-1900. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State U niversity Press, 
1995.
Breeden, Jam es O. Advice A m ong M asters: The Ideal in  Slave M anagem ent 
in the O ld  South. W estport, Connecticut: G reenw ood Press, 1980.
Carlton, D avid L. Mill and Town in  South Carolina. 1880-1920. Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State U niversity Press, 1982.
Chandler, A lfred D., Jr., ed. The R ailroads: Pioneers in  M odem  
M anagem ent. New York: A m o Press, 1979.
__________• The Visible H and: The M anagerial R evolution in A m erican
Business. Cambridge: H arvard University Press, 1977.
Chaplin, Joyce. An Anxious P ursuit: A gricultural Innovation  and
M odernity in  the Lower South. 1730-1815. C hapel Hill: U niversity of 
N orth C arolina Press, 1993.
Cochran, Thom as C. Railroad l  eaders. 1845-1890: The Business M ind in  
Action. N ew  York: Russell & Russell, 1965.
Cooper, W illiam  J., Jr. The South an d  the Politics of Slavery. 1828-1856.
Baton Rouge: Louisiana State U niversity Press, 1978.
_________   an d  Thom as E. Terrill. The Am erican South: A H istory, v. 1.
New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1991.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
297
C oulter, E. M erton. The C onfederate States of America 1861-1865. B aton 
Rouge: Louisiana S tate University Press, 1950.
C urrent, R ichard N., ed. Encyclopedia of the Confederacy. New York:
Sim on & Shuster, Inc., 1993.
DeCredico, M ary A. Patriotism  for Profit: G eorgia's U rban Entrepreneurs 
and the Confederate W ar Effort. C hapel H ill: U niversity o f N orth  
Carolina Press, 1990.
Dew, Charles B. Ironm aker o f the Confederacy: foseph R. Anderson and  the 
T redegar Iron W orks. N ew  Haven: Yale U niversity Press, 1966.
Dobyns, K enneth W. The P aten t Office Pony: A H istory of the Early P aten t 
Office. Fredericksburg, Virginia: Sergeant K irkland's, 1997.
Doyle, D on H . New M en. N ew  Cities. N ew  South: A tlanta. N ashville. 
Charleston. Mobile. 1860-1910. Chapel H ill: U niversity of N orth  
Carolina Press, 1990.
Earle, Carville. Geographical Inquiry and A m erican H istorical Problems. 
Stanford: Stanford U niversity Press, 1992.
Eaton, Clem ent. A H istory o f the Southern Confederacy. New York: The 
M acm illian Com pany, 1956.
Farley, Jam es J. M aking A rm s in  the M achine Age: Philadelphia's
Frankford Arsenal. 1816-1870. U niversity Park: The Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 1994.
Faust, D rew  Gilpin. Tames H enrv Ham m ond and  the O ld South: A D esign 
for M astery. Baton Rouge: Louisiana S tate U niversity Press, 1982.
Fogel, R obert W illiam and  Stanley L. Engerm an. Tim e on the Cross: The 
Econom ics of A m erican N egro Slavery. Boston: Little, Brown and  
Com pany, 1974.
Ford, Lacy K., Jr. O rigins of Southern Radicalism : The South Carolina 
U pcountrv. 1800-1860. N ew  York: O xford U niversity Press, 1988.
Foster, Gaines M. Ghosts of the Confederacy: Defeat. The Lost Cause. A nd 
the Emergence of the N ew  South. 1865 to  1913. N ew York: O xford 
U niversity Press, 1987.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
298
Frey, Robert L., ed. Encyclopedia of Am erican Business H istory and
Biography: R ailroads in the N ineteenth Century. N ew  York: Facts on 
File, 1988.
Frost, D an R. and K ou K. Nelson. The I-SI I College of Engineering: Origins 
and E stablishm ent 1860-1908. vol. 1. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1995.
Galambos, Louis. C om petition & C ooperation: The Em ergence of a
National T rade Association. Baltim ore: Johns H opkins U niversity 
Press, 1966.
Genovese, Eugene D. The Political Econom y of Slavery: S tudies in the
Economy and  Society of the Slave South. New York: Pantheon Books, 
1965.
__________• Roll. Tordan. RoU: The W orld the Slaves M ade. N ew  York:
Random H ouse, 1976.
__________• The Slaveholders' Dilemma: Freedom  and Progress in
Southern C onservative Thought. 1820-1860. Columbia: U niversity of 
South Carolina Press, 1992.
Goff, Richard D. Confederate Supply. D urham , N orth C arolina: Duke 
University Press, 1969.
H ahn, Steven. The Roots of Southern Populism : Yeomen Farm ers and the 
Transform ation of the Georgia U pcountrv. 1850-1890. N ew  York: 
Oxford U niversity Press, 1983.
H eitm ann, A lfred. The M odernization of the Louisiana Sugar Industry. 
1830-1910. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1987.
H ounshell, David A. From  the A m erican System to Mass Production. 1800- 
1932: The D evelopm ent of M anufacturing Technology in  the U nited 
States. Baltimore: The Johns H opkins U niversity Press, 1989.
H ow e, Danial W alker. The Political C ulture of the A m erican W higs. 
Chicago: The U niversity of Chicago Press, 1979.
Johnson, Vicki V aughn. The M en and the V ision of the Southern  
Commercial C onventions. 1845-1871. Columbia: U niversity of 
M issouri Press, 1992.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
299
Johnston, A ngus James, II. V irg in ia  R ailroad s in  the C ivil W ar. Chapel 
Hill: The U niversity of N orth  Carolina Press, 1961.
Johnston, M ary Tabb w ith E lizabeth Johnston Lipscomb. Amelia Gayle
Gorgas: A  Biography. Tuscaloosa, Alabama: U niversity of A labam a 
Press, 1978.
Jordan, Ervin L., Jr. C harlottesville and  the U niversity o f V irginia in  the 
Civil W ar. Lynchburg, V irginia: H.E. Howard Inc., 1988.
Kasson, John F. Civilizing the M achine: Technology an d  Republican 
Values in  America. 1776-1900. N ew  York: Penguin Books, 1976.
Klein, M aury. The G reat Richm ond Term inal: A S tudy  in  Businessm en 
and Business Strategy. Charlottesville: U niversity o f V irginia Press, 
1970.
Kohl, Lawrence F. The Politics of Individualism : Parties and the A m erican 
Character in  the lacksonian Era. New York: O xford U niversity Press, 
1989.
Lash, Jeffrey N . D estroyer of the Iron  Horse: General Toseph E. Tohnston and 
Confederate Rail Transport. 1861-1865. Kent, Ohio: K ent State 
U niversity Press, 1991.
Licht, W alter. W orking for the Railroad: The O rganization of W ork in the 
N ineteenth C entury. Princeton: Princeton U niversity Press, 1983.
Lichtenstein, Alex. Twice the W ork of Free Labor: The Political Economy of 
Convict Labor in the N ew  South. New York: Verso Press, 1996.
McKiven, H enry M. Iron fc Steel: C lass. Race, and Com m unity in
B irm in gh am . Alabama. 1875-1920. Chapel Hill: U niversity of N orth  
Carolina Press, 1995.
McMath, Robert C., Jr. American Populism : A Social H istory. 1877-1898. 
New York: H ill and Wang, 1993.
M agill, Frank N . ed. The G reat Scientists. Danbury, Connecticut: G rolier 
Educational Corporation, 1989.
M artin, Albro. R ailroads T rium phant: The G rowth. Refection, an d  Rebirth 
of a V ital A m erican Force. N ew  York: Oxford U niversity Press, 1992.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
300
Mayr, O tto an d  Richard C. Post. eds. Yankee Enterprise: The Rise of the
A m erican System of M anufacturers. W ashington, D. C.: Sm ithsonian 
In titu tion  Press, 1981.
M ilgram, Joseph B., Jr. and N orm an P. G entieu. G eorge W ashington Rains— 
G unpow derm aker of th e  Confederacy. Philadelphia: Foote M ineral 
Com pany, 1961.
M oore, Jerrold  N orthrop. C onfederate Com m issary General: Lucius
Bellinger N orthrop and  th e  Subsistence B ureau of the Southern Armv. 
Shippensburg, Pennsylvania: W hite M ane, 1996.
Moore, John H ebron. The Em ergence of the C otton Kingdom  in the O ld 
Southw est: M ississippi. 1770-1860. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
U niversity Press, 1988.
Nelson, Scott Reynolds. Iron C onfederacies: Southern Railways. Klan
Violence, and R econstruction. C hapel H ill: The U niversity of N orth  
Carolina Press, 1999.
Noble, D avid F. The Religion  o f Technology: The D ivinity of M an and the 
S pirit o f Invention. N ew  York: A lfred A. Knopf, 1998.
Noe, K enneth W. Southw est V irginia s R ailroad: M odernization and the 
Sectional Crisis. U rbana: U niversity of Illinois Press, 1994.
N orm an, M atthew  W. C olonel B urton 's Spiller & B urr Revolver: An 
U ntim ely V enture in C onfederate Sm all-Arm s M anufacturing.
Macon: M ercer U niversity Press, 1996.
N orrell, R obert J. A Prom ising Field: Engineering a t Alabama. 1837-1897. 
Tuscaloosa: U niversity o f A labam a Press, 1990.
Oakes, James. The Ruling Race: A H istory  o f A m erican Slaveholders. New 
York: A lfred A. Knopf, 1982.
_________ - Slavery and Freedom : A n In terp retation  of the O ld South.
N ew York: Vintage Books, 1990.
Owsley, Frank Lawrence. King C otton Diplom acy. Chicago: The U niversity 
of Chicago Press, 1931.
Perry, M ilton F. Infernal M achines: The Story of the Confederate 
Subm arine and M ine W arfare. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
U niversity Press, 1965.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
301
Phillips, U . B. A H istory of T ransportation in the E astern Cotton Belt to 
1860. N ew  York, 1908.
Rable, George C. The C onfederate Republic: A R evolution A gainst Politics. 
C hapel H ill: U niversity o f N orth  Carolina Press, 1994.
Ram sdell, C harles W. Behind the  Lines in the S outhern Confederacy.
E dited an d  w ith  a  Forw ard by  W endell H . Stephenson. Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State U niversity Press, 1944; reprint. N ew  York: Greenwood 
Press, 1969.
Reidy, Joseph P. From  Slavery to  A grarian Capitalism  in  the Cotton
Plantation South: C entral Georgia. 1800-1860. C hapel Hill: U niversity 
of N orth  Carolina Press, 1992.
Scarborough, W illiam  Kauffm an . The Overseer: P lantation  M anagem ent 
in the  O ld South. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State U niversity, 1966.
Sellers, C harles. The M arket Revolution: Tacksonian A m erica. 1815-1846. 
N ew  York: Oxford U niversity Press, 1991.
Shore, Laurence. Southern C ap ita lists: The Ideological Leadership of an
Elite. 1832-1885. Chapel H ill: University of N orth  C arolina Press, 1986.
Sifakis, S tew art. W ho Was W ho in  th e  Civil W ar. N ew  York: Facts on File 
Publications, 1988.
Sm ith, M ark M . M astered by the  Clock: Time. Slavery, and Freedom in the 
A m erican South. C hapel H ill: The U niversity o f N orth  Carolina 
Press, 1997.
Sm ith, M erritt Roe. H arpers Ferry Arm ory and the N ew  Technology: The 
Challenge of Change. Ithaca: Cornell U niversity Press, 1977.
__________- ed. M ilitary Enterprise and  Technological Change: Perspectives
on the  A m erican Experience. Cambridge: Cam bridge, M assachusetts: 
The MIT Press, 1985.
Sum m ers, M ark W. R ailroads. Reconstruction and the Gospel of Prosperity: 
A id under the Radical Republicans. 1865-1877. Princeton: Princeton 
U niversity Press, 1984.
Stam pp, K enneth. The Peculiar Institu tion: Slavery in  the Ante-Bellum 
S outh . N ew  York: V intage Books, 1956.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
302
Stover, John F. The Railroads o f the South, 1865-1900: A S tudy in Finance 
and C ontrol. Chapel H ill: The University of N orth  Carolina Press, 
1955.
Taylor, G eorge R., and Irene D. Neu. The A m erican  Railroad Network. 
1861-1890. Cambridge: H arvard University Press, 1956.
Taylor, George R. The T ransportation Revolution. 1815-1860. New York: M. 
E. Sharpe, In c , 1951.
Thomas, D ean S. Ready . . .  A im  . . .  Fire? Small A rm s Am m unition in the 
Battle o f Gettysburg. Biglerville, Pennsylvania: O sborn Printing Co., 
1981.
Thomas, Em ory M. The Confederacy as a Revolutionary Experience. 
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1871.
_________ - The Confederate N ation: 1861-1865. N ew York: H arper & Row,
Publishers, 1979.
Thom pson, R obert Luther. W iring the Continent: The H istory of the
Telegraph Industry in the United States. 1832-1866- Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1947.
Thom pson, Sam uel Bernard. Confederate Purchasing O perations Abroad. 
Chapel Hill: The U niversity of N orth Carolina Press, 1935.
Thornton, J. M ills. Politics and  Pow er in  a Slave Society: Alabama. 1800- 
1860. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1978.
Trelease, A llen W. The N orth C arolina Railroad. 1849-1871. and the
M odernization of N orth C arolina. Chapel Hill: The University of 
N orth  Carolina Press, 1991.
Turner, George Edgar. Victory Road the Rails: The Strategic Place of the 
R ailroads in  the Civil W ar. Indianapolis: Bobbs-M errill, 1953.
Tyler, Ronnie Curtis. Santiago V idaurri and the Southern Confederacy. 
A ustin: Texas State H istorical Association, 1973.
V andiver, F rank E. Ploughshares into Swords: Tosiah G orgas and 
Confederate Ordnance. A ustin: University of Texas Press, 1952.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
303
__________• Rebel Brass: The C onfederate C om m and System . W ith and
Introduction  by T. H arry  W illiams. B aton Rouge: Louisiana State 
U niversity Press, 1956.
W allace, A nthony F .C . Rockdale: The G row th o f an A m erican Village in 
th e  early  Industrial R evolution. N ew  York: W. W. N orton, 1980.
W ard, Jam es A. T. Edgar Thom son: M aster o f the Pennsylvania. W esport, 
Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980.
W arner, Ezra J. and W. Buck Yearns. B iog ra p h ica l R eg ister  o f  th e
C onfederate Congress. B aton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1975.
W ayne, M ichael. The R eshaping of P lantation Society: The N atchez
D istrict. 1860-1880. B aton Rouge: L ouisiana S tate U niversity Press, 
1983.
W iley, Bell Irw in. The Life of Tohnnv Reb: The Com m on Soldier of the 
Confederacy. Baton Rouge: Louisiana S tate U niversity Press, 1980.
W ilkinson, Frederick, ed., The Illustrated Book of G uns and  Rifles. New 
York: Ham lyn Publishing, 1979.
W iebe, Robert. The Search fo r O rder. 1877-1920. N ew  York, 1965.
W iener, Jonathan M. Social O rigins of the N ew  South: Alabama. 1860-1885. 
Baton Rouge: Louisiana State U niversity Press, 1978.
Wise, Jennings Cropper. The Long Arm of Lee: The H istory of the A rtillery 
of the Arm y of N orthern  V irginia. W ith a  Forw ard by L. Van Loan 
N aisaw ald. Lynchburg, Virginia: J.P. Bell Com pany, 1915; reprint,
N ew  York: Oxford U niversity Press, 1959.
W ise, S tephen  R. Lifeline of the Confederacy: Blockade Running D uring 
the C ivil W ar. C olum bia, South C arolina: U niversity  of South 
C arolina Press, 1988.
W oodm an, H arold D. King C otton and H is R etainers: Financing and 
M arketing the C otton C rop of the South. 1800-1925. Columbia: 
U niversity of South C arolina Press, 1968.
W oodw ard, C. Vann. O rigins of the New South. 1877-1913. Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State U niversity Press, 1951.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
304
W right, Gavin. O ld South . N ew  South: R evolutions in  the S outhern 
Econom y Since th e  C ivil W ar. New York: Basic Books, 1986.
__________ - The Political Econom y of the C otton South: H ouseholds.
M arkets, and W ealth in  the  N ineteenth C entury . New York: W . W. 
N orton, 1978.
Yates, JoAnne. C ontrol th rough  Com m unication: The Rise of System  in  
A m erican M anagem ent. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins U niversity  
Press, 1989.
D issertations. Theses, an d  U npublished Papers
Falk, Stanley L. "Soldier-Technologist: M ajor A lfred M ordecai and the 
Beginnings of Science in  the U nited States A rm y." Ph.D. diss., 
Georgetown U niversity, 1959.
Frost, D an R. "A C onfederate Education in  the N ew  South: Southern
Academ ia and the  Idea of Progress in  the N ineteenth Century." Ph.D. 
diss., Louisiana S tate U niversity, 1994.
H unt, Robert E. "O rganizing a  N ew  South: E ducation Reformers in  A nte­
bellum  Alabama, 1840-1860." Ph.D. diss., U niversity of M issouri- 
Colum bia, 1988.
M elton, M aurice. "M ajor M ilitary Industries of the Confederate 
Governm ent." Ph.D . diss., Emory U niversity, 1978.
Paskoff, Paul F. "Invention and  C ulture in  the O ld South, 1790-1860." 
U npublished p ap er delivered  at W orks-in-Progress Seminar, 
Louisiana State U niversity, 1991.
Thors tad , Linda M arie. "The H istorical and C ultural Geography of the
G range in  M innesota and  Louisiana 1870-1880." Ph.D. diss., Louisiana 
S tate U niversity, 1999.
Y oungblood, N orm an E., IV. "T he M ost M urderous and Barbarous 
C onduct': The D evelopm ent of M ine W arfare in  the N ineteenth 
C entury A m erican M ilitary." M.A. thesis, Southw est Texas State 
U niversity, 1990.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
APPENDIX: LETTER OF PERMISSION
O ctober 11,1999
To: Johns H opkins U niversity Press 
Re: Copyright Persm ission
D ear Joseph J. Tobin:
I am w riting to  request Johns H opkins University P ress's copyright 
perm ission to include a previously published article in m y dissertation. The 
article is the following:
C ollins, Steven G. "System  in  the South: John W. M allet, Josiah G orgas, and 
U niform  Production a t the Confederate O rdnance D epartm ent," Technology 




Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
JOHNS HOPKINS
The Johns Hopkins University Press
2715 N. Charles Sued
Baltimore MO 21218-4363
Am encm ’t  Q kkrtt V m in r p tffim t/fm m d p f / f t
October 15. 1999 
Steven Collins
Re.: Permission Request: Collins. Steven G.. Technology and Culture. "System in the South: John W. Manet. 
Josiah Gorgas. and Uniform Production at the Confederate Ordnance Department", pp. 514-577
Dear Steven Collins:
Thank you for your permission request to use material from publications of the Johns Hopkins University Press. 
We are pleased to grant gratis permission for use as slated below:
1. On each copy of the selection full credit must be given as follows:
Collins. Steven G.. System in the South: John W. Mallet. Josiah Gorgas. and Uniform Production at the 
Confederate Ordnance Department Technology and Culture, [vol. issue (date)]:, pp. 514-577. © [Year]. Society for 
the History of Technology.
2. This permission does not apply to any part of the selection which is independently copyrighted or which bears a 
separate source notation. The responsMity for determining the source of the material rests with the prospective 
publisher of the quoted material.
3. This permission is nonexclusive and. unless otherwise stated, is valid throughout the world in the English 
language only.
4. This permission includes BraiRe. large type, or other editions of your work for nonprofit organizations solely for 




Joseph J. Tobin 
Permissions Manager (Acting) 
jtobin@jhu.edu 
(410) 516-6968 Fax
Area Code <10/Book Orders 1 Customer Service S16-69S6/FAX516-6998/ Journals PuCksiwig Division 516-6980 
Acquisitions 516-3853 rMaiwsc*ipl EdHing 516-6901 /Ocsign I  Production 516-6923/M il let ing 516-6930 
Duet financM Otncer 516-6971 /Director’s Office 516-6971 /FAX 516-6968
306
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
VITA
Steven G edson Collins w as b o m  at Scott A ir Force Base, Illinois, on  A pril 22, 
1965. H e grew  up  on several A ir Force bases and  graduated from  Prattville 
H igh School, Alabam a, in  1983. h i May 1987, h e  com pleted a bachelor of 
science degree in  business m anagem ent a t O klahom a State U niversity  and 
w as com m issioned a Second Lieutenant in  the U nited States A ir Force. 
W hile on  active du ty  in  the A ir Force, he flew  the T-41 and T-37 aircraft. 
U pon joining the A ir Force Reserves, he en tered  graduate school a t 
Southw est Texas State U niversity. In 1992, he com pleted a m aster's degree 
in  A m erican history at Southw est Texas and w as presented the  B. R. 
B runson O utstanding Thesis A w ard by the faculty of the H istory 
D epartm ent. H e entered the doctoral program  in  H istory at Louisiana State 
U niversity in  the fall of 1992. In  1996-1997, he received the T. H arry  
W illiam s D issertation Fellow ship from  the Louisiana State U niversity  
H istory D epartm ent. In 1999, he was hired as a  full-tim e h istory  instructor at 
St. Louis Com m unity College a t Meramec. He expects to earn the degree of 
D octor of Philosophy in  H istory in  December 1999. M ost im portantly , he 
m arried  A nn V ictoria B runson in  A ugust 1990.
307








The Dexter Prize is awarded by the Society for the History of Technology to the 
author of an outstanding book in the history of technology published during any of 
the three years preceding the award. Donated by the Dexter Chemical Corporation of 
New York City, manufacturers of industrial chemicals, the prize consists of a cash 
award and a plaque. The design on the plaque, reproduced above, was sculpted by 
Edward Widstrom and was derived from the Plictho of Gioanventura Rosetti (1548), 
the first basic printed book on dyeing. An English edition of the Plictho, translated by 
Sidney M. Edelstein and Hector Borghetty, was published in 1969 by the MIT Press.
1968 Hans Ebethatd Wulff
1969 GOtzQuarg
1970 Lynn White, jr.
1971 Edwin T. Layton, Jr.
1972 Thomas Parke Hughes
1973 Donald S. L Cardwell
1974 Daniel J. Boorstin 
Donald R. Hill
1975 Bruce Sinclair
1976 Hugh G. |. Aitken
1977 Richard W. Bulliet
1978 Reese V, Jenkins
1979 David P. Billington
1980 Louis C. Hunter
1981 David). Jeremy
1982 Edward W. Constant 11
1983 Clayton R. Koppes
1984 Ruth S. Cowan
1985 Thomas Parke Hughes
1986 Waller A. McDougall
1987 David A. Hounshell
1988 H ugh  G, J. A itken
1989 Judith A. McGaw 





1994 John H. White, Jr.
1995 Claude S. Fischer
1996 Jeffrey Meikle
1997 Thomas J, Misa 
Michael J. Neufeld
1998 Ken Alder
System in the  South
John W. Mallet, Josiah Gorgas, and Uniform Production 
at the  Confederate Ordnance Department
S T E V E N  G.  C O L L I N S
W hen ii wnr is th rilled  uihui, it becomes necessary to prepare, no t on  en tire  
phni o f  operations,— which is always im possible,— Inn a  system  o f  operations 
in reference to o  prescribed aim ; to provide o base, os well os oil the m ateria l 
m eans necessary to g u a ra n te e  the success o f  the  enterprise,1
When the South seceded from the Union in 1861, few trained soldiers 
would have disagreed with Henri Jomini’s assessment that war required a 
"system o f operations." It is worth examining, then, why the production o f  
ammunition in the Confederate States Ordnance Department became one 
of the few bureaucratic bright spots in the Confederacy’s dismally organ­
ized war effort. By war’s end the Confederate government could barely feed 
and clothe its troops. Ammunition, however, continued to be produced in 
adequate amounts. Brigadier General Josiah Gorgas, chief o f  the Ordnance 
Department, and his subordinate, Lieutenant Colonel John W. Mallet, com ­
mander o f  the Confederate laboratory at Macon, Georgia, enhanced the 
Confederacy’s ability to wage a long and destructive war.2 With the appli-
M r, C o llin s  is ,i I’ll.I), c a n d id a te  in tlw  D e p a rtm e n t o f  H is to ry  a t L o u is ian a  S ta te  
U niversity . H e is co m p le tin g  a d is s e r ta tio n  t i lle d  “O rg a n iz in g  th e  S o u th ; R ailroads, 
P lan tations, a n d  W ar, 1840-1890." l i e  thanks Paul Paskoff, G aines Foster, Jam es Pohl, 
A n thony  G au g h an , Jam es G a ughan , the Technology and  Culture referees, a n d  th e  ed ito r 
for th e ir help fu l an d  insigh tfu l com m en ts.
4)1999 by the Society for the 1 listory o f  Technology, All righ ts reserved.
11040-165,\/99/40()3-()0l)3$8,(M )
1. H enri Jom ini, The Art o f  War, ed. T h o m as E, G ricss a n d  Jay Luvass, tran s . G . II. 
M endell an d  W. P. f .ra igh ill (W estport, C o n n ., 1971), 45.
2. T he  m ost im p o rta n t w ork  o n  the C o n fed e ra te  O rd n an ce  D e p artm en t rem ains 
f ra n k  I.. V andiver, Ploughshares into Swords: losiah Gorgas and Confederate Ordnance 
f Austin, l e v .  19521. The m ost significant artic le o n  th is topic is W. Stanley H o o le ,“ |o h n  
W. M allet a n d  the t  o iiledera te  O rdnance  I ah o ta in ric s , 1862-1865," Atahaiaa Review 26 
11973): 33-72 , w hich Iod ises on  M allet’s visits to the m any  arsenals an d  the co nstruc tion  
o f  th e  labo ra to ry . A n o th er valuab le  source is M aurice  Kaye M ellon , “M ajo r M ilita ry  
Industries o f  the C onfederate  G o vernm en t"  (Ph .D . diss., Em ory  University, 1978), For a
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